

TRENDS OF
CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE



CHARLES GRAY SHAW

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
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(frontpiece)

TRENDS OF CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE

BY

CHARLES GRAY SHAW, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY



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TRENDS OF CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE

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PREFACE



A STUDY OF CIVILIZATION IS NO NOVELTY. FROM THE BEGINNING of human history, if not in the pre-historic period, man has shown such interest in himself as to record his deeds and thoughts. Hence the concern for civilization shown by our contemporaries is not wholly different from that of fossil men in the geologic past, while the enthusiasm that Americans feel for their cities is fairly well matched by similar emotions in the hearts of Aurignacian men, who were proud of their caves.

In addition to recording his activities, man has rationalized them; hence we have the intensive studies of civilization as found in the writings of Polybius and St. Augustine, Hegel and Spengler, to say nothing of certain impressionistic works which have appeared since the World War. In the present work, it has been the intention of the author to come to an understanding with the present, although not to the extent of discussing "what's wrong with the world" or "what this country needs."

The pursuit of the present, as carried on in the following pages, has necessitated a consideration of the past even unto the formation of the planet whereon civilization has been set up. For the civilization that is now bearing fruits both bitter and sweet is deeply rooted in the past. The range of this book is that of western civilization although, as will appear toward the close of it, the East has not been overlooked.

The sources of this study of civilization and culture have been varied but none too many and they have been duly noted. But in addition to aid from books, the author has been helped by certain of his colleagues at New York University. He is indebted to the following scholars for material assistance in the connections mentioned: Floyd A. Spencer, Ph.D., Greek Culture and Roman Civilization; Charles C. Thach, Ph.D., Feudal Civilization; G. Roland Collins, A.M., The Economic View of Civilization; Albert Sheppard, A.M., The Industrial Form of Civilization; Younghill Kang, Sc.B., The Eastern Question; Rudolph M. Binder, Ph.D., The Present Outlook; Vincent Jones, A.M.,

Contemporary Music; and E. Herman Hespelt, Ph.D., Spanish Culture.

The author desires to make special acknowledgment of aid received from his daughter, Winifred Clarke Shaw, A.B., who contributed liberally to the chapters on Hebrew Religion and The Religious Trend of Modern Life and rendered valuable assistance by correcting both manuscript and proof.

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CHAPTER I

THE EVOLUTION OF MAN



THE SOLAR SYSTEM

THE SUBJECT OF CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE IS MAN; THE SECRET of what man has done and thought is to be found in the history of mankind. The study of man by man—that identifies the matter and indicates the manner of such a study as we are about to take up. Other factors will enter in to give human life its more complete setting, and we shall have to consider the earth in its divisions of sea and land, life in its enormous span of time between protoplasm and the man of the present. Other forces than human volition will be found in operation, gravitation and energy, electricity and life; but it is the nature and work of man which most concerns us. We desire to discover whence man came and whither he is tending, how he has worked and what he has accomplished. Thus we investigate the trends of civilization and culture.

The seat of man's activities is the planet earth. Other planets in our solar system, that private park in the universe, may be thought inhabited. Other stars than our sun may be imagined to have their planets spinning around them. On these solar and stellar planets there may be conscious life akin to our own, but we are responsible for only what we observe and experience in one tiniest speck of matter in the whole universe. It is, of course, the only habitable place we know and, perhaps, the only spot we dare dream of as supporting life. At any rate, it is here without our immediate ken, a stage upon a stage, that the drama of human life is acted. Earth may not have been made for man, but it is here that he has learned how to live. He draws his sustenance from plants and other animals; these are fed by the earth and the earth itself is supplied with such foodstuffs in the form of solar energy. In the last analysis, man is fed by the sun.

How are planets produced? They might seem to have come from the stars by a process of excessive rotation casting off gaseous

matter. This was the nebular hypothesis advanced by Laplace, only to be discarded for a more plausible view. This is the tidal conception of Sir James Jeans according to which the planetary matter was drawn off by a gravitational process pretty much as the waters of the sea are drawn away in the form of tides by the moon. In the universe the excessive rotation of a star, which was supposed to have generated the solar system, is not unusual and it is quite common for stars to be split up in this way. But the effect of such fissioning has been stellar, not planetary. The stars, or about a third of them, experience the effect of rotation by splitting into double stars, creating binary systems. But in the case of "our star," as we may call the sun, there seems to have been no such surplus of centrifugal force, no tendency to split up into celestial twins. Something quite different, extremely exceptional, must have happened in our part of the universe.

What did happen, it is conjectured, was the approach of some wandering star which came close to the region that was destined to be our solar system. There it exercised tidal influence and drew off a filament of solar stuff which broke up, as it were, into so many planetary drops. In this manner, the passing star became the father of the planetary family. Two forces have been and still are at work in the heavens — the rotational and the tidal. One has produced double stars, the other a planetary system. "We know of myriads of double stars," says Eddington, "and of only one planetary system. . . . The solar system is not the typical product of development of a star; it is not even a common variety of development; it is a freak."¹ It is this "freak" of Creation that interests us. This vulgar fraction of the universe represents the field of our investigation.

THE EARTH

If, then, we can whittle the range of life down to the confines of our solar system, can we bring the matter to a point by asserting that it is on the planet earth alone that life is findable? This also seems to be the most likely idea in the case. Life depends upon the sun. Some planets are too close, others too far from this source of heat to be habitable. Inside the earth's orbit is Venus,

¹ *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 176.

outside it is Mars, and in a general way the conditions of life at these points may seem to be analogous to what we actually find on the earth. As far as Venus is concerned, the general situation seems to be maritime and its atmosphere vaporous, so that, if it be inhabited, it must be by creatures different from what we are now; it must be a place where, as Eddington says, "fishes are supreme." Unlike Venus, the planet Mars has solid land and an atmosphere containing oxygen, but no seas. Moreover, its climate is so chilly and with such sharp differences between the temperature of day and night that it is difficult to accept the idea that Mars harbors life in our sense of that term. "There is no definite evidence of life," says Jeans, "and certainly not of conscious life, on Mars . . . or indeed anywhere else in the universe."² Earth alone appears to be the place of conscious life.

But after we have detached the planet earth and located life upon it, there remains the rest of the universe. What shall we do with it? We will set aside the earth as the place of culture and civilization and relegate the rest to mathematics and mechanics. "The world is made up of human beings and astronomers," says Harlow Shapley; very well, then, we human beings will stick to our private planet and let the astronomers consider the heavens. But in all this we should not be appalled by any idea of size that the astronomer may hold up before us, and should be unusually careful in applying the adjective "infinite" to what looks like a finite universe. The situation in the skies and the latest report from the observatories are such as to make the whole universe appear small indeed. Science is now talking about the "radius of space." Eddington's estimate includes a hundred million light-years; Hubble made his estimate equal a million million. In either case, the farthest reaches of space are within our mathematical grasp.

By a process of mental arithmetic, we can figure that, since light travels six million million miles in a year, it will travel somewhat over five thousand times that number of feet. Once we have a light-year in the form of feet, we can reduce the distance to inches and fractions thereof. The result is that the radius of the universe, expressed in terms of razor-blade edges, yields a sum

² *The Universe Around Us*, p. 322.

made up of comparatively few figures. The row of such digits would extend only half way across the page along a single line of this book. In the case of one computation, thirty figures would suffice, while the other would require only thirty-five. As far as the size of man is concerned, if we measure this by a comparison with the macroscopic universe, man is bound to appear small, but let him contrast his dimensions with those of the electron and he will appear correspondingly large. We may conclude, therefore, that since man is of about average size in the total universe, there is no reason to belittle his being or think lightly of his work.

A TERRESTRIAL POINT OF VIEW

But this line of popular reasoning is not to be taken as a return to any manlike view of the universe, or anthropomorphism. It will be sufficient to assume that the earth is good enough as a viewpoint for considering the universe, just as it will be safe to conclude that man is able to grasp the meaning of things generally. In some ways it does look as though the advanced science of the XXth century had thrown us back upon a geocentric position and an anthropocentric point of view as these restricted outlooks prevailed up to the beginning of modern times. But if, again, we assume those limited points of view, it is only after we have surveyed the whole galaxy in which we live and thus are like returned tourists who appreciate the advantages and disadvantages of home-life after they have been abroad for an extended tour. Since we realize that all depends upon the point of view, we may make due allowance for this and avoid misconceptions. If we were placed on Vega, we should take a Vegan viewpoint and regard the whole heavens as though they revolved about us there. If, as in the case of Copernican astronomy, the standpoint is the sun, we take a solar point of view. But being actually located upon the earth, we view the universe from a terrestrial vantage point, realizing that our outlook is not an absolute but a relative one. We take man where we find him.

Our subject is man; his arts and sciences, languages and laws, beliefs and customs. But we cannot pass at once from the formation of the earth to the development of civilization. We must



THE GREAT NEBULA IN ANDROMEDA. PHOTOGRAPH BY ROBERTS

(facing page 5)

wait for the earth to cool down and prepare itself for organisms, watch for the emergence of life from the sea, note the development of animal existence, the evolution of mammals, and the final appearance of crude mankind. We shall have difficulty in making the transition from matter to the organism, and that difficulty will occur again when we attempt to pass from animal existence to human life. It will not be easy to abide by the dogma that the world permits no leaps; if these have not been taken by nature herself they will have to be taken by us in our study of the world. We must be prepared to consider, not one missing link as that between the ape and man, but such a number of them that the blank spaces in the panorama are far more numerous than those occupied. Our program is — from sun to earth, from earth to life, from life to man, from the man of the present to the being who is going to continue or destroy our civilization. Suppose we begin by glancing at life with the hope of gaining some hint as to our own existence. In doing this we must observe how life arose, what was the general course of its development, and what is significant in the emergence of the human species.

THE ORIGIN OF LIFE

We are accustomed to use the word "life" in a nobly narrow sense to indicate the existence of the human family on earth or even the history of civilization. That we take to be the life of man and it is just that which forms the ultimate object of our present study. But the life principle within man, that out of which he has developed arts and sciences and the manifold forms of his civilization and culture, has had such a long history that the life of humanity seems no more than the twinkling of an eye. Hence, before we can study man as he has appeared in history, we must investigate life as it is known in geology. Nature must be allowed to relate a long story before man can tell his little tale. We must seek the living among the dead and view the brightness of the present in the darkness of the past.

By studying the remains of former living things we begin to understand those that live now. Such fossils as the entombed bones of animals in the bedded rocks or shell-forms of creatures

that once lived on the sands of the sea-floor, enable the geologists to restore the life assemblages of the geologic periods. These trace back in time for hundreds of millions of years. The age of the earth is set by geologists, as also by astronomers, at something like 2,000 million years. The rocks abundantly supplied with fossils are in a long series which carries us back to a period of at least half that length of time. Such is the age of the earth on which, as though it were yesterday, the history of humanity has been conducted. The life of man in the larger sense of the term is far more recent.

What was the origin of the life-process that, beginning a hundred million years ago, is still felt by us in our breathing, in our immediate experience of our surroundings? We can reply, but cannot give answer to that question, by saying that we do not know. If our ignorance is devout, we may follow tradition and attribute the origin of life to a divine source; but still we should be confronted by the question how that miraculous life came into existence. With such scientists as Helmholtz and Lord Kelvin, we might think of life as having come to earth in the form of meteorites or meteoric dust, but that would amount to no more than a change of venue. We should still have to inquire how life came into existence elsewhere. Or we might follow Sir Ray Lancaster and look upon life as a happy combination of proteids in a colloid state which itself had come out of a natural synthesis of inorganic substances. But here again we should wonder how that happy combination came about. The best we can do, perhaps, is to speak of life as something that emerges from inorganic matter, realizing that our explanation is nothing more than a description of some inscrutable process. We cannot assert that the principle of life is radically different from every other form of physical existence, as though there were some extra element called "vita" or "bios," yet we cannot deny that the outcome of life has been different from the effects observed in connection with inorganic matter. Life means growth and out of this growing life has come man.

Our subject is man and his development, his exterior civilization and interior culture. In proceeding from the generation of the earth to the evolution of its leading inhabitants, we are like

travelers on an express train, their minds intent upon their destination, their eyes observing the way stations through which the train passes without stopping. Nevertheless we desire to take cognizance of our route more for the purpose of assuring ourselves of the evolutionary line than with the idea of indicating stages along the path it follows. What was the origin of life? Or, if we do not care to meet that profound question directly, what views of this origin are we expected to assume? These seem to center in the idea of novelty, as though life were something new in the inorganic universe. If we cannot assert that life means a new substance or a new energy, we may feel assured that it represents a new and unusual combination of old elements. As far as the life process is concerned, we may assume with Osborn that "living matter does not follow the old evolutionary order, but represents a new assemblage of energies and new types of action."³ What course has this taken in arriving at man?

To answer that question would be to trace out the genealogy of a multitude of species and encounter various conflicting schools of geology and biology. We start with the lifeless earth and the equally lifeless sea upon its surface and follow the view that "life originated on the continents, either in the moist crevices of rocks or soils, in the fresh waters of continental pools, or in the slightly saline waters of the bordering primordial seas."⁴ We seem to find the origin of life in or near the sea and let the biologist show us that the life elements in both sea-water and blood serum are pretty much the same, as though the sea were a fine medium for organic existence.

THE LIFE PROCESS

The life process itself seems to reveal neither continuity nor abruptness, but a graded system of development marked by leaps and bounds of no great length. Such primordial life looks like, more than anything else, a grouping of life's essential elements in an aggregation so distinct as to constitute an organism. This primitive thing was of a gelatinous or colloidal character involving an energy which had not existed previously. The vital char-

³ *The Origin and Evolution of Life*, pp. 4-5.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 35.

acter of this novel form of matter began to show itself when, in addition to the laws of physics and chemistry, the biological principle of Natural Selection entered in. From then on the story of nature became more thrilling, the plot thickened, and the most simple kinds of life assumed a highly complex form. No specific principle of vitality showed itself, but the behavior of the new organism was such as to reveal a novel form of existence and a new way of handling energy.

Life made a beginning with bacteria which, themselves able to find food and store up energy in a world without life, prepared both the earth and the sea for the coming of plants and animals. These bacteria are known better by what they do than what they are, by their energy rather than their form. In the beginnings of life, they operated between the chemical stage of existence and that of the most primitive forms of life. They were not satisfied, we might say, in adapting themselves to their lifeless environment; they went to work upon the earth, decomposed rocks and formed the soil. "These bacteria," says Osborn, "were at once the soil-forming and the soil-nourishing agents of the primal earth; they thrive in the presence of energy-liberating compounds of extremely primitive character."⁵

The work of forming the earth for the appearance of life was continued by the primitive algae, seaweeds, and simpler forms of aqueous vegetation. These primitive forms of vegetable life have exhibited remarkable power as earth-forming agents, reef-builders, and the makers of ancient limestones. From them the whole plant-world spreads out. "In their evolution, while there is a continuous specialization and differentiation of the modes of obtaining energy, plants may not attain a higher chemical stage than that observed among the bacteria and algae. . . . In the energy which they derive from the soil, plants continue to be closely dependent upon bacteria, because they derive their nitrogen from nitrates generated by bacteria and absorbed along with water by the roots. In reaching out into the air and sunlight, the chlorophyllic organs differentiate into the marvelous variety of leaf forms, and these in turn are supported upon stems and branches which finally lead into the creation of woody tissues and the

⁵ *The Origin and Evolution of Life*, p. 84.

clothing of the earth with forests. Through the specialization of leaves in connection with the germ cells, flowers are developed and plants establish a marvelous series of balanced relations with their life environment, first with the developing insect-life and finally with developing bird-life.”⁶

Life seems to consist of obtaining food and storing up energy. In the case of animal life, this energy is derived indirectly from plants, or from both bacteria and plants. Science cannot tell us exactly when animal life in the form of Protozoa made its appearance on earth. It may have been during the period of the primitive algae or may trace as far back as the bacterial epoch. The animals began to distinguish themselves from the plants by their powers of locomotion; indeed, we might go so far as to say, by behavior. The course of evolution carries us from the single-celled Protozoa to the many-celled Metazoa, which evince a more effective locomotive apparatus in that fundamental life-operation which we recognize in the food-quest. Here among the Metazoa we find fast- and slow-moving creatures; the one with superior means of propulsion, the other covered with dense armature for defense. To the eye of the layman, the Sagitta looks very much like a modern submarine, while the heavy Trilobite seems to resemble the old-style monitor. Each conducted its life-warfare or struggle for existence in its own way.

AMPHIBIANS AND REPTILES

The potentiality of living matter brings life closer to us in the form of the Vertebrata. The structure and function of these back-boned creatures brought about a release of animal existence from its immediate habitat in that the new type of animal was able to swim in the water, walk, or otherwise move on the land and fly in the air. Accordingly we observe the appearance of fishes, amphibians, reptiles, birds, mammals, men. Our interest seems to be drawn toward the Amphibia, since they knew how to effect the transition from sea-life to life on land. This required important modifications—a double set of locomotive organs, as fins and legs; a double equipment of respiratory apparatus, as

⁶ *Ib.*, p. 105.

the old gills and new lungs. We recognize such a duplex creature in the modern salamander, small-headed, long-bodied, and small-limbed, adapted to either swimming or crawling.

The attempts of the Amphibia to adapt themselves to sea-and-land life were matched and surpassed by the Reptilia. We are not specially interested in these primitive monsters, although their amphibious existence and their predatory habits cannot help remind us of certain primitive traits in our own human life. But we must observe these reptiles since they are, in a way, our ancestors, and since they were the potential ancestors of our large mammalian family. Thus our life must be viewed as passing through the reptilian form. There seem to have been eighteen different orders of these creatures; among them we recognize the turtles, snakes, and lizards of our own experience; the ichthyosaurs, plesiosaurs, and dinosaurs we observe in museums. Apparently nature did not particularly favor the forms of life she had produced thus far, if we may put it that way, but was preparing the way for a more successful life-form. This appeared in the family to which we belong — the Mammalia.

THE MAMMALS

“During this (Tertiary) period of 3,000,000 million years,” says Osborn, “the entire plant world, the invertebrate world, the fish, the amphibian and the reptilian worlds have all remained as relatively balanced, static, unchanged, or persistent types, while the mammals, radiating 3 million years ago from very small and inconspicuous forms, have undergone a phenomenal evolution, spreading into every geographic region formerly occupied by the Reptilia and passing through multitudinously varied phases not only of direct but of alternating and of reversed evolution.”⁷

When we distinguish between the reptiles and mammals, we do so by observing their different ways of producing their young, by hatching or by giving birth to them; that is, in an oviparous or viviparous manner. If we wish to connect the two types historically, we call attention to the egg-laying mammals, the Monotremata of Australia and New Guinea, recognizable to the lay-

⁷ *The Origin and Evolution of Life*, p. 231.

man in the form of the spiny anteater. If we desire to fill in the evolutionary gap more thoroughly, we make mention of the pouched mammals, or marsupials, of Australia. In our own opossums we observe the way in which these marsupials are now typified. In these mammals we find the results of evolution, whatever the purposes may have been. We observe ten great branches of the original stock, including whales, seals, and sea-cows; bats, rodents, and primates like ourselves. These covered the face of the earth and may seem to have been the heirs of Creation. As it appears now, one family has taken possession of the earth and is selecting for further existence such types of mammalian and other life as seem best to it. That is the peculiar family to which we belong, the human one.

THE ORIGIN OF MAN

Our concern is with the human species, hence we have referred to the origin of the earth and the appearance of life on its surface only for the sake of setting man in bold relief. What was the origin of human life and by what means did civilized man come into existence? Here, again, we are confronted by those troublesome questions: "Whence?" and "How?" Here, again, we are tempted to let the experienced fact act as a vehicle for the implied cause and content ourselves by saying, "Man emerged from the general order of life, animal, mammalian, simian." From the standpoint of civilization, man seems so utterly different from other animals that evolution cannot account for him or anthropology convey the content of his life. But, since we wish our development of human civilization to be as fully rooted as possible, we postpone our consideration of man's cultured traits and survey him in the dim light of his long natural history. In order to know what we are and are to be, we must observe what we have been and were at the very beginning. Hence, we pause for a moment and consider man in the form of fossil remains which may have some message for us.

The fossil population of the globe is pathetically scanty, its members widely scattered, and their family resemblances remote. Yet they also were men and it may be that some of their early

strivings still persist, some of the primitive traits remain unto this day. Man appeared on earth 500 thousand years ago; in only the last tenth of that time has he been what we may call a human being. In the period between the original anthropoid and man as we know him today we find a few hundred skeletons, most of them in fragmentary form. It is not a question of discovering the so-called "missing link"; that we seem to have in the Java man. It is the series of missing links between these fossil men that perplexes us. It is as though nature had made a moving picture film one hundred miles long and had then destroyed all of it save for a few random snapshots. Of these isolated exposures we are reasonably sure; of the whole picture we must conjecture. The record itself was made in different parts of the world: in Java and China, in England and on the Continent. We must look at these fossil men and note all possible human resemblances.

FOSSIL MEN

The Java man, *pithecanthropus erectus*, is the oldest fossil man known to us but can hardly be claimed as an ancestor, since he represents an unusual and unprogressive type. What we actually know of him amounts to the upper part of a skull, three molars, and a femur bone. His title of ape-man, *pithecanthropus*, is ambiguous, but he seems to be so far above the ape that the human family can hardly reject him. The discovery of this specimen is a fact of recent history, for it was only in 1891 that he was unearthed in Trinil, East Java. His own geologic date is that of the earliest Pleistocene period. The significant feature of the Java man is not his head but his feet. He had the ability to assume an erect posture and move about freely on earth. "Since the human type of leg and foot is already present in the oldest known fossil man, it is clear that this evolution also took place prior to the Pleistocene. The human type of leg and foot was, then, developed long before the human brain came to be as we see it now."⁸

When we change the geologic scene from Asia to Europe, we observe the Piltdown man, discovered in 1913 and represented by

⁸ Pirsson and Schuchert, *Introductory Geology* (1924), p. 656.

parts of a skull and jaw, a human skull and an ape-jaw. The head, according to the way it has been restored, reveals human features as far as the forehead is concerned and indicates a brain capacity not much below that of the average European. It is the lower part of the face that betokens lack of human development in that the chin is wanting. Something resembling weapons are associated with this type of man who is known by the name of *eoanthropus*, as his implements, found rather than made, are called *eoliths*. Closely related to *eoanthropus* was the Heidelberg man, discovered in 1907, and consisting of no more than a jaw with all of the teeth, these being of distinctly human form. The unformed human face is signified by the lack of a chin.

HOMO SAPIENS

The Neanderthal man was much earlier in the history of geology, dating back to 1856, but ever so much later in the line of the human series. He represents an approach to man as we know him and is significant for his large head and the manufacture of stone implements and hearths. The use of fire is probably the most significant factor in his material culture. This type of man, *homo primigenius*, was succeeded by the Aurignacian man who seems entitled to the name of *homo sapiens*; he appeared at the dawn of human civilization, which dates back to less than 20 thousand years ago. He is found in the New Stone Age, the *Neolithic*, but the manufacture and use of stone implements is not the most significant feature of his existence. He had mastered the art of fire and ate cooked food. To his tool-making he added the arts of pottery, weaving, basket-making, and spinning. More significant still for his culture were his sculpture and drawing, indicative of free mentality out of which came language and religion also.

When we look back upon the broken record of mankind as this is made by geology, we observe that the skeletal features of fossil men were not altogether different from our own. We note that from the beginning the ultimate human ancestor had a human posture and gait and that, in time, he acquired the use of his hands in the manufacture and manipulation of tools. Himself

wanting in the mechanical appliances peculiar to so many other creatures, man had to make his own machinery. The simplicity of his body led to the complexity of his work. In his development, the most marked feature was his head. This had to be tilted forward, the brow enlarged, the cerebellum tucked away, as it were, under the cortex, and the jaw so altered as to project the jawbones in the form of the chin. "Whatever the precise cause may have been," says Robert Monroe, "there can be no doubt that the gradual formation of the chin has had a striking parallelism with the progressive stages in man's intellectual development ever since he started his human career."⁹ It has taken nature a large part of a million years to form the human face. Perhaps we are right in assuming that human life as such has just begun, since the period of human existence on earth is very brief in comparison with the age of the earth, to say nothing of the whole universe.

LIFE AND FOOD

If we cannot decide how life arose, we may be able to tell what it is. From our own intuitive experience we know what life is like; we feel it within us as a sensation, although its meaning is far from clear. From the physical point of view, life appears to exhibit vital phenomena in the way that it uses energy. Instead of expending this, life in the plant tends to save it and thus retard the degradation of energy so peculiar to the inorganic world. Chemically viewed, life is metabolism; its system of activity is such that it preserves itself in the midst of the building-up and breaking-down process of organic existence. When life is regarded in its own special realm of biology, it shows itself to be a self-preserving and self-propagating entity capable further of growth and variability. From a psychological standpoint, the vital process in animals involves awareness of environment, response to stimuli, and purposive behavior. In all of these phases of organic existence there is one factor that should not be overlooked; that is, the need of food common to plants and animals. Their methods of obtaining and digesting food are quite different,

⁹ Article "Anthropology," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

but their need is common. All life obtains its necessary sustenance from the sun.

"Earth," said Anatole France, "is the planet of hunger, the place where one eats." Life means food. The source of our food supply, as we have said, is the sun, whose solar energy the plant acquires from the air above and the soil below in the mineral form of carbon and nitrogen. Since the plant is so constituted that it can create organic matter out of these mineral elements, it is not necessary for it to move about in search of food. This it derives directly from the earth. With the animal it is otherwise; the animal must feed on organic matter as it finds this in the plant or other animal that has fed upon the plant. Hence the animal must be able to move about to obtain food; to move about involves the existence and operation of a motor mechanism. We are in the habit of attributing the faculty of locomotion to an animal as though it were a sort of luxury when, as a matter of fact, this mobility is a necessary factor in the all-imperative work of food-getting. From the simplest animal down to the inhabitant of a civilized community, the primary question in life is, "What shall we eat?"

But movement is not of itself sufficient to constitute and sustain animal existence. The movement in the great food-quest must be directed. This implies a sensory mechanism to accompany and act as a guide for the motor one. The two together constitute the nervous system of the animal, and the nervous system is the animal *par excellence*. It is by such means that the animal is enabled to seek food and supply its bodily wants. In the lowest type of animality, this may not be the nervous system as such but a kind of combined sensitivity and spontaneity out of which the cerebro-spinal system develops. If the animal does not have a brain, it requires the equivalent of one.

FOOD AND BRAIN

Man is brain. We make this statement in view of the biological facts of man's life, not in behalf of any ideals of his spiritual nature. We speak of man's body, not his mind. And when we say "brain," we refer to the cerebro-spinal nervous system as this

branches out into the moto-sensory system with its terminations in muscles and sense-organs. This extended nervous system, presiding over the systems of respiration, digestion, circulation, and the like, is the creature itself — in this case, man. In his animal capacity, man is placed in a situation akin to that of other species; all alike require food, must be able to store up the energy the food supplies, and be in a condition to release this in the form of action. To the lay mind, it looks as though the rest of the body were collecting as much energy as possible for the sake of the moto-sensory system, in order that the animal might live and move and realize its very being. The proper function of food seems to be to provide energy for the nervous system, hence the tissues of nerve and muscle are copiously supplied with glycogen. Apparently the nervous system must be kept intact and in operation for the sake of the rest of the organism. The effect of the food is felt by the nerve tissue. Jonathan, while pursuing the Philistines, ate of the honey that had fallen to the ground "and his eyes were enlightened."

When we stress the importance of food in sustaining the nervous system, we do not mean that the organism is merely a system of nerves, much less that the body is the brain. Food is meant to supply the whole organism with power and repair its tissues. But alimentation has special significance for the nervous system. The situation is like that in a needy household wherein the head of the family must be fed at all costs, even if other members of the household have to endure privation. This is not because the head of the family is more important in himself as a person. It is because he, in his capacity as bread-winner, must be nourished in order that by means of work he may supply food for the other members of the little group. It is thus that the body is ready to demand sacrifice of the other organs in order that the brain may be fed.

When the organism is deprived of the food that supplies it with energy, it is as though the nervous system, the first to be fed, were the last to be starved. The body, like the family of dependents, seems only too ready to make sacrifices for the sake of the organ that, like the head of the house, knows how to seek food and obtain it. "It is a remarkable fact that in animals that

have died of hunger, the brain is found to be almost unimpaired, while the other organs have lost more or less of their weight and their cells have undergone profound changes. It seems as though the rest of the body had sustained the nervous system to the last extremity, treating itself simply as the means of which the nervous system is the end."¹⁰ It is in this sense, if in no other, that there is truth in the materialistic motto, "Man is what he eats — *der Mensch ist was er isst*." Indeed, the question of food is so important on "the planet of hunger" that men and all animals exist only as they eat. Civilization has not been able to change this radical condition of human life; all that civilization can do is to afford the best means of satisfying human hunger.

THE HUMAN BRAIN

We find in the emergence of mankind something more than the appearance of an extra species, a bipedal mammal. Man is primarily and ultimately mind. In his brain we observe something more than an organ which, itself duly fed, enables man to seek nourishment for his body; in or about his brain we observe a specific form of consciousness. We have not as yet come to the place where we can refer to the human mind as a faculty which has developed industries and institutions to promote civilization and culture. As far as we have advanced, man's mind means no more than a large and superior brain. But the characteristic of this organ is found in its function as well as in its form. It is an organ of extreme sensitivity and spontaneity, being something superior to the mere senso-motor apparatus found among animals generally. If we compare the brain of man with that of the ape, we observe a difference in size and degree of complexity, but these quantitative and qualitative differences are not sufficient to indicate the mental gap between them. Wherein does this difference consist?

The difference between the two brains consists primarily in the way they function. We might indicate this by pointing to the enormous distinction between the types of life that each species leads: the life of the ape and that of civilized man. There can be

¹⁰ Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, tr. Mitchell, p. 124.

no question about the ultimate results of these two kinds of cerebral activity. But how does this difference appear when subjected to psychological examination? Doubtless in connection with memory. Both brains retain their previous impressions, but in the case of man's there is the added function of recollection whereby man is able to conjure up a past state and hold it before his mind in the form of image. There is a marked difference in the learning process also, since man, with his freer type of memory, is able to invent new forms of activity such as we observe at the beginning of his career as a tool-maker. In man there is a free process of learning that is absent from the brain of the ape. It is true, of course, that animals may be taught both tricks and useful forms of activity, but their teacher is a being superior to them. In the case of the human brain it is man who is his own teacher.

Man taught himself the art of living in order that he might persist upon the planet. This meant something more than an instinctive struggle for existence; it involved a certain versatility of effort and adaptability of nature. Man was necessitated to seek food and prepare it and, with the change of climate, to provide home and hearth-stone. These things required ingenuity, manufacture, and the inventiveness that this implies. In order to work, man must plan by picturing the object he desires to create or by turning it over in his mind. The primitive man may not have been at all like *The Thinker* of Rodin's statue, but he had mastered the art of thinking up to the point of its usefulness for him. Doubtless this was effected largely by means of language, which is a symbolic form of activity. After man's larynx and jawbone had assumed something like their present form, the development of language was much simpler than we are inclined to believe. The very exigencies of life demanded thought, the brain was forced to respond to the kind of activities adopted, and the mental process facilitated by the art of speech. The human body became a psychophysical organization.

BRAIN AND MIND

This biological conception of man, although suggestive of man's unique nature, does not tell the whole story; the rest of it must

be taken up by psychology in order that we may appreciate the nature of the one animal species which creates its own habitat and proceeds to live an artificial life. Unless we differentiate man from other animals, his civilization and culture will fail to convey the idea of anything significant. We may be able to apprehend these as facts but cannot so easily appreciate them as values, and we desire both the real and the ideal in one if that be at all possible. Unless we are sure of man at the outset, we may be open to attack on the part of those who have suggested that civilization is a disease or others who are under the impression that it is destined for a downfall. For this reason we cannot afford to indulge in a sentiment which would glorify man and take his art and religion, his civilization and culture for granted. We believe in man and his work, but must, if possible, give a reason for the faith that is in us.

In placing man apart from the other animal species with which his origin was involved, we may appeal psychologically to the facts in the case. These involve man's habitat and his nature. At first man took these for granted and lived pretty much as did other animals, although with the faint presentiment that his kind of animal life was different. Man exercised about his world a curiosity which has culminated in the scientific conception of nature in which we now rejoice. It may seem strange that a product of matter should itself come to the degree of development by which it summed up the meaning of things in the form of an astronomic whole, but such is the case with man. He has been able to view all nature in the character of a systematic whole whose laws he has formulated with such perfection as to justify Kant in saying that "the understanding is the law-giver of nature." In scientific achievement, the superiority, the supremacy of man has been vindicated.

The same contention may be brought forth biologically in relation to man's origin. Himself a product of the evolutionary process, it seems strange to think of man as raising his head above the stream and contemplating it as a whole; but is not such actually the case, and does not the theory of evolution, which is man's idea, justify us in exalting him? If the principle of Natural Selection, following its own course and producing the human species

among others, produced man, the conduct of man has reached a point where he has taken his evolution in his own hands. For this reason, we cannot speak of the evolution of civilization in the way that we speak of the evolution of the human species, since the course of civilization has been directed by man's own will. Man has not lifted himself by his own bootstraps, but he has used nature as a fulcrum for his lever. With this he has raised his civilization.

MAN THE END OF CREATION

Is man to be esteemed the purpose of Creation? He acts as though this were the case and it is only when he indulges in naturalistic speculation that he is inclined to doubt his destiny. But, for the purpose of placing human civilization in a clear light, we need do no more than assume that man is *an* end in Creation. Man may or may not have been the *finis*, or last-comer, in the vertebrate series, but we may still regard him as a *telos*, or end, in the life-series as a whole. Inasmuch as the process of evolution has followed more than one line instead of proceeding in a unilinear manner, other ends may be assumed as realized. Evolution has had its failures and successes, but in the case of man, whatever the purpose may have been, a definite result has been achieved in the form of a rational creature which apparently has made itself an end in the general scheme of things. This we may do without indulging in unguarded dogmatism, without assuming any philosophy of Finalism.

In the case of man, it is as though human life had been decided upon as an objective long after the evolutionary process had been under way. Now, the difference between a complete Finalism, with its dogmatic idea of purpose, and the general conception of ends in nature is the difference between the games of chess and checkers. In the game of chess, the one end in view, which is that of checkmating the king, is determined at the beginning. No matter what a complexity of specific moves there may be, that one end is always kept in mind. In the game of checkers, on the contrary, there is no purpose in sight at the opening except the general idea of success, of winning the game. But in the course of the game, a promising objective arises as one

out of a hundred or more possible *termini*. At the end of the game, it looks as though that had been the original purpose when, in fact, it was only an objective determined during the play in view of the positions of the pieces.

It is thinkable that some other creature than man might have been the lord of Creation or that the evolution of man, as we know it now, might have taken some other course and produced a different type of humanity. But the fact remains that evolution has taken the course that we now recognize as the one that has led to man as he is, just as it is a further fact that man has made himself an end in the evolutionary process. The development of his nature and the organization of his civilization show that. Hence it seems idle to speculate about what might have been if nature had taken some other turn. Man is an end in Creation, not because evolution took a happy turn or, as if to celebrate a holiday, gave special privileges to one species above all the others. Man is an end because, seeing his opportunity, he decided to place himself in a strategic position. "It is," says Bergson, "as if a vague and formless being, whom we may call as we will man or superman, had sought to realize himself, and had succeeded only by abandoning a part of himself on the way. The losses are represented by the rest of the animal world and even by the vegetable world, at least in what these have that is positive and above the accidents of evolution."¹¹ Of course, it was necessary for nature to grant man existence and endow him with a brain, but the use of his brain has been his own affair. It is from the fossil skull of the archaeological man to the living, operative brain of the human being that we must turn if we are to understand the natural evolution and human expression of mind.

THE LIBERATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The human brain has done more than guide the human species in the necessary concerns of life, as food-getting. It has expressed itself. When we consider the human brain, we observe that it unfolded, so to speak, in the form of consciousness. The result has been the human world-order, the practical civilization and

¹¹ *Creative Evolution*, tr. Mitchell, p. 266.

intellectual culture of the human race. Before we can present these major products of consciousness, we must consider how the mind delivered itself from the domination of the body. We must note how the mind emancipated itself from immediate necessities to the fulfillment of remote desires. In pure science and speculative philosophy, it is not necessary to discover by what means the mind liberated itself from the body. In those forms of intellection, pure mentality as an ideal arrangement of thought is the sole consideration. But when we are dealing with the natural history of mankind and are considering how man passed from nature to humanity, the psychophysical issue is bound to arise. Hence we must pay tribute to nature before we can feel exempt. After that we can proceed to the methods whereby man as man humanized his own nature, and then advance to a study of arts and sciences, systems of thought, and modes of civilization. Just how is the mind related to the body?

The professional view of the problem, as we may call it, is that of psychophysical parallelism. This was Spinoza's solution of the modern problem precipitated by Descartes. It amounts to an equipoise of mind and body, or so much of the psychological means just as much of the physical. It was a plausible and pardonable conception at the beginning of modern thought, when the physical was understood in a purely mechanical way and the psychological was looked upon in a strictly intellectual manner. Descartes and his followers viewed nature in a schematic way; hence, their conception of mind and body was that of thought and extension. The parallel between such a *cogitatio* and an *extensio* appeared complete. The pattern that these early thinkers had in mind was that of a framework or even of a system of pickets running up and down between the lower and upper rails of a fence. What the brain bound was bound in consciousness and what the brain loosed was loosed in consciousness. The stimuli projected themselves upward in the form of sensations, so that, to understand a conscious state, one needed to understand only a cerebral one. This was the practical outcome of the theory as it was developed in the XIXth century in connection with physiological psychology. It is the general type of psychological reasoning even today.

We are required by the facts in the case to take a more energetic view of both the physical and psychological. Nature is not merely a geometrical scheme which imprints itself upon the mind as though thought were only the cogitation of extension. Both the physical and psychological are functional and operative concerns. Mind came into being to serve the movements of the animal in its quest for food, not to mirror the universe. It may be inseparable from the body, but, as Aristotle pointed out, so is the sharp edge of the ax from the blade. The two are inseparable, but still different.

THE EMERGENCE OF MIND

Now, experience is constantly showing us that consciousness does not sit idly waiting for stimuli to turn up, but recalls past sensations, connects them with others, and works out patterns which are not in any wise prefigured in the brain no matter how complex its structure. Hence it seems more empirical to look upon consciousness as a kite floating about in the free air, although its flying depends upon its being held down to earth by a string. There is indeed a connection between mind and body, so that one's consciousness may be said to travel about with him approximately as his organism does. But it is not the mere possession of a brain, still less the brain's possession of consciousness, that is significant in the life of man, but the way man uses this organ. He keeps it open to new impressions, urges it to put forth novel activities, and changes its original status, such as it had in the animal, from master to slave. It was the power of invention that, it seems, set man as such free from a purely anthropic condition like that which his primitive ancestors experienced; it is the inventive in man that has led him into the ways of civilization and culture.

The emergence of man has meant something more than the appearance of a new species; it has amounted to the entrance of consciousness. In man we find what Schopenhauer called "knowledge of the Will-to-Live," which means something more than the awareness of objects and the means of securing food. It means the condition of a creature which, by its consciousness, detaches itself from the world, measures the extent of the uni-

verse, and analyzes the very nature of matter as well as that of its own soul. This consciousness is the stuff out of which it makes its own life, its civilization and culture, its very humanity.

Where do we stand now in our preliminary study of man? We have observed how the earth was drawn off from the sun at a time so remote that a terrestrial calendar can hardly measure it. We have seen how, after the planet had cooled, life began to appear in the crevices of the rocks and how in the long course of time animal life emerged. Man's history we have traced or indicated in the last half million years from the Man Erect to the Man Thinking. This brought us to the Psychozoic Era, the period of mental dominance, the age of man. The geologic forces that formed the earth are still at work in the form of atmospheric influence, ocean currents, rain and snow, earthquake and volcano. However, nature has all but completed her work of natural selection, leaving the fate of animal existence, including the life of man himself, in the hands of man. "The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death."¹²

¹² Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, tr. Mitchell, p. 271.

CHAPTER II

THE HUMANIZING OF MANKIND



THE DISCOVERY OF MAN

MAN HAS JUST BEEN DISCOVERED!" THIS STARTLING STATEMENT was made by Ludwig Feuerbach less than a century ago. Suppose we revise it in terms of the timetable in the previous chapter and interpret it psychologically. Then we shall say, man was discovered when he began to walk erect or when he started making tools or when he began to speak. Man has discovered himself: his powers of body by which he moves and acts, the faculties of brain by which he speaks and thinks. The discovery of man was made by the Aurignacian group whom we know somewhat better in the definite form of the Cro-Magnon man. From him were descended men as we know them, and we begin to find them historically in Egypt and Mesopotamia. In the men of those places we find the beginnings of the languages we recognize in the form of the Hamitic, Semitic, and Aryan, which must trace back to a common form of speech. Then began also a kind of thought-existence which showed itself in the habit of observing the seasons, reckoning time generally, and counting by means of symbols. Man discovered himself, his world, and a spiritual order beyond both of these.

The general factors in the discovery of man may be styled sensitivity and spontaneity, or the awakening of the senses and the arousing of the faculties of action. These movements led to the clarification of the intellect and the fortification of the will, or the proper development of the senso-motor arrangement within man. Evolution had produced man, set him on his feet, and raised his head. It was now for man to raise himself to his proper stature, or take his strict humanization into his own hands. It may be that it was only some fortunate turn in the process of evolution that produced man or that, with some other sort of evolution, different creatures would now be in control

of the planet earth; but, in effect, evolution has worked to produce such a race as we now find here. Hence, in looking back over the history of mankind, it is as if the production of the race was something that had been planned from the beginning.

In addition to the above conjectures which lead us nowhere, we might inquire why it was that man has used only one tenth of his 500 thousand years on earth to better himself to such a degree as to have become man indeed. We know only that about 50 thousand years ago, man did set out upon a truly human course of development which has brought him to the levels of civilization and culture as we observe them today. Now, it will be more effective if, instead of wondering about the general evolution of mankind, we consider the means by which man has humanized his being. Then we shall discover that man became man by means of the head that nature had given him, for in this there was room for an adequate brain and the organs of speech. In addition to these things that we may call gifts, man developed the powers of industry and art, social life and religion. Two things have been in operation in this process of humanization — the passage of time and human effort. Of the two, it is the effort of man that must engage our attention.

THE FREE BRAIN

The emancipation of man, which is still going on, has been brought about by both nature and man himself. Man is indebted to nature for his erect posture and straightforward gait, by means of which his upper limbs were set free for work and his head was placed in a position to direct movement and action. The most important consideration is his brain. When man appears, his brain is not wholly different from that of the ape-like relative in the larger family of nature. When the brain of the Java man is compared with that of the ape, it seems large; but when set alongside that of the modern man, it appears correspondingly small. But it is the use of the organ that counts, not merely the possession of it. In the ape-mind, such consciousness as springs from the brain is no more than a sort of phosphorescence with its power to lend a certain glow of intelligence to the creature's

limited sphere of activity. In man, however, there is a certain excess of consciousness, a distance and differentiation between body and mind, whereby he is enabled to cover a broader field of activity and initiate a work of his own. If we regard the two brains outwardly, the difference appears to be only one of degree; but if we consider them inwardly and observe their respective functions, that difference becomes one of kind.

We may assume, if we choose, that in the matter of brain-building nature has advanced step by step, so that actually the differences among the Primates are only so many gradations. But it is the product rather than the process that concerns us. The product is man's present brain, but not that alone; it is what that brain has accomplished in the civilization and culture of the human race. When we turn from process to product, we receive the impression that in the case of the human brain a sudden leap occurred, for man has arrived at a position in nature which no other animal can match. He has thrust his mind forward in the way that he had previously set his body upward and has become man mental in the way that he was originally man physical. How has this mental thrust been accomplished?

We cannot answer this question by pointing to some good genius who instructed man in the art of thinking; still less can we attribute his acquisition of intelligence to some extra gift from nature. We might say metaphorically that when nature placed man on his feet, she released his head and equipped him with the kind of brain he needed for his work. But it would be more in accordance with experience to suggest that the development of the brain and, with it, the emancipation of the mind were due to man's own effort. This effort was not put forth in the form of mere strength, but in the form of skill. It showed itself physically in man's original industry and art, psychologically in his language and social life. Its most consummate expression was in religion. These outward thrusts are significant of man's unique nature and represent man as a creature which can go beyond itself. The bird's nest, spider's web, and even the beaver's dam are forms of ingenious activity which serve their purpose without the extension of the creature beyond itself. In man's case, however, there is the ability on the part of the crea-

ture to teach itself new activities, form new habits, and then create variations of these.

EMANCIPATION THROUGH INDUSTRY

The most direct way in which man emancipated himself from nature and set his mind free from his body was that of industry. The aim of the primitive man was far from that of controlling nature in our modern sense of the term; the best that primitive man could do was to adapt himself to nature, or let intelligence effect a conscious adaptation, as instinct had afforded an unconscious modification. He did this by means of stone implements, weapons, and tools. Some of these, the "dawn stones," or *coliths*, extend backward in time to an incredibly remote age, causing the layman in geology to wonder whether such crudely pointed bits of flint were formed or were merely found by the men of that period, if men there were in existence in that early era of the earth's history. The progress of primitive industry was such as to include traps for beasts and nets for fish, tents for dwellings and boats of some sort for transportation. We can do no more than point at these, as though we were passing through an anthropological museum in order to prime our minds for the finished work of man as revealed in a modern exposition of machinery and a museum of art. If we were to indicate the character and development of such pre-historic activity on the part of our fossil ancestors, we should soon become bewildered by details and thrown off our historical course. We appeal to industry as evidence of intelligence in the primitive brain.

When we refer to industry, we are thinking more of the inventive process within it than the object it created. "In the beginning was the deed," as Goethe said. Man began to be himself by means of what he did, and although his mind was inarticulate, his brain did not fail to express its intentions. The value of such manufacture was more mental than material and it was the mind rather than the body that was to experience the ultimate advantage. If we think lightly of such human beginnings, we should consider how long it was after man had de-

vised his alphabet that he postponed the art of printing and how long, again, it was after the Greeks had discovered the principles of practical mechanics, even to the steam engine, that man waited before he started the age of machinery.

The effect of invention was to reveal man's powers to him and show him how, in part, the problem of life was to be solved. The nature of invention is such as to reveal the adaptation of nature to man instead of the original adaptation of man to nature. It was the beginning of that artificial world in which we now live and which in its technicalism is beginning to feel annoying. When invention is viewed, as it were, on the inner side, it shows that man has the ability to make use of thoughts as well as things; the ability to discover the physical qualities of things and the psychological processes of the mind. Man created both material and mental instruments at the same time. There was a kind of logic in the mental operations of the primitive maker of tools and weapons, houses and boats, but its field was that of the concrete. It was the realistic logic of nature itself and proceeded more instinctively than consciously. But it was still a logic, a mental process according to which man was to become man indeed.

INDUSTRY AND INTELLECT

Man's industry, as he works with stone and metal, with clay and wood, reacts upon his brain to render him *homo sapiens*. The effect of inventive industry is both exterior and interior; it shows in man's mode of living and in his method of thinking. The hearth with the fire that man built upon it, the home in which he lives, and the instruments he uses in his hunting and agriculture have a refining effect upon him. But it is just as much the mental process whereby he creates his own surroundings and performs his work which develops the inherent human being within him. As Bergson says, "It is this mastery that profits humanity much more even than the material result of the invention itself. Though we derive an immediate advantage from the thing made . . . it is a slight matter compared with the new ideas and new feelings that the invention may give rise to in every direction, as if the essential part of the effect were to

raise us above ourselves and enlarge our horizon.”¹ We observe this in our day in the way that one invention not only leads to another, but also increases desires whereby luxuries soon become necessities. We observe the workings of this principle in the primitive mind, wherein the betterment of the outer condition went hand in hand with the improvement of the inner state of mind.

What is true in the specific field of fabrication is none the less observable in the general domain of civilization. It is as though the will in carrying out an idea furnished by the intellect felt called upon to repay the debt with interest. The deed reverberates with ideas. Hence it was that Turgenev said, “We are indebted to civilization, not alone for knowledge, art, and law, but for the fact that the very sentiment of beauty and poetry is developed and enters into force under the influence of that same civilization.”² Thus the two forms of human life, the active and the intellectual, interweave and the total effect is human life in its fullness. It is in this country that the elaborate development of exterior life in the form of technicalized civilization has still to develop a parallel form of existence, an interior condition of American culture.

THE EFFECT OF ART

To the testimony of industry must be added that of art, a material and manual manifestation of a dawning spiritual life in man. Like the manufacture of tool or weapon, boat or basket, a work of art is physical, yet it tends to assume a more psychological character. It contains less and less of the material, more and more of the mental, consisting as it does of something extra and useless in the form of decoration, ornament, or object of art. The manufactured article was a necessity in the actual life of man; the work of art is more of a luxury or something added in response to an inward demand for completeness. Art seems thus to have grown out of industry and, since these human origins retrace their way so far back into antiquity, we will risk the as-

¹ *Creative Evolution*, tr. Mitchell, p. 183.

² *Smoke*, tr. Hapgood, p. 165.

sertion that art is about as old as man. We can safeguard ourselves by the further assertion that man is not man until he is artist, or until his aesthetic nature has developed. "Man," said Schiller, "is not fully man until he plays"; that is, until he expresses the *Spieltrieb* out of which art is engendered.

How did primitive man exhibit this aesthetic "playfulness" out of which the fine arts were to spring? He did this by the direct application of his free hands to detachable materials of the earth. The moment we discover some evidence of technique in such manual work, we discover what we must call art. This may not be found in the *eoliths* referred to in connection with primitive industry, not because they were made, or chosen, to serve a practical purpose, but for the reason that they lack the artistic touch, the human finish able to transform them from things to instruments. But with the *paleoliths* this is not the case, in that the human touch is not lacking since these flint implements may be considered well-made implements. When objects of primitive industry are well made, they are useful; when they are made better than the need requires, they are "beautiful." "The technical skill involved becomes itself a stimulant for the development of still higher skill, and when this is the case, the object is not merely well made, but also artistically made, for virtuosity and playfulness, when held within the bonds of a more or less rigid form, are art." ³

The aesthetic spirit of man advances farther beyond the domain of the natural when a decorated object appears beside the well-made one. The very nature of the material employed and the method of manipulating seem to invite free design. What was the character of the primitive pattern? On this point anthropologists differ, some of them inclining toward the idea that the pattern was purely geometrical, others observing the presence of realistic forms. The layman, who looks upon works of primitive art in museums and further considers the art tendencies of the present time, does not find it necessary to take sides with either party. He realizes that both the more rigid and the free-flowing lines have their aesthetic appeals, and can see how each can interweave with the other. A geometrical design with


³ Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 165.

its straight lines, curves, and angles can be used to portray a realistic object like an animal. And just as easily can a realistic representation of an object like an animal convey the impression of geometrical forms, as in the case of Cubism. What the general student of human civilization is bound to observe, over and above these differences, is the beginning of human emancipation in the free sense of play.

ART AS PLAY

The mental activity involved in the art-work of primitive man thus becomes more important for our purpose, which is really psychological. We know that the mind of man has freed itself from nature in the form of both matter and the brain. Man is still on the earth and his mental functions operate in some relationship to his nervous system, but his intelligence has become a free agent in the total scheme of things. It is this emancipated intelligence that has made man's world for him. In specific relation to art, the release has come about through the functions of play-activity, imitation, and expression; or it was by means of the combination of play and imitation that man arrived at expression. The works of art peculiar to primitive man can in no wise compare with the perfected art of ancient Greece or of modern Europe, but the change has been exterior, not interior. The art of the present like that of the past is an aesthetic urge in which play, imitation, and expression are the characteristic forms.

A brief analysis of the play-impulse will suffice to reveal its simple method of emancipating man from the material world without taking him out of it into the domain of pure intellection, as in science and philosophy. Play arises out of a sense of superabundance or surplus energy; out of the strength that is left after necessary work has been performed. It is in this sense that play is "ideal." In a necessary industry like that of tool-making, the factor of play exhibits itself in a simple form of playfulness or an artistic touch added to a useful implement. In design, however, the play-factor becomes more creative and tends all the more to release the consciousness of the primitive artist. He, as well as the artist of a perfected culture, passes serenely from the external



PRIMITIVE ART FROM THE CEILING OF THE ALTAMIRA CAVE IN SPAIN



EARLIEST EXTANT WRITING, FROM THE TOMB
OF MENES AT ABYDOS



PREHISTORIC EUROPEAN POTTERY, FOUND IN EXCAVATIONS OF
A LAKE DWELLERS' VILLAGE

(facing page 32)

to the internal, from the necessary to the free, from immediate interests to remote ones. Art thus assumes the form of excess, something not actually demanded by the exigencies of life. It springs from the brain of man which has stored up extra energies, delivers itself from purely physical laws, and elaborates principles of its own. It is indeed what Prosper Mérimée called it — “exaggeration *à propos*.”

The aesthetic “exaggerations” of art, past and present, are not wholly motor; they assume the parallel form of the intellectual. This they do when they satisfy the desire for ideal stimulation, as though the everyday sensation were insufficient. We might imagine that primitive man would be so taken up with the struggle for existence that he would have no time for play and no desire for artistic entertainment. Just as fully might we suppose that, in an industrial age like our own, the desire for gain would be so intense that there would be no room for ideal interests. But such is not the case. With both primitive man and man in an industrial civilization we find a play-activity worthy of the Greeks. With the savage, it was the war dance with pantomime and mimetic gesture; with civilized man, it is theatrical entertainment of various sorts. With both sorts of men, savage and civilized, these entertainments are not necessarily intellectual, but they are operative in the field of intellect. That is, they involve the free play of mind and have no other source than the desire for “ideal” excitement.

But the natural function of play is not sufficient to account for the elaborate institution of art as we know it today or even for the results of primitive art. Play ends where it begins — in movement, while art is a definite result, a thing created. In animal play, the games of children, and the sports of adults we observe the functioning of the faculty; but we are in search of a product, not a process only. Hence, to attach play-activity to things and have them change to works of art, we must have recourse to something at once more substantial and more definite whereby play may take on form. This we find in imitation, which enables play to pass significantly from an impression in the mind to its expression in an object. Play may supply the motive for art, but imitation involves the motif.

ART AS EXPRESSION

This does not mean that we accept and perpetuate the traditional idea that art is the imitation of nature, for, while there is some resemblance between an object in nature and the representation of it, art does not copy nature. To imitate the appearance of an object would be merely to make a record of it, as in drawing a map; not to develop the beauty of it, as in painting a landscape. But when the aesthetic impulse is aroused and the art-play has begun, it stands in need of guidance, which is afforded it by the mimetic faculty in the form of perception. Art may go to the extreme of pure play, as it has done of late in accordance with the maxim "no representation of the recognizable," but when an art is undeveloped it cannot rejoice in such freedom. It must follow the general plan of nature and use imitation as its *modus vivendi*. Such imitation is really expression.

The term "expression" is so comprehensive that we do not hesitate to use it in connection with primitive art. But even when expression is taken specifically and its psychological nature duly stipulated, it is genuinely applicable to the aesthetic efforts of the primitive mind and hand. We approach the idea of art-expression as though it were the resultant of inner and outer forces, of play and imitation. We regard it as an effort on the part of the mind to render a subjective impression or feeling objective. The merit of an art depends upon the character of the inner state of mind and the adequacy of its objectification. Did the artist see clearly and feel deeply? Does his art reveal these things? By raising such questions we try to feel our way back into the minds of the early artists.

When we speak of art as expression, we realize that, even in its most gigantic form, a work of art can convey fine feeling. This we realize in looking upon such a massive structure as Stonehenge on Salisbury Plain must have been when, in the late Neolithic period, it was erected as, perhaps, a temple of the sun. More adequately do we realize the expressive character of architecture in such a monument as the Great Pyramid or in the Parthenon. Expression of a more distinct type appears in the

Cathedral at Rheims, St. Peter's at Rome, or a set-back skyscraper in New York. The principle of expression is such in its integrity that it may be applied to such different types of building as we have mentioned. It is a stream with works of art jutting out into it like capes and peninsulas.

The same continuity of aesthetic activity appears in folk lore and the fully organized poem of the *Iliad*; in early modern tales and their dramatic form on the Shakespearean stage; in the crude drawings on the walls of caves, the frescoes of Giotto, and the canvases of Raphael. If we choose to clarify art as it has appeared in history, we may make artificial cuts up and down, thus dividing art into periods; but if we wish to feel its vitality, we must look upon it longitudinally, or stream-wise, as continuous expression. We, for all our sophistication, are bound to share the sentiments of primitive man and participate in the same feeling of expression that animated him. He groped after the beauty that we more fully grasp and sought to discern the aesthetic forms that are so much clearer to our eyes; and yet he expressed himself as we express ourselves.

We might find it difficult to consider primitive art as expression were it not for the fact that our generation seems to be indulging in it in somewhat the same way. In our despair over formalism, which reached its climax in the Victorian period, we are inclined to revert to the primitive. In architecture, we observe this in the massive type of building, such as the American Telegraph and Telephone Building in New York. In sculpture we observe the crude in Rodin's *The Thinker*. Gauguin's paintings, so distinctly atavistic, portray primitive life as the artist observed it in Tahiti. Eugene O'Neill, with such a play as *Emperor Jones*, reveals the modern desire to return to a primitive ideal of drama. Such works of art look natural, "strangely natural" as we say. Their "Futurism" is really a kind of "Pastism."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE

The humanizing of man, while still more or less of a natural process, was intensified by the development of language. As we saw in Chapter I, the work that man was forced to perform

called for the development of abridged or symbolized activity in a linguistic form. Man spoke, we might say, in order to exist. His word had meaning for him and significance for his fellow man also. In what degree was primitive man adapted to verbal expression? We have long been accustomed to believe that primitive tongues contained a limited vocabulary and no grammatical structure. But the studies of anthropologists in the present century are calculated to disabuse our minds of such a prejudice. "It is now known," says Goldenweiser, "that the vocabularies of more than one Indian tongue comprise several thousands of words and possess phonetic characteristics comparable in fixity and complexity to those of ancient and modern languages."⁴ If we observe the ease with which a child absorbs a language, our own English or a difficult tongue like the Chinese, we can well credit the primitive mind with adequate linguistic capacity, which is a purely human possession.

It is not necessary for us to go into the philosophy of language to appreciate its influence in the humanizing of a creature that, having learned to walk erect, use his hands and elaborate his primitive industries, came at last to apply names to things, feelings, operations in nature, and social relations. On the subjective side of language there was doubtless the desire to express emotion, whereby language would amount to something akin to the cry of the animal. On the social side, language gratified the primitive individual's desire for communication with his fellow. From the standpoint of nature, there was the need to recognize the differences between now and then, here and there, or the natural categories of time and space. Just as fully did the primitive mind appreciate the qualities of things and the forces operative within them, leading it to the ideas of substance and causality. The effect of language has been to detach man from the natural order and attach him to the human one. Instead of dealing with things only, man began to operate with symbols of them. If language had not arisen when work began and the intellectual had not accompanied the industrial, human beings would have amounted to no more than automata. But when language did come into being, it gave man a world of his own,

⁴ *Early Civilization*, p. 111.

akin to the world about him, but more a world of ideas than a world of things.

A glance at the parts of speech will serve to express this more clearly, just as it will enhance the importance of language. The multitudinous words in a developed language fall into definite compartments. Not only do they reduce themselves to alphabetical form, but they become what we call "parts of speech." Of these the noun with its adjective and the verb with its adverb are the most significant. Indeed it was by means of these four parts of speech that Aristotle developed his categories, or fundamental forms of thought. In a way which is by no means a manner of speaking, one uses the noun to indicate things as far as these become the objects of his consciousness. Since these things or objects are recognizable and often are known only through their qualities, the mind turns to adjectives to indicate states of existence or characteristics of things. As a sort of balance for the noun, language makes use of the verb to indicate relations of one sort or another, the relation of a thing to its qualities as also the relation of one thing to another. Then, just as the adjective adapts itself to the noun, so does the adverb locate action in space and time and indicate the way in which it is carried on. In general, it was when man desired to extend and intensify the field of action that he resorted to language.

SOCIAL LIFE AND HUMANITY

The social life of man was another factor in effecting the humanizing of the species. As in the case of industry and speech, we are accustomed to take social life for granted, little realizing by what effort mankind came to avail itself of these humanizing forces. Even today, after civilization has a long history behind it, we find it difficult to assume the social standpoint except in limited ways. Social life itself, entering human life in connection with man's works and words, must be taken to mean more than the quantity of human life as this may be summed up in the form of population. For there is an inward quality of social existence whereby the Greek became Grecian and the citizen of Rome a Roman indeed, and it is this inward quality that civiliza-

tion and culture are supposed to enhance and purify. It is not sufficient to attain an outer unity of mankind, as we endeavor to do politically by means of international relations; there is a demand for an inner unity which can beget a common consciousness. Society means division of labor and the coöperation that results from it, but it is calculated to mean a kind of mental collaboration involving an exchange of the goods of the mind.

The psychological aspect of social life tends to take the place of the biological analogies employed in the XIXth century, when society was looked upon as an "organism" made up of "social tissue" with its individual "cells." We are recognizing the fact that society is a great deal more than the gregarious instinct which is so apparent in the animal order. Society is an organization of minds which avail themselves of such human institutions as religion, art, and science to bring them together and promote mutual understanding. It is a mistake to follow the psychological analogy too far and thus speak of a "social mind" in the way that society was once regarded as an organism. A mind is an individuated thing definitely related to an individual brain. However, we have a right to refer to a "social consciousness" in its various forms, since there is social as well as individual psychology. Now it was by means of such a social feeling that primitive mankind began to promote the humanization that makes man a man to himself and mankind to the human species.

The social organization of man, whereby he began to approximate to his humanity, was brought about by the institution of marriage; out of it came blood-relationship, and the family in its widest sense of kinship became the State in miniature. It is not the only social factor, but it is the most original one. It may not have assumed the regular form of husband, wife, and children, since polygamy and polyandry entered in. But it was there at the beginning as it is now — the basis of social organization. The "mother" is used in primitive societies to designate both the mother and the maternal relatives, as the corresponding term "father" may denote things paternal, but the fundamental idea of kinship predominates. The *clan* arises when the children are thought of as belonging to the mother, the *gens* when they belong to the father.

FAMILY, VILLAGE, CITY

The family as a social factor appears in history in connection with the patriarchal family of the ancient Hebrews, where the names Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are most thoroughly understood as groups of individuals or chains of generations rather than as particular individuals bearing those names. The social and religious function of the family appears in a sanctified form in China with its ancestor worship. Even in our own age, when society might seem able to run of its own force and carry its own weight, it is necessary to have the simple, original family in a highly organized State. A theoretical conception of evolution seems to urge us to think of the family as itself having evolved out of an original condition of promiscuity through group marriage to individual marriage, but the facts in the case are against such a conception. As Aristotle pointed out long ago, it is the household, *oikos*, which lies at the foundation of the State, *polis*.

The family relationship at the basis of social organization was extended and enhanced by totemism. In its simplest form, totemism is a belief that a tribe or totemic group may trace their descent from some plant, bird, animal, or other natural object. Just as the human group relates itself to these objects, the latter are thought of as groups or species of things rather than as individuals. Totemism is more social than religious, since the totem is not an object of direct worship so much as one of awe. In speaking of the organization of the totemic system, Goldenweiser says, "The skeleton is always a social system. It may be a tribal set of families or of local groups, but in a surprisingly large majority of cases it is either a clan or a gentile system. The totemic complex may constitute the very flesh and spirit of that system, but if the totemic complex were conceivably removed, the skeleton would remain; there would still be a social system."⁵

TOTEMISM

How can we make a place in our own minds for totemism? We can do this when we observe our peculiar attachment for pet

⁵ *Early Civilization*, pp. 288-289.

animals, as for example dogs, which at the present time seem to live and multiply under a special human providence. We can sympathize with the original totemist, again, if we observe how penetrating minds are accustomed to see animal features in human faces. The physiognomist does this, but so does the observant mind generally. This we observe in one of Ibsen's cynical comments on human nature; it is where the sculptor, Rubek, speaks in *When We Dead Awaken*.

"There is something equivocal, something cryptic, lurking in and behind these busts—a secret something that the people themselves cannot see. I alone can see it and it amuses me unspeakably. On the surface, I give them the 'striking likeness,' as they call it, that they all stand and gape at in astonishment. But at bottom they are all respectable, pompous horse-faces, and self-opinionated donkey-muzzles, and lop-eared, low-browed dog-skulls, and fatted swine-snouts and sometimes dull, brutal bull-fronts as well."⁶

We are not pleased with such comments, yet all of us are inclined to observe quasi-animal features, and often attractive ones, in the people whom we see pass by. How much simpler must it have been for primitive men with poorly developed features to have noted these animal resemblances. But it was the working of the totem that had to do with the process of human socialization. This was in connection with marriage. Exogamy was the most universal and significant feature of the custom. It governed marriage in that it forbade a man to touch a woman of the same totem as his own, or even the female members of a whole group of totemic clans. Even today there is a tendency on the part of a young man to seek his mate outside his familiar circle of acquaintances, although there is nothing obligatory about this. All in all, the tendency of totemism was to extend the social circle and, likewise, render the individual more conscious of his social nature.

The various processes by which man became a human being thus seem to be concentrated in his social nature. Without a society about him, man could not have developed language, and however individualized his art and industry may have been they

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Act I.

required a social setting and played a social part. Hence we assume the social character of mankind and then cast about for plausible ways of explaining its origin. In so doing, we proceed as social science is in the habit of doing; we assume what we desire to prove and then show that our idea, industrial, aesthetical, linguistic, or social, fits into the general plan of human life as we know it. We do not attempt to deduce industry or art, speech or social life from anything not already contained in them. In so doing, however imperfect our logic may be, we avoid the error of the XVIIIth century, which regarded such natural effects as social life and language, political and religious institutions as things deliberately invented by the conscious intellect. We define man as an artistic, linguistic, social, and religious creature; then we have little trouble in showing how society with its various forms arose.

THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL

The process by which the human species became human beings was bound to include religion. The function of religion at the present time is not wholly clear; it appears to be a means of socializing human existence and promoting human welfare, but it is more inclined to speak of peace on earth among men than glory to God in the heavens. With the primitive mind, religion was a means of gaining insight into and power over nature. By means of common perception, man came to an immediate understanding with the objects of his experience. Through his industry he gained partial power over them in particular. But to comprehend and command the world as a whole, as the primitive mind so understood that world, was another matter. Hence the primitive mind confronted nature with supernaturalism. This assumed two leading forms: a speculative animism and practical magic. These forms of primitive psychology received classic treatment at the hands of Tylor in his *Primitive Culture* (1871) and Frazer in *The Golden Bough* (1890).

The religious life of mankind seems to have begun in a psychological manner in special connection with animism. According to Tylor, religion is a belief in spiritual beings,⁷ a belief uni-

⁷ *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I, Ch. 11.

versal among primitive peoples. In his naturalistic psychology the primitive man had to distinguish between life and death waking hours and those of sleep; hence he resorted to an animistic interpretation. The life of man was attributed to the spirit in the form of breath, for when a man died he stopped breathing. The spirit, however, survived and it was this disembodied ghost-soul, a kind of filmy or vaporous substance that visited man, appearing in the form of dreams and visions.

ANIMISM

But this animism was more than a psychology; it was a form of worship or cult of the dead; out of it grew various religious practices. Among these were funeral rites which involved human sacrifices, based on the idea that the dead man would need the services of his wives and his servants. These victims of their own faith, or that of the community, were buried alive or strangled to death or burned on the funeral pyre. When not put to death by force, they were made to sacrifice themselves by force of public opinion, which would make intolerable the life of the survivor, chiefly the widow. The Japanese improved upon the principle of the living sacrifice of the deceased's attendants by substituting images of stone, clay, or wood which, since the dead could have no physical needs, would serve his purposes about as well. Then there were feasts of the dead celebrated near the tomb of the dead man, who consumed only the steam and odor of the food which was eaten by the mourners. Certain modern survivals of animistic practice are to be found in the custom of placing flowers on a grave, originally with the idea that the spirit might enjoy their odor. The military custom of having the horse of a deceased general march riderless in the funeral procession may be accepted as another survival of animistic procedure. The significance of such practices has been forgotten, but the symbol remains.

The philosophy or science inherent in animistic belief and practice involves a kind of primitive idealism. Animism thus takes on a cosmic form when it attributes spirits to objects generally, the animate and the inanimate. The power by which things

live and move is accounted for on animistic grounds, the assumption being that spirits can enter into things as well as persons. This lends sanctity to things, which become objects of worship. Such an object then becomes a fetish. Animistic philosophy takes on a social form also, since the souls of the dead came to be thought of as constituting a class of spiritual beings. "The souls of dead men," says Tylor, "are in fact considered as actually forming one of the most important classes of demons and deities."⁸ Out of such animism sprang ancestor worship, also; the deified ancestors tended to become patron saints. Indeed, ancestor worship, which is of no little domestic and social value, is so widespread in India and Siam, China and Japan, and so venerable in form, that it tends to mask its origin in the crude psychology of the primitive mind. Naturally such a reverence for the dead tends to promote conservatism, which retards civilization and culture.

MAGIC

In distinction from animism, magic is the practical application of belief in supernatural powers; these the primitive mind desires to control or, at any rate, conciliate. In magic, religion is put to work and used. According to Frazer, magic is older than religion, can exist in independence of it, but shows a tendency to fuse with it. It arose in connection with the simplest of mental processes — the association of ideas; it follows the principles of association that Hume made a part of modern psychological science — resemblance and contiguity. "The very beasts," says Frazer, "associate the ideas of things that are like each other or that have been found together in their experience, and they could hardly survive for a day if they ceased to do so."⁹ The believer in magic, however, proceeds to produce the association that usually is merely given in experience, where it affords a kind of guide for reason. The believer in magic thus fashions a crude doll to represent his enemy, so that what injury he inflicts upon this representative object will through association by similarity be inflicted upon his enemy. By this simulation of the real act,

⁸ *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II, Ch. 14.

⁹ *The Golden Bough*, Vol. I, p. 233.

he brings about, to his mind, the actual fulfillment of his desire. On the other hand, one may himself suffer injury at the hands of the enemy who has in his possession any of one's personal effects, as hair, nail-parings, or clothing. This is the complementary form of the magical situation; it involves association by contiguity in space and time.

It comes about in this way that magical belief is related to the idea of causality. We have referred to Hume and his doctrine of association; dare we make similar reference to Kant and his doctrine of causality? In both the primitive mind and that of the profound philosopher, there is the notion that causal relation in thought is equivalent to causal connection in fact. "Thus the analogy between the magical and the scientific conception of the world is close. In both of them the succession of events is perfectly regular and certain, being determined by immutable laws the operation of which can be foreseen and calculated precisely."¹⁰ There is something magical about science in its discoveries and inventions, but it is a question whether there is anything really scientific about magic.

The differences between the magical and scientific states of mind, between the mind of primitive man and the philosopher, are obvious. There is a vast difference in the degree of general intelligence and intelligent experience. The magical mind proceeds at once from a connection which has established itself in consciousness to a parallel connection in the world of things. The metaphysical mind does not attempt such a mento-material relationship until, in the case of the philosopher, he has made a critical analysis of mind; until, in the instance of the physicist, he has made an equally careful analysis of the kind of matter with which he is to deal. The magical mind may intuit a principle of fate governing the world; the scientific mind prefers to look upon this in the form of Natural Law, or a system of laws which the mind has discovered. The one is intensely emotional; the other, rational. The differences in the results are that the primitive type of mind attempts to control nature by means of the wish, while the philosophical seeks the control by obedience to the laws of nature.

¹⁰ *The Golden Bough*, Vol. I, p. 221.

SURVIVALS OF PRIMITIVE BELIEF

Although naturally we are bound to deal critically with the savage mind and repudiate its animism and magic, we are not entitled to regard animistic beliefs and magical practices as "superstition." Primitive men were not superstitious but religious, since superstition arises when the mind departs from principles established by experience and reason. In default of a higher standard of belief, the primitive mind made use of such mental processes as were available, as the association of ideas. The development of religion with its function of sacrifice, prayer, and righteousness aroused opposition to magical practices. These were condemned by the Levitical Law and early Christianity, but persisted in mediaeval astrology and alchemy. It has some place on the periphery of modern thought in the form of lucky objects and lucky days, signs and omens, if not in hero worship and the "magic of a name." It has its place on the realistic stage of Ibsen, as one observes in *Master Builder*, whose hero, Solness, was able to achieve his aims by merely wishing and willing.

"Don't you agree with me, Hilda, that there exist special, chosen people who have been endowed with the power and faculty of desiring a thing, craving for a thing, willing a thing so persistently and so inexorably that at last it has to happen? Don't you believe that?"¹¹ Apparently the special, chosen people are those who have been unable to disabuse their minds of primitive notions or who resort to them by way of fantasy. The same might be said of the host of astrologists and numerologists who at the present time are resorting to certain forms of magical practice. In all such magical reasoning, if reasoning it can be called, there is a decided touch of egoism. The individual desires that his will prevail; it is always his welfare or his good luck that is paramount.

In the case of the primitive mind, this egoistic tone assumes a less objectionable character, since the savage is not in a position to distinguish between the stream of his ideas and the course of the world, or between his private welfare and that of the tribe. His is really the voice of the tribe, the crying out of the humanity

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, Act II.

within him. In this sense, then, the root of religion may be found in something humanistic; in the attempt on the part of the Man within the savage to assert himself as a human being. It is a spiritual form of self-assertion, or the affirmation of spiritual life within the heart of the natural man. It is for this reason that we come to regard religion as the most penetrating way of humanizing mankind. It works crudely enough at the beginning or even now, but it does not fail to assert a spiritual principle within man. This may be in the form of another self revealed in dreams just as it may assume the deeper conception of a life after death. The effect of such primitive religion is what concerns us. This was the humanization of the human species. Our ancestors sought gods and found men.

THE NATURE OF HUMANITY

But the general humanization of mankind means more than the invention of tools and the development of language, the institutions of society and religion. It means civilization and culture. What do we mean when we refer to humanity? It must be more than a superior form of animality. As we pursue the course of man's deeds and thoughts, we shall be led to the belief that in man we find a unique creature whose connection with the animal order and place in the evolutionary scheme can be all but ignored. We shall cease speaking of industry and begin discussing the effects of this industry upon nature and man. We shall make no further reference to language as such, but shall consider what various human languages have expressed in literature. We shall turn away from the general principle of sociality and consider how this has elaborated significant civilizations and shall abandon the primitive conception of religion for the sake of observing the trend of religion in modern life.

We must not fail to observe how man has detached his being from the order of nature whence he sprang and made himself lord of the whole earth, where he dictates which animals shall or shall not survive. It is man himself who has elaborated the evolutionary theory of his own origin whereby he has come to think of himself in ways that would have dismayed philosophers

in the days of Plato and even amazed scientists in the more recent age of Newton. There is no denying the evidence of evolution, but there is good reason for resisting the implication that therefore man is only one animal among others, albeit a *primus inter pares*. From what man has thought and said and done we have the right to believe that he is qualitatively different from the animal order to which he is related only incidentally. We are to regard man as though he were free.

THE EMANCIPATION OF MAN

The moment we speak of human freedom, we encounter another human theory that man elaborated for the purpose of comprehending the natural order and then applied to himself. This is the principle of causality. Now, it would require an independent treatise to do justice to the question of free will and causal determinism; even then the argument might result in a stalemate. Hence, instead of engaging in a dialectical dispute, we will merely refer to the works of man we are about to examine and make the assumption that the effects of civilization and culture are to be ascribed to man's own will. Arts and sciences are not among the usual works of nature, and their existence is argument *de facto* in favor of the free activity of man, who builds the cities and writes the poems, who installs a system of mechanism in nature even at the risk of including himself in it. If at the moment man is performing an act, he is not conscious of his freedom; when he reflects upon the work of his hands he has the right to refer to it as the great Babylon he has builded. This leads us to a third aspect of humanism — the consciousness of mankind.

Here, again, just as in the case of man's humanity and freedom, we are called upon to observe how man tends to include himself in his own work, as though one were to build a boat inside a shop with a small door and then find himself unable to launch his craft. As long as we dwell upon the idea of common consciousness, as we may call our combination of sensations, just so long will it be possible for us to relegate this to the brain. But when we advance from a given to an acquired consciousness,

such as expresses itself in culture and exercises itself in civilization, we find the cerebral theory of consciousness so out of place as to be almost meaningless. Our culture-consciousness, so to call it, is a massive product, out of which we build humanistic things such as are found in the arts and sciences. We might call it "mind," but that would involve us in metaphysics. If we referred to it as "spirit" or the "life of the spirit," the suggestion would be religious. Let us continue to call it "consciousness," but think of it in that special way we recognize in the history of humanity with its accumulation of wisdom and work. It is what we think of and refer to as "human life" when we are not terrorized by some scientific theory of our own making. It is really the memory of the human race. It is in this human memory that man discovered himself.

The discovery of man as *homo sapiens* and the invention of man as *homo civilis* would have amounted to little but for the direct development of mankind in civilization and culture. If we ignore these, we shall not be able to advance beyond anthropology and shall continue to speak of man as of some animal species only. But our concern is with men like ourselves and the human order of which we are a part, hence we must ourselves assume responsibility for what man does and thinks. This we do when we consider the great schemes already mentioned—civilization and culture. What do these terms signify and how much weight of meaning can they carry? In answering these impromptu questions, we make little headway by considering the original connotation of the words, for civilization seems to suggest city life while culture conveys the idea of a garden. We use these terms because they are conventional, but we must apply them in a philosophical or universal manner.

The point of departure in the conception of these terms or ideas is that of human life, for they are views of mankind and human history at large. Both civilization and culture imply the perfectibility of man, or an outer and inner form of development. Accordingly we say that civilization, which we recognize in empires and social systems, is an attempt to perfect man's life outwardly. Culture, discernible in Greek life, Scholasticism, the Renaissance, and the like, are parallel attempts to perfect man's

life inwardly. We can identify civilization in the multifarious works of man in State-making, government, commerce, and law. Culture we can observe in the manifold development of the arts and sciences. The idea of civilization is likely to assume a political; culture, an aesthetical form. Both attempt to perfect man, to humanize him.

CHAPTER III

THE FACTORS IN CIVILIZATION



THE MEANING OF CIVILIZATION

WE ARE NOT AT ALL ENLIGHTENED WHEN WE READ IN DICTIONARIES or encyclopedias that "civilization" means a condition in which man is "civilized." We are scarcely better off when a writer on the subject of civilization proceeds to etymology and identifies a complex subject with a simple term — civilization with *civis*, meaning a citizen. This would lead us to believe that to be civilized means to live in a city and rejoice in the customs and manners of urban existence. To be civilized would amount to no more than having the sophistication that is associated with a city and the fine manners supposed to accompany city life. This is of course a shallow way of approaching a serious subject; it involves no more than the popular contrast between "citified" people and the inhabitants of rural regions. But it may be pointed out that the "civilized" people of England live in the country and go up to London for the season, while the "civilized" people of France dwell in Paris and make excursions into the country. Hence we accomplish nothing by playing upon the word *civis* and had better settle down to a substantial conception of our subject matter. By civilization we mean the improvement or perfection of man's outer condition; it concerns man's relation to nature and his fellow man. It is a state of affairs, and is both physical and social.

Mankind lives in nature, but men are not civilized until they are adjusted intelligently to their natural environment. All men are gregarious, but they do not enjoy civilization until they become social, until their relationships are rational. Man entered the world on the same level with other animals. He was without clothing or shelter and devoid of tools and weapons. For food he was directly dependent upon what nature had to offer him. His relations to those about him were purely instinctive in the form of family life and clan existence. He was a long dis-

tance from such civilization as we have today in the form of machines and institutions. But man was equipped with a superior brain and a skillful hand, the gift of language and the possibilities of reason. By such means was he to solve the problem of life, a problem still awaiting solution. His senses were receptive and his brain inventive; by means of observation and invention he was able to detach himself from nature and live a truly human life. His civilization began when he reacted to nature and responded to his fellow man. Such civilization was instinctive—something that man found in himself. It was not formed consciously by means of a social contract, as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau thought, but was implicit in the life of man as man. Man is naturally social and is thus apt for civilization. Aristotle made this idea the basis of political theory; Grotius laid it down as a fundamental principle of law. This is likewise the testimony of history and anthropology. Retrace the history of man as far back as we may, we find a social creature. How is human civilization to be understood and evaluated?

THE POINT OF DEPARTURE

It is natural to seek definitions which will give us some subject matter in so many words. But what are we profited when we have a set of terms supposed to indicate the meaning of "nature" or "humanity," "culture" or "civilization"? Such fundamental notions are as difficult to define in language as they are correspondingly simple to realize in life. In the instance of civilization, we are in a position to appreciate the significance of the thing itself, but are not so well situated when it comes to rendering the meaning of this in words. The translation from fact to idea, from human deeds to human words can never be literal; at best it is only a paraphrase of things. However, it is not impossible for us to identify the meaning of the idea in question. In the case of both culture and civilization, we find the point of departure, if not the norm, in the contrasted idea of nature.

When we refer to nature as the contrary of civilization, we do not have in mind the exterior order of things which surrounds man. Man at once humanizes the world by perceiving it; he

makes it something like himself by means of his human arts and sciences. But this philosophical and scientific conception of the world, which yields a kind of intellectual cosmos, is not the natural order which concerns civilization. Here the situation is dynamic, not intellectual. It is a living state of affairs in which nature acts upon man and man reacts upon nature. Hence it is not the forms of the world — space and time — which appeal to man and engage his attention, but the forces of the world — matter and motion — which challenge his will and are involved in the problem of human civilization. What nature has done for man has been observed already in the evolution of the human species from the Peking man to the man of the present. But this has nothing to do with civilization. Civilization is man's own work.

In its simplest form, civilization consists of exchange. Man puts off something natural and puts on something artificial; or he puts off the "old man" and puts on the "new man." It is natural for mankind to wander, not only in search of food but also to satisfy the desire for novelty. It is "civil" or civilized for mankind to abide in a fixed habitation, produce a large population, and carry on some sort of socialized work by means of co-operation. It was natural for human beings, if we may call them such, to live as they did from the age of the Peking man to that of the Cro-Magnon type. The differences among types of men — *Pithecanthropus*, *Heidelberg*, *Neanderthal* — were wrought by nature itself. But when instead of mere differences, which still obtain in racial forms, improvements appear, these improvements are to be attributed to men themselves and are to be duly credited to civilization. Hence, as far as we have advanced in framing a concept of civilization, we see that distance from nature and difference from nature are the most significant ideas. Civilization at large consists in putting off the "natural man."

This human civilization may have been in vain, but that pathetic idea need not stand in the way of finding out what it is that has failed to better man's condition and character. The arts and sciences, governments and industries, ideals and institutions that man has elaborated may not have elevated him above savagery, such savagery as was witnessed in the World War, but it

is the tendency to elaborate just such things that constitutes civilization. Hence the *value of the product*, which can easily be questioned, cannot negate the *fact of the process*, for civilization as a fact cannot be denied. Furthermore, when we are inclined to doubt that the *result* of civilization has meant human betterment, we cannot overlook the fact that such betterment has been the *purpose* of civilization.

NATURE AND HUMANITY

The self-emancipation of man from nature, or civilization, has been carried on by thought as much as by action. Indeed, the intellectual character of civilization is such as often to render it indistinguishable, as it is ever inseparable, from culture. Both alike sunder man from the natural order. Man verily knows that a minimum of insight and activity suffices to satisfy his immediate wants in the form of food and clothing and shelter. Man realizes at heart that, after all, the processes of human satisfaction are simple and may be said to be bound up in the common experience of pleasure-pain. Yet, in spite of the benefit near at hand and the satisfaction near at heart, man has persuaded himself that his "needs" include what are really luxuries. He needs shelter, but desires to dwell in a palace. He must have food, but has expended great effort to secure tea and coffee and exotic condiments generally. Clothing he requires, but he sets an unusual value upon such forms of dress as furs and silks, brought from a distance. In our age, a certain amount of machinery has become necessary, but we have extended the list of life's essentials until it includes an automobile and a radio for almost every family. And yet, with all these increasing luxuries ever settling down into necessities, it is only so much instinct, so much emotion that is to be, or can be, satisfied.

But this fact of luxury in civilization should be accepted as evidence of man's desire to be "unnatural," rather than as a criticism of his effort toward self-emancipation. The luxuries of the civilized man may be regarded in the form of a will-o'-the-wisp or even bait to lead man into human enterprise wherein the effort itself rather than its effects becomes the factor in civiliza-

tion. If man had continued to exert himself merely as a creature seeking food and similar natural boons, he would not have had the civilizations that history records. The effort, the enterprise, the *élan*, the flair is the leading consideration. "Progressive culture," says Lotze, "is not unlike a majestic waterfall which, seen from a great distance, seems to promise great things, and yet which when we look nearer does not appear to shower upon the soil of life a greater amount of refreshing spray than was afforded in the quieter life of antiquity by the more modest stream of a less splendid civilization."¹ Nevertheless it is the mighty effort, man's constant striving toward civilization rather than the fruitful results of it that has urged man forward and upward.

Instead of rounding out a definition that might have no more than verbal value, we had better indicate some of the leading features of civilization. They will be found to involve the idea of less and less nature, more and more humanity. They include such obvious operations as securing food, making clothing, and providing shelter, and might appear to be only the extension of natural forces working through man according to the general struggle for existence. But these necessities of life are not merely things that man finds; he prepares and manufactures them. Further removed from man's natural activities is the manufacture of implements, of tools and weapons. The development of such industrial civilization has been from stone to steel, from the rude implements of primitive man to the elaborate machinery of civilization today. These elements of material civilization have an importance of their own inasmuch as by means of them man was able to live and improve the conditions of his existence. But they are of psychological significance also; they indicate human inventiveness. Invention means a combination of mind and matter, the production of something novel, and the ideal of improvement. By means of instruments man invented an object and discovered himself as the maker of it. Each invention which could be applied to his own advantage or enjoyment led man to devise other contrivances. Moreover he established practical habits of mind.

¹ *Microcosmus*, tr. Hamilton and Jones, Bk. VI, Ch. I, § 1.

INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS

But civilization is institutional as well as instrumental, for man operates with both the tangible and the intangible. Alongside mechanisms, he builds institutions—the family and property, worship and political organization, law and education. All of these institutional inventions, so to style them, may have their physical characteristics, as the living beings that constitute a family and the real objects that go to make up property; but these institutions exist in another than the physical order. They enjoy an existence in a realm that is social, mental, spiritual. If we attempt to analyze them, we discover a texture of ideas, intentions, feelings, habits, customs, and the like. We may not be able to identify them with any specific domain of existence, but we know that they are not in any of the realms of nature. Civilization means distance from nature and a corresponding approach to a human order of existence; hence the tendency to civilize may be praised or blamed accordingly as one's philosophy of life may dictate. But the fact of separation from the natural order and the elaboration of a spiritual one is ever apparent.

The separation of man from the earth and the distinction between nature and humanity result in a double task for the civilized man. He must subdue both nature and himself, must perfect his condition and his character. His progress along the physical line of instruments has been physical, while his elevation by means of institutions has been moral. Before we come to the question of civilization as progress, we must observe that advancement apparently inherent in the very nature of mankind has been more marked on the physical than on the moral side of his civilization. It might be thought that nature would resist and that he would obey his own nature, but something like the reverse seems to be the situation. This may be due to the fact that the human mind has a better comprehension of nature than of man himself; physics is more perfect than psychology and the science of astronomy far superior to that of sociology. Nature proceeds according to laws which man can discover and apply. Human nature for all its religious beliefs, ethical ideals, and aesthetical standards does not present such a system of laws. It

cannot be said strictly that "nature obeys man"; nature obeys her own laws, and it is by discovering these that man is able to exercise some practical control over physical forces.

CAUSE AND PURPOSE

The distinction between the physical and moral in civilization, or the perfection of natural forces in machines and the attempted perfection of human forces in institutions, is a distinction between cause and purpose. We can discern a certain degree of purpose in natural operations and as much causation in human actions, but it is best to relegate causality to nature and purpose to humanity. In the case of nature, we are bound to be satisfied with what is given in experience, but in the instance of man we are just as much bound to take into consideration both that which has been in the past and that which we believe should be in the future. This does not mean that civilization must aim at Utopia or that a given system of government, such as that of the United States, should be modeled upon the ideal republic of Plato. All that it means is that human institutions are a combination of the actual and the ideal, of the historical and the utopian. The reason why there are no laws of civilization comparable to the laws of nature is that civilization, while suggesting laws, is determined by ideals; it involves more of the future than of the present or the past; it is an aspiration more than a phenomenon. Social science is "inferior" to physical science in that it lacks accuracy and predictability; it is "superior" to it because it includes the ethical ideal of what ought to be.


The arts and sciences of culture, the tools and weapons of civilization are instruments. Man creates them, uses them, and drops them for other similar things for the sake of getting value out of life. Does not this instrumentalism, as we may call it, yield us a good working definition of our subject, of civilization—getting values out of life and putting values into life? Value may stand as the constant with all sorts of variables about it. The Jews valued a temple, the Greeks an academy, the Romans a forum, mediaeval Christianity a church, modern life a machine. Eastern civilization will be one thing, western an-




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other, for the East desires an autocratic, the West a democratic way of living. An ancient felt that he was civilized when his State produced an artist, a philosopher, a legislator; a modern feels civilized because he has a scientist, a business man, a plumber. These differences in civilization, all other things being equal, are due to differences in valuation, due likewise to what man expects from nature and the way in which he goes about to realize that expectation. The history of civilization, preserved in museums in the form of relics, is largely a history of these instruments of value. They are the mute books of the past or a picture-language of those civilizations, differing in dates and localities, which bear testimony to man's effort to perfect his outer existence. They are direct evidences of civilization.

THE DOUBLE TASK OF CIVILIZATION

The fact of civilization in the changed appearance of the globe invites explanation. The earth is not what it was when man appeared, still less is it like the original earth that emerged from the sun and then became the scene of storms from above and volcanoes below. It is now a humanized planet thoroughly marked by the hand of man, the scene of his various civilizations. These may be regarded as relationships — the adaptation of man to earth, the adjustment of man to man. We may accept these civilizations as facts or, at least, as trends, and then cast about for explanations of them. In so doing, we are confronted by the question whether civilization is the work of nature or of man; whether it is the extension of natural causation or the introduction of a new force in the form of the human will, the environmental or volitional. The very fact that human beings in groups appear in time and are located in space encourages the view that the time-space order produces a civilization just as it brings forth a family of plants or species of animals. We must consider to what extent civilization is physical and in what ways differences in civilizations are geographical.

In perfected civilizations, such as we find in modern Europe, it is obvious that mind predominates over matter, hence it would be absurd to assert that England and France, Germany and Italy

rejoiced in forms of politics, economics, and social life peculiar to the conditions of sky and soil and dependent upon climate and geographical location. The environment in Europe is pretty much the same; the types of civilization are various. The geographical contrast between England and the United States has not been able to prevent the development of similar civilizations. Civilization in general is dependent upon environment only in the way that life is dependent upon nature. The forms that civilization takes must be sought in human nature itself. "Do not talk to me about environmental determinants," said Hegel in an oft-quoted comment; "where once lived the Greeks now live the Turks." Now, how is human civilization to be explained?

DETERMINISM

The theory of civilization, as indeed of the whole course of things natural and human, was elaborated originally by the Greeks. Their first conception was that of Fate or a scheme of absolute decrees which fulfill themselves in independence of both natural forces and human wills. We sense this in Greek religion and see it exemplified in Greek tragedy. This idea of divine determinism reappeared in the theology of St. Augustine, who substituted the will of God for the caprices of pagan deities. In modern times, it was exemplified by Bossuet and Vico. A more intelligible conception of the course of things appeared in Plato and Aristotle, who viewed things in terms of ends or purposes and organized the world according to the idea of the Good. This view that we may style teleological determinism appeared in modern times in the philosophies of history represented by Herder, Hegel, and Ranke. In addition to such religious and ethical determinism, we have the doctrine of Physical Necessity as this culminated in Democritus. It was in a sense a return to the original idea of fate, but was even more drastic in that it exercised sway over both earth and heaven, dominating both men and gods. Modern thought exalts and uses this method as Scientific Determinism growing out of the mechanistic views of nature which have prevailed since the days of Newton. We observe such determinism in Comte, Spencer, and St. Simon. It is the third

type of social causation that prevails today; we must see to what extent civilization is a matter of determinism.

Those who believe that there is such a thing as social science comparable to natural science are bound to premise some sort of causation. These fall into two main groups, which we may call the physical determinists and the social determinists. They agree upon the general principle of environment as the cause of social phenomena, but disagree on the point of whether this is natural or social. The physical determinist attempts to explain the facts of civilization upon the basis of natural forces as the mere movement of particles in space. This is the view taken by A. P. Weiss. Or the physical cause of social phenomena may be attributed to the dissipation of energy, as do Ostwald, Brooks, and Henry Adams. Sometimes the processes of bio-chemistry are assumed as causes. We have then what amounts to an unusual branch of "social physics," "social thermodynamics," or "social chemistry." Since these theories deal with the lives and activities of human beings, they may be criticized on the ground that they have to leave out the psychological phenomena of sensation and feeling, will and purpose. More generally, such physical theories ignore the qualities of the data with which they are dealing and make the cardinal mistake of trying to explain different sets of phenomena, the physical and social, upon the basis of the physical alone.

PHYSICAL CAUSATION

The physical theory of civilization assumes a more definite and plausible form in the character of geographic determinism, which includes the influence of location and climate, soil and food. This physical theory of civilization was developed by Montesquieu (1689-1755), made classic by Buckle (1821-1862), developed scientifically by Ratzel (1844-1904), and brought down to date by Huntington (1876-). The physiographic view of causation is plausible. Most of us are inclined to believe that there are better civilizations in the northern than in the southern hemisphere, even when there is the marvelous civilization of ancient Egypt. In like manner, we are in the habit of looking to the West rather than to the East for outer perfection of human life,

even if there are good examples of oriental civilization in India and China. In a word, we are accustomed to believe that civilization is Europeanization. But we are not so sure that nature itself is responsible for what has taken place in such a restricted portion of the globe. Peoples in different zones will dress differently, dwell in abodes of different sorts, and have different diets; and with primitive tribes these natural causes springing up from the various environments may have produced social effects. The matter is not so easily shown after civilization has reached a definite stage of development.

Even with primitive peoples, it is not the presence of the environment but the use of what it contains that affects the mode of human life. The Americans who were native to this continent did not respond to earth the way the Americans of the last four hundred years have been doing. When the comparison is not that between the native and the late settler, but has to do with different tribes, the same environment will bring forth different reactions. We observe this in the arctic regions, where the natives might seem to be under the complete domination of nature. However, in the matter of housing, we might assume that those who live in similar latitudes would dwell in similar abodes determined by the climate. But, as Goldenweiser points out,² the Eskimos of arctic America build snow houses, as one would expect; but just across the Behring Strait, in northeastern Siberia, the arctic Chukchi build and live in tents made of hides.

In the domain of primitive industry the same indifference to natural conditions shows itself. The distribution of clay in North America is one thing, the development of pottery another. The material is found practically everywhere, but the use of it is confined to definite districts. "Roughly speaking," says Goldenweiser, "a line drawn from the northeastern corner of the continent to the southwestern one would divide North America into a pot-making district south and east of the line and one in which no pottery is made north and west of it."³ In the case of those who accept the suggestion of nature and make pottery out of the material offered, the environmental force appears to be at work.

² *Early Civilization*, pp. 294-295.

³ *Ib.*, p. 294.

But with other tribes in a similar situation, tribes using but not manufacturing pots, another factor enters in — that of barter. They buy or obtain their pottery by exchange; in which case it is the relation of man to man, not the adaptation of man to nature, that becomes an effective force in civilization. All tribes of primitive men, as indeed all groups of civilized ones, depend upon nature at large for their existence, but this is far from saying that their particular forms of civilization are dependent upon geographical factors. These forms of social life are more dependent upon the creative character of the human mind itself.

SOCIAL DETERMINISM

But even when we advance from nature to society and seek the cause of civilization in men rather than in things, we do not escape from deterministic theories. Both the theories of physical and social causation have one thing in common — the idea of environment. But the social conception of environmental influence is to the effect that it is not something given in nature, as soil, or something found in man, as instinct, but social organization as a whole that acts causally. Typical theories of social causation involve the economic and the religious. According to Karl Marx the course of civilization as well as the creation and modification of institutions is determined by the economic factor, the way in which wealth is produced. Accordingly a feudal system of civilization will have one set of institutions, capitalism another. Max Weber finds a religious root to modern economics. Originally modern capitalism was confronted by naïve piety and the desire for gain. Religion called upon man to serve God by labor and deny himself worldly indulgence. The result was the accumulation of wealth. In this predicament, the Calvinist regarded man as only an “administrator” of his God-given wealth and looked upon his business as his “calling.” The inference that we draw from Weber’s religious sociology is that our present form of civilization has a religious background and that, indeed, all economic relations are based upon religion in the form of sanctified tradition.⁴

⁴ *General Economic History*, tr. Knight, Ch. XXX.

In addition to the purely social attempt to account for civilization, there is the popular conception of civilization as the work of the "great man." "Every institution," said Emerson, "is the lengthened shadow of some man." This is the reason why we attribute the institution of law to Moses, empire to Alexander and Caesar and Charlemagne, military ability to Napoleon, philosophy to Plato. But imagine any one of these supermen reappearing upon earth and trying to live up to his reputation! It would be impossible for him to fill the place we have made for him in our civilization and culture. This does not mean that we should "debunk" the biographies of these heroes, a process which often consists in no more than relating real or imaginary scandals in their lives. It means that we should realize how such greatness comes about and what purpose it serves. If we are willing to admit that such men were not supermen but were only quantitatively different from the rank and file of men, we can account for them psychologically and evaluate them sociologically.

The psychology of the man who is great in the minds of people generally involves what is called empathy, or in-feeling; it means the self-identification of another and many others with the excellences and exploits of the great man. It is as though we ourselves had said and done the great word or deed with which his name is associated. When this is done on a large scale with a living person, it produces what we call the "host of admirers" and makes the man's name, even if it be "Smith," a "name to conjure with." Let any one examine the nature of his admiration for a great man in athletics, aviation, finance, or politics and he will find that in admiring his hero's exploits he is so identifying himself with the hero that it is as though he himself had performed the deed. In the case of historical characters, in addition to the convenience which the personification of an institution with a person affords, there is the feeling that such a person's excellence takes effect generally. Plato's thought is the wisdom of mankind, and Napoleon's ambition its inherent will.

Emerson expressed this when he said,

"I am owner of the sphere,
Of the seven stars and solar year;

Of Caesar's hand and Plato's brain,
Of Lord Christ's heart and Shakespeare's strain."

The social value of such empathy is considerable. Religion advances and keeps its hold upon faith by constant appeal to the prophet. Virtue is enhanced, as it was with Cynic and Stoic, by a constant reference to the name of Socrates. Patriotism is nourished by incessant reference to the national hero and the annual celebration of his birthday. Such empathy is of vast value in civilization, even if it does consist of naïve egoism on the part of the host of admirers. The "great man" is allowed the inherent greatness of each member of the social order.

DETERMINISM INADEQUATE

These theories of civilization concern our modes of existence, the institutions in which we believe, and our very existence as human beings. By means of them we theorize about ourselves, so that they are not to be dismissed lightly or accepted carelessly. There must be certain factors that control civilization, although we cannot hope to reduce them to a general principle like that of gravity, since the subject of society is too complex, human beings too thoroughly individuated, and the will too volatile to admit of a fixed law. If we do lay down any law, it may be expected to operate statistically, as in the case of the death-rate and life-expectation tables employed by insurance companies. The principle may be found true of the group as a whole but not necessarily for any individual in the group. If there is to be determinism, it must be in harmony with the subject matter over which it is supposed to preside, for human beings in their struggle for social existence cannot be expected to behave like particles of matter in motion. What shall we say, then, of such social causes as soil and climate, industry and religion?

If we could explain civilization by such means, we cannot thus explain it away, for the fact of civilization remains and at the same time exhibits its unique value. We experience and appreciate the kind of life we are living no matter how it was brought into existence. The meaning of a thing is not nullified, or its

value destroyed, merely because it is the effect of something else. As far as causation itself is concerned, we deny that social science has the right to select something salient in our natural or social environment and isolate it as the cause of our civilization. A civilization which is effected by the soil does not fail to reveal the effect of religious belief also; both earth and heaven operate upon it at the same time. If a social group is influenced by the climate, it influences itself by the type of economic environment it has itself created. Both nature and man, the visible and the invisible are among the complex causes of any civilization.

The principle of causality, which is so important, so imperative in the field of natural science, is by no means as dominant in the social order. Modern science has used the principle of causality as a kind of model according to which all physical changes were supposed to take place. But the physics of the XXth century is not so thoroughly pledged to determinism. "Those who maintain a deterministic theory of mental activity," says Eddington, "must do so as the outcome of their study of the mind itself and not with the idea that they are thereby making it more conformable with our experimental knowledge of the laws of inorganic nature."⁵ Hence it would seem that, in place of a fixed system of cause and effect, it would be wiser to apply to the phenomena of civilization the idea of causality as an influence or a force which tends to release something psychological and social already in the human mind. The idea of a compelling cause so efficacious in simple action of a mechanical sort should give way before the notion of a releasing cause as that which brings about change and development in the social order. Hence we cannot say that soil or climate, industry or religion is the cause of a civilization in its origin or in the changes that take place within it. The best we can do is to suggest that these factors, among others, have been influential in shaping that form of civilization.

CIVILIZATION AND PROGRESS

The meaning, or connotation, of civilization appears again in the concept of progress or, at least, change. Movement is essen-

⁵ *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 295.

tial to all nature, as we observe from the rotation of stars, the generation of new orbs, and the formation of a planetary system. On the planet earth, the spirit of movement shows itself in the form of geological and geographical changes and the evolution of plants and animals. With man, there is this general sense of natural change plus the restless, creative activity of his will. When, therefore, man conceives of the idea that his outer situation can be made different, he avails himself of the spirit of change in nature, as a sailor makes use of the wind, and adds to the spirit of motion in general certain activities of his own, as manufacture and building. The result of this general consideration is the idea of progress, whence it comes about that civilization is practically the history of civilization; history in the sense of a force rather than a record of the effects which that force produces. How has that historical force been operating?

Before we can attempt to cope with the particular forces that work in history we must try to determine their general direction. This involves the simple notion of "up" or "down"; simple when stated in such a geometrical way, but extremely complicated when we attempt to make historical events conform to it. When we recall that mankind, in its self-humanization, has passed through the stages of religion, philosophy, and science, we are inclined to tolerate the idealistic notion that civilization had a heavenly origin. Long ago mankind began to entertain that beautiful but pathetic picture of itself in the form of a myth concerning the Golden Age. But when we recall, again, that the humanizing of the race was effected by such simple factors as tool-making, crude attempts at language, and primitive society, we are driven to the other extreme—that of an earthly origin and a painfully slow development of civilized existence. How are we to decide between the natural and the supernatural theories as to the origin of civilization and culture?

Before we abandon the supernaturalistic conception of an original condition of primitive perfection, we can afford to ask ourselves to what extent and in what way this ideal can be of service to us. The notion involved in it is that of an inverted view of history, figured as a cone balanced upon its apex and representing a descent from the greater to the less, from perfection to decay.

It is made more plausible than preposterous by the historical fact that the broad and intuitive ideals of religion preceded the tighter reasonings of philosophy as these were far in advance of the closer calculations of science. This first or celestial age was characterized by a psychology wherein revelations, myths, and epic poems were the serene product of the human mind; it is only by forgetting our science and philosophy that we can exercise anything like such powers of imagination. We cannot credit the idea that mankind has fallen from the superior, if not perfect, state of existence; just as little can we discredit the idea that the mind of man has "fallen" from the original state of religious insight, artistic intuition, and the worldly wisdom expressed of old in fables.

On the other hand, when we assume the naturalistic point of view and postulate progress along a vertical line, we discover to our disappointment that the facts of history do not lend themselves to our abstract plan, which, in itself, is almost as naïve as the idea it would combat. The supernaturalistic view involved perfection at the beginning; the naturalistic idea is that of a constant improvement with perfection in the method of progress. The same contrast, the same difficulty in making a choice between views, appears again in the matter of education concerning what man should think, how he should speak, and what he should do. The older view attributed this insight to the instruction man received from divine beings, while the modern idea is to the effect that man has instructed himself. Man made society by entering into a social compact with his fellows; he fashioned his morality by observing the useful consequences of virtue, and discovered his religion by means of reason. We feel that neither gods nor men were directly responsible for civilization and culture.

WHAT PROGRESS MEANS

The principle of progress appeals to us as something obvious. We live in the intellectual atmosphere of evolution, which impresses us with the reality and ever-forward thrust of time. We observe scientific discoveries every day with the result that the finding of a new planet, a new chemical element, or a new form

of matter, such as the neutron, is reported in the news as a matter of general interest. Just as fully do we observe new inventions which are calculated to save labor, increase entertainment, and add to the interest of life. There are new departures in art, new movements in religion, and new schemes for social existence. We behold the spirit that maketh all things new. For this reason we find it difficult to sympathize with those who speak despairingly of progress. Our problem is that of resting in the present and conserving the past in the face of the energetic futurism that keeps thrusting itself upon us. However, the idea of progress is a comparatively new one and we are hardly able to handle it.

The idea of human progress, which had been in the French mind for a century, culminated in Condorcet (1743-1794) and his famous *Essay* on the progress of the human spirit. Among the French the idea of progress arose in connection with the "quarrel between the ancients and moderns" as to the superiority of classic and modern culture. The "moderns" asserted that the present, inheriting all of the past and adding its own knowledge, was superior to the past not only because it came later, but also because it was able to improve upon what had gone before. We ourselves can afford to pass over the aesthetical arguments used to establish this particular thesis and can confine our attention to the main idea — that the nature of progress is such as to include the culture of the past and to add to it the values of succeeding ages. Fontenelle (1657-1757) especially was enthusiastic over the new idea and did all in his power to inspire his generation with faith in progress.

But, in spite of enthusiasm for progress manifest in the XVIIIth century and the belief in evolution engendered by the XIXth century, we are inclined to assume a critical attitude toward such a forward philosophy. Duration may be a real process which carries mankind along with it, but it seems as though the gains of the future might have to be balanced by losses of the past. Growth may mean outgrowth. When one, like the Apostle Paul, becomes a man, he puts away childish things. If we have advanced beyond the Greeks in our science, we have fallen behind their standards of art; and if we have excelled the mediaevals in the breadth of our modern vision, we may have done so at the

sacrifice of spiritual depth. The idea of absolute progress, whereby the spirit of mankind moves through history increasing its acceleration like a falling body or accumulating its experience like a rolling snowball, seems inconsistent with experience. In addition to this physical impossibility of human progress, there is the moral issue of justice.

If progress is absolute in its character, the benefits of human history would be experienced only by those who came at the end of the historical series. Their ancestors would be but their fore-runners and servants. Then, although the idea in itself seems ridiculous, we might ask when and where would these fortunate last people come into final possession of life's total benefit? It is more reasonable and more ethical to assume that, in a way, each age enjoys all that there is in life whether this be in the form of art or religion or science, just as all peoples on earth enjoy the light and warmth of the sun at different times and in different ways. If an age lacks insight into the mysteries of nature, it may enjoy the ability to perceive nature aesthetically; if it is without rational insight, it may find compensation for this in the naïveté of its faith.

PAST AND PRESENT

It is a significant fact that we are more inclined to envy the men of the past than the supermen of the future. No matter how much we pride ourselves on our sophistication, we cannot help wishing we might have been in the position of Shakespeare and Copernicus, of Homer and Archimedes. For the most part, the culture and civilization that we now enjoy so fills us that we are not inclined to envy those who, coming later, will live in a better world and enjoy brighter views of nature. The future will inherit our wealth, but it will have to pay our bills. If we bequeath it more knowledge, it will be required to synthesize it; and if we convey to it our secret of producing wealth, it will have to find the proper means of distributing it. The course of civilization is such that it keeps balancing its accounts as it goes along.

The principle of evolution represents the development of civilization in the most attractive if not the most seductive form. The general idea of transformation from age to age is by no means

new in the study of mankind. The Hebrews used the idea in the form of a spiritual heritage passed from generation to generation, while St. Paul considered the course of the old order as a preparation for the new. "The law," said he, "was a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ."⁶ The Greeks and Romans presented the idea in the form of a descent from the gods to the heroes and men. In the Middle Ages, the notion of development was such as to involve the development of doctrine from the Apostles to the Fathers and thence to the Schoolmen. The general renaissance which followed the close of the mediaeval period broke up this continuity by introducing the idea of something catastrophic. The idea of continuous development was far from being furthered by the mechanistic ideas of the XVIIth and the rationalistic notions of the XVIIIth centuries.

It was in the XIXth century that the evolutionary conception of history took hold of the modern mind and brought it to a perfection which is easier to attack than to rival. In a general way, we may associate this developmental idea with the nebular theory of the solar system propounded by Laplace, the evolutionary geology of Lyell, and the system of organic evolution developed by Darwin. With such splendid theories behind us, we find it difficult to avoid the implications of evolution. They impress us with the feeling that all nature advances and that its line of progress is uniform, gradual, and progressive. They suggest to our minds that the physical idea of accretion and the organic principle of growth persist beyond the domain of the natural order and become the patterns of human history.

STAGES OF PROGRESS

The principle of progress is not confined to the ethical ideal of slow but sure ascent to a utopian condition; it is a working rule of social science in its attempt to account for the passage of the race from nature to some form of civilization. It is based upon the idea of definite stages in the development of the race with the presumption that these stages are steps upward. It is assumed that society passed through just such states of civilized existence

⁶ *Gal.* III, 24.

in order to arrive at stable conditions wholly distinct from any ideal conception of its general striving after perfection. Now in both instances, of definite development by stages and of the general approximation to perfection, the principle of progress is not easily maintained.

In connection with the family or household group, the theoretical program of classic evolution demands a certain form of matrimonial development. The first stage of this is sex promiscuity marked by uncontrolled and unorganized sex relationships. The second stage in the evolutionary process was that of group marriage. Here the clan forms a matrimonial unit; a group of women become the wives of a group of men. The children belong to the maternal clan. From this second stage, the development was to the gens, or clanlike organization, with the children belonging to the father. Out of this has come the family in the modern sense of the term. But, apart from theory, it is doubtful whether any such fourfold development took place; it is more reasonable to suppose that a family relationship of some sort rather than promiscuity was the origin of the social order. "Contrary to a widespread notion for which anthropologists are in part responsible, the family consisting of husband, wife, and children is found everywhere," says Goldenweiser, who sums up the whole situation as follows:

"There seems to be no evidence that a state of promiscuity ever existed; again, the condition of group marriage, far from being a universal antecedent of individual marriage, seems to constitute, in the rare instances where it occurs, an outgrowth of a pre-existing state of individual marriage. The family and local group are universal forms of social organization, extending to the very beginning. In some tribes the clan organization never develops. In others the clan follows the family-village organization. In still others, the gens follows directly upon this early organization. The development of the gens out of the clan has apparently occurred only in a few instances. It must, moreover, be remembered that the family-village grouping persists through all the other forms of organization."⁷

The same discrepancy between observed fact and proposed

⁷ *Early Civilization*, pp. 24-25.

theory appears in the well-known triad of hunting, nomadic life, and agriculture. It is assumed that primitive civilizations everywhere must pass through these three stages. As for the first level of human industry, it may be said that it traces back to the beginning of man's life but does not cease after his civilization has reached a higher level. It may be added, also, that tribes have practiced agriculture without having passed through the nomadic stage of development. In like manner, we may express doubt concerning the fixity of the rule that requires a tribe to pass in regular order through the three industrial stages of stone, bronze, and iron. These divisions of industry are of value as norms for modern theory, but cannot serve as rules of primitive civilization. Even if social science could lay down laws of development in connection with social life, we should still be unable to determine whether general progress was the rule of the race.

STANDARDS OF PROGRESS

Civilization is in itself a progressive concern in the sense that it is not stable, but ever changing. Whether we can evince the perfecting progress of civilization from its mobility is another matter, but one that cannot be avoided. As we realize from the foregoing, it is difficult to measure the progress of the race since we have no standards outside the life of the race itself. But this is no less true in the case of physical motion and organic evolution; yet we do not hesitate to speak of motion and development. Man's progress has been on the human level; he has not remained in the animal order or approached the realm of angelic existence. Yet if we do not think of him as progressing in his humanity, it is difficult to understand how he survives. The fact that man has not become extinct and shows no tendency to become so, may be understood as a form of progress, the progress of persistence. More human beings live and live longer than ever before; the population increases and the average life lengthens. But we prefer to think of progress in some other than a purely physical manner.

It is unnecessary to defend the idea that there has been intellectual progress since the dawn of civilization. The copious li-

braries of the world are substantial records to that effect. But the intellectual development of mankind expresses itself in more significant ways than the chronicles of science might indicate. Scientific progress shows itself today in the development of mathematical methods and physical instruments of measurement. Man has measured the world in both its macroscopic and microscopic forms and is in a position to make his knowledge of nature ever more detailed, ever more accurate. He has discovered the truth of things and the uses to which they may be put. We can express doubt about intellectual progress only as we observe that the knowledge of the world is confined to a minority of the race, the *intelligentsia*. The mass of mankind is still ignorant of the simplest truths of physical science.

However, the scientific progress of the race is appreciated by practically all the members of a civilized community who share in the benefits of applied science. Not one in a thousand who daily use such a thing as the telephone is able to explain the scientific principles upon which this useful device works. How many who talk freely about their car or radio are aware of the physical principles which these omnipresent devices involve? And yet the scientific progress of the world has been such as to include these lay members of the intellectual community. Hence, if the question of progress is to be based upon advancement along scientific and physical lines, there can be no doubt about its authenticity. The application of science and to some extent the popularization of its more spectacular truths have been such as to include the whole population in the intellectual progress of modern times. The result is that we generally live in an enlightened age even when few members of the population are cognizant of the conditions of their enlightenment.

PHYSICAL AND MORAL PROGRESS

The application of intellect to nature has brought about genuine physical progress; can the same be said about the application of the mind to man himself? This raises the question of moral progress. It is easy to deny that man's effort to attain to the Good has been as successful as his attempt to arrive at the True.

He has found nature obedient, himself disobedient. After the idea of progress had been established, its critics began to appear. Goethe denied that men had become more moral in the sense of being happier and better; Schopenhauer's conception of life made the idea of betterment impossible. In our day the repudiation of progress has been put forth in most spectacular manner by Nietzsche and Bernard Shaw, both of whom await the birth of the superman. But the difficulty with those who deny the reality of progress is that they, while asserting that there has been no progress up to the present time, expect that there can be progress from the present onward. If, however, mankind had not made moral progress since the days of the Hittites, it is a question whether he can initiate a forward movement now. If there has been no moral advance, there never will be.

Among those who are pessimistic about the past and as optimistic over the future are the socialists and eugenists. One party seeks a better state, the other a better citizen. But if the present order is as imperfect as the socialist claims, it should be good enough for the average person or even for one who is inferior. Hence the eugenist movement is not so convincing as it might be. Inadvertently, both socialist and eugenist — the one thinking of a better state, the other of a better citizen — tend to lend their approval to the established order. The socialist favors industrial civilization, but would have its benefits more equally distributed. The eugenist, who is likely to be contemptuous of the proletariat, implies that society is superior to the individual, hence that we should have fewer and better specimens of the human race. These are examples of the present distaste for the present and a corresponding enthusiasm for the future. There can be no doubt that man has progressed; in the present age he seems to have progressed too far from his older way of living with its standards of life.

Civilization eyes the future, but is bound to be more deeply interested in the past, although not the past that has simply moved along in time. It is the office of history to pick up the past and carry it along with the present, if not to prepare it for the future. Hence, history advises us to study the roots of civilization and not seek merely to gather its fruits. "Deep minds,"

said Goethe, "need to be nourished by the past as well as the future" — a significant remark made by this great seer in connection with his youthful study of the Old Testament.⁸ We shall recall this, as, having analyzed the idea of culture, we approach the study of Hebrew history.

⁸ *Truth and Fiction from my Life*, Bk. VII.

CHAPTER IV

FORMS OF CULTURE



THE MEANING OF CULTURE

BY THIS TIME WE HAVE ARRIVED AT THE REALIZATION THAT MAN'S attempt to humanize himself means more than an extra urge in nature or an unusual effort on the part of man's will. Indeed the term "effort," so suggestive of physical energy, is one we must use with care. It may perhaps express the mode of behavior in man's body as it exercises the will-to-live or *élan vital*; it is not so expressive of man's mental behavior. There, in the mind, the situation is different; it is characterized by ideas and feelings and motivated by attention and expression. That which is operative in the human mind, even when it is the will, is something fine rather than something strong. It is by the force of fineness, then, that man avails himself of culture in order to build up an inner life and thus become a human being *par excellence*. If we are to appreciate the influence of culture in human history, we must analyze the idea into its proper forms and then observe how the history of the western world has used culture to elaborate various types of national existence from the ancient Athenian to the modern American. But what do we mean by the term "culture?"

The term culture is often used to cover the whole range of man's activities when these are viewed psychologically. The anthropologist applies the term to the work of primitive man in making tools, baskets, boats, and the like; these are referred to as forms of material culture. The popular mind thinks of culture in terms of polite society, where it connotes good manners and grammatical speech. The crude person who lacks these, even though he be far superior to the savage with his "culture," is referred to as "uncultured," meaning unrefined. Just as the term animal is used to cover various fauna from a tiny insect to a large mammal, so the term culture is often extended to the glimmerings of intelligence in primitive men and the graces of

those who move in the best circles of urban society. It will be seen at once that we cannot make headway in the analysis of cultural types among modern nations if we apply the term so indiscriminately.

CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

The confusion in the use of the term culture is that which arises when it is closely associated with civilization, so closely associated as to be identified with it. The term when it is used in its most general sense is often made to include both culture and civilization. When, at the beginning of the World War, the Germans used the term *Kultur*, they meant the whole socio-politico-scientific activity that had grown up among them since the Franco-German War. If they had been thinking of the Germany of Goethe and Schiller, they would have used the word *Bildung*. Culture is associated with civilization, but is not identifiable with it. The Germans were cultured a century before the World War, but did not have their XXth-century civilization. We have civilization in America, but have we culture also? Certainly not to the same degree. Suppose, then, we cut the Gordian knot that entangles this pair of human enterprises and set the two in twain. Civilization is the outer perfection, culture the inner perfection of human life. They accompany each other, but do not always keep abreast.

The outer perfection of life is something we recognize definitely although not completely in urban existence. The idea of civilization, as we have seen, suggests a city and this in turn conveys the idea of living according to a definite pattern. In a city, the streets are arranged geometrically, the houses built in regular rows, transportation is by means of electricity, and the forms of life generally are regulated. It is still possible for some naturalistic philosopher to argue that the perfection of life is just as well if not better attained in connection with rural existence, but from time immemorial it has been a tendency among men to express their desire for perfection by the building of cities and the development of regular institutions. The obvious difference between savagery and civilization is found in just this—the difference between the planned and artificial life of a city and the more

instinctive form of existence experienced in an undeveloped community. But it is the inward perfection of life that concerns us at this point.

The inward development and perfection of human life is the aim of culture. It is not that culture is the only or the best means of enhancing the inner life; this is attempted and accomplished by religion and morals. But the method employed in connection with culture is by no means the same; it is less rigorous and perhaps less meritorious. It is the means commonly observed in the arts and sciences. In a word, then, culture is the attempt to perfect life intellectually and aesthetically. When these tendencies are turned inward, they express themselves psychologically as cultured desires — the desire to acquire knowledge for its own sake and cultivate taste because of its intrinsic value. This does not mean learning, for one may be familiar with the principle of science and the forms of art without being cultured. It means appreciation more than knowledge, an emotional rather than an intellectual condition, and a personal rather than a general attitude toward the True and Beautiful. Though one have all knowledge and understand all mysteries and have not culture, it profiteth him nothing; that is, as far as one's culture is concerned.

CULTURE AND HUMANITY

In its broader or more public character, culture connotes "Humanity." But here, as before, confusion may arise. Humanity may be taken scientifically as a class-term meant to include all examples of mankind, just as animality may be used to signify all forms of life marked by locomotion. Yet such an error is not likely to arise; more likely is it that the term humanity may be taken in an ethical sense to signify a kindly disposition or tendency toward benevolence. But, of course, we realize that this means the quality of being humane. When the term humanity is used to indicate the presence of culture, the term is to be taken in an intellectual and aesthetical sense. Usually we find it in the plural and refer to the "humanities" as forms of study peculiar to a classic system of education and not altogether conspicuous in the modern college curriculum, where the more obvious impres-

sion is that of the vocational. In academic circles, we strive to maintain a distinction between "liberal arts" and "pure sciences" on the one hand and studies which have a direct bearing upon a profession or the science of engineering. These pure and liberal studies are still spoken of as the "humanities," sometimes they are referred to adjectivally as "cultural" pursuits, but they help us here in forming a conception of humanistic culture.

The term culture, however, is not deep enough to express the idea it is intended to convey; yet it is about the only term we can use. The idea we wish to convey involves two elements, an active and a passive one. We may indicate these directly by calling one form of culture "genius"; the other, "knowledge." One is culture *rampant*, the other culture *couchant*; one shines by *lumen illuminans*, the other by *lumen illuminatum*. The distinction is one that we can feel when we appreciate the difference between the creative and the receptive; one that we can apply when we distinguish between the mood of the artist and the mind of the critic. It is thus that we have ventured to introduce the term "genius" to express the idea that the primary form of culture is something spontaneous and creative in contrast to the culture that consists in knowledge and appreciation. The idea of genius is applied usually to the individual, but may have some application by accommodation to a nation. The distinction demands illustration.

By way of illustration, we may suggest that the Greek mind was creative when it was under the domination of the god Dionysus, the deity of passion and creative force; it proceeded under the auspices of Apollo when it became exact and reflective. Or, to take the Greek mind in its totality, we may say that it was the direct expression of genius-culture in contrast with the Roman, which was more studious, critical. To cite another example and install another contrast, we might suggest that the Italian culture of the Renaissance was that of creative genius while the German culture, which, apart from its Renaissance artists, came much later, was critical and philosophical. When we consider Greek sculpture and Italian painting, we realize that the robust tone of culture is not to be mistaken for an echo of this in either exact imitation or careful criticism.

When we seek this distinction between primary and secondary culture, we observe it among individuals as well as nations. Was Shakespeare a cultured man? There can be no question about his genius, but in comparison with Bacon one would hardly refer to the culture of Shakespeare, who chose "the better part." In Shakespeare we find a minimum of learning when this is compared with the maximum of creative power the poet exhibited with such apparent ease. If we take personal examples generally, we may venture to affirm that the poet and the novelist, the painter and the composer whose arts reveal creative ability may easily have less culture than the erudite critics who pass judgment upon their works. It is for this reason that we are compelled to extend the term culture to include the constructive and unconscious work performed by those whose culture is of the primary sort.

CULTURE CONTRASTS

If this is the general conception of culture, how can the idea be determined more definitely? The determination of culture cannot be made by investigating nature with the hope of discovering any sort of culture-instinct. Culture is not an immediate feeling like the sense of beauty or the religious feeling of awe. It is something that man builds up by means of ideas within him and objects outside his consciousness, as we observe in the development of the fine arts. Or can culture be identified with something within man himself as though it were a gift like mechanical skill or language? Culture is something that man develops within himself as the expression of superabundance. We observe this with even primitive man, who used his hand for decorative as well as skillful work, for song as well as speech. Culture comes about not by nature alone or man alone, but by a contrast between the two. It is not a continuous but a discontinuous idea; it means the opposition of man to nature and the assertion of an independent existence on man's part. Our age is not conspicuous for its culture-consciousness. We have a desire for information, a lust for sophistication, and a zeal for the technical, but we lack aesthetic appetite. It is in an era of noble artificiality that we find the culture-consciousness—the age of

Pericles, of Augustus, the Gothic era, the Renaissance, France in the XVIIth century, England in the days of its famous queens, Elizabeth and Victoria, and America before the Civil War. When a generation thinks according to science and acts according to industry, it performs great exploits, but it is in no mood to create and admire the beautiful. For culture demands that man shall react upon his environment and transcend his immediate activities. This reaction, this elevation produces contrasts and engenders problems.

The contrasted ideas peculiar to culture are really more than ideas; they are competitive interests. They may be stated in the form of certain junctures which have confronted the human race and which man will continue to meet in the progress of his human life. First, there is the general contrast between *Animality* and *Humanity*, between man finding himself as a creature and man forming himself as a character. Secondly, this general contrast of situations repeats itself in the form of competitive interests or those of the *Immediate* and the *Remote*, illustrated in the contrast between industry and art, or in the difference between a technical school and a college of liberal arts. Thirdly, the motivation that follows from this disjunction appears in the opposed forces of *Conquest* and *Contemplation*, both of which are rather extravagant terms used to indicate the difference between the work of the will and the procedure of the intellect. Finally, in the fourth place, the psychological state of affairs is such as to produce a contrast between *Outer Existence* and *Inner Life*, which expressions bear their own weight fairly well.

ANIMALITY AND HUMANITY

The contrast between *Animality* and *Humanity* is too broad to signify the special nature of the culture-problem, but must be laid down as basic. It is a contrast which is felt in both culture and civilization, in art and science, in philosophy and religion, all of which human enterprises place the human mind in juxtaposition to the world. Art attempts to perfect certain forms of nature. Science seeks to reduce things and events to natural laws with measurable forms. Philosophy desires to substitute ideas or cate-

gories or relations for the things of this world, while religion tends to seek another world altogether. Man endeavors to move forward into the world of enlightenment, but his steps are dogged by the interests of animality. He would seek the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, but he cannot keep his mind off food, clothing, and shelter. Animal interests like the poor are ever with us.

The inherent animality of man, over which culture seeks to triumph, shows itself unmistakably in the incessant tendency to seek food. It may be true that "where there is no vision the people perish," but it is just as obvious that bread is the staff of life. It may be noble to declare that "philosophy cannot bake bread, but it can give us God, freedom, and immortality," but while we are pursuing these ideals we must be fed. There is at least an apparent conflict between the animality and the humanity of man, so that it is difficult to see how the inner man can be renewed day by day when the outer man perishes. Shall we decide in favor of man as the animal that seeks food or man as the spirit that seeks culture? Of course, we must vote for both these candidates and escape from the paradox as best we can. The conflict has arisen again and again in the life of civilized man; it comes up today in the competition between the interests of commerce and culture. How can we adjust their respective claims?

We can come to some sort of tentative conclusion by observing, as we did at the outset when we considered *The Evolution of Man*, that the ultimate purpose of food is to nourish the brain and nervous system. It is as though nature, realizing that the animal's quest of food depended upon the ability of its sensations to direct its movements, had resolved to feed that nervous system at all costs. Hence, in the attempt to supply the animal with a senso-motor organ necessary in seeking sustenance, nature has overdone the matter, as seems to be the case with the human species. For nature has given man a brain that he can use in still other ways than those of food-getting. He can use the brain as brain, as an organ of cognition generally.

Man does this in connection with the operations of his hands in manufacture of various sorts, from stone implements to gigantic machines. But in so doing he keeps releasing his brain, which builds better than it knows. The act begets the idea, then

the idea outgrows the act; the result is free intellection or culture. When mankind is placed in the tropical regions where the quest for food is no real problem or when it is located in arctic areas where it is the main question, there is no need, there is no opportunity for any independent thought process. It is when mankind finds itself in a temperate zone, where food-getting by agriculture and hunting is neither too easy nor too difficult, that its mental powers are called forth to the proper degree, for it is in the temperate areas that we find the highest types of both civilization and culture. Animality comes to an understanding with humanity and the creature of nature realizes itself as a spiritual being.

At the present time, when the needs of life are supplied by industry and distributed commercially, the same problem of humanity and animality comes up in the form of an antinomy between culture and commerce. Our age is a commercial not a cultural one, and it is in this country that excess of the practical over the intellectual is most flagrant. But at last, after such tremendous success in the mechanical production of commodities, it is coming to light that the modern man has not been so successful in the distribution of these benefits. He has developed mass-production with class- but not mass-distribution in the economic form of buying power. He is now trying to distribute buying power, or wealth, in order that the population generally may share in the inherent prosperity of the industrial age. Just where is the need of proper distribution felt?

Not altogether in the direction of things that money will buy, but along the line of the advantages that wealth is calculated to afford. That is, freedom from anxiety about food, a due amount of leisure, and the spiritual advantages which this liberty and leisure involve. This means culture. It means the opportunity of the human brain to attend to what interests it rather than to feel itself riveted to work. It means the active attention of the mind in place of the kind of attention that is arrested by the incessant needs of life. By means of machinery, man has delivered himself from that animalistic condition according to which he must use his brain in the pursuit of nothing but food and the essentials of life generally. For man has manufactured

a mannikin capable of acting, as it were, in a senso-motor capacity to do his work for him. It is thus that in meeting the demands of animality, as these appear in a civilized community, man made it possible for his brain to detach itself from its work and serve the needs of the spirit. But it will require a proper ethical and educational system if this advantage is to be realized in a practical way and on a large scale.

THE IMMEDIATE AND THE REMOTE

The disjunction between the *Immediate* and the *Remote* does not show itself in any physical way, but in a psychological form; it is a matter of interest or what appeals to man as worth cultivating. Wealth and the business which is supposed to produce it have immediate interest for mankind today. Wisdom and the study that engenders it is a matter of interest or that which is worth striving after, but the interest involved is remote from the concerns and activities of everyday life. This was not always the case. The Greeks were not money-mad, but had a kind of mania for knowledge, which showed itself in the age of the Sophists and assumed a more worthy form after Socrates appeared. The Elizabethan period does not stand out in history as a time when men were given up to gain; they were more bent upon entertainment, so that the era may be symbolized by a stage rather than a store. In our own country, the period before the Civil War and even the one after it revealed the American as a person who sought comfort, some luxury, and a graceful way of living. The remote interests of knowledge and good taste have made appeal pathetically comparable to the present demand for an immediate value like money and what money can buy.

Our intellectual progress during the last hundred years has been guided by science, which itself has proceeded along the lines of *physical energy* and *organic evolution*. The effect of the evolutionary theory has been to re-relate us to the earth and thus emphasize immediacy of interest, although in a general way only. The principle of energy in the form of applied science has stressed the immediate interests in the definite forms of labor-saving machines, time-saving devices, and creature-comforts gen-

erally. Science has not enhanced virtue, improved taste, or deepened faith, so that, as generally received, it has not contributed to man's remote interests. Science as ordinarily understood means average cognition adaptable to education and applicable to everyday life.

However, the range of science is so vast and its points of penetration so many that the remote interests of mankind have not been altogether neglected. The interests of the remote appear in the extremes of the macroscopic and microscopic, whereby the science of the present century has all but calculated the size of space and the electronic nature of the atom. In addition to these remote considerations, which redeem science from the charge of utilitarianism, the contemporary study of the world is revealing the essential nature of space and time as well as the intimate relationship between them. The result has been to engender a new idea of the universe. This is something that cannot be claimed by the forces of immediacy, by practical men, but is that which belongs by right on the side of the remote, where it is appreciated by idealists.

Apart from its definite connection with science, our modern life reveals the strident conflict of minor and major interests, or concern for the immediate and the remote. We feel the difference between commerce and culture, life's needs and life's ideals, efficiency and enlightenment. The student is made to feel it when he is forced to choose between an ancient language and a modern tongue, business English and romantic poetry, accounting and higher mathematics. The general reader appreciates it, however vaguely, when he inclines toward a book or set of books that are supposed to equip him for his work and increase his income and turns away from general literature. The claims of the remote are weak in comparison with the demands of the immediate, as these are put forth by technicalism and everyday life.

CONQUEST AND CONTEMPLATION

The same bifurcation of man's very being appears again in the contrast between *Conquest* and *Contemplation*, or the claims asserted by will and intellect, not merely a tendency to fight or to

dream. It is of course impossible to consider man as merely a creature of action on the one hand or a being who thinks on the other; as *homo faber* or *homo sapiens*. The human brain could tolerate no such exclusive distinction. But it is possible to adjust the will of conquest to the intellect of contemplation in such a way as to place one or the other in a superior position. This is precisely what man has done in his philosophy of life. When the principle of culture was paramount, man subordinated the will to the intellect; when culture and intellectual procedure generally seemed unsatisfactory, man sought to reverse the mental order and make the will superior. This was expressed by Duns Scotus at the close of the *Scholastic* period when that early modern created the maxim, *voluntas superior est intellectu*. Now this reference to Scholasticism is made chiefly for the sake of the phrase just cited. The culture-issue, as far as this involves the active will or the contemplative intellect, is found elsewhere; it appears massively and vividly in the contrast between the ancient and the modern mind or, say, the Athenian and the American.

The spokesman for ancient order was Aristotle. He appeared well toward the close of ancient philosophy, whose meaning he summed up and systematized. His thought in its range and variety was such that it appealed to periods wholly different from the one in which he lived, and just as different from each other as Scholasticism and contemporary thought. Aristotle did not discuss the question of culture as such, but the essence of the idea was not wanting in his *Poetics* and *Ethics*, wherein he makes significant reference to the function of art and the nature of happiness.

In his discussion of eudaemonism, Aristotle, who proceeded along the general line of "energy," concludes that it is the possession of the desired object rather than the pursuit of it that yields happiness. This leads him to stress the importance of the possessing intellect rather than the pursuing will in the realization of life's aim. This is done by following the idea of "energy" to its ultimate conclusion. Assuming that happiness is a form of energy, Aristotle modifies it by adding the idea that such energy must be in moderation, and then concludes that the highest energy is that of intellect. Energy remains, but it is so moderated and

purified as to "lose the name of action." "Now if from a living being," says he, "you take away action, what remains but contemplation? So then the energy of the gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for contemplative speculation; and of all human energies that will have the greatest capacity for happiness which is nearest akin to this."¹

The same philosophical preference for intellect over will was expressed by Bacon. Theoretically this modern propagandist of science was opposed to Aristotle, whom in all probability he did not appreciate or even understand, but practically he was in agreement with him, and exalts his intellectualism above the militarism of Alexander the Great. Like Aristotle, Bacon contends in favor of the contemplative life on the ground that it is more satisfactory; the intellect ministers unto *suavissima vita*. Toward the close of his career, Bacon changed from the idea that "knowledge is pleasure" to "knowledge is power," but his earlier work, *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), advances the cause of culture by the way it combines learning with happiness.

In presenting the claims of knowledge, Bacon contends for the superiority of what he calls "the work of contemplation." His preference for this that really is culture is based upon historical evidence rather than psychological analysis or logical reasoning. The testimony is first sacred, then secular. As Aristotle had referred so naïvely to the happiness of the contemplative gods of the Greeks, so Bacon appeals to the Jehovah of the Hebrews and his divine attitude toward the Sabbath. "The seventh day in which God rested and contemplated his own works was blessed above all the days wherein he did effect and accomplish them." The similarity between pagan and Christian theologies is suggestive, but far more striking is the psychological parallel between two modes of reasoning in which the life of contemplation, or culture, is deemed more satisfactory than the life of conquest to even divine beings.

Bacon proceeds from the contemplative attitude of the Deity toward Creation to the life-ideal implanted in God's creatures. The vocation of Adam consisted in giving names to the beasts

¹ *Ethics*, Bk. X, Ch. VI.

of the field and birds of the air as God brought them unto man. The hard labor of life, which contrasts painfully with this work of contemplation, came only after man's expulsion from Eden. Bacon then asserts that the offering of Abel was more acceptable than that of Cain since the life of a shepherd was naturally more contemplative than that of a husbandman. In like manner, Moses, a man of action, was famous for Egyptian learning; Job, for natural philosophy; and Solomon, for wisdom. On the secular side of history, continues Bacon, mythology shows how superior were the inventors of new arts and sciences over mere rulers and lawgivers; the former were deemed gods, the latter only demi-gods. In human history, men of thought are placed higher than men of action; Socrates above Xenophon, Aristotle over Alexander, and Cicero before Caesar.

It is needless to point out that the development of modern thought after the death of Bacon was such as to forget the naïve idealism expressed in *The Advancement of Learning* and incline toward the more practical, more potent ideas of the *Novum Organum* (1620). The development of physical science as this culminated in Newtonian mechanics was so impressive that the modern mind could hardly think of nature as something to be contemplated for the sake of enjoyment. No, nature seemed the form of a vast machine that was to be analyzed and then set to work in behalf of the beholder. It is no wonder that the idea of culture came up for criticism.

OUTER EXISTENCE AND INNER LIFE

The fourth and final contrast peculiar to the culture-problem follows from the other three. When the man of culture sets his humanity in opposition to nature, pursues remote rather than immediate interests, and insists on the superiority of contemplation over all forms of conquest, he is only emphasizing the importance of his *Inner Life* in contrast with his *Outer Existence*. Man's inner life is made up of sensations, feelings, ideas, and that general mass of consciousness that each one comes to recognize as himself. His outer existence consists of the objects that engage his attention and the activities that go forth toward them. Both

these objects and the activities they enlist may be called the "things to be done." What chance has the inner life of feelings with the outer existence of facts?

The exponent of culture in his defense of the inner life has not been tempted to resort to the extremes of subjective idealism according to which all outer existence is just so much inner life in the sense that reality is mental, things ideas, and objects only percepts. In the case of German Romanticism, as also with French Symbolism, something like this was done, and that quite largely upon the basis of Kant's Transcendental Idealism which made the human understanding "the lawgiver of all nature." But Kant was not working in behalf of aesthetic culture, nor was the aestheticism of these hectic movements at all well grounded in transcendental logic. Hence it may be concluded that the cultural contention in favor of the inner life is not to be made upon the basis of speculative idealism. What the proponent of culture does is what Aristotle and Bacon did before him; he resorts to the principle of *value* and insists that the worth of life consists in an inward satisfaction rather than any outward acquisition. With Aristotle and Bacon, this inward satisfaction, this human value was expressed simply and sincerely in the form of *happiness*.

There is an inner life for man just as there is an outer existence. There can be no question about the facts in these contrasted cases, no possibility of having psychology absorb physics or physics engulf psychology. The only question, where human culture is concerned, is that of values; which sort of existence, inner or outer, is calculated to yield true and lasting satisfaction to an individual or a nation? How can this question be answered? Certainly not by experimenting upon so many individuals assembled in a psychological laboratory or by an extensive questionnaire. For it is not what this or that individual thinks of his life or what a majority of such individuals decide by vote as to the true issue of life, but what the nature of life itself reveals. Science, in dealing with the conditions of life as a biological function, does not ask various individuals whether they think that their adaptation to their environment is an important factor in their individual existence as organisms. Science asserts that such adaptation is important.

That parallel need not be pressed to any great extent before it reveals the fact that human happiness, like human existence, involves a form of adaptation—the adaptation of inner life to outer existence. The nature of such adaptation is culture; the result is happiness; the method of reasoning is eudaemonistic, just as it was with Aristotle and Bacon. The whole situation, which may have become complicated in all that has gone before, resolves itself into the simple question, What is happiness? When are individuals and nations happy? This question is not to be answered in a miscellaneous manner as though happiness consisted in some one of a large variety of things—wealth, social position, success in business, travel, political office, ancestry, race, and the like. The question of happiness, which involves that of culture, is to be solved by an appeal to the major functions of the human mind, intellect and will. Is man happy in his thoughts or his actions, in the sensory or motor portion of his brain, if one cares to reduce such an august question to the common denominator of naturalism? The exponents of culture, convinced that happiness is the criterion of culture, have had no doubts about its ability to produce that happiness; their case is therefore closed. In a certain sense, this sort of argument might be likened to the Method of Agreement in inductive logic even when there has been no genuine induction. This, of course, suggests the Method of Difference, or the negative side of the argument. This, however, introduces an independent line of thought, although one that corroborates the foregoing theory of culture.

OPPONENTS OF CULTURE

The opponents of culture are in agreement with its exponents as far as the criterion is concerned. Both place their merits upon human happiness. The difference between them lies solely in this—that the proponent of culture says “culture makes men happy,” while his opponent denies this by saying “culture does not make men happy.” It was Rousseau who inaugurated the attack upon culture, although it was not he who set up activity as the rival of thought in the heart of man. The pursuit of culture had been carried on aristocratically by the ancients, in which

spirit it was resumed during the Renaissance. By the time Rousseau appeared (1712-1778), this aristocracy had taken on a form both artificial and tyrannical. Furthermore, Europe, especially England and France, had been saturated with rationalism, so that an emotional and revolutionary thinker like Rousseau was bound to oppose the intellectualism that seemed to have engendered these ills.

Rousseau's quarrel with culture, expressed originally in the Dijon prize essay on *The Influence of the Sciences and Arts* (1750), had to do with the baneful influence of culture upon the nature of man. According to Rousseau, man came from the hands of nature perfect and happy and it was only because he had been led to indulge in thought that he had degenerated. This degeneration reveals itself in the misery which man now experiences and indicates that the separation of animality and humanity, the first step in culture, was a mistake. Hence the famous maxim, "Let us return to nature!" This anti-cultural point of view was resumed by Rousseau in 1753, when he wrote a discourse *The Source and Ground of Inequality among Men*, claiming that the advance beyond nature had been by unequal steps because some men were more cultured than others. With democratic enthusiasm does he argue against the aristocratic tendency of culture only to conclude that no culture at all is better than that which renders men unequal, an argument which he applies to civilization also.

There is more semblance of argument in the ideals of Voltaire and Goethe, who like Rousseau were themselves both men of the very highest culture. What one finds in their anti-culture is the sharp disjunction between the ideals of remote contemplation and immediate conquest. Voltaire expresses his disdain for the intellect and corresponding enthusiasm for the will in the well-known story of *Candide*. The tone of the story is a melancholy one, produced by the Lisbon earthquake of 1755; the idea is to discover whether Leibnitz was correct in assuming that this is the best world possible; and the conclusion is that we must solve the riddle of the universe by action rather than thought. Long before Voltaire, Montaigne had taken a similar point of view, basing his practical ideal, that the highest moment in man's life

is when he is found in his garden planting cabbages, upon the theoretical assumption that man was born in order that he might act. Voltaire expresses this by asserting that man was placed in the Garden of Eden that he might work, which is not in accordance with the actual story, and that, since thought can only make us miserable, we should "cultivate our garden" in order to be happy.

Goethe's contribution to this anti-cultural chapter in human history is expressed in the inclusive and extensive story of *Faust*. Previous to the completion of this life-long poem, Goethe had set intellect and will in painful juxtaposition in the drama of *Torquato Tasso* (1789). In this drama of genius, Tasso with the manuscript of *Jerusalem Delivered* in his hands is placed in contrast with Antonio, who carries a portfolio significant of the active life. The contrast between the two characters is broadened and deepened in such a way as to develop the difference between the man of thought and the man of action expressed in the memorable lines, "Talent is formed in solitude, character in the stream of the world." But it is indicated that practical character is more significant and satisfactory than private talent. At the conclusion of *Faust* the everlastingly happy moment comes when the intellectual hero enjoys the satisfaction of draining a swamp in order to make a near-by town sanitary. It is then that Faust finds the moment he would perpetuate and thus exclaims, "*O, Augenblick! verweile doch, du bist so schön.*" Now, it can hardly be concealed that these arguments against the contemplative life of culture might have been more impressive if they had devised for the misguided *homo sapiens* some more worthy vocation than that of planting cabbages, cultivating a garden, and draining a swamp. There are serious arguments against culture and contentions in favor of the active life, but these are barely implied by Rousseau, Voltaire, and Goethe.

The idea of happiness is so bound up in the question of culture that it would be unwise to detach it and give it independent discussion. But there are two other ideas that stand in less intimate relation to culture—work, which is the contrary of culture, and democracy as this challenges culture in its original form of aristocracy. We live in an industrial democracy, are acquainted with

its principles, and are inclined to accept its values. How can we sympathize with any land or people or age which exalted cultural aristocracy? If we are to continue our human culture, we must adjust it to the problem of work and the populace.

CULTURE AND WORK

First, as to the problem of life as work and life as thought, the original contrast between conquest and contemplation; how can there be culture in an age of industry? Aristotle and Bacon saw in what we call "work" the energy or work of contemplation. Voltaire and Goethe came to feel, if we may believe their jaunty words, that the procedure of the intellect is nothing in comparison with the performance of the will. Hence they spoke figuratively of cultivating the garden and draining the swamp as forms of activity most worthy of man and just as satisfactory to him. Now, the idea of work must be analyzed in order to determine whether it is able to oust culture from its time-honored place. If men of culture see value in the idea of work, it may turn out that work and culture are not contradictory, but complementary.

A beginning or perhaps *the* beginning of man's life as such was made by means of work in the form of tool-making. According to Bergson, mechanical invention has ever been the essential feature of human intelligence; mechanisms of some sort mark the course of history, while at the present time our social life revolves about the manufacture and use of artificial instruments. "Intelligence," says Bergson, "considered in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture."² Now, inasmuch as culture, in distinction from the pure cognition as such peculiar to speculative metaphysics and mathematics, is a more or less concrete and active form of intellectual procedure, this practical conception of intelligence can prove only acceptable.

By adopting, if in only a provisional way, the idea that human intelligence is akin to human activity, the exponent of culture has made overtures to those who insist that life means work. On the

² *Creative Evolution*, tr. Mitchell, p. 139.

other hand, if such work involves intelligence, it is bound to contain the essence of culture. Culture itself, being no theoretical thing, involves a certain praxis as this appears in the fine arts, especially those of architecture, sculpture, and painting. If one is inclined to stress the force of etymology, one can find a certain kind of "making" with words in the energy of the poet, who, according to the Greek word *poiein*, is a maker, while his poem, or *poiema*, is a kind of thing made. But this twist of language can amount to only a suggestion of the actual work accomplished in the spatial arts. If, then, we may assume that there is more likeness than difference between culture and work, we may proceed to the case of the individual worker. In an ideal order, the individual gets culture out of life in the same proportion that he puts work into the world. When he acts upon the external world by means of work, what he does reacts upon him, so that as he changes the face of nature he changes the form of his own mind. The work involves both an object and a subject; the results are both economic and educational. The process by means of which this double result is produced can be expressed in a traditional form by saying that one learns to know by doing. But doubtless this process has more to do with education than with culture, which requires leisure, or time which can be devoted to private pursuits.

At the present time, the attempts to provide cultural opportunities for the laboring man or woman show themselves tentatively in the form of the "culture wage," a shorter labor-day with leisure at the far end of it, the five-day week, and other devices for liberating the worker from the bondage of his task. These are on the subjective side of the question concerning man and his work. (On the objective side, the social order is providing the means of culture, if we may call it such, in the form of the free library, cheap books, inexpensive reprints of classic works of art, extension courses, home study, municipal concerts, radio, moving pictures, and the like. These are at least gestures in the direction of culture or a recognition that the people in an industrial democracy deserve and demand more than work and wage. Whether or not these means of culture are used in the new leisure is a question for the laboring man and woman.

CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY

The problem of culture and democracy runs parallel to that of culture and work. The conflict between culture and democracy is based on the traditional notion that what is called culture means refinement if not social prestige, a certain degree of wealth, and a tone of aristocracy. However, there is practically nothing in genuine culture, which is the pursuit of art and science, philosophy and literature, that justifies this unhappy conception. An aristocratic order like that of the Greeks with their *kaloi kagathoi*, or superior men, enjoyed culture because it had opportunity for it in connection with the master-slave organization of the State. When the men of a democracy are afforded a similar opportunity, there can be culture for those who desire it just as there can be wealth or political office. All are within the range of physical possibility and political opportunity.

Certainly nothing is to be gained by pitting the intellectual life of man against man's present form of political organization. Democracy has other and better things to think about than the prohibition of intellectual and aesthetic experience. Those who oppose culture in a democracy do so on the grounds of formal reasoning that has little to do with facts and tendencies. Their implicit argument can be expressed in syllogistic form as follows:

Everything that is opposed to democracy is bad
 Culture is opposed to democracy
 Culture is bad

There is no doubt about the validity of this argument once the major premise is assumed, but suppose we prefer to change the terms in such a way as to prove the contrary. Then we shall have this syllogism, which is equally cogent:

Everything that is opposed to culture is bad
 Democracy is opposed to culture
 Democracy is bad

All depends upon the point of view as this reveals itself in the major premise, but these rival premises, the first democratic, the second aristocratic, lead us nowhere in connection with our liv-

ing problem, which is that of relating culture to our social and political life rather than of divorcing it from our vital existence. If we cannot harmonize our philosophy of culture with our political democracy, we can worry along with contrary ideals just as we do with free will and determinism, belief and doubt, capitalism and communism.

If we assume, as we have a right to do by virtue of the integrity of the spirit that is within us, that both culture and democracy are among our modern values, we may be able to realize that the fusion of these values can be of mutual advantage. There can be no doubt that democracy with its mass and mob tendency stands in special need of all the intelligence and refinement that can come from the pursuit of science and art. Democracy with its leveling tendency ever stands in need of the elevation that comes from enlightenment. The present plight of democracy with its tendency to gravitate toward communism is pathetic, the condition of sheep without either shepherd or sheepfold. Democracy may need a more equable distribution of this world's goods, more faith, and better physical health, but it stands in need of culture also.

DECADENCE AND DILETTANTISM

On the other hand, the old culture that became too effete and impotent in the old aristocratic regime, and deserved the hectic criticism of Rousseau and the more healthy criticism of Voltaire and Goethe, stands in need of democratic rejuvenation, otherwise it will continue to be decadent. "Decadence" has its own meaning and place in XIXth-century literature, where it involves the work of Edgar Allan Poe, who anticipated it. But the thing itself is capable of an interpretation and application broader than the purely literary; it means something cultural and social. "By the word Decadence," says Paul Bourget, "one denotes that state of society which produces too large a number of individuals who are unfitted for the work of common life."³ From this definition and what follows from it, we are in a position to see and to state that democracy in culture is the thing needed to check or even prevent decadence in art and life.

³ *Essais de psychologie contemporaine* (1883), p. 24.

Bourget follows the principles of social biology and social evolution pretty much after the manner of XIXth-century sociology, so that some of his methods of expressing his ideas may be somewhat outmoded although their inherent truth may remain. The individual is to Bourget a social cell whose particular functioning makes possible the functioning of the social organism generally. Usually the individual cell expresses its energy in subordination to the energy of the social organism. When, however, individual, cellular energy becomes independent, the tendency engendered is that of anarchy. Now it is the social organism itself rather than the mere individual that produces such anarchy, for development and decadence follow one and the same law. That is to say, while society is perfecting itself through civilization and culture, it so overdoes its own work that the civilized, cultured individual makes his escape from the social organism which produced and perfected him. Such was the situation that obtained throughout the rise and fall of the Roman Empire.

There can be little doubt that this philosophy of development and decadence is far too sweeping. It appears to be more a personal opinion than a general view and indicates a certain amount of enthusiasm for the decadent movement. Thus it is wiser to assume that decadence is confined to a certain class of artists and aesthetes within the broad circle of those who create and appreciate sound art. At the present time, culture as expressed by the fine arts betrays a decadent tendency in such things as a futuristic building, an impressionistic work of sculpture, the pursuit of unrecognizability in painting, unintelligibility in poetry, and various cacophonous effects in music. If culture can be made democratic, so that people generally shall set the standard of taste now being left to a restricted and irresponsible group, these decadent distortions may give place to genuine developments.

The modern experiment of democratic culture is hampered by dilettantism as much as it is hindered by decadence. The decadent withdraws from the social order and seeks refuge in a quasi-intellectual region as the Latin Quarter in Paris or Greenwich Village in New York. These sections afford a home for genuine artists and critics, but we are bound to associate them with harbors of refuge for those who are unfit for both art and

work. The dilettant resembles the decadent and may be just as little a social asset, but his attitude is different. The dilettant remains within the social circle, performs his tasks there, and has both a place and work in the world. Our criticism of him, therefore, must be cultural rather than social. The dilettant inclines to affect culture instead of assuming it as an intellectual burden, just as he regards art as something more emotional than mental. He takes delight, or *diletto*, in beautiful objects of all sorts, but does not realize their meaning as forms of expression put forth by the artist to be energized by the beholder.

When dilettantism assumes an intellectual form, it is usually in connection with up-to-date ideas and impressions. The classic conception of things in both art and science is set aside with the feeling that the world of culture was created about the year 1900. There is, perhaps, such a thing as genuine dilettantism, if we may so speak, and we shall see presently how the French have made a type of national culture out of emotional mentality. There is a lightness of touch and an ease of apprehension that is peculiar to all culture, which makes it different from science. But the present age is not sounding the depths of dilettantism, if we may use another doubtful form of expression. It is not indulging the massive emotions that aesthetic expression is calculated to produce. The result is sophistication. The sophisticated person is awake to the latest fad or fashion in art or science, *le dernier cri*. He knows his Freud or Einstein, he is quite familiar with Futurism, Cubism, or Dadaism. But the kind of culture that withdraws mankind from nature, arouses remote interests, and for the sake of humanity creates an inner life is a more serious matter. This will appear when various types of national culture are examined.

Long before this can be done, however, we must take special and somewhat detailed cognizance of the historical cultures that have made their impression upon the western world and given form to our own minds. We might traverse the whole field of culture and glance at the various types, including the Africo-Egyptian, Mongolian, Hindu, Persian, Aztec, and the like. Then, however, we should be like travelers who go round the world to see what in general it is like. But we shall confine our views to those cultures that have influenced our life and thought, the Medi-

terranean cultures of Hebrew, Greek, and Roman. Thus we shall be like student-travelers who visit the lands whose history has bearing upon their study. The bearing that Africa and Asia have had upon Europe will be found included in the three forms we shall examine. At the present time, the Far East is beginning to affect us and hence we shall have to inquire into the nature and extent of oriental influence. But the East is affecting the West only after the form and character of western culture has been determined, hence this slanting influence need not be noted until the direct forms of occidental culture have been determined. We begin with the religious influence of the Hebrews.

CHAPTER V

HEBREW RELIGION



JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY

THE READER OF KIPLING'S *Recessional* IS BOUND TO BE IMPRESSED by the poetic beauty and reverential spirit laid upon every line of the English psalm. He is not so likely to observe the Jewish tone of such a modern poem. It is addressed to the "God of our fathers, known of old," calls upon the Lord God of Hosts to keep England in mind of Nineveh and Tyre, refers with contempt to the "lesser breeds without the law," and would have the late Victorians abhor "such boasting as the Gentiles use." The reception of this poem in both school and church is one among a multitude of indications of the way in which the "lesser breeds" in the Europe of the last nineteen centuries adopted and absorbed a religious belief not intended for and perhaps not adapted to them; for, in accepting Christianity, Europe did not stop until it had borrowed also the Judaism from which that Christianity had emerged. However, to be an orthodox Christian has often amounted to being something more than a half-orthodox Hebrew. To accept the teaching of the Old Testament, likewise, used to mean that the believer should accept old Hebrew tradition as to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. Now, if the factors of race and language had been operative in European history, we should be worshipping Brahma, reciting the hymns of the *Rik Veda*, and writing theology upon the basis of the *Upanishads*. But, as it has turned out historically, we have taken our religion from one of the Semitic peoples.

What was there about the Hebrews in distinction from other Semites, such as the Babylonians and Assyrians, Arabs and Phoenicians, that made them feel themselves to be the Chosen People and later made them the religious educators of the western world? "Among the theocratically governed nations of the East," said Lotze, "the Hebrews seem to us as sober men among drunkards, but to antiquity they seemed like dreamers among

waking folk.”¹ The Hebrews were distinguished from other nations of the ancient world chiefly by the fact that they took a historical rather than a naturalistic point of view, whereby they were able to ignore the symbolism suggested by the objects of nature and proceed toward the future of their race if not of all mankind. To compare the *Psalms* with the hymns of the *Veda* is to see this at once. To consider the Hebrew idea of God is to realize how all the objects of nature, the heavenly bodies and the forms of life on earth, are nothing in themselves, but are dependent upon the Divine Will. Now, such conceptions as these came to appeal to the European mind as sensible considerations; they make their appeal even at this late date in the history of the West. For we believe that all nature is subject to an intelligible principle of some sort; we think of mankind as the subject of historical progress. Hence, in spite of certain outer peculiarities in Hebrew religion, as its racial character and persistent ceremonialism, we are inclined to feel that Hebraism is acceptable to our western ideals and intentions.

THE ORIGIN OF THE HEBREWS

We refer to the Hebrews as an oriental people, and doubtless they were eminently so at the beginning of their existence in their original home. This was somewhere east of the Euphrates River, in the land of Chaldea or Babylonia. But when the Hebrews migrated thence, about the year 2000 B.C., and sought a place of a purer worship than they had previously known, it was as though they detached themselves from the Orient, forsook its sensualistic spirit to elaborate an unusual form of religious belief and practice. The accounts in *Genesis* make mention of the fact that Abraham's father left Ur of the Chaldees with all his household, household goods, his flocks and herds, and settled temporarily around Haran. A beginning having been made, Abraham himself left Haran and proceeded westward to the land of Canaan at the very edge of the eastern world. The land was strategically and conveniently located for the development and dispensation of a great sentiment. It was in touch with the African culture of Egypt.

¹ *Microcosmus*, tr. Hamilton and Jones, Bk. VII, Ch. V, § 5.

and was quite accessible by caravan routes to Babylonia and Assyria. None the less was it in geographical touch by land and sea with Europe, so that it was a simple matter when, later, the Apostle Paul decided to pass over from Asia Minor to Macedonia. The isolation which the primitive Hebrews desired was thus more psychological than physical; the geographical position between Egypt and Assyria was both advantageous and perilous. There the Hebrews elaborated their unique worship; thence they went into Egyptian bondage and Babylonian captivity.

The history of the Hebrews dates from Abraham's departure from Mesopotamia. Already his father, Terah, had planned to enter the land of Canaan, but in breaking away from the Chaldean city of Ur and making his journey round the northern end of the desert he had gone no farther than the city of Haran. When, therefore, Abraham completed the pilgrimage and reached the land of Canaan, he was but carrying out the paternal plan. The movements and activities of this little band, including Abraham's household and that of his nephew Lot, may be stated briefly, and their significance may with equal directness be indicated. Yet we may pause a moment to suggest that Abraham's significant journey was quite in keeping with his nomadic type of life, while his journey to and beyond Canaan was in harmony with his adventurous spirit. Moreover, there was in his heart, as there had been in the heart of his father before him, a desire to sever social and spiritual relationships in Chaldea, a land no longer productive of religious promise.

THE CALL OF ABRAHAM

The famous "call" of Abraham was such as to get him out of his home country, his kindred, and his father's house, and to set his face toward the land of a new habitation. How terse the historical account! "And they went forth to go into the land of Canaan, and into the land of Canaan they came."² The country seemed promising although, as the record states, "the Canaanite was then in the land," the Hamitic Canaanite who, later, was to be the deadly foe of the Israelite. The pious nomad

² *Gen.* XII, 5.

pitched his tent and built an altar between Bethel and Hai, but his stay was brief. A famine occurs and the lure of Egyptian grain draws him farther south. Upon entering the land of the Pharaohs, Abraham fears that the fairness of his wife, Sarai, will tempt the Egyptian to kill him and take her; whereupon he persuades this comely Oriental, whom apparently "age cannot wither," to pass herself off as his sister. The story is told with the usual brevity of patriarchal history.

"And it came to pass that, when Abram was come into Egypt, the Egyptians beheld the woman that she was very fair. The princes also of Pharaoh saw her and commended her before Pharaoh; and the woman was taken into Pharaoh's house. And he entreated Abram well for her sake; and he had sheep and oxen, and he-asses and menservants, and maidservants, and she-asses and camels."³ But a plague, the first that Israel was to bring upon Egypt, fell upon the house of Pharaoh. The vulgar trick is exposed, and the superstitious Egyptian commands the patriarch to take his wife and all his company away. It was not long before Abraham and his band are back at the site of the tent and altar between Bethel and Hai, only this time the adventurous nomad is rich in cattle, in silver, and in gold. Indeed, the herds were so large that there was not room enough for them; hence the historic separation of Abraham and Lot. It was in connection with the unfortunate Lot, who was taken prisoner in the mysterious warfare of the four and five kings, that the same Abraham showed a certain amount of military strategy. This he did by engaging Chedorlaomer in front while the other half of his improvised army attacked him in the rear.

The naïve tales of the Hebrew patriarchs convey a significance which cannot be discovered by any analytical process, for there was no patriarchal theology. The psychology of such early religion seems to reveal these early believers as strong and active men who were convinced of a national destiny and a Divine Providence guiding them toward a far-off future of their race. "Beautiful is it, therefore," said Goethe, "that the Israelitish tradition represents the very first men who confide in this particular Providence as heroes of faith, following all the commands

³ *Gen. XII, 14-16.*

of that High Being on whom they acknowledge themselves dependent, just as blindly as, undisturbed by doubts, they are unwearied in awaiting the later fulfillment of his promises.”⁴ In the minds of later Biblical characters, primarily St. Paul, the sweet strength of the patriarch’s faith is practically identified with the kind of belief demanded by a universal and spiritual religion. For Abraham believed and it was counted unto him for righteousness.⁵

In the same manner, we observe, as though we were trying to trace the outlines of a faded picture, the strange encounter of Abraham and Melchizedec, king of Salem and priest of the Most High God, who met the military patriarch after his slaughter of the kings and gave him his blessing. The original account of this strange meeting between two shadowy figures in history contains some three score words, yet out of it was destined to emerge the ideal of a pure and spiritual priesthood free from legalism and full of power, “the power of an endless life.”⁶ Indeed, the writers of the New Testament, while appreciative of the merits findable in the Law and the Prophets, seem inclined to revert to the patriarchs for the patterns of the believing mind.

THE HEBREWS IN EGYPT

From the life of Isaac, the man of laughter, we glean no spiritual insight. We associate him with the story that tells how his aged father, following an ancient custom, attempted to sacrifice him, the first-born, on the fiery altar. We read with truly human interest the long chapter⁷ in which his courtship of Rebecca is recounted. Jacob appeals to us less pleasantly but with somewhat more significance, yet his religious intuitions exemplified in his vision of the heavenly ladder seem to lack the sincerity and simplicity of the spiritual insight of his ancestor Abraham. Jacob, however, is important in Hebrew history in that he became the father of the children of Israel, founders of the twelve tribes. Although Jacob’s favorite son, Joseph, failed to fall heir to any tribal headship, he became the most significant figure in

⁴ *Truth and Fiction from my Life*, Bk. 4.

⁵ *Gen.* XV, 6; *Rom.* IV, 3.

⁶ *Heb.* VII.

⁷ *Gen.* XXIV.

the family. This appears in Israel's relation to Egypt; it involves the everlasting question of food. The fertile plain of Mesopotamia, whence the Hebrews came, and the rich valley of the Nile, to which they repaired, bloomed in contrast to the less fertile land of Canaan.

In the time of Joseph, there was a famine in the land of Canaan and its inhabitants were forced down into Egypt for their food, as had been the case in the days of Abraham. Joseph was already there, having been sold to Pharaoh by the brothers, who were jealous of him and envious of his famous coat of many colors. By the time the hungry brothers arrived, Joseph was already in high favor with the king, for it was due to the foresight, if not the shrewdness, of the Hebrew steward that the Egyptian granaries were full of corn. Joseph is famous in Biblical history for his display of chastity in the matter of Potiphar's wife; his private life was beyond reproach. Not so his public conduct, for in the period of the great famine he was guilty of both extortion and a kind of secret rebate. Taking advantage of the situation, he made the improvident Egyptians sacrifice their money, their cattle, and their lands for corn. At the same time, when his brethren came to buy the corn, he restored their money secretly, by putting the money paid back into the sacks of grain.

The result of the famine was the settlement of the Hebrews in Egypt, for Pharaoh set aside for their habitation the land of Goshen. The length of this excursion or "exile" in Egypt is not easy to determine; one Biblical record makes it four generations,⁸ another four centuries.⁹ Egyptian records themselves, as found in the Tel-el-Amarna tablets, reveal the relationship between Egypt and Palestine and make the story of Joseph's stewardship and Pharaoh's kindness appear plausible. The change of Pharaohs brought about the accession of the king that "knew not Joseph," so that what had been a sojourn to secure food became a real exile of captivity. The Hebrews became slaves, with taskmasters over them, and were forced to build for the new Pharaoh the treasure cities of Pithom and Raamses.¹⁰ This oc-


⁸ *Gen.* XV, 16; *Ex.* VI, 16-20.

¹⁰ *Ex.* I, 11.

⁹ *Gen.* XV, 13; *Ex.* XII, 40.



CARAVAN OF CANAANITES, ABOUT 1900 B.C.
Painting on an Egyptian tomb.



ANCIENT EGYPTIAN PAINTING OF CAPTIVES WORKING IN A BRICK-
YARD, ABOUT 1600 B.C.



CARVING ON THE TEMPLE AT ABYDOS, SHOWING AMORITE
AUXILIARIES OF A HITTITE ARMY

(facing page 104)

casioned the famous incident of "bricks without straw." It was not that the enslaved brick-layers were expected to build in such an impossible way; it was that they were both to make the bricks and scour the whole land in search of straw or stubble for the clay. The obvious purpose of this was to keep the Hebrews from congregating and carrying on the worship of their national deity.¹¹ It was this oppression that made Israel ripe for the national deliverer that was to appear in the heroic form of Moses.

THE CAREER OF MOSES

The early life of Moses from his birth to the birth of his son is recounted in some twenty verses of the 2d chapter of *Exodus*. It is well known how, at the age of three months, he was taken by his mother and hidden in the flags by the river's brink there to be found by none other than Pharaoh's daughter, who adopted him and called him "Moses," the one drawn out. In the court of Pharaoh, Moses must have acquired Egyptian ideas, since he was referred to later as a man "learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians."¹² But, while his mind may have been molded in this way, his heart was with the people from whom, for the time, he had been separated. For when he sallied forth from the court to visit his Hebrew brethren he observed one suffering at the hands of an Egyptian taskmaster, whom he promptly slew. It was the fear of being charged with this act of manslaughter that drove Moses out of Goshen into Midian, on the peninsula between the arms of the Red Sea. It was here that he met and married the daughter of Jethro, priest of Midian. But this amounted to more than primitive romance and domesticity, for it was Moses' father-in-law who, some time after the historic exodus, visited Moses and advised him to give the people laws and appoint judges over them.¹³

The Midian retirement of Moses and his temporary detachment from his own people and their oppressors were fruitful of both a political plan and a theological principle. The political plan was the well-known one—to deliver Israel out of the hand of the Egyptians and establish a theocratic nation in the land of

¹¹ *Ex.* V, 7-17.

¹² *Acts* VII, 22.

¹³ *Ex.* XVIII.

promise to which Abraham had taken title. The theological principle is not so familiar to us. It begins to unfold itself when Moses has his mystic conversation with the Deity. "When I come unto the children of Israel and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them? And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM . . . and say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you."¹⁴ This strange incident clears up somewhat when the Deity is represented as speaking in the following manner: "And spake Elohim to Moses and said to him, I am Jahweh. And I appeared to Abraham and to Isaac and to Jacob and El Shaddai but by my name Jahweh I was not known to them."¹⁵ It was this new God, if we may thus express it, who was to be the national Deity of the Hebrew people; no longer the benign Providence of a wandering tribe of mystics, but the stern ruler of a race which was destined to indulge political ambitions and be a nation along with the other nations of the East.

THE EXODUS

The sojourn of the Hebrews in Egypt, where they were reputed to have spent over four hundred years, was brought to a spectacular close. The vigorous exodus was achieved under the guidance of the national hero who as an infant had been drawn from his hiding place on the reedy river bank and installed in the court of Pharaoh. Moses, back from brooding in the land of Midian, accomplished the deliverance by magic and miracle, by the rod he had handed to his brother Aaron and by his own hand. The one was to break down the hardness of Pharaoh's heart, the other to part the waters of the Red Sea. In breaking down Pharaoh's resistance, it was necessary for Moses, or Aaron through Moses, to perform feats of magic which the magicians of old Egypt could not match. Aaron throws down the rod and it becomes a serpent. "Now the magicians of Egypt, they also did in like manner with their enchantments."¹⁶ Aaron's rod works greater magic when it turns the river into blood, but the

¹⁴ *Ex.* III, 13-14.

¹⁶ *Ex.* VII, 11.

¹⁵ *Ex.* VI, 2-3, from the original Hebrew.

enchantments of the native sorcerers were equally effective. Likewise with the magical multiplication of frogs which plagued the whole land. Not so, however, with the plague of lice which the rod of Aaron conjured up to disconcert the older magicians and make them confess, "This is the finger of God." From then on, the two Hebrew brothers, working in concert, devise and accomplish some seven other plagues — plague of flies, murrain of beasts, epidemic of boils, fiery hail stones, locusts, a darkness that could be fairly felt, and death of the first-born beginning with the first-born of Pharaoh and descending even unto the dungeon and the cattle-barn.¹⁷

The positive part of the Hebrew exodus involved the famous crossing of the Red Sea. The narrative advances from the magic worked by Aaron's rod to the miracle worked by Moses' hand, which he stretched out over the waters. It happened that a strong east wind had been blowing all night rendering the sea, presumably at low tide, unusually shallow and making passage through it a physical possibility. The narrative does not fail to add that, even so, the waters were as a wall to right and left of the flying multitude, while it goes on to state that, in obedience to another sublime gesture on the part of Moses, "the sea returned to his strength" and overwhelmed the pursuing Egyptians, chariots and horsemen and all the host of Pharaoh. The triumphant poem of Moses, to which his sister Miriam and all the women, timbrel in hand, sang and danced, seemed to indicate that this hurriedly organized host would proceed at once into the promised land and spread sorrow among the inhabitants of Palestina, or Philistia; but the poet was also a man of affairs, hence the entrance into the land was delayed for a generation.

What Moses did with his unorganized, undisciplined people was to lead them down into the little Sinai peninsula east of Egypt, where the runaways could be drilled and a new generation brought into existence and transformed into a body of warriors. Doubtless these Hebrews were something like an Arab tribe today, apt for discipline and willing to meet the exigencies of rigorous religious belief. Furthermore, this sequestered life on the peninsula begot a sense of mutual dependence and a still

¹⁷ *Ex.* VII-X.

greater dependence upon the new Deity. At Sinai, or Horeb, the new religio-social policy was slowly installed. Much of this work we must surmise, since the actual account of what took place in the wilderness of the wandering is confined to a record of but two of the forty years passed there. We have, however, a description of the giving of the law and must determine as best we can how much meaning is attributable to the well-known saying, "The law was given by Moses." The time will come in this chapter when we shall have to consider what literary connection Moses had with the five books that bear his name; but now it is a question of Moses and that indefinite thing known as "the law."

MOSES AS LEGISLATOR

We have pictured Moses as a kind of Xenophon leading a triumphant retreat. Can we think of him after the pattern of a Lycurgus? Jewish jurisprudence is found in parts of *Exodus* and *Numbers*, in most of *Deuteronomy* and all of *Leviticus*, books which contain the law in its finished form. When we examine such a work on canon law as *Leviticus*, we find a detailed system of priestly and ceremonial legislation centered in a temple, concerned with sacrifices, ceremonial cleanness, the prohibition of idolatry, and the like. This we cannot fit into the picture of Moses and his tribe, who worshiped in a tent at an earthen altar. In like manner, we find it difficult to think of this tribal leader as the giver of the Decalogue, as found in *Exodus* XX and *Deuteronomy* V, since its ethical and individual standards of righteousness seem too ideal for a folk placed in a very realistic situation — journeying in a wilderness.

What we do find, however, is a kind of impromptu Decalogue in *Exodus* XXXIV. This consists of what are called the "ten words" of a practical and religious character calculated to regulate the simple worship and wholesome conduct of a rude people. These little laws forbade idolatry, commanded the observance of certain sacred times, and required gifts and services. It was when the practical lawgiver came down from Sinai with these two tables of testimony in his hands that his face shone with such brightness that the people were afraid to come near

him.¹⁸ To Moses we may attribute also the "Book of the Covenant" as given in *Exodus* XX, following almost immediately upon the Decalogue and continuing through Chapter XXIII. The rest of the jurisprudence in *Exodus* and *Leviticus*, *Numbers* and *Deuteronomy* seem to the reader to be a ceremonial form to the "words" with which Moses communicated the will of Jahweh to his people, hence the oft-recurring expression, "And the Lord spake unto Moses."

The death of Moses occurred in Moab, atop Mt. Nebo and within sight of the land whither he led his people, but which he himself was not to enter. He was essentially a man of isolated life although a leader of men, and it was thus that Alfred de Vigny in his poem spoke of him as saying, "O Lord, thou hast made me powerful but solitary — *puissant et solitaire*." With the grave of Moses behind them in a valley of Moab, Israel entered the land of Canaan that had been promised them. Their real history as a nation was about to begin and their national character undergo development. To this historical process we may allot two centuries, one for the mastery of the land, the other for the development of their little kingdom; a period of judges and an era of kings. The connection between the Mosaic regime and the inception of the judges is made by the personality of Joshua, a man something after the manner of Moses and ordained to succeed him in the capacity of personal leader.¹⁹

HEBREWS AND HITTITES

The land that the Israelites entered was in possession of groups of Canaanitish peoples to whom we may refer generally as Hittites. These had been quite a formidable nation able to carry on some sort of warfare with the Egyptians to the south and the Assyrians in the north, but unsuccessful combat with these mightier forces had reduced their military power to a minimum, hence they were fairly easy foes for their new enemy.²⁰ As for the Israelites, the occupation of Canaan meant the exchange of nomadic existence for agricultural life, resulting in the develop-

¹⁸ *Ex.* XXXIV, 29-30.

²⁰ Sanders, *History of the Hebrews*, p. 77.

¹⁹ *Num.* XXVII, 18; *Deut.* I, 38, etc.

ment of domestic, social, and religious forms. After the passing of the personal, Moses-like leadership of Joshua, they settled down to some sort of political regime under what they called "Judges." These impromptu officials were far from being what their title would imply except as we regard them after the manner of rural justices of the peace or police magistrates in a large city. They seem to have been men of natural ability to whom the people turned for aid and advice, and in their robust capacity of judges may be likened to some of our pioneer leaders, such as Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett, or Andrew Jackson.

The career of Israel during the century of judges yields interesting materials for history, but does not constitute a brilliant record of a nation. The spirit of the period is summed up in the last verse of *Judges*: "In those days, there was no king in Israel; every man did that which was right in his own eyes." The story of this naïve anarchy includes the crafty murder of Sisera at the hands of Jael, wife of Heber the Kenite, as also the robust song of Deborah and Barak, which celebrated the bloody act.²¹ Here, in this crude but interesting book, we read of Judge Jephtha, his famous victory over the Ammonites, and the rash vow that cost his beautiful daughter her life.²² Among others who did what was right in his own eyes was Samson, the giant and humorist of the age. He seems to have specialized in riddles and feats of strength. Thus we read with more interest than credulity of his ability to strangle a lion, catch foxes by the hundred, and slay a thousand men with the jawbone of an ass; read also of his blind revenge upon the Philistines who, aided by the wily Delilah, had made him captive. From a political point of view, we are more interested in Samuel, practically the last of the judges, but, above all, the original king-maker of Israel.

THE HISTORY OF THE KINGS

The history of Israel's throne is recorded in the four *Books of the Kings*, better known as *I and II Samuel*, *I and II Kings*. A subsequent account of the kingdom with both its unified and divided throne is found in the two *Books of the Chronicles*. The

²¹ *Judges* IV-V.

²² *Judges* XI.

reader of the books of Samuel, written about but not by the man whose name they bear, may wonder what was their historical source. He observes that, in the second book, the Biblical writer refers to a certain "remembrancer" or recorder, as also to a scribe or "secretary,"²³ and in another place he seems to be quoting from *The Book of Jasher*.²⁴ This selection is David's famous lament over the death of Saul and Jonathan, "lovely and pleasant in their lives and in their death not divided." Certain sources of the *Books of the Kings* are mentioned in that work: *The Book of the Acts of Solomon*;²⁵ *The Chronicles of the Kings of Judah*;²⁶ and *The Chronicles of the Kings of Israel*.²⁷ We mention these literary matters in order to enhance the realism of the Bible, a sacred work so detached from the affairs of earth that few there are who make a study of its sources and general characteristics.

The establishment of the Kingdom of Israel, which in the days of Abraham and Moses had been a "kingdom not of this world," may have been a false step for the Hebrews. In its unity, it lasted but a century; its disruption was violent, and the two petty principalities that resulted ended in captivity. However, there was a popular demand for such political organization; its first king, Saul, seemed available; and there was the need of defense against the rival government of Philistia in the south. These Philistines in the book of *Genesis* are identified as the natives of Caphtor, which may be the island of Crete, spoken of as "the isle." They remained in Palestine until the sixth century B.C. It was the task of Saul to relieve Israel of their oppression. He seems to have been chosen on a physical basis, for "from his shoulders and upward he was higher than any of the people."²⁸ He was selected by Samuel while he was seeking the asses that had strayed from the fold, a historical item which prompted Goethe to say, "Go forth searching for the meanest of thy father's goods and a kingdom shall be brought thee."

The monarchical and military career of this easy-going leader of Israel is summed up in a single verse of the record: "So Saul took the kingdom over Israel and fought against all his enemies

²³ *II Sam.* VIII, 16-17.

²⁴ *II Sam.* I, 17-27.

²⁵ *I Kings* XI, 41.

²⁶ *I Kings* XV, 23.

²⁷ *I Kings* XV, 31.

²⁸ *I Sam.* IX, 2.


on every side; against Moab, and against the children of Ammon, and against Edom and against the kings of Zobah, and against the Philistines; and whithersoever he turned himself he vexed them." ²⁹ But an act of disobedience to the command of God as given by the seer Samuel, who acted as a sort of Secretary of State in the kingdom, caused Saul to be practically deposed and brought about the anointing of David in his stead. Apparently Saul did not have a sound mind in a sound body. He was subject to fits of madness and somewhat given to sorcery; he finally committed suicide. He is pictured as chieftain in his camp rather than king upon a throne. "Now Saul abode in Gibeah under a tree in Ramah, having his spear in his hand, and all his servants were standing about him." ³⁰

THE KINGDOM OF DAVID

The history of King David is comparatively voluminous. The writer of *I Samuel* weaves it into the life of Saul and devotes all of *II Samuel* to it. The reign of this dashing monarch constituted the great glory of Israel. He had all the military ability of Saul, something like Moses' capacity for political leadership, and to some degree the religious fervor of Samuel. His weakness lay in his emotionalism. A spirit of romance accompanied his entire career, so that, as we cannot think of Solomon as ever having been young, we cannot think of David as ever growing old. The biography of David is well known and need not be dwelt upon, although we cannot, like H. G. Wells, dismiss it with considerably less than a hundred words and say simply, "His story, with its constant assignations and executions, reads rather like the history of some savage chief than of a civilized monarch." ³¹

What King David did for the history of Hebrew civilization consisted chiefly in taking Jerusalem and making it "the city of the Great King," or Jahweh. This new Hebrew capital had ever been a Canaanitish fortress; David was to give it a fame equal almost to that of Israel, although it was severely criticized by the prophet Ezekiel, who attributed its abominations to its Canaanit-

²⁹ *I Sam.* XIV, 47. ³⁰ *I Sam.* XXII, 6. ³¹ *Outline of History*, Ch. XIX, § 2.



SOLOMON'S TEMPLE

A modern pictured restoration of the temple before the destruction of Jerusalem in 586 B.C.
(facing page 113)

ish origin. "Thus saith the Lord God unto Jerusalem: Thy birth and thy nativity is of the land of Canaan; thy father was an Amorite and thy mother an Hittite."³² It is a matter of surprise that the taking of Jerusalem is not reported in any spectacular manner but is noted with the terseness of a military report. David seems to have overawed the Jebusites who dwelt there and, as it were, walked into the city. "The inhabitants of Jebus (Jerusalem) said to David, Thou shalt not come hither. Nevertheless David took the castle of Zion, which is the city of David."³³ Jerusalem was strategically situated, was the property of no one tribe, and as easy to defend as it was difficult to attack.

David's work was that of Hebrew nationalization and to the inner unity of religion he added an outer unity of politics. To Jerusalem he brought the Mosaic ark of the covenant that the superstitious Philistines, having taken from the Israelites, sent back to them. He had Hiram, king of Tyre, build him a royal palace of cedar wood and stone. After this exhibition of his political spirit, he desired to express his religious faith by building a temple that the ark of the Lord might be housed in some better place than a tent, but his prophet Nathan commands him to leave that work to his successor.³⁴ A natural leader of men, David organized his companions and captains into a corps of lieutenants called the "mighty men," among them those who had been wont to gather with him in his famous Cave of Adullam. The organization of the capital city resulted in the unification of the whole nation.

DAVIDIC LITERATURE

There was a development of culture as well as civilization. Up to the days of David, Israel had practically no literature. To the Davidic period may be attributed *The Blessings of Jacob*,³⁵ *The Oracles of Balaam*,³⁶ *The Book of the Wars of the Lord*,³⁷ and *The Book of Jasher*.³⁸ Then there is *The Book of Psalms*, commonly attributed to David, but his authorship of them as a whole is a literary impossibility. David was a sweet singer and devout worshiper but we know nothing of his poetic ability; thus we are

³² *Ezek.* XVI, 3. ³⁴ *II Sam.* VII. ³⁶ *Num.* XII-XIV. ³⁸ *II Sam.* I, 18.
³³ *II Sam.* V, 6-7. ³⁵ *Gen.* XL. ³⁷ *Num.* XXI, 14.

inclined to think of the *Psalms* as Davidic in the way that we consider the plays of Shakespeare Elizabethan. The conduct of David, when he was at his worst, is condemned by us, but so was it condemned by his people. The acts of this man seem to have received special literary treatment in *The Book of Samuel the Seer*, *The Book of Nathan the Prophet*, and *The Book of Gad the Seer*.³⁹ From all the records of his reign, we gather that David extended the Hebrew realm, built a national capitol, organized his people, and gave them both a national consciousness and a presentiment of their future. David's origin was humble and of him it was said, "Thee took I from the sheep cote and following the flock;" none the less was the Kingdom of Israel the kingdom of David, a throne established forever.

The history of King Solomon does not occupy half so much space as that of his father David in the *Books of the Kings*, but the biography is colorful, the events recorded magnificent, and the tone eulogistic. Solomon was the child of Bathsheba, widow of Uriah the Hittite, whose first child had died so pathetically.⁴⁰ It was this tragic woman who placed Solomon upon the throne of David. Solomon reveals the glory of Israel and the decline of Egypt by marrying Pharaoh's daughter, and it was his many marriages with foreign women who brought their idolatries into his court, the worship of Astarte and Moloch, for example, that was his ultimate undoing. It was this, in the hands of Jeroboam, a son of one of his servants, that finally split the great kingdom.

The kingdom of this petty Oriental was reputed to extend from the river Euphrates to the border of Egypt. Its subjects were many as the sand of the sea and in their royal revelry they were found "eating and drinking and making merry," every one dwelling safely under his vine and his fig tree.⁴¹ The description of the menage in the monarch's household is quite impressive. The provisions for a single day were thirty measures of fine flour and sixty measures of meal; ten fat oxen and twenty oxen out of the pasture, a hundred sheep, besides harts, roebucks, fallow deer, and fatted fowl. In his royal entourage, Solomon had forty thousand stalls for the horses of his chariots and twelve thousand

³⁹ *I Chron.* XXIX, 29. ⁴⁰ *II Sam.* XII, 15 *et seq.* ⁴¹ *I Kings* IV, 20.

horsemen. These with their dromedaries were well supplied with food, there being plenty of barley and straw for the beasts.

Along with this largess on the part of Solomon, there seems to have been breadth of vision whereby Solomon's wisdom has become a byword. In his own day, it was reputed to be superior to the wisdom of all Egypt. This reputation seems to have been based upon the story of Solomon's judgment in deciding the maternity of the child which the two harlots contended for; but it would seem as though the instinct of the woman, the rightful mother, who was willing to relinquish her child in order to save its life, was more wonderful than the intelligence of the man who settled the question of its maternity. However, to this king are reputed some three thousand proverbs and more than a thousand songs. Solomon enjoyed some sort of scientific reputation also, because of his knowledge of the flora and fauna about him, the trees and plants, the beasts and fowl, the fishes and creeping things.⁴² Doubtless these descriptions are more adulatory than authentic.

SOLOMON'S TEMPLE

It will be recalled that David, upon taking Jerusalem, desired to build a temple but was restrained therefrom by the prophet Nathan. Solomon's architectural enterprise was elaborate. He built The House of the Forest of Lebanon, to which was attached his Porch of Judgment; a house for Pharaoh's daughter, a building resplendent in costly stone and polished cedar; his own residence, which required thirteen years to build; and last, if not really least of all, the Temple. In building the Temple, Solomon availed himself of his father's acquaintance with King Hiram of Tyre, who seems to have been an expert builder, or, at any rate, "a man filled with wisdom and understanding and cunning to work all works in brass." The Biblical description of the Temple with its great variety of building materials of wood, stone, metal, jewels, and the like is impressive. The building itself, a rectangular walled structure 124 feet long, 55 feet wide, and 52 feet high, was no Pyramid or Taj Mahal or Cathedral at Cologne. Indeed it was somewhat smaller than Solomon's own house; but

⁴² *1 Kings IV.*

then, it was not supposed to be a place of public worship, but a private dwelling place for Jahweh, or a mere symbol of his earthly presence. The old Hebrew sense of God's sublimity was voiced by Solomon when he said, "But will God indeed dwell on the earth? Behold the heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house that I have builded?"⁴³

The secular activities of Solomon were no less spectacular. They included the building of cities like Hazor, Megiddo, and Gezer; the development of commerce in spices and ivory, gold and silver, horses and mules, apes and peacocks. Solomon built up a navy also, the famous ships of Tarshish, which were manned by King Hiram's sailors. All of this splendor was costly and involved severe taxation and enforced labor, and it was this afterwards which was referred to as the "grievous yoke" that King Solomon had placed upon his people. His son and successor, Rehoboam, promised to be even more tyrannical, whereupon, in 937 B.C., the ten tribes in the northern and central portion of Palestine formed a new kingdom under Jeroboam, who had been in Egypt waiting for just this opportunity, while the southern tribes of Judah and Simeon maintained the old order and formed the Kingdom of Judah. The northern Kingdom of Israel lasted until 722 B.C., when it was taken by Sargon of Assyria, after which its ten tribes were lost to view in the history of the world. The Kingdom of Judah lasted more than a century longer probably because it maintained an unbroken dynasty, had the inspiration of the Temple and the influence of Jerusalem, was comparatively small, and followed a conservative policy. But Judah also was fated for a foreign yoke; its complete captivity by Babylon and the destruction of Jerusalem occurred in 586 B.C.

BABYLONIAN EXILE

The history of the Hebrews from that time on was marked by subjugation to four foreign yokes, Babylonian and Persian, Greek and Roman, two of them oriental and two occidental. The seventy years of Babylonian Exile changed these Biblical

⁴³ *1 Kings VIII, 27.*

people from "Hebrews"⁴⁴ into "Jews."⁴⁵ That is, from being provincial they became cosmopolitan, exchanged agricultural practices for commercial pursuits in what the prophet Ezekiel called "a land of traffic and a city of merchants," and developed their patriotico-religious literature. The Jews, as they were coming to be called, became a literary people, and it was during the period of the Exile that the Deuteronomic School of writers collected, edited, and extended the traditional records of their race and formed a history of the Hebrew people.

The beginnings of Aryan domination in Syria and Palestine, which was to continue for a thousand years between Cyrus and Mahomet, occurred in 539 B.C. when Cyrus swept serenely into the city of Babylon. The diplomacy of this Persian is as famous as his military ability; it showed itself in the way he allowed the Jews to return to Judea and the decree he made concerning the rebuilding of the temple at Jerusalem.⁴⁶ Some forty thousand Jews, or less, responded to this royal invitation to return, but it is obvious that in the minds of the people generally the physical Jerusalem was little in comparison with the spiritual Zion. However, a second temple was dedicated in 516 B.C., social reforms were carried out, and in 400 B.C. a new law promulgated by Ezra was adopted. This stressed the letter rather than the spirit of the law, was more ceremonial than prophetic, and made the Jewish people a nation of the book. It is hardly too much to say that it was under the auspices of Babylonian and Persian domination that the Jews came into their own spiritual heritage and became Jews indeed. When Grecian domination succeeded that of the Persians, a new phase of Jewish culture developed.

THE END OF JEWISH NATIONALISM

The Grecian domination of the Jewish people was but a small part of Alexander the Great's conquest of Asia and the development of Hellenism. The military ability and political skill of Alexander are well-known facts of general history; his relations to the Jews are more obscure. Alexander made a tremendous im-

⁴⁴ *Gen.* X, 21; *XIV*, 13.

⁴⁶ *Ezra* VI, 1-5.

⁴⁵ *Ezra* IV, 12; *II Kings* XVI, 6.

pression upon the Jewish mind. The prophet Daniel likened him to a he-goat, "a notable horn between his two eyes," bounding out of the west; "and the rough goat," said he, "is the king of Grecia and the great horn that is between his eyes is the first king."⁴⁷ The conquests of Alexander do not specially concern us, since we are interested in observing the culmination of the Jewish idea as, in the following chapter, we shall note the development of the Grecian one. What Alexander means for us here is "Alexandria."

The actual founding of Alexandria resulted in a meeting place and common ground for Hellenism and Hebraism; out of this synthesis grew something that is called "Hellenistic," a Graeco-Jewish product. Outwardly, this union was signalized by the translation of the Old Testament into Greek, a long process which began in the year 250 B.C. This was the version made by "The Seventy," or *The Septuagint*, often indicated as LXX. Inwardly, the Alexandrian movement, which engendered Hellenistic culture, was brought about by contrary ideals and yet complementary aims on the part of Greek and Jew alike. The Greeks had ever attributed the existence and behavior of things to the inherent power of nature; the Jews, to the will of God. In parallel manner, the Greek moralist had ascribed goodness to that which is according to nature, while the Jew defined goodness in terms of obedience to the Divine Will. This produced the peculiar phenomena of Hebraizing Greeks and Hellenizing Jews; it amounted to little more than a tolerant tone and a common desire to discover an adequate philosophy of life. This was to appear not much later in Christianity, a Hebraic belief which assumed a Hellenistic form, an eastern religion which had its success in the western world.

HEBREW CULTURE

The inner history of the Hebrew people, their culture, is reflected in their literature, in the books of the Old Testament. We are quite correct in referring to these works of history, poetry, philosophy, and prophecy as religious literature, but they are not

⁴⁷ *Dan.* VIII, 21.

that alone. In addition to fairly sedate historical narratives such as we find in the books of the kings, *I* and *II Samuel*, *I* and *II Kings*, we find myths and legends, folk lore and folk songs, songs, riddles, fables, and even puns. In the books of *Ruth* and *Esther* we observe something not wholly unlike the modern short story. *Job* is a kind of drama somewhat akin in tone to the plays of Aeschylus; the book of *Jonah* is an allegory and Isaiah's Vineyard Song, beginning "Now will I sing to my well-beloved a song of my beloved touching his vineyard," is a parable suggestive of the *Parable of the Vineyard* in the Gospels. Although the Hebrew mind was conscious of a religious destiny, it did not feel it necessary to express this in a purely theological manner, hence the Hebrew writer proceeded pretty much in the style of his contemporaries in other lands.

In the case of the books of Moses, the Pentateuch, the literary situation was not at all unusual at such a period in history. It is only because our way of writing is so different that the problem of the Pentateuch arose. What we expect to find is a single narrative from the pen of one man; what we do find even after only superficial reading is a collection of documents written at different times and places by different men. In the instance of the four Gospels, our problem is to put the narratives together in the form of a harmonious account of Christ's life. In the case of the first five, or indeed, six books of the Old Testament, our problem is to detach the documents made by four or five unknown writers whose accounts were woven into the Pentateuch or the Hexateuch. Once we have done that, the duplications and variations which we encounter will become quite intelligible.

THE PROPHETS AND THE LAW

In order to comprehend the development of Hebrew literature, we must all but reverse the order in which the books are now found in the Old Testament. Then the arrangement will be: the Prophets, the Law, the Psalms. Apart from fragments of history, to which we have already referred, the works of the prophets were the first to be written. We find it difficult to think of them as growing out of the Law, as though it could have been their

Alma Mater, but find it comparatively easy to consider them as giving immediate expression to the religious intuitions which were growing up among the people. Their attitude toward the Law was one of antipathy, as we observe in such minor prophets as Amos and Micah, such major ones as Isaiah and Jeremiah. The discovery of the different documents ensconced in the Hexateuch was made originally, in the middle of the XVIIIth century, upon the basis of the different names for the Divine Being, who here is called "Elohim," there "Jahweh." But this distinction between an Elohist and a Jahvist writer was observed to hold for practically no book but that of *Genesis*, just as it was noted that there are evidences of other writers; hence, in extending the critical view beyond the 6th chapter of *Exodus*, it became necessary to recognize the presence of other scribes. The result is that an inner unity of spirit has taken the place of the outer and older unity of form.

The writers of the first six books of the Old Testament, the Hexateuch, are known as J, the Judaistic writer of the ninth century; E, an Ephraemitic author of the eighth century; D, the supposed author of the book of *Deuteronomy*, which was found in Judah in the year 621 B.C.; P, the priestly writer in the period of the Exile. A *rédacteur*, or editor known as R, is sometimes referred to by the Biblical scholar. The documents we know as J, E, and D were probably combined during the Exile, when the document known as P was written and woven into the record. Such a composite conception of the Hexateuch will serve to account for the combination of cosmological theory, naïve narrative, bits of folk lore, songs, ritualistic regulations, prophetic utterances, and chapters of religious instruction. A fuller description of J, E, D, and P will help to explain and enforce this theory of Biblical criticism.

The document called J, written by a Judean prophet in the ninth century B.C., begins with the second story of Creation given in the 2d chapter of *Genesis* and continues with the history of the Hebrew people to the accession of King Solomon. The second document used in the compilation, E, is of northern origin. It begins with the account of Abraham and tells the story of Israel in the form of biography, tradition, and custom. Docu-

ments J and E were probably combined in the seventh century B.C. The D document of the book of *Deuteronomy* is more didactic than historical, reflects the spirit of the prophets, and contends for monotheism in opposition to the idolatry that had grown up through contact with the Canaanitish natives. To the priestly writer of the Exile, P, we are indebted for the original account of Creation and the ceremonial ideas found in *Leviticus*, as also in *Exodus* and *Numbers*. By the year 400 B.C., the historical books up to *II Kings* were in their present form. The *Books of the Chronicles*, a repetition of the four *Books of the Kings*, appeared a century later. The Old Testament was in something like its present form by the year 100 B.C., although the complete canon including *The Song of Solomon*, *Esther*, and *Ecclesiastes* was not formed until the time of the Council of Jamnia in 90 A.D.

It was the destruction of the capitol at Jerusalem and the period of exile in Babylon that brought out the literary gifts of the Hebrew people. The Babylonians made much of the art of writing and the development of literature, so that they afforded the Hebrews a good example of early literary art. Moreover, the detachment from their own land and freedom from political responsibility combined to enhance a Jewish consciousness, so that it was natural for the Jews to write the history of their past and further consider the possibilities of their own national culture.

Our subject is the religion of the Hebrews; we have taken it up and shall proceed to Greek intellectualism and Roman imperialism for the purpose of discovering the several strands in our own civilization and culture. We have now to make an analysis of the religious ideas and intentions of the ancient Hebrews as these have been implied by their history and literature. The Hebrews had no word for religion and it is only in their late literature that we find the term "worship." But, better than the word, they had the religious sentiment; this they expressed in simple form without mystical complications. Their religion thus amounted to theism and righteousness; belief in God and the moral obligations involved therein. The monotheism for which they are famous historically was not achieved until the days of the prophets; it did not become universal among the people of the nation at large until they were exiles in Babylon.

THE HEBREW IDEA OF GOD

The God of the Hebrews was revealed to them in both outer nature and inner consciousness. They sought him in the earthquake and fire but found him in the still small voice. The Hebrews were far from avoiding anthropomorphism; they seemed to see God in human form and spoke of him as having human characteristics, as hands and feet, heart and eyes. God seemed to be in sympathy with human beings and their experiences; hence, when Hezekiah, king of Judah, received a threatening letter from Sennacherib, the Assyrian, he spread it before the Lord.⁴⁸ Yet even in the earlier history of this people, their Deity was thought of in a superior manner, as when it was said in *Genesis*, "My spirit shall not always strive with man."⁴⁹ For the most part the Hebrew mind was so lacking in metaphysical ideas and so intent upon ideals, that their anthropomorphism is not inclined to offend us.

Before the days of the prophets and the spiritual cleansing which the Kingdom of Judah received in the Babylonian Captivity, Hebrew religion was inclined to be racial and local. The idea of God was that of henotheism rather than monotheism; the notion that there is one God for each nation, not that God is an only God. Examples of this very restricted monotheism or henotheism are found among the early kings and early prophets. When David was driven out of the kingdom by the jealous wrath of Saul, he protested against his enemies, saying, "For they have driven me out this day from abiding in the inheritance of the Lord (Jahweh) saying, Go, serve other gods."⁵⁰ When Elisha the prophet healed Naaman the Syrian of his leprosy, Naaman requested that "two mules' burden of earth" be given to him to take back to his own country so that he might worship the God whose prophet had healed him.⁵¹ Even *The Book of Ruth*, written after the Exile, though indeed depicting an earlier scene, suggests that the heroine in going from Moab to Israel must adopt a new deity, hence the words, "Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God." It was the prophets

⁴⁸ *II Kings* XIX, 14.

⁵⁰ *I Sam.* XXVI, 19.

⁴⁹ *Gen.* VI, 3. The J document.

⁵¹ *II Kings* V, 17.

who spoke of God as the Lord of the whole earth who had a world-wide purpose.

HEBREW CONCEPTION OF RELIGION

In addition to this metaphysical purification of Hebrew worship, the prophets placed religion upon an ethical basis. They did this socially when they extended the dominion of Jahweh to other nations than Israel. In this latitudinarian spirit, Amos, whose prophecy was the first book of the Bible to be written, tells the people that, if Jahweh had brought them out of the land of Egypt, he had brought the Philistines from Caphtor and the Syrians from Kir. From this liberal point of view, the complacent Israelites were no more to their God than were the children of the Ethiopians.⁵² This rural prophet claimed that the sacrificial system was not of primitive origin, but the artificial growth of later times. "Have ye offered unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?"⁵³ At a later date, the prophet Jeremiah put this extraordinary matter even more strongly, insisting that Jahweh was a God of righteousness who demanded righteousness from his people.

The transmutation of religious worship from the ceremonial to the moral was conducted primarily by Amos and Micah, Isaiah and Jeremiah. Amos attacked the social injustice of his day when "they sold the righteous for silver and the poor for a pair of shoes" and represents Jahweh as saying, "I hate, I despise your feast days . . . Though ye offer me burnt offerings and meat offerings, I will not accept them . . . But let judgment run down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream."⁵⁴ In a similar tone of ethical idealism, the prophet Micah condemned the sacrificial system and asserted that Jahweh required the worshiper only "to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly."⁵⁵ The first Isaiah was no less emphatic in his denunciation of ceremonialism with its celebration of new moons and sabbaths, no less enthusiastic in the humanitarianism of relieving the oppressed, judging the fatherless, and pleading for the widow.⁵⁶

⁵² *Amos* IX, 7.

⁵³ *Amos* V, 25.

⁵⁴ *Amos* V, 21-24.

⁵⁵ *Micah* VI, 8.

⁵⁶ *Is.* I, 10-17.

Indeed, with the prophets generally there is the manifest desire to translate racial custom into ethical behavior, and ceremonial practice into moral procedure.

In brief, the religion of the Hebrews resulted in developing a conception of God which was personal but not anthropomorphic; of a deity whose will, while supreme, was not arbitrary but ethical in character. The notion of goodness that followed from the Hebrew conception of life was not based upon anything like the self-sufficient virtue of the Stoics or the autonomous sense of rectitude peculiar to Kant. The Hebrew conception of righteousness, while not utilitarian, did not overlook the purposive character of the ethical or the inherent value of morality. The Hebrew faith belongs to the class of morality-religions rather than to that of redemptive religions; it is much more like Confucianism than Buddhism. Its ideal is the sanctification of life in the world rather than the salvation of the soul from the world. It aimed at perfection, to use an ambitious term, in the realization of life on earth. But while this significant branch of the Semitic family of races had been at work upon its ideal, the Aryans had not neglected the problem of life, for they also had their civilization, which was much more impressive than that of the Hebrews. Suppose, then, we turn to the Hellenes.

CHAPTER VI

GREEK CULTURE



GREEK AND HEBREW

THE FUSION OF HEBRAIC AND HELLENIC CULTURES IN PRE-Christian Alexandria was an indication that two forms of spiritual life might be made one. But the relation of Hebrew to Greek in the development of Christianity was far from being such a mystical blending. It was indeed a relation and one in which the Semitic and Aryan strands could ever be discerned. Having observed in the history of Hebrew religion the leading traits of that culture, we must attempt a different and more difficult task — the analysis of the Greek mind, a description of its unique culture, and the manifold ramifications that it assumed. Most of us know Greece, its language and literature, religion and philosophy in only a desultory way, since Greek classics are no longer pursued with the academic rigor known to our fathers. We entertain the Hellenic ideal in about the manner that we consider a Greek statue, whose cool perfection and lack of realism make its creator seem a being apart from the practical world in which we live. For this reason, or as a counterpoise to the popularly classic conception, we must consider the ancient Greek in a manner as naturalistic and modern as the facts will permit and our imagination allow.

Our conception of Greek culture, apart from what we ourselves have found in the classics, has been shaped by French neo-Classicism, the Germanic Greekdom of Lessing and Winckelmann, Goethe and Schiller, and the Victorian Hellenism represented by Matthew Arnold. Many of us are inclined to adopt Arnold's clever contrast between Hebraism and Hellenism as if indeed it had been little more than "strictness of conscience" and "spontaneity of consciousness."¹ But these classic conceptions of Classicism overlook the many-sidedness and modernness of the ancient Hellene and what might be called the classic form

¹ *Culture and Anarchy*, Ch. IV.

of the modern Greek mind. Thus we tend to overestimate the merits of the ancient Greek and underestimate those of the modern one. The popular mind does not realize that modern literary Greek more closely resembles the Periclean tongue than does our English that of Chaucer's time. Scholars, who lay weight upon the infusion of Albanian, Slavonic, and other bloods into the Greek race, apply their conceptions of the modern Greeks to the inhabitants of the islands as well as those of the Balkan peninsula. Thus they fail to observe that in temperament the new Greek closely resembles his courteous, curious, credulous, and hospitable forebears whom Homer and Aristophanes described so graphically. They do not take into account the fact that the folk lore of the modern Greek peasant preserves not only the essential structure of Greek mythology, but even the names of many ancient deities.

THE CLASSIC CONCEPTION OF THE GREEKS

Those who are enthusiastic about Greek culture are apt to think of the Hellenes as a special class of human beings who, clad in white, passed their lives in calm devotion to the arts and sciences, or who, in lighter moments, bounded from the heights of Parnassus to the slopes of Parnes and back again while they kept crying out, "Know thyself" and "Nothing in excess." These popular classicists think of the Greeks as forever young, optimistic and intellectual, and believe further that in their city-state they achieved a harmonious existence marred by neither indulgence nor asceticism. Others, thinking no doubt of the later Greeks, consider them as joyous in the days of their youth only and as pessimistic in their mature view of life and death. In general, the intellectualism of the Greeks has received such emphasis that they are looked upon as men who, in their "spontaneity of consciousness," had much less regard for any "strictness of conscience," for they were, it seems to some, as irresponsible as they were intellectual. To the moralist, the Greek appeared to be lacking in ethical earnestness, zeal for social reform, and pity for the helpless. They seemed, further, to have no desire to impart to others the way of life they had discovered, but were

concerned with themselves and the enjoyment of the leisure afforded them by the labor of their slaves.

It is true that, by a limited use of texts drawn from a certain type of writer, even one of the golden age of Greek literature, a fairly good case can be made out for an almost conventional view of the ancient Hellenes. But a long and serious study of the Greeks throughout their entire history reveals in the Hellenic temperament a bewildering array of contradictions. There is ample proof of their Hellenic grace, but none the less a versatility, so to call it, which Pericles extolled without hinting at the serious defects of character to which unfortunately it led.²

VERSATILITY OF GREEK GENIUS

Among the Hellenes a natural bent for *theoria*, the calm, scientific study of the world without and of man within, was offset by various types of ascetic mysticism, indeed on certain levels by the lowest forms of superstition and magic. Independent thinking was checked at times by the most intolerant reverence for custom and authority. Hard-headed realism in politics was tempered by the most garrulous credulity and open-mouthed susceptibility to the flattery of demagogues. Greed for wealth clashed with cultural aims and was roundly criticized by literary men. Moderation was in general the keynote of the best Greek life. Yet we find cultured Athenian gentlemen asked to decide at a banquet whether they will make a night of it or engage in serious philosophic discussion. And the philosophic discussion on which they decide ends with at least two of the guests under the table.³

The Athenians could accept untroubled the money sweated out by slaves in the silver mines of Laureion; they could unblushingly torture servants as a prelude to getting evidence in the law-courts. Yet in the industrial cities such as Athens, where prosperity stood at a high mark, the lines of caste were perfectly fluid; so far as freedom of speech and social relations were concerned, though not in the business of politics, there was a notable equality between slaves, foreigners, and citizens. Only in agricultural communities such as Thessaly and Sparta did one find an ex-

² *Thucydides* II, 41.

³ Plato, *Symposium*.

exploited serf class. Finally, there is ample evidence in the activities of various mystic cults, of Platonic philosophers descending once more into the dark cave, of Stoics and Cynics with whom philosophy took to the road, that the Greeks were solicitous of the welfare of the oppressed, that they were not without a desire to impart to others the way of life which they themselves had found best.

It is no wonder that the Greeks have been so variously interpreted. They had contradictory traits; they have been studied by different types of men. One generation has concentrated its interest on Greek religion and metaphysics; another has gone to Aristotle as to the father of scientific research. Through Greek the minds of the Renaissance underwent a new birth in life and literature. French neo-Classicism drew at second hand from Greek drama the cramping doctrine of the unities, while Schiller, Goethe, and Shelley saw in Prometheus the prototype of radical and reformer. In our day, Greek mythology has given inspiration to psychoanalysis with its Oedipus and Electra complexes, and a trilogy of Aeschylus has furnished the pretext for Eugene O'Neill's study in the morbid psychology of New England. Science has made liberal use of the Greek language to give its phenomena and processes significant terminology, and art ever looks to it for its model. The ancient Hellenes were first in almost every domain of modern activity. The facts they found and the processes they discovered, the classifications they devised and the terminology they invented are of interest and sometimes of scientific importance today. To them we owe literary forms, political patterns, and theological conceptions. The Greeks are still with us.

MYTHOLOGY AND CITY-STATE RELIGION

Ancient Greek legend like ancient Greek philosophy begins with an attempt to explain the origin of the world. Homer asserts that all things including the gods sprang from father Ocean. According to Hesiod, Chaos came first. Next followed Earth; Tartaros, like Erebus, symbolizing the gloom of the underworld; and Love. After them were born Erebus and Night, the

children of Chaos; then Aether, the bright upper air, not Aër, the murky atmosphere of earth. Aether along with Day did Night and Erebus bring forth. Alone Night bore black Fate and Death, Sleep, and the tribe of Dreams. Alone, for she lay with none, murky Night brought forth Blame and painful Woe and the Hesperides, who guard the rich, golden apples beyond Ocean. The Fates, too, Clotho and Lachesis and Atropos, were her children, and Nemesis, the goddess of indignation, who hates all transgressions of the bounds of moderation and punishes the arrogant among men. Broad-bosomed Earth, the sure foundation of all, begat starry Heaven and with him produced the Titans: Ocean and Rhea; Themis, goddess of justice and law; Mnemosyne, who is memory; Iapetus, through his son Prometheus destined to create the race of men; and wily Cronos, youngest and most terrible of all that brood, who hated his father, Heaven, and mutilated him with a sickle. From the blood of Heaven thus wounded rose the Giants and the Furies and Aphrodite, goddess of love.

With Rhea, Cronos became the parent of Hestia, deity of the hearth; Demeter, the earth goddess; Hades, lord of the underworld; Poseidon, god of ocean and shaker of the earth; and finally Zeus, the sky god, the thunderer, and his destined wife, Hera. Athena, the patroness of wisdom and all the arts, leapt full-armed from the head of Zeus, which Hephaestus had cleft with a blow of his ax. Fair-haired Leto, coming in the island of Delos to the end of her many wanderings, bore to Zeus Apollo, lord of the bow, god of plague and prophecy and music; and Artemis, virgin deity of the chase, goddess of the moon, who with her shafts brings peaceful death to the aged. Likewise Hephaestus, ruling over fire and forge; Ares, god of war; Hermes, who bears the messages of the gods and conducts the souls of the dead to Hades; and joyous Dionysus, god of wine, were all children of Zeus. Through a long period of volcanic upheaval and convulsion, with rocks and mountains and the blazing thunderbolt forged by the Cyclopes, the gods contended for mastery with both Titans and Giants. At length Zeus was firmly established as lord of gods and men. He with his colleagues and children, Hera, Poseidon, Demeter, Hestia, Apollo, Artemis, Hephaestus, Athena,

Hermes, Ares, and Aphrodite, made up the number of those twelve deities who have their palaces on snow-clad Olympus.

GODS AND MEN

The origin of men is made less clear. According to one belief the human race sprang from the earth or from rocks and trees. Certain families claimed direct descent from gods and nymphs. Another account relates that the gods or Prometheus, son of the Titan Iapetus, made men out of clay. Hesiod tells us that Prometheus not only tricked Zeus by giving him the poorest part of a sacrifice, but stole the fire which the all-father had hidden from men, taking it out of heaven in a hollow fennel stalk. In revenge the gods made an evil thing for men as the price of fire. Zeus commanded Hephaestus to knead out of earth and water the first woman, Pandora, so called because she possessed all gifts, a lovely maiden like in face to the immortal goddesses. Athene taught her needlework and weaving; Aphrodite shed grace upon her head and cruel longing that wearies the limbs of men. When Hermes conducted Pandora to the home of Prometheus she carried with her a jar containing all manner of cares and wasting diseases previously unknown. This she had been straitly enjoined not to open. Epimetheus, or "after-thought," did not remember the warnings of his brother Prometheus, "fore-thought," but received the gift she carried. When Pandora, her curiosity overcoming her, opened the box, all the evils of toil and sickness and old age flew out, leaving only Hope within the jar. Thus ended the Silver Age which had followed the golden reign of Cronos. Prometheus himself was fastened to a lonely cliff where a vulture preyed upon his liver.

With their champion gone, men went from bad to worse; thence ensued the Brazen and the Iron Age, in which violence and war overwhelmed all things. Modesty, Truth, and Honor wrapped their white robes about them and fled from earth to heaven. Zeus swept the race of mankind away with a mighty flood and only Deucalion, son of Prometheus, with his wife Pyrrha was left to tell the tale of humanity. After nine days and nights, when a dove had given good omen, the ark in which

these two were floating came to rest on Mount Parnassus. There Deucalion and Pyrrha, at divine direction, threw rocks over their shoulders and those that Pyrrha threw became women; those thrown by Deucalion, men. The son of Deucalion, according to the most common account, was Hellen, whose own sons were Aeolus, Dorus, Achaeus, and Ion. Thus there came into being the world, the Hellenic race, and its divisions—Aeolians, Dorians, Achaeans, and Ionians.⁴ By the eighth century B.C. the Greeks had presented in their own image gods who portrayed the whole pageant of nature and symbolized the fundamental passions of the race, as wine, war, and love.

HIGH GODS AND LOW

There are traces in ancient Greek communities of the worship of stones and trees and animals. And there is every indication that the Greeks had cults devoted to the worship of heroes, ancestors, and the dead generally. These undersurface manifestations, however, are far less important than the worship of the Olympian gods as a part of everyday Greek existence. No meal was complete without an offering of food and wine to the gods. At the end of each meal every guest took a sip of unmixed wine in honor of the "Good Divinity." During the course of the symposium, or drinking bout, which followed the food, three bowls of wine and water were ordinarily consumed. Out of the first a libation of one cup was poured to the Olympians, especially Zeus; out of the second, a libation to the Heroes; and out of the third a libation to Zeus, the Savior; then last of all came a paean or hymn.

On festival days special sacrifices were offered in each home to the particular god who was being honored. Every important undertaking was begun with sacrifice and prayer; birth, marriage, and death had each a specific ceremony to the appropriate god. In public life the meetings of assemblies, councils, and law-courts were opened with similar ceremonies. At the beginning of assemblies, for example, a sacrificed suckling-pig was carried round the meeting place to purify the assembly; a crier summoned all

⁴ Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 43-201; *Theogony*, 115 *et seq.*

the people to come within the line of purification. Prayers were offered that no speaker might deceive the people with his harangues or his oratory.

In the ritual of sacrifice garlanded priests led a garlanded victim, often with gilded horns, to the altar. A struggling victim augured ill for the sacrifice; a willing one was a good omen. All the worshipers as well as the altar were sprinkled with water consecrated by a torch from the altar of sacrifice. Solemn silence was then enjoined for the prayers that followed. Subsequently the victim was sprinkled with barley grains, hair was cut from its head and thrown into the fire, and when the beast had been stunned by the blow of an ax or a club, its throat was slit. If the sacrifice was offered to the Olympians, the head of the animal was pulled upward; if to the underworld deities, downward. The gushing blood, caught in a bowl, was used to sprinkle altar and congregation. After the victim had been skinned and cut up, the liver, lobe, and internal organs were inspected for omens. The thigh-bones, fat, parts of each joint, and the tail were burned on the altar for the gods; the remainder was placed on spits for cooking and was often eaten by the worshipers on the spot. The gods, if we may believe Greek satire, sniffed the savor of the meat as it poured through holes in the heavenly pavement. Throughout the sacrifice a flute-player kept up a constant droning in order to drown out ill-omened noises that might drive away the god, hovering near.

The Greek prayed standing with hands raised, palm up, unless he was addressing the gods of the lower world, in which case it was proper to stretch the arms downward, kneel to touch the earth with the hand, or even stamp on the ground to get the attention of underworld deities. The petitions of ordinary prayer followed a set formula. The assumption was that if the worshiper did his part and offered proper sacrifices of unblemished animals, the gods would do their share. Curses were felt to be very real things, existing in force until nullified by counter magic. Generally speaking, the objects of sacrifice and prayer were to discover the will of the gods, to find in this manner guidance for public and private life, to keep the friendship of the kindly Olympians, and placate the hostile powers of the underworld.

PRIESTHOOD AND SACRIFICE

Greece was never priest-ridden as was the Orient. No priestly caste with overwhelming powers dictated a uniform policy, though the priests of Apollo at Delphi did endeavor in many ways to shape the course of Greek government. It was their aim in general to subordinate completely the welfare of the individual to that of the body politic. They were successful in fact and theory only at Sparta. Athens theoretically made the individual less important than the State, but in practice gave the widest possible scope for the free development of personality. In a very real sense the father of every Greek family was a priest by right and practice. Religion, the worship of the gods, was inextricably linked, as we have seen, with both private and public life. Sacrifices offered in behalf of the State on the public hearth, which corresponded to that in each home, were conducted by a city magistrate, known as the "King," who represented in his person the priestly powers enjoyed by the old king of the Homeric tribe from which the city-state organization had evolved.

There were of course hereditary priesthoods, concerned mainly with the management of oracles and mystery cults. But these tended to become mere political offices, filled by election or by lot, or indeed in later times, sold to the highest bidder. The perquisites of a priest attached to a temple included a share of the victims. The temple itself owned property, slaves, money, and real estate, especially the land surrounding the building proper. One beneficent custom observed in connection with temples deserves mention here, the right of refuge. In the case of the great shrine of Artemis at Ephesus, the territory for a considerable space round about was sacred. Within it criminals, ill-used slaves, and others might take refuge from punishment.

It was customary for good citizens to sacrifice when the city did, but that was a matter of loyalty and good taste. There was no binding oath, nor was there a bible containing the whole true and complete faith. Homer and Hesiod were in some ways the bibles of the Greeks. Nurses told their small charges stories from these poems, sometimes scandalous ones, a custom which Plato condemned in *The Republic*. Thieves and adulterers de-

fended their conduct by referring to the morals of the Olympic gods, and perhaps the very credulous took every myth as gospel truth. Certain maxims, often attributed to the centaur Chiron, sum up the pre-Socratic household morality — Honor the gods, Honor your parents; Do not illtreat strangers or foreigners. The sayings of the Seven Sages represent the Greek ethics of common sense and practical philosophy. The most brilliant examples of these *dicta* are found in the philosophic injunctions "Know thyself," attributed to Chilon of Sparta, and "Nothing in excess," a maxim of Solon inscribed on one of the temples at Delphi. In a way, these were autonomous ideals, yet there were various gods who were believed to enforce the laws of piety, filial duty, the sanctity of the household, and the treatment of guests, as also to punish perjury.

Greek religion, however, was more than a moral way of life. There were household and state observances of a daily nature, as well as certain national festivals which tended to make Athens, if not all Greece, a year-long pageant of beauty. Among these we need mention only the Olympic Games, the Panathenaic Festival, depicted on the frieze of the Parthenon, and the great spring festival of Dionysus, during which twelve tragedies and five comedies were produced annually at Athens. In attending these religious celebrations, it was possible for a Greek to meet old friends and make new ones, to witness contests of strength and skill, and to attend recitals of music and poetry. Thus the aims of everyday life and the aspirations after friendship and beauty were fulfilled by the various rites associated with the gods of ancient Greece.

BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY

But there was another side to the religion of Hellas — the spiritual. The statement is often made that the Greeks had no vital belief in immortality, yet the Greek orator Isocrates says that those who have been initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries 'have sweeter hopes regarding the end of life and all eternity.'⁵ In the Eleusinian Mysteries, as with similar cults, no lines were

⁵ *Panegyric on Athens*, Sect. 28.

drawn between bond and free, male and female; all alike were free to undergo the initiation provided they were persons of good morals. The central feature of this cult seems to have been a pageant of immortality representing the search of Demeter, the goddess of grain and harvest, for her daughter Proserpine, who had been carried off by the god of the underworld. The comparison of the human body to a grain of wheat sown in death and raised in immortality is common to Greek as to rabbinical and Christian thought.

The Eleusinian initiates did not constitute a separate congregation with fixed places and times for meeting; their influence in favor of the doctrine worked quietly like widely scattered social leaven. This was not the case with the brotherhood of Pythagoras and the society of the Orphics, which first began to attract notice in Greece during the sixth century B.C. Even in Homer we hear of the ascetic Selli, priests of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus, who went barefoot, never bathed, and slept on the ground.⁶ The pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus retired to the mountains where he lived on herbs and roots, while the philosopher Empedocles advised his disciples to abstain from sexual relations and lead a celibate life. But these are isolated instances of extreme moralism.

The Orphics and Pythagoreans made up a fairly large portion of a section of Greek society. The supreme god of the Orphics was Bacchus, or Dionysus-Zagreus. Legend has it that this Zagreus was slain at the command of the jealous Hera by the Titan spirits of winter and frost but that, in the spring, the buoyant son of Zeus rose from the dead. Man himself, so it was believed, by drinking the blood of victims or wine, which is the god's blood, and by eating the flesh of sacrificial animals, which is the god's body, may approach divinity and attain to immortality after death. The higher group of Orphics stressed the intoxicating and orgiastic features of their religion rather than its ascetic side. Holiness may be attained only by rigorous living, which purges the body of its Titanic elements and renders man pure and Dionysiac. The more severe Orphics dressed in white, abstained from meat and wine, and practiced frequent fasting,

⁶ *Iliad*, Bk. XVI, 233.


purification, confessions, and atonements, if not actual flagellation. The soul, they held, is imprisoned in the tomb of the body as punishment for past sins and must be purified, not only by ascetic practices, but by a series of reincarnations also. Those who live the good life change into higher bodies, while those who are base are transformed into beasts. The tortures of mud and fire and cold are reserved in Hell for the incorrigible, but the truly pure finally escape from the wheel of generation and depart wholly from the prison of the body.

The tenets of the Pythagoreans were much the same, although their chief god was a person very different from Dionysus; he was Apollo, god of arts and sciences, and, as we shall see presently, he inspired the Greek intellect. But as time went on, Pythagoreanism came to mean daily self-examination, going bare-foot, and abstinence from beef, wine, and beans. Indeed, this Apollonian cult came to signify a belief in transmigration and punishment after death rather than devotion to science.

GREEK SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Like Greek mythology, early Greek philosophy dealt with the problem of the world; the mythology was rich and riotous, the metaphysics crude and limited. Thales inaugurated what was to become Greek philosophy by reducing all existence to the single element of water. This pioneer philosopher was more adept at science. He predicted the eclipse of 585 B.C., measured the height of the pyramids of Egypt by the shadows they cast, foretold a fruitful season for olives, and made a fortune by renting all the oil-presses available. Anaximander, his contemporary, set up as his first principle what he called unlimited material or *to apeiron* and suggested that the cosmic scheme involves an indefinite number of rotating systems. As a primitive evolutionist, Anaximander claimed that fishes developed from the earthly slime under the warmth of the sun, and from fishes came animals and men.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae in Asia Minor, who in the fifth century taught Pericles and was the intimate of Euripides, held that all things had existed from the beginning in the form of an



RUINS OF THE PARTHENON ON THE CROWN OF THE ACROPOLIS

(facing page 137)

unlimited number of "seeds," or elements consisting of homogeneous substances. All was chaos until Mind came and formed the ordered world. Shortly before the Peloponnesian War Anaxagoras was indicted for impiety on the charge that he had called the sun a mass of red-hot metal rather than a god. Although Pericles defended him, Anaxagoras narrowly escaped death, and after paying a fine of more than five thousand dollars went into exile.⁷

Empedocles of Agrigentum in Sicily, who flourished during the fifth century, recognized four elements as the basis of his world: earth, water, air, and fire. The phenomena in this world are accounted for by two forces: Love, which unites; and Hate, which separates the elements. Apparently he taught that among animals the fit survive and the unfit die out. Heraclitus of Ephesus, the obscure, the "weeping philosopher," found in sentient, self-kindled, self-extinguished fire, which he identified with the divine spirit, an explanation for the universe. All things flow, said Heraclitus. Nothing remains constant. Into fire all things change and from fire they pass to various forms, affording sport to the creator who destroys and creates again the world innumerable times. Before the time of Heraclitus, Anaximenes found in air, through the theory of condensation and rarefaction, the prime substance of the universe and the motivating cause of its changing phenomena.

Parmenides of Elea in the early fifth century contradicted vigorously those who emphasized variety in their theories of the universe. He denied the existence of space, and asserted that true being exists as a single and eternal sphere, filling the space of the sphere continuously. Only being exists; non-being has no existence; the plurality of objects, of phenomena, is a mere delusion. Other members of the Eleatic school sought to show that motion is impossible. These absurdities were combated by Democritus, the "laughing philosopher" of Abdera, and by Leucippus, who frankly avowed the existence of space and declared that atoms moving by necessity in the void were what brought about our universe.

⁷ Plutarch, *Life of Pericles*, 32. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*, II, 12.

GREEK MATHEMATICS

Pythagoras himself was a contemporary of Thales. But inasmuch as he left no writings, it is better to discuss him in relation to his school. The Pythagoreans found in harmony and number the basic elements of the world. They developed the science of numbers, which they were the first to distinguish from practical calculation, and wisely so, for the Greek system of numerals was always alphabetical and so unsatisfactory that business men and schoolboys had recourse to counting-boards or finger-symbolism. Geometry they developed to a high point. The Pythagorean theorem that the square on the hypotenuse of any right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides enjoys such general currency that it is almost an impertinence to mention it. Pythagoras or the Pythagoreans discovered the numerical relations of tones, as determined by the length of the vibrating strings which produce them. They were the first to point out that the earth is spherical; they knew that the sun, moon, and planets have movements of their own distinguished from their daily rotations, and discovered that the earth revolves about the sun.

The history of later Greek mathematics must be briefly scanned. Plato shared the contemporary enthusiasm and urged his disciples to specialize in mathematics and astronomy. Heraclides of Pontus announced that the earth rotates on its axis once every twenty-four hours and that Mercury and Venus revolve like satellites around the sun. Menaechmus, the pupil of Plato's brilliant contemporary Eudoxus, discovered conic sections. About 300 B.C., Euclid wrote a textbook on geometry, *The Elements*, which remained sovereign in the classroom until recent years. Aristarchus of Samos, who flourished in the third century B.C., anticipated the Copernican theory. The sun, said he, is at rest; the earth, Mercury, Venus, and the other planets revolve in circles about it. According to Cleanthes the Stoic, a man so bold as to set the earth, Hearth of the Universe, in motion ought to be tried for impiety.

Archimedes, a contemporary of Aristarchus, was the greatest scientist of antiquity and deserves special mention. The princi-

ple of the lever had been known from very early times. Archimedes, with his flair for the dramatic, said, "Give me a place on which to stand and I'll move the earth." So great was his absorption with mathematical problems that his servants had literally to drag him away from his studies for relaxation and anointing in the bath, and even there he continued to draw diagrams on his body with a flesh-scraper. Once, while entering his bath, he observed that the water overflowed the tub; this action suggested to him that a body immersed in a fluid loses in weight by an amount equal to that of the fluid displaced. This suggested to him the solution of a problem that had been put to him when King Hieron wished to discover the proportion of gold in his crown. Archimedes had discovered one of the most important principles of hydrostatics. Accordingly we have the story that he leaped from the tub and rushed forth shouting, "Eureka—I have found it." The tubular screw he invented for draining the fields of Egypt after a Nile flood is still in practical use. But the great Sicilian prided himself most on his contributions to pure mathematics. On his sand-table he worked out problems of the most complicated nature in connection with the measurement of curvilinear areas and volumes.

Eratosthenes measured the circumference of the earth. In doing this, he observed that at Syene during the summer solstice the sun is vertical, whereas at Alexandria, a city on about the same meridian, the sun is below the zenith by the fifteenth part of a great circle. Neglecting to take into account the solar parallax, he concluded that the diameter of the earth is fifty times the distance from Alexandria, or 7,850 miles, which is fifty miles less than the true polar diameter. In the next century, the astronomer Hipparchus invented plane and spherical trigonometry and devised a method for locating places by means of latitude and longitude. An Egyptian engineer, Heron of Alexandria, who wrote in Greek, described a number of mechanical inventions and toys, among them a penny slot-machine. In the second century A.D., Claudius Ptolemaeus of Upper Egypt wrote a classic work on geography which dealt with map-making, and furnished a table of climates as well as a catalogue of the stars. This work, called the *Almagest*, reasserted the old geocentric the-

ory and remained standard until the time of Copernicus. Returning to the Greeks, we observe that the Pythagoreans had operated to some extent with algebraic equations. But it was not until the third century A.D. that Diophantus of Alexandria wrote the first known textbook on algebra. He is the earliest writer to use conventional algebraic symbols, though he was probably not their inventor.

In summary form, then, the Greeks devised the terminology and classifications of the higher mathematical sciences by which they were able to invade the province even of integral calculus. On the side of astronomy they began to name and map the stars and, among other things, anticipated the Copernican system. In geography they were the first to develop the science of map-making and to study the problem of climate and racial distribution.

MEDICAL PRACTICE

Medicine, like the earliest Greek speculations about the origin of the world, had its roots in religion. The first physicians were probably the priests of Asclepius, the healing god, and the temples of Asclepius at Tricca in northern Greece, Epidaurus in southwestern Greece, and in the island of Cos were the earliest sanatoria. The fully developed shrine of Asclepius contained within its grounds a dormitory for patients, a running-track, and theater. Patients were sometimes cured outright while they slept by the god, who appeared with his sacred snakes and his daughters, Hygieia and Panacea. More often the god gave directions for a strenuous course of diet and exercise in the open air. The walls of the shrine were covered with replicas of parts of the body that had been healed, offerings from rich and poor alike.

As early as the fifth century two distinct schools of medicine had come to the fore: that of Cnidos in Asia Minor and that of Hippocrates, the Asclepiad priest, in the island of Cos. The former laid great weight on diagnosis; the latter, on prognosis, or the ability on the basis of case-histories carefully recorded to predict the probable course of a disease. Dissection of animals had been practiced as early as 500 B.C. by Alcmaeon of Croton in Italy, who discovered the optic nerves and the eustachian tubes.

Diogenes of Apollonia in the late fifth century probably dissected human bodies as well as animals and gave an excellent description of the human heart, which he compared with that of animals. But it remained for Hippocrates, who flourished about 400 B.C., to make of medicine a humanitarian art, a profession with a definite procedure and code of ethics rather than a static priestly trade handed down without improvement from father to son.

The great contributions of Hippocrates and his school — it is generally impossible to distinguish the one from the other in the Hippocratic Corpus — were: the Hippocratic Oath, which still continues to influence medical ethics, and the case-history method by which they recorded the courses and origins of the various diseases which came under their observation. The Hippocratic Oath directs the student to support and care for his teacher and his teacher's sons as if they were his own parent and offspring; to teach the art of medicine without fee or price to his own sons and those of his teacher, as well as to disciples bound by the oath of physicians — but to no one else; to prescribe only that treatment which is harmless and never to give a deadly drug or procure an abortion; to keep his own life in purity and holiness, refraining from wrong relations with patients and keeping professional secrets jealously.

Some of the Hippocratic findings are still valid in modern medicine. They noted, for instance, the symptoms of approaching death, particularly what is now called "Cheyne-Stokes" respiration, the labored breathing as of one "suddenly recollecting himself." They observed that convulsions or hiccups, supervening on profuse bleeding, and the lack of swelling following severe wounds are dangerous; and they marked the beneficent nature of sound sleep after fever-delirium. In dealing with chest conditions they used the method of tapping, shaking, and listening employed now in connection with the stethoscope. They opened the chest and drew out discharges accumulating in cases of empyema; they dealt very skillfully with fractures and dislocations, even trephining the skull for treatment of fractures there, though of course they did not advance to major surgery. Hippocratic discussions of the care of operating-rooms, and the insist-

ence on the necessity for keeping hands and instruments spotlessly clean are still classic. Treatment included dieting, baths, clysters, massage, and regulated exercise with the application or administering of healing herbs; but most of all the Hippocratics believed in the "healing force of nature."

The scientific viewpoint of the Hippocratics is well illustrated by an anonymous work *On the Sacred Disease*, or epilepsy. The author denies that epilepsy is caused by demonic possession and states that, if not chronic, it may be cured. Like other diseases it has a cause and a cure. Nature, he declares, has certain laws which may be followed and these laws know no exceptions. Another treatise, belonging to the same school, *On Airs, Waters, and Places*, sets forth the interesting theory that acquired physical characteristics may be inherited, discusses the effect of soil and climate on national temperaments, and maintains that Europeans are superior to Asiatics because of the harsher climate of Europe. The Hippocratics may claim also to have founded the study of epidemiology. Their knowledge of the distribution of epidemic diseases by seasons, years, and climates, the progress and symptoms of these manifestations so disturbing to public morale, is well represented in Thucydides' description of the great plague at Athens.⁸

NATURAL SCIENCE

Only four more names need detain us in our study of ancient medicine. The Alexandrian school in the fourth century B.C. regularly practiced dissection and autopsy, a practice which is reflected in the greater realism characterizing sculpture of the period. The bolder spirits opened the bodies of criminals in order to find out, if possible, the secret springs of life. Among this number was Herophilus, a keen student of brain structure, who gave his name to one sinus—the winepress of Herophilus—and designated the hollow in the fourth brain ventricle as "the writer's pen," a term which it still bears. Our name for that part of the intestine which follows the stomach, the duodenum, mirrors Herophilus' description of it as a "twelve-finger extension." Celsus, in the first century before or the first century after Christ,

⁸ *Op. cit.*, II, 47-53.

wrote a vast encyclopaedia treating of philosophy, law, war, agriculture, and medicine. The parts of it which survive catalogue the best medical and surgical practice of the Alexandrian school and contain, interestingly enough, a description of methods for extracting and wiring teeth and an account of what seems to be a dental mirror.

Theophrastus, a pupil of Aristotle, in his *History of Plants* framed the outlines of botany as a serious science. Dioscorides, representing the tendency of the first century A.D. and indeed of all later ancient science to emphasize the practical, gave to modern botany and pharmacy almost its entire popular and scientific nomenclature. In other words, he listed and named plants mostly with reference to their noxious or healing powers as drugs. The same remark applies in some degree to Galen, who flourished during the second century A.D. Though Galen's importance as a writer on historical medicine is considerable, his chief influence lay in the fact that he everywhere emphasized design in nature. Thus he appealed to scientists of a theological turn more strongly than did the blunter writers of the older school. In his own practice, Galen dissected dogs, calves, pigs, bears, and Barbary apes, often drawing wrong analogies between their structure and that of man. In conclusion it may be said that, while Hippocrates and the Alexandrians raised medicine to the level of a profession, the art suffered severely because there was never in antiquity such a thing as a license to practice. One charlatan's word was as good as that of another if it had sufficient plausibility. Hence the classic jibe about the undertaker who turns doctor and still pursues the same trade.

The beginnings of natural history as a science are found in Aristotle. Specifically he occupied himself with dissecting and classifying shellfish. His whole range of information regarding ichthyology needs surprisingly little correction in the light of modern science. He was the first to insist that the student of causes who attempts to track out nature's law may find in the study of the living creatures at our door the same pleasure which one derives from gazing at a beautiful statue. So with Aristotle the Greek instinct for beauty and order found the same expression in science that it elsewhere did in literature and art.

GREEK POLITICS AND EDUCATION

Throughout this discussion of Greek science it has been apparent that the ancient world gave wide scope for the development of the individual, at least the male individual. We can identify comparatively few craftsmen in early Egypt, for example, but we know the names of hundreds of Greek authors, musicians, painters, and sculptors. The signature not only of the painter but also of the maker appears on a finished Greek vase. Herodotus and Thucydides begin their histories by proudly announcing their names and the city from which they come. The city from which they come—the phrase is all important. As we trace the history of Panhellenism, Athenian nationalism, Greek monarchy, and Panhellenic culture, we become increasingly aware of the persistence of the city-state ideal.

The city-state, an outgrowth of the walled village of Homeric times, was the focal point of civilization in those valleys, rimmed off securely from one another by mountains, which make up the Balkan peninsula. The smallness and independent isolation of these towns gave a special turn to Greek citizenship. The population, for instance, of Attica, the territory immediately surrounding the city of Athens, probably consisted in 431 B.C. of some 200,000 free souls and 100,000 slaves. Theoretically at least not one of the free group had any rights as an individual independent of his citizenship, which came to him through blood membership in a Greek tribe. After 451 B.C. citizenship was seldom conferred on foreigners by vote. A citizen must be born at least of a Greek father, preferably of a Greek mother as well. Ordinary metics, or resident aliens, could neither vote nor own real property. For the most part they were small shopkeepers and hucksters, or engaged in transportation service.

In Homeric times, law was handed down to kings by Zeus and his daughter Themis. During the classical period, the law of the city-state somewhat similarly represented abstract Justice. Under this law each citizen must live; to break it was treason comparable to flouting one's parents. The *Antigone* of Sophocles defies man-made law when the young woman buries her brother Polynices, setting at naught the edict of King Creon. But

there she is following the older, unwritten code, which is sometimes felt to clash with the edicts of a tyrannical human sovereign. There was no such thing as international law in ancient Greece. The codes of certain cities had a wide influence; Rhodian sea-law governed common maritime practice; but law was always in essence that of the individual city-state.

Hence it was that the tribally engendered city-state, with its full assembly form of government, with its dogged insistence on autonomy, shaped the whole course of Greek history. Athens made a strong effort during and shortly following the Persian War to establish a Panhellenic league, but it soon became apparent that she aimed at open imperialism. Euripides and the Greek orators praised the beauty and the unique position of Athens as a free defender of the free, as a refuge for the distressed, but the warring city-states took such nationalistic utterances at what seemed their face value: a reflection of Athens' desire to tyrannize over the rest of the world.

First one state and then another succeeded to the leadership, though not to the unified government of the Greek world. Athens fell a victim to Sparta, Sparta in turn to Thebes. The Chalcidic and Boeotian Leagues worked out a fairly complete form of representative government on the basis of population, taxation, and military strength, but these, like later experiments in the same direction, came too late. Isocrates in the fourth century urged the Greeks to unite in a war against the barbarians, with *Athens* as leader, and yet Isocrates had to turn eventually with his proposal to Philip of Macedon, who conquered the assembled Greeks at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C. The stiff-necked city-states refused apparently to unite under any other government than monarchy. Even so, Philip made a gesture in the direction of autonomy when he organized his League of Hellenes.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE CITY-STATE

Alexander met the problem by the political expedient of having himself deified. The distinction between god and man in Greece of this period was not held to be great. The measure enabled Alexander to avoid the issue of local self-government and declare

himself above the laws. Then, too, Alexander soon swung round from the Isocratic notion of a league of Hellenes united against the barbarians to a kind of cosmopolitanism or internationalism, the conception of Greeks and barbarians working together without distinction for the dispersion of Hellenic culture. Isocrates had declared⁹ that the word Greek no longer designated a race, but a culture. In the next century the scientist Eratosthenes of Cyrene said that one no longer asked whether men were Greeks or barbarians, but whether they were good or bad.

Many factors contributed to this breaking down of the narrow limits of the city-state, such as the growth of devotion to a larger ideal of Hellenic culture and with it the development of an almost modern individualism. As causes and accompanying results we may mention: intermarriage between Greeks and barbarians; better roads and improved facilities of communication; the increasing use of cheap papyrus writing material for the spread of knowledge regarding Hellas and the Orient in Greek, which had now become the universal language; the growth of the syncretistic spirit in religion, which made it perfectly proper and not unusual for one priest to serve half a dozen deities. Supremely important also are the Stoic doctrine of the brotherhood of man and the activity of the mystery cults, which tended to wipe out the old distinctions between male and female, slave and free, Greek and barbarian. Tradesmen, somewhat bewildered by the new era in which they found themselves, took refuge not only in the mystery cults but also in guilds or unions, devoted, without reference to sex or creed or social position, to the interests of a single profession and the worship of a single deity. In fourth-century Athens, the ephebic system was designed for giving military training to young Athenians between the ages of 18 and 20. During the Hellenistic period, membership in the ephebic clubs was a mark not of Greek blood, but of social distinction. Thus the word cosmopolitan, first used in the fourth century by Diogenes, the Cynic of lantern fame,¹⁰ became a living reality.

This new spirit manifested itself not only in the emergence of dominating personalities, who after a meteoric career sank

⁹ *Panegyric on Athens*, 50.

¹⁰ *Diogenes Laertius*, VI, 63.

back into obscurity leaving only popular biographies and portrait busts as memorials, but also in the emancipation to some extent of women and slaves. In Periclean Athens the chief virtues of a woman were thrift, silence, and modesty. A woman's duty was to manage her household and rear sons to carry on the family name and worship. The use of rouge and powder was an offense not only against modesty but against nature. In the courts of law a woman was represented by her husband. Though a wife could leave the home of her married partner at will, she must return forthwith to the head of the house from which she came. No formal provision was made, at least in fifth-century Athens, for the education of respectable women; it must be remembered that Aspasia, the charming and cultured friend of Pericles and Socrates, was a courtesan. A prominent Greek lady who brought a heavy dowry might spank her husband with a slipper to bring him round; the heroines of Greek tragedy are standing exceptions to the meek and inarticulate type; but for the most part the virtues of the fifth-century woman are those of the harem.

In the fourth century, however, a woman was among the students of Epicurus. During Alexander's lifetime his mother Olympias enjoyed unusual influence and after his death exercised unprecedented power, while Alexander's sister gave her name to the important city of Thessalonica. This is due in some measure to the survival in primitive Macedonia of the Homeric attitude toward women, but we may fairly see in it signs that during the Hellenistic period the so-called weaker sex was coming into its own. At this time, for another example, city-states, taking over endowments from wealthy men, appointed in the schools deans or rather supervisors of women.

Euripides declared that nothing but the name made a virtuous slave worse than a free man;¹¹ while Philemon, who wrote in the fourth century, asserted that no man was ever born a slave by nature. Only Fortune, he said, has placed men in that position. Plato in his *Republic* made a great many provisions for the amelioration of the slave's lot, though Aristotle asserted that a slave was such by nature and represented to his master a living piece of property.¹² But it was the Stoic conception of the

¹¹ *Ion*, 854.

¹² *Politics*, I, 4, 2.

brotherhood of man which more than anything else tended to erase the distinction between slave and free. In the true spirit of Christian Stoicism Paul the Apostle advises Philemon to receive his runaway slave, Onesimus, as a beloved brother.¹³

The State, as we have seen, made strong claims on the individual; even Alexander founded his colonies on the city-state model; and his successors who threw a mesh of bureaucratic government over their territories organized local control on the basis of the classical *polis*. In fifth-century Athens, the man who took no part in the endless political debates so popular at the time was held to be good for nothing.¹⁴ It might be necessary to round up a few loafers who preferred to gossip or play at dice in the sunny market place and herd them into the assembly with a rope dipped in red paint.¹⁵ But the majority attended the assembly faithfully to elect magistrates and vote on questions of public policy. Even in the fourth century wealthy citizens bore willingly the old burden of fitting out war-vessels, training and equipping dramatic choruses, and supplying gymnasia with sand and oil. Yet the state never provided by taxation for the support even of the common schools.

GREEK EDUCATION

The common schools, in all conscience, offered nothing but instruction in the three R's and training in singing and harp-playing, accompanied by rigorous gymnastic exercise. The Sophists appeared early in the fifth century to correct this situation. Primarily they were traveling teachers of oratory in an age when each man might expect at some time to defend himself in the law-courts. But the Sophists were much more than teachers of public-speaking; they conceived that the duty of teaching, founded on the sciences of grammar and dialectics, or the ability to argue on both sides of any proposition, and enriched with a smattering of physical sciences, history, and literature, was to make effective citizens. Man, they declared, is the measure of all things; good and evil are relative. It may be wise for the weak man to know

¹³ *Philemon*, verse 16.

¹⁵ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 22.

¹⁴ *Thucydides*, II, 40.

and keep his place, but the strong man is beyond the laws which, like the State, are not divine in origin, but mere social devices, the inventions of the weak to protect themselves against the strong. And the superman by right of the Law of Nature may rule and exploit the weak. Society may need an ethical code based on justice and modesty to hold it together, but the strong citizen, the man with nerve and a mastery of the art of persuasion, is above that code.

Socrates was no Sophist, though like them he held that education should make good citizens. In spite of the fact that he professed himself the wisest of men only because he was conscious of knowing nothing — while other men had a conceit of knowledge — he combated the doctrine of relativity and maintained that truth is attainable. The concepts to which we win by right reasoning, the Socratic method of question and answer based on Sophistic dialectic, are forever valid. Knowledge can be won and imparted by learning and teaching. The man who really knows the Good will do it. Education does not imply irreverence for the traditional morality and the deities of the city-state. Protagoras had asserted that he could not be sure of the existence of the gods. The Athenians only banished him and sent round a herald to collect private-owned copies of the book in which he made this statement for burning in the market place.¹⁶ Socrates specifically disclaimed all belief in such speculations as those of Anaxagoras. Blatant agnosticism was foreign to his nature; he asserted always that the care of the soul was his chief concern. The Athenians, confusing him with both the Sophists and the physical scientists, gave him the hemlock because he introduced new gods into the city, as the prosecution asserted, and had shown himself a corrupter of young men.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

Plato, the pupil of Socrates, held that the highest good consists not in pleasure nor in knowledge, but in the utmost possible likeness to God, the author of no evil, Himself representing absolute goodness. Abstract concepts such as Justice and Good-

¹⁶ *Diogenes Laertius*, IX, 51.

ness have a definite reality and exist, as it were, in the heaven from which the soul originally came. They stand to concrete objects in the same relation as the shadows of objects, thrown by a blazing fire on the wall before prisoners so chained that they cannot look round, stand to the objects themselves. Thus in his vision of the cave¹⁷ did Plato combat the "flowing" philosophy of Heraclitus and the relativity of the Sophists; thus he asserted in a way half poetic and half realistic the validity of the universal. Ideas come to the soul, he continues, only as she recollects what she has known in the bright heaven above the cave of mortality.¹⁸

Since, then, Virtue and Justice are realities attainable by knowledge and since Happiness consists in the possession of the Good, we must educate our citizens in an ideal State where society and the curriculum are so framed as to achieve these desirable ends. The three classes in the State, philosopher-rulers, warriors, and producers, are to be sifted out in the process of education. The old Greek curriculum is to be used as a basis, but with the addition of dialectics and higher mathematics, the rigorous censorship of myths, and the exclusion of poetry in the ordinary sense of that word. The State, in Spartan style, is to control completely the rearing and education of citizen children. Among the philosopher-guardians, who like the warrior-citizens are to be separated completely from the producers who support them, all things, including wives, must be held in common. Women as such are not to be excluded from any activity, though their natural endowments fit them for certain types of work more than for others. The upper classes are not to engage in commerce or handicraft other than agriculture. Agricultural surpluses are to be controlled by the State. Neither usury nor credit business nor indeed the possession of any money is to be allowed citizens.

Such, in the crudest outline, is the plan by which Plato hoped to create what may fitly be called a Kingdom of God. He held firmly to his conviction that in the cause of virtue one ought rather to suffer than do wrong.¹⁹ And even when, somewhat disillusioned by contact with reality in the form of a weak and refractory pupil, Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, who was to help

¹⁷ *Republic*, Bk. VII.

¹⁸ *Phaedrus*, 250.

¹⁹ *Gorgias*, 469 C.

Plato set up a model State; even when after all this he wrote the *Laws*, he was still, though he makes some compromises with practical conditions, convinced that government will never be tolerable until philosophers become kings or, by some happy chance, kings become philosophers.²⁰

Plato makes Socrates prophesy a brilliant future in philosophy for young Isocrates,²¹ but the facts did not justify that prophecy. Philosophy, in the definition of Isocrates, is little more than rhetoric broadly conceived. Culture, he held, consists not in the possession of any professional technique or given body of knowledge, but in trained judgment. The educated and cultured man is the temperate citizen, happy in his relations with boors and gentlemen alike, who can deal effectively with the problems of daily life and keep his head in both adversity and prosperity. The curriculum of Isocrates, which consisted apparently of a blend of history, natural science, and literature so treated as to make them of practical value, ordinarily occupied the time of students for three or four years. Not only the pamphlets of Isocrates advocating a return to the older principles of Greek government, uncontaminated by the prevailing mobocracy, not only his educational principles, but through Cicero his elaborate style had an immense influence on politicians, educators, and literary men throughout antiquity.²²

POLITICAL THEORY

Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, declared that the end of the State is to promote virtue in its citizens, and that the State, whose basis is the family, ranks before the individual as a whole, takes precedence over the parts which make it up. Happiness, he held, is the chief end of man and rational happiness may best be attained by the individual pursuing the traditional Greek policy of observing the mean between two extremes within the framework of a modified city-state. The model State in training citizens for virtue is to use as a basis a curriculum containing the subjects of grammar, gymnastics, music, and drawing. But

²⁰ *Republic*, 473 D.

²² *Panathenaicus*, 30; *Antidosis*, 87.

²¹ *Phaedrus*, 279.

Aristotle's chief importance lies in his work as a student of political forms rather than as a reformer of Greek education. As a prelude to his *Politics* he analyzed 158 state organizations. His description of man as a naturally social animal is of course classic. And the Aristotelian division of government into deliberative, executive, and judicial departments is still generally in force.

Plato attempted to serve as adviser to Dionysius. Isocrates, as we have already noted, in addition to criticizing some contemporary tendencies in government, helped to shape the policy of King Philip. Aristotle served as tutor to Alexander the Great. The Stoics, during the fourth century and later, emphasized the dignity and importance of the individual. Man, according to their teaching, may so fortify his will by the control of the emotions as to rise superior to all the whims of Fate; and every man, without regard to race or social condition, is eligible to membership in this stern brotherhood of wisdom. Yet the Stoics found it not only possible to educate monarchs, but also to serve themselves in that capacity, little as the monarchic form suited their fine theories. The Epicureans stood quite outside the practical circle. For them the highest happiness of man as individual, a happiness most often attained by the pursuit of science, was the goal of life. The State—in this they resembled the Sophists—was a mere social convenience, whose ties were not binding on the wise man. With the Cynics, from the fourth century onward, philosophy definitely took to the road. In a "whither are we drifting" style, their voices raised to the sharp, shrill bark which gave them the name of Cynic (dog) philosophers, these militant missionaries pointed out abusively the follies of contemporary rulers. Unkempt, unwashed, insolent, aggressive, flouting all governmental and social conventions, they invited men to lead life according to nature, with the earth for a bed and the sky for a covering. The Cynics perhaps most fully represented that tendency which in the Hellenistic period made chaplains and missionaries of almost all philosophers.

Christianity, therefore, fell into a soil well prepared. The conception of the dignity and worth of the individual had been well established. Philosophers and educators, attempting to confirm

this doctrine, had not only criticized existing forms of government, but had gone far beyond them, setting up ideal States, Kingdoms of God, world-wide brotherhoods which completely transcended the narrow limits of the city-state. To men overwhelmed with a sense of sin, dissatisfied with or oppressed by temporal government, the Greek and oriental mystery cults had held out the comforting doctrine of a savior-god, a being both human and divine, who offers humanity, if they eat his body and drink his blood, if they emulate his sufferings in behalf of God, a blessed immortality after death.

Jesus of Nazareth, who felt himself to be in the line of the Hebrew prophets, preached the gospel of a reformed and quickened Judaism. But Paul, the greatest Christian missionary, presented his gospel of the Christ-cult, the distillation of his own personal experience, in language highly reminiscent of pagan cult terminology. His use of the word "conscience," certain features of his ethical code, notably the insistence on "self-sufficiency," and his attitude toward slaves were colored by Stoicism. St. Ambrose literally baptized Stoic ethics into Christianity, while St. Augustine chiefly through neo-Platonism was profoundly influenced by Platonic teachings. Paul, in his organization and administration of the early churches owed much to the Roman system, which in turn was in the debt of later Hellenistic government. And, finally, the Mediaeval Hierarchy, with its recognition of the superior claims of a philosopher-priest class, carried on further toward the modern age the structure of the Platonic State.

THE FORMS OF GREEK LITERATURE

The siren charm of the Greek language itself is perhaps the thing which first impresses one who turns from Greek thought to literature as a form of art. Through its sharp, clean consonants and many-voweled adjectives, through its clear, logical structure, the Greek language at the highest attains a beauty, a compression, a simplicity of style which often defy translation. Cleopatra spoke the language of the Ethiopians and the Troglodytes, of the Hebrews, Arabs, Syrians, Medes, and Parthians.²³

²³ Plutarch, *Life of Antony*, 27.

The Greeks concentrated on their own language, for ordinarily it was the only one they knew.

Greek literature at its best has perfection of form without rigidity, a firm yet perfectly flexible line which yields simplicity and nobility without baldness or bombast. This becomes evident first of all in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the earliest recorded Greek poetry. Having to deal with the siege of Troy and the wanderings of Odysseus in the Mediterranean, Homer does not write a catalogue in alphabetic style. He leaps at once into the midst of his story, which deals only with a brief part of the full legend, and paints in his background as he goes along. The simplicity, rapidity, and nobleness of Homer's style, his ability to portray sentiment without lapsing into sentimentality, in short the universal appeal of his work have made the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* veritable bibles of literary Europe and America to this day. Homer has been imitated and parodied, admired and maligned. He still remains the fountain source of all European literature.

Later Greek epic, still written in the Homeric hexameter, produced its greatest figure in Hesiod, the Boeotian farmer of the eighth century B.C. Hesiod's farmer pessimism, his Franklinian emphasis on the value of honesty and industry, his homely good sense, and his hatred of worthless women inform alike the *Works and Days*, a species of almanac for those who till the soil, and the *Theogony*, a work on the birth of the gods.

During both the sixth and the fifth centuries B.C. the many-stringed Greek lyre gave forth a variety of intimate and highly personal notes. Alcaics, Sapphics, Archilochean stanzas intermixed with the sharp, pungent elegiac distich served as vehicles for patriotic exhortations, satire, epitaphs, and amorous complaints. The most notable poets of this period are perhaps Sappho, the Lady of Lesbos, whose odes summon up not a single passion but a whole congress of the emotions, and Pindar, the intimate of kings, who for gold wrote odes in praise of athletic victors.

GREEK TRAGEDY

One special type of lyric, the dithyramb, a wild and frenzied hymn addressed to Bacchus, grew into the chorus of Greek tragedy.

By steps which we have not space to describe it came to form the framework of Greek drama. Concerning Aeschylus, the lofty and austere, whose monotheism approaches that of Plato; regarding Sophocles, who most closely approached the classic Greek ideal of seeing life steadily and seeing it whole; or Euripides, the critic of traditional Greek religion, the champion of women and slaves, we have not here space to speak in detail. Greek tragedy, perhaps more than any other form of literary art, succeeded in uniting local interest and comment with timeless appeal. Political satire reached its height with Aristophanes. Never had the stupid general and the militaristic politician been so caustically held up to ridicule. The *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus, the *Oedipus Tyrannus* and *Electra* of Sophocles, and various dramas of Euripides are still occasionally produced with moderate success. But Aristophanes' riotous and ribald comedy, the *Lysistrata*, in which women, disgusted with the stupidity and pugnaciousness of male politicians, take the government into their own hands and forswear relations with their husbands until war is renounced and peace declared—this comedy, now more than two thousand years old, enjoyed recently an unprecedented run during a crowded Broadway season.

After Aristophanes, thanks to political intervention, comedy criticizing characters in high circles came to an end. One finds instead the beginnings of polite society farce in the works of Menander, who, with others of his contemporaries, furnished models for skillful Roman adapters, such as Plautus and Terence. Greek tragedy continued to be written, but its influence was purely that of a literary form and was transmitted to the "blood and thunder" school of Shakespearean times through the medium of the Roman playwright Seneca.

Lyric poetry continued to be written in almost all its forms with unabating interest. The so-called Greek anthology contains specimens which range in time from the fifth century B.C. to the close of the tenth century A.D. Theocritus, who flourished during the third century B.C., is usually classified as a pastoral poet. But no man can be more lyric than he in describing the passion of romantic love; no one describes with more lyric freshness the town and the country life of his day. And when his manuscripts

come back, rejected by a wealthy man who might have been a patron, not even a Nobel prize-winner could assail more vigorously the money-loving spirit of the age.²⁴

In oratory, the Greeks developed not only court-room pleas, but also speech-writing of a broader national scope. For the first type, Lysias' initial oration, in which a man defends himself against the charge of slaying his wife's lover, may stand as an example. Of the second, Demosthenes' speech *On the Crown*, in which he reviews his entire political career and justifies his war on Philip of Macedon, may be taken as the finest example. In history, Herodotus, although given to exaggeration, endeavored to tell the truth as he heard and saw it. But with Thucydides we come to a scientific historian in the modern sense of the term. Critical examination of sources, searching study of motives, and sober impartiality are found welded in a style which may justify Thucydides' claim that his composition was destined to be a possession for all ages.

GREEK AESTHETICS

In literary criticism, the Greeks produced two classic works—the *Poetics* of Aristotle and the treatise *On the Sublime*, commonly but falsely supposed to have been written in the third century A.D. by the rhetorician Longinus. The *Poetics* affords not only a penetrating study of Greek drama but Aristotle's famous definition of tragedy, the *katharsis*, a form calculated to purge the spectator of pity and terror by arousing these emotions within him. Longinus' adventures as he ranges through the Greek and Hebrew classics in quest of the sublime furnish the nearest approach to impressionistic criticism that the Greeks ever made, although the author declares in typically Periclean manner that literary judgment is the result of long toil.

The dialogue, which Plato brought to inimitable perfection, was wedded to satire in the second century A.D. by Lucian, the critic of gods and human charlatans of all breeds, the father of the modern sketch and short story. The Greek novel offers the charming pastoral romance of *Daphnis and Chloe* and more

²⁴ *Idylls*, 16.



SECTION OF THE "PANATHENAIK PROCESSION," FROM A FRIEZE IN
THE PARTHENON



THE "FATES," FROM THE EASTERN PEDIMENT OF THE PARTHENON
(facing page 157)

prosaic stories of adventure in which sentimental heroines swoon their way through unspeakable temptations on land and sea into the arms of impossibly perfect heroes.

The Greek sense of beauty expressed itself not only in poetry and painting, sculpture and architecture, but also in a wealth of smaller forms such as coins fine as rare etchings, charming terracottas such as the Tanagra figurines, jewels, engraved gems, and even the common utensils of everyday life. The history of Greek sculpture from the athletic grace of Myron's *Discus Thrower* to the sensuous charm of the Praxitelean *Hermes*, from the magnificence of Pheidias' *Olympian Zeus* to the painfully human agonies of the *Laocoön* group reveals alike the versatility and vitality of the Greek genius. One who stands today on the Acropolis under the Parthenon's sober Doric form and glances across the way to the more effeminate Ionic of the Erechtheum or looks up at the light Corinthian charm of the Lysicrates Monument in the city below will gather living proofs of the Greek genius in all its power and variety.

CHAPTER VII

ROMAN CIVILIZATION



GREECE AND ROME

IT WAS THE DESTINY OF ROME TO DEVELOP IN HISTORICAL PARALLEL to Greece and to counterbalance culture with civilization. Speaking in a broad, psychological manner, we may refer to Greece as having developed the intellect; Rome, the will; just as the former nation has given us our theory, the latter our practical principles of life. Greek democracy has survived the onslaughts of Roman and Hun, Turk and Italian, and is still a living thing. Greek continued to be the international language of the Roman world perhaps as late as the third century A.D., but with the emergence of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire, Latin tended more and more to become the dialect of government and theology in the western world, the *lingua franca* of administrators and of scholars, if not of the mass of common people. Greek went into retirement at Constantinople and did not come out of hiding, as far as cultured Europe was concerned, until the Turks captured that city in 1453, although isolated scholars had known and had taught Greek before that time.

When, in the Vth century, Rome "fell," as we are in the habit of saying, the torch of culture was caught up by the Latin-speaking and Latin-writing peoples in Africa, handed over to Spain, carried even before that time with Christianity to Ireland, thence to Britain, France, Germany, and, at length, once more to Italy. Then, nourished by the Catholic Church, pagan culture became enmeshed in Christian tradition, preparing the way for the culture of Scholasticism.

The process of transmission went on during the period between 500 and 1200 A.D., when modern nations were being molded, not only by direct survival, but also by learned and conscious revival. The nations which were to be French, Spanish, and Italian adopted and adapted in pronunciation and syntactical

structure the Latin language of those who had conquered them and whom they in turn conquered. While popular authors were writing literature of many forms in vulgar Latin or later in that type of modified popular Latin which was the vernacular, learned men were striving to perpetuate the ancient tongue in Ciceronian purity.

Greek culture would not, perhaps, have been handed down in this manner had it not been for what we may justly call the Roman superiority-inferiority complex. Others, says Virgil,¹ may prove better artists and orators than the Romans. Others may excel them in science. But the real task of Rome is to rule the nations of the world. Her arts are to crown peace with law, to spare the conquered and subdue in war the proud. There, quite moderately stated, one has the Roman attitude. Culture is essentially Greek; so too is pure science. Rome admits the mastery of the "Greeklings" in these fields, is even willing to imitate and adapt their original creations.

But after all, culture of this sort is for leisure moments; pre-occupation with it is below the dignity of a busy, governing race. Rome's main concern is with government, and there she knows no master. Cicero in his fifth Verrine oration affects to despise or even to be ignorant of Greek art; elsewhere² he asserts that Greek laws are absurd compared to the Roman. We shall find in the course of this chapter that, while Rome adapted and made her own the Greek contributions in religion, philosophy, and science, in literature and art, she gave most to the world in the spheres of law and government. From Rome came that strong central organization which preserved the world from chaos even when bearded barbarians in the skins of wild animals ran riot over the Empire, and which helped to mold the national systems under which Graeco-Roman culture was transmitted to the modern age.

ROMAN RELIGION

Primitive Roman religion, the cult of home and farm which afterwards crystallized into the cult of the State, was almost wholly mundane in its point of view. Supernatural beings,

¹ *Aeneid*, VI, 847-853.

² *De Oratore*, I, 44 *et seq.*

"wills" or "powers" (*numina*), were held to exist in trees and rocks and springs and animals. Special spots, places struck by lightning, the tombs of the dead, were held in religious awe and veneration, though actual ghost-worship cannot perhaps be certainly proved for the Romans. Spirits haunted farm and woodland, invested with their own peculiar character the hearth and cupboard and doorway of the Roman house. The business of religion was, by the preservation of certain taboos, by the performance of sacrifice and a ritual meticulously observed, to placate and please or drive away these mysterious beings, not to embody them after the Greek manner in the gorgeous vestments of poetry and myth.

The father of the Roman family, who is the priest, enters, so to speak, into a contract with the gods. He gives to them that he may receive in turn. If he offers unsuitable victims, trips or stumbles in uttering the formular prayers, the gods need not keep their part of the bargain. This business-like spirit, this tendency to observe and regard the letter of a compact, entered naturally into Roman Law, for the priests of Rome were also its earliest lawyers. Even after the primitive agricultural community had come to center round the city of Rome, the old festivals were retained. The boundaries of the land were still sprinkled and sacrifice made about them at the end of May in a spot a few miles outside the metropolis.

The father of the family became in Roman state religion the king, or later the high priest, a position held during the Empire by the emperor alone. The Pontifex Maximus was assisted by various priests and diviners. Vestal Virgins kept the fire of Rome alight on the city hearth. Each important deity had flamens charged with perpetuating the ancient rites. The precise form of these ceremonies was intrusted to the "priestly books" and kept a profound secret. Prayers to be said in time of birth or marriage, formulas for the beginning of all sorts of work, particularly agricultural, were also contained in these volumes. There one might find the names of those abstract deities, those little gods and goddesses who watched over the sleeping child, taught it to eat and drink, strengthened it to stand, walk and talk, and in general accompanied it from birth to the grave.

Briefly speaking, the Roman found in the state religion the complete exemplification of that "divine law" by which he might live at peace with the gods.

The old religion offered, it is true, some colorful spectacles. During February the flamen of Jupiter sacrificed in turn he-goats and a dog. Two youths, who had been smeared with goat's blood on the blade of a knife, cleansed themselves with milk-soaked sponges of wool and went dancing round the city clad only in a goat-skin apron. The women they met they struck with thongs of the skin to ward off barrenness and insure fertility. During another festival, the Saturnalia, all Rome held holiday. Slaves enjoyed for once complete license of speech. Candles were lighted and presents exchanged by men and women of all classes. Thus in the December carnival of eating and drinking was the rôle of good old King Saturn brought back.

ROMAN DEITIES

But the good old days of Saturn came back only in mimicry. Actually metropolitan Rome, in touch during the Punic Wars for the first time with foreign vice and luxury, needed gods more personal and strong to save them than the powers of the primitive religion. As early as the fifth century B.C. Greek and Etruscan influences began to enter the stream of Roman religious practice. The Greek pantheon was gradually adapted to Roman needs. Roman gods were identified with, or at least took on names and epithets which tended to identify them with their Greek counterparts. Jupiter stood for ancient Zeus, Juno for Hera, Neptune for Poseidon, Mercury for Hermes, and Venus for Aphrodite. With Greek gods entered the Greek ritual, always carefully distinguished from the Roman, and the Hellenic custom of praying with head uncovered, so strange at first to the men of Rome. By the year 399 B.C. the statues of the gods, after the Hellenistic mode, were placed at banquet on couches in a public place so that the whole populace, keeping festival, might dine with them.

Along with the other new deities whom merchants and craftsmen, artists and slaves brought in, came Diana of Aricia, that Diana whose priest, the King of the Wood, was a runaway slave,

a slave who held rule only until a stronger man slew him and took his place. Etruscan diviners instructed the Romans in temple practice and the art of interpreting omens drawn from the flash of lightning, the vitals of victims, the flight of birds.

But more than anything else the influx of partly Hellenized oriental deities filled the needs of a war-torn, almost hysterical populace and contributed to the breakdown of the old Roman religion. At the command of a Sibylline Oracle, when nothing else could drive off the menacing Hannibal, the fetish-stone of the Great Mother Cybele was brought from Galatia in 204 B.C. A Greek priest carried to Etruria the rites of the baser Bacchus. The orgies which ensued throughout Italy, among even the highest classes, led the Senate in 186 B.C. to pass a decree stamping out the vinous heresy.³ At almost the same time that Cybele brought to Rome her ceremony of blood, her mourning for the death and rejoicing for the resurrection of the mutilated Attis so curiously akin to our own Easter festival, Egyptian Isis invaded Roman territory, and there remained, though her temples were often destroyed and her priests slandered and persecuted. Pompey the Great scoured the hills of Cilicia for pirates and captured them, but the prisoners whom he carried to Rome in 67 B.C. brought along the worship of Persian Mithra, which well-nigh captured the Empire. Thus, through one channel or another, the various immortality cults which centered round a god-man, had solidly established themselves on Roman soil by the middle of the first century B.C.

The emperor Augustus, thrusting his hand into the dike, attempted to check this oriental river and revive the old Roman religion, through edict and organized literary propaganda and personal effort. He restored eighty-two temples in or near Rome and infused life into the old priesthoods. On the Palatine he built a resplendent new temple of his family god, Apollo, as well as a costly shrine to Vesta, and in his forum he erected a fane to Mars, the avenger of the death of Julius Caesar. Though he never allowed himself formally to be worshiped as a god in Italy during his lifetime, he was hailed by the East as a deity before his death, and following it the cult of Augustus as a man-

³ Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita Libri*, XXIX, 8-19.

god was put in charge of a special group of priests. Augustus could hardly have rested easy in heaven had he known that a few centuries later another cult, whose King partook of the nature of Hebrew prophet, man-god, and god-man, would use the imperial organization which the first emperor built up to spread its influence throughout the western world.

ROMAN PHILOSOPHY

Rome's first formal contact with Greek philosophy dates from the year 155 B.C. when there came from Athens an embassy including Diogenes the Stoic, Critolaus the Peripatetic, and Carneades the Academic. The Roman Senate, particularly in the person of old-fashioned Cato, objected to Greek teachings, and a few years after the embassy foreign philosophers and rhetoricians were by decree expelled from Rome. But their influence remained. The literary circle surrounding the younger Scipio, which numbered among others Terence, the writer of comedy, undertook about this time the regular study of philosophy. Their special mentor was Panaetius the Stoic, whose common-sense teaching with regard to virtue anticipates the popularizing of Seneca. After Panaetius came Posidonius, who was the teacher of Cicero.

By direct tradition, then, as well as by reason of its suitability to the gravity and piety of the Roman temperament, Stoicism became the unofficial philosophy of Rome. Enough has been said in the preceding chapter about the Epicureans to show that their quest, untroubled by the claims of public life, for purely personal pleasure was thoroughly uncongenial to the Roman temperament. Those persons who, misled by too attentive a reading of Petronius, Juvenal, and Suetonius, imagine that every Roman spent his time careering from tavern to tavern, with a trull under one arm and a wine bottle under the other, forget that Rome had an empire to govern. They forget that Petronius depicts the luxury and vice of the new age in the person of a wealthy freedman; they do not remember that all Roman noblemen were not so degenerate as those whom Juvenal portrays; they forget that the Stoic virtues of dignity, gravity, and piety, the love of country and

family had always been and continued in some degree to remain thoroughly Roman.

Cicero, who was the chief Latin transmitter of Greek philosophy to the modern world, professes himself, indeed, to be an eclectic. For that matter, he declares ⁴ that his works are only copies of Greek originals; all he adds is words, in which, to use his own phrase, "I abound." In reality Cicero was a Stoic on the side of morals and an Academic on the side of the intellect. Lucian ⁵ hits off in a happy sentence the popular opinion of both Academics and Stoics. When he and his companions in the course of their famous nightmare journey arrive at the Island of the Blest and inquire for the philosophers, they find neither the Academics nor the Stoics. The Academics, suspending judgment and debating endlessly, are stalled on the road—they cannot make up their minds whether there *is* such a place as the Island of the Blest. The Stoics are still climbing the steep hill of virtue and have not arrived yet.

Now the Stoicism which Cicero and other Romans embraced was not the almost ludicrous pedantry of the earlier school. The typical sage of that breed, the man who had attained wisdom by suppressing his emotions and living according to nature's law, was a creature as impossible as the "sanctified" Christian who cannot fall from grace. The Stoicism popular in Rome was the type described so fully by Seneca, the tutor of Nero in the first century A.D. The human soul, said the Stoics, is a part of or an emanation from deity. And deity, whether one identifies him with Zeus who thunders on high or with the all-pervading breath of creative fire, contains the soul and reason of all things; he contains within himself the rational germs of the whole universe. Now since every man contains a part of the divine fire, and since all men are brothers and sons of the same God, it follows that man exists for and must take part in society, though that involves a certain amount of compromise with the prevailing form of government.

Life itself is an inn where we tarry overnight. Life is a battlefield on which the forces of good and evil clash continually. The wise campaigner will not only dress in coarse raiment and eat

⁴ *Letters to Atticus*, XII, 52.

⁵ *True History*, II, 18.

scant food, but also keep himself in mental trim by guarding against random thoughts and emotions. Especially will he come to Philosophy, the physician of the soul, the great healer whose ministrations are open to all men willing to practice meditation and self-discipline. But above all else the wise man, or the man striving for wisdom, will lean on the Divine Providence which is seen everywhere in the world, which is mirrored faintly even in the conventional mythology. Where the Divine Will leads, the wise man, making progress in virtue, must follow obediently, even though the road conducts him to death. And if a man feels that he has lost control of the threads of his life, if he is mocked by Fate, he may assume control again for one last time and commit suicide, assured that, while the soul may not be immortal, it will at least endure until the present world-cycle is ended in fire and makes way for the next.

Roman religion gave to Christianity the very word "religion" and its consecrated terms, "piety" and "saint" and "sacrament," became a part of the Church's heritage. The contributions of Stoicism have already been pointed out in the preceding chapter. But by and large Roman religion in itself had no universal appeal. Stoicism called mostly to the upper classes. Both owe any broad influence they may have exercised to their blending in the curious tapestry which we call Christianity.

LATIN SCIENCE

Rome produced neither a great philosopher nor an original scientist. Her writers in the latter field tend either to copy Greek works directly, to reject Hellenic science entirely and rely on the lowest kind of magical practice, or finally to vitiate scientific study by a tendency to see design everywhere in nature and to bear down too heavily on the ethical pedal. To the first class belong Lucretius, the poet, and Celsus, the Roman patrician, whom we have mentioned in the foregoing chapter.

One thinks of Lucretius primarily as a literary artist of the first rank. But in reality his poem *On the Nature of Things* is a setting forth in Latin hexameters of the Epicurean world-system. The Epicurean assumption that the world was formed by a fortuitous

concourse of swerving and clashing atoms, borrowed in part from Democritus and Leucippus, is a fascinating anticipation of modern atomic theories, though Dalton in the XIXth century seems to have worked independently. Intriguing also is Lucretius' statement, when describing the great plague at Athens toward the close of his poem, that there are seeds which bring good and seeds which bring evil and disease to men. Here, as in a mirror darkly, one sees modern bacteriology. From his Greek original likewise Lucretius takes the notions of the survival of the fittest and the growth of higher human from lower animal forms. Extant remains of the Epicurean writings show how faithfully Lucretius translated and adapted his master. Lucretius' missionary zeal, his burning desire to free men from the burden of superstition and set them to investigating the causes of things, coupled with his mastery of Latin verse, gives him high position as a poet, but he cannot claim to be an original thinker any more than, on a lower scale, Celsus, the compiler and adapter of Greek medical works.

To the second group belongs the reactionary Marcus Porcius Cato, who died in 149 B.C., fifty years before the birth of Lucretius. His work on agriculture, which is marked throughout by an uncompromisingly old-fashioned Roman attitude toward experimental science, preserves not only a recipe for making cheese-cake, but also one of the most curious and tantalizing of spells for curing dislocation. One can almost see the sufferer hopping about and hear him cursing as his voice rises to a shriek in the magic words: "*Huat hanat huat ista pista sista domiabo damnaustra.*"

In the last group fall Pliny the Elder, who perished while investigating an eruption of Vesuvius in 79 A.D., and Seneca, the tutor of Nero. The thirty-seven books of Pliny's so-called *Natural History* are encyclopedic in their scope, embracing the subjects of cosmology, geography, anthropology, zoölogy, botany, medicine, mineralogy, and art. But the modern reader will be more interested in the grotesque and utterly delightful superstitions which Pliny catalogues than in what passes with him for science or his monotonous insistence on the fact that nature serves man. Seneca's *Naturales Quaestiones*, investigations into various problems connected with natural science, represents a distinct advance on Pliny in the matter of accuracy. Seneca is less gullible than

Pliny, but he insists always on the ethical implications of scientific study, an attitude fatal to real progress. Marcus Terentius Varro, who helped Julius Caesar catalogue the vast collection of books in Rome, was a philologist and antiquary rather than a scientist. Among other things he marked out more clearly than had been done before the subjects of the curriculum. These he designated as: grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, medicine, and architecture. All save the last two, we may add, became part of the consecrated mediaeval course of study.

ROMAN MEDICINE

Greece had employed state physicians in the early fifth century B.C. The Romans extended and perfected the system. Not only were state physicians recognized during the late Empire as a tax-exempt group whose duties consisted chiefly in ministering to the poor, but medical men were organized into schools and colleges in various parts of the Empire and halls were provided for teaching purposes. Each Roman legion, each group of policemen, firemen, and city-guards in Rome had an attending physician, who held the rank of non-commissioned officer.

In Greece surgeries were privately owned, though the temples of Asclepius were open to rich and poor alike and were of a more public character. During the early part of the first century A.D. the temple of Asclepius on a ship-shaped island in the Tiber became the refuge for sick and broken-down slaves. This curious island, on which was carved the poop of a ship, bearing the staff and serpent and a likeness of the head of Asclepius, was officially recognized as a slave-asylum when the emperor Claudius freed those who had taken shelter there. Infirmaries of other kinds for the use of free and slave alike existed during the first century A.D. By the end of the first or the beginning of the second century, fully equipped free hospitals were known. These owed much in organization and arrangement to the military dressing-stations. At first it was customary to ship wounded soldiers to Rome for treatment; later, military hospitals were founded at various convenient points. To the period of the late first or early second century A.D. belongs the building which has been excavated

at Düsseldorf on the Rhine. This is constructed in the modern manner, with offices and a vestibule in front, wards and corridors on the sides, and a dining room in the middle.

During the earlier days of Rome, physicians were either slaves or freemen relegated to an extremely insignificant position. Julius Caesar bestowed citizenship on all who practiced medicine in Rome. Yet, in spite of all that, physicians were not highly regarded on the whole during the course of Roman history. High-born Romans left such practice to the starving Greeks, as they contemptuously called them. A very early decree, sometimes attributed to the almost mythical Roman king Numa, recommends Caesarean operation. But the Alexandrian practice of dissecting human bodies was abandoned some time after the close of the first century. Summarily speaking, medical theory in the Roman Empire lagged far behind medical organization and practical measures for hospitalization and sanitation.

In the last field the Romans were supreme. The daily bath had been an institution in Athens. And the older Romans, who according to Seneca bathed once a week whether they needed it or not, soon learned to take up Greek fashions. About the baths we shall speak in a later section of this chapter. Suffice it now to say that fourteen aqueducts brought three hundred million gallons of drinkable water into the city every day. Both public buildings and private houses were adequately equipped with latrines and plumbing facilities.

APPLIED SCIENCE

The Romans made no contributions worth mentioning to the science of pure mathematics, but they were active in surveying. They used, whether they invented it or not, a crude surveyor's instrument for sighting and laying out farms and towns in rectangular lines. They employed an instrument singularly like the taximeter for measuring distances. A wheel of known circumference carried the machine. This wheel was hitched up by reducing cogs to a bar at the top of which was a slotted disk containing a number of pebbles. When the wheel which ran on the ground had covered the space of a mile, one pebble dropped through an aperture in the disk to a receptacle below. Distance was meas-

ured by counting the pebbles or by reference to a dial on the face of the meter. The principle of the pulley the Romans adapted to cranes used for raising blocks of stone and worked by a treadmill.

Astronomy was almost entirely neglected by the Romans, but they did give to the months names which we still use and the Julian calendar paved the way for the Gregorian system. January is of course the month of Janus, god of the doorway; February is the season of purification; March is the month of Mars; April "opens" the spring; May is the "older" and June the "younger" month. July is named for Julius Caesar and August for the emperor Augustus. September, October, November, and December are in Latin, respectively, the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth months. In the earliest times the days of the month and year were calculated by the lunar system. But in the fourth century B.C. the Greek astronomer Eudoxus devised a solar system adopted in the third century by the Egyptians and adapted in the first century B.C. by Julius Caesar. According to this method the days of the year were reckoned at 365. Every fourth year a day was thrown in before the 24th of February. This system remained in vogue until 1582, when Pope Gregory XIII excised the superfluous days which had accumulated, and is still employed by the Greek Orthodox Church. Parenthetically we may remark that lucky and unlucky, designated in popular use by white and black stone, secular and religious days were marked off on the calendar by letters, and that the number of days devoted to games and festivals, comprising only 76 in the late Republic, rose in the fourth century A.D. to 175 — a priceless boon to lazy schoolboys and a populace clamoring for games as well as bread.

The first sundial was apparently introduced into Rome in 263 B.C. Sundials, both stationary and portable for the use of travelers, were commonly employed during the Empire. Supplementing the sundial we find the common water-glass ordinarily employed in Greek law-courts to mark the length of time an orator could speak. But other and more elaborate arrangements existed, though apparently they too were of Greek origin. Vitruvius, a writer on architecture in the time of Julius Caesar, mentions a most ingenious contrivance described by Ctesibius, a clever

Alexandrian barber of the late second century. In this, water dripped at a fixed rate from a tank into a reservoir containing a float attached to a shaft, geared in turn to a cogwheel. The cogwheel worked a pointer which marked out the hours on a dial above the reservoir.

The most notable, if not the most up-to-date clock in antiquity was that erected by the Greek astronomer Andronicus Cyrrestes, in 159 B.C. Its remains are still a striking tourist attraction in Athens. This structure, commonly called The Tower of the Winds, is an octagonal affair exhibiting on its outer surface eight figures which represent the various winds. Lines engraved below the figures served to section off the shadows thrown on or near them by styles fixed above. Originally a triton surmounted the whole. The pointer which he held indicated the figure of the wind then blowing. Inside was an elaborate water-clock for use on cloudy days. Similar structures were no doubt to be found in many Roman towns, but it should be noted that here as elsewhere the Romans were dependent on the Greeks.

Augustus directed his chief engineer, Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, to make a complete survey of the Empire. The resulting map, which was completed toward the close of the first century B.C., was displayed in Rome in a building specially made for the purpose. Other maps or road-directions were engraved on mile-stones and bowls, and route-books with names of towns and the distances between them were devised for the convenience of tourists, especially in the Christian era for those making pilgrimages to Jerusalem. But it remained for the Greek writer Ptolemy, who worked in the employ of Roman officials, to present the world with the first really scientific geography.

LAW AND GOVERNMENT

Before the primitive Italian community could become the empire universal, the local law of Rome had to grow, with many changes, into a group of statutes having validity everywhere; the early democracy had to develop into a universal monarchy. Roman Law was finally codified in the years 527-565 A.D. during the reign of the Eastern emperor Justinian, and at his direction. This

code it was which, elaborately annotated and often somewhat freely adapted by learned lawyers, continued throughout the Middle Ages to be revered as nothing less than Natural Law; it was this code which won adoption in Italy and Scotland and Germany, where Roman Law remained in force until displaced in the XIXth century by a more truly national jurisprudence. We may pause now briefly to inquire how the early Roman civil code became the code universal.

In Roman practice every lawsuit consisted of two parts: the first in which a superior judge defined the point at issue; the second in which a lower judge or judges rendered decision on the issue already defined. Two conflicting tendencies were early observable in the interpretation of points at issue. The older priestly group stood fast on a dry and legalistic adherence to the letter of rulings precisely defined. The second group, exemplified by the praetor's courts, allowed for slips and stumbles in the definition and trial of a case and stood by the spirit of the law rather than its ritualistic letter. Out of these two rival tendencies grew "civil law" in the older and narrower sense of a rigid code applicable only to Roman citizens and "civil law" in the larger sense, which, colored by "natural law," the decisions of the praetors, and the writings and responses of the great jurists became "universal law."

From the year 242 B.C. there had existed at Rome two types of praetors, or trial magistrates; the one concerned himself with cases involving citizens, the other busied himself with suits involving foreigners. Each praetor was entitled at the beginning of his year of office to lay down by means of an edict the policy which generally speaking he meant to pursue. Out of the praetor's edicts, and the *formulae* which he evolved in rendering decision on various points at issue came a rather elastic code suitable not only for citizens, but for foreigners as well. Two other forces, one of which we have mentioned already, contributed to the growth of universal or international law. The *prudentes*, who correspond fairly closely to a group of lawyers if not to a formally recognized legal profession, were often called upon by judges of all sorts to give advice in the definition of disputed points. The "responses" of the *prudentes* had well-nigh the validity of our own Supreme

Court decisions. Under the Empire the ruler, at least in the later period, himself appointed *prudentes* who helped him in drafting his "rescripts," or answers to legal questions which as supreme praetor, judge, and lawyer he had a right to make. Finally, Roman Law may fairly be said to have become universal when in 212 A.D. the emperor Caracalla by his *Constitutio Antonina* bestowed Roman citizenship on all free-born members of communities throughout the Empire and thus extended the code to almost every inhabitant of the ancient world.

ROMAN BUREAUCRACY

If we look at the purely political side of Roman history from Augustus to the abdication of Diocletian, from 31 B.C. to 305 A.D., we shall observe a general tendency to abrogate the ancient law-making power of the Roman people as vested in their magistrates; we shall note a gradual wiping out of the old distinctions between senators and knights, citizens and freedmen; and, finally, we shall mark a tendency to substitute for the early republican form of government, where the people themselves gave power of administration to their own magistrates, a gigantic system of bureaucracy in which the emperor's own financial agents and secretaries largely take over the work formerly assigned to the Senate and the citizen populace.

Augustus, to be sure, was most politic in his treatment of the Senate; he hemmed in and hedged and covered his royal trail with a smoke-screen of republican titles. But he was, nevertheless, an absolute ruler. Later emperors handled the Senate with less tact. What the high-born senators said when they were forced during the morning call to kiss the toes of an upstart emperor, during the day to run for miles alongside his chariot, or during the dinner-hour to serve him as waiters may better be imagined than described within the limitations of decent print. Even during the first century, foreigners and freedmen were creeping into the Senate. Under Diocletian the old order completely lost caste; it was degraded to the position of a municipal council and its members were liable to torture in trials for treason. Secretaries of Finance and Petitions and Correspondence, earning salaries of

ten and fifteen thousand dollars a year and assisted by a vast corps of slaves and freedmen, now assumed under direction of the emperor complete control of provincial administration which Augustus had shared with the Senate.

Theoretically the small towns which made up the urban population of the Empire remained self-governing, some of them under treaty, some of them as free communities, for it had never been the policy of Rome to interfere too much with local customs or local affairs. But the burden of the taxes required to maintain so colossal a bureaucracy, the expenses involved in sustaining local offices were so great that natives frequently rebelled, and prominent townsmen had to be forced to hold the position of magistrate. Concomitantly the system of absentee landlordship worked an ever greater hardship on the agricultural populace and the old free farmer, who enjoyed certain special privileges under the earlier regime, sank to a state little better than that of a serf. Incidentally, the upsurge of an oppressed rural population seems to have been one of the causes contributing to the gradual decline of the Western Empire.

DEIFICATION OF THE EMPERORS

But there is another side to the history of the later Empire than the purely political one: the emergence of the religious element in government and concurrently the growth in power of the Catholic Church, which had such far-reaching results in the Middle Ages. Universal monarchy, even the earliest growth of the Roman Empire, was in large measure made possible by the concomitant development of monotheism. In the person of Augustus, though he discreetly claimed to be only the first citizen of the State, monarchy was realized and the Church became one with the State. As we have already said, Augustus was worshiped as a god in various localities during his lifetime. He was hailed as "the savior of the world," the deity whose accession brought "good news" to the whole universe. And the Greek word translated "good news," we may add, is the same which in the King James version of the New Testament is rendered "gospel."

Succeeding emperors were frankly deified at Rome during their

lifetime, though they were thought of rather as men who became gods than gods who took the form of men on earth. So marked is this tendency in the later period that even the chickens of the imperial court are called "sacred." About the middle of the third century, the emperor Aurelian proclaimed himself the earthly representation and actual emanation of the oriental "sun god" whose worship, closely allied to that of Mithra, he made the official cult of the Empire.

The growing tendency to make religion the chief element in the Church-State combination was helped along when Constantine adopted Christianity as the State cult (313 A.D.). The power of the Church now became stronger and stronger. In 390 the emperor Theodosius I sent a barbarian army to Thessalonica to punish the inhabitants for a riot during which an officer and some soldiers had been killed. Summoning the populace into the circus, the barbarians quickly put more than seven thousand souls to the sword. Shortly afterwards Theodosius attempted to enter the cathedral at Milan, but Ambrose, the militant bishop, barred his way. Not until Theodosius had stripped himself of his imperial insignia and bowed himself to the dust, uttering at the same time a verse of the *Psalms* properly addressed to God himself (*Psalms* cxix, 25), not until then did Ambrose allow the prostrate emperor to rise and enter the cathedral. Largely at the instigation of Ambrose, paganism was forbidden in 391 A.D. and the splendid Temple of Serapis at Alexandria was destroyed. Ten years before that time Theodosius called a synod together at Constantinople which ended the Arian heresy and strengthened the power of the militant and now unified Church.

After the death of Theodosius, Goths and Huns ravaged East and West. The Vandals invaded Spain and in 455 sacked Rome. Finally, in 476, the last Western Emperor appeared on the scene in the person of Augustulus. The earthly empire of old Rome perhaps fell, but the Church did not. For many years the two powers recognized in the ancient world were the pope in the West and the emperor in the East, where the political sovereign was still head of the Church. Not content with religious power, the Church invaded politics. Carrying on in almost perfect detail the bureaucratic organization borrowed in part by Augustus

from the Hellenistic world and perfected at long length by Diocletian, the Church felt competent to dominate both spheres. And so, for many years, she did. Pope Gregory VII brought Henry IV in penitent's garb to his knees in the snow-covered castle of Canossa more than a thousand years after Paul the Apostle had begun the planting of a church unified without reference to position or caste, a church whose "polity was from heaven." And not until Philip IV of France defied the bull of Boniface VIII which in 1296 forbade the clergy to pay secular taxes without his consent, was the authority of the pope seriously challenged.

THE ROMANS AS ARTISTS AND BUILDERS

For the average Roman, statues and paintings were mostly things one bought rather than created. Efforts to show that the Romans had a definite art of their own have on the whole proved unsuccessful. Romans like Verres, the governor of Sicily, stole or bought at a ridiculous price the objects of art which they fancied; and some Roman emperors as well were not exempt from this charge. Art one must have for the decoration of home and palace and public building, for the glorification of personal pride and the perpetuation of one's name. Where it came from mattered little.

Wealthy Romans might be able to afford the originals of Greek statues and paintings, but the majority had to be contented with copies. Wretched little Cupids and Venuses and Mercurys squinted down at the visitor from every conceivable niche and cranny. The making of these statues and statuettes became a very lucrative and specialized business. Some workmen concentrated on making heads, others did nothing but put in eyes, still others riveted their attention on torsos. About as much art went into the making of the average commercial copy as goes into our window-dummies or the trumpery Beethovens and Napoleons which used to glare with beetling brows from every library shelf. A good deal of the painting which survives in houses excavated at Pompeii falls into the dining-room picture class. We learn from it a good deal about ancient mythology

and no little about ancient private life, but most of it is late Hellenistic and rather contemptible.

Petty vanity had an abnormal growth during the Empire. Small towns were choked with equestrian statues and portrait busts of little seekers after immortality. In some cases the statues of the emperors were so bad that nothing had to be changed save the inscription when a new ruler came to the throne. This does not of course apply to the major portrait busts, which in some cases are very fine. Cicero and Caesar, for instance, are known to us in very life. To this realism the Roman habit of making wax death-masks of their ancestors must have contributed a great deal. The custom, finally, of making a formal statue of a dead man in various postures had much to do with a similar custom in mediaeval times, and tomb or sarcophagus sculpture carries on, sometimes, the finest traditions of ancient art.

The Roman triumphal arch, of which the best example is that of Titus, showing the spoils from Jerusalem carried in procession, and the triumphal column, notably that of Trajan, have been more ambitiously than successfully imitated in modern times, and have, alas, contributed much to our "public fountain" school of sculpture, as well as to the mediaeval and modern habit of loading church doors with historical carvings.

ARCHITECTURE

The art of building was an entirely different matter. Elaborate political organizations demand elaborate public buildings; the effective use of land demands drainage and a large city population, to be kept in health and comfort, needs water mains and baths; rapid transportation and communication call for bridges and roads. In these fields the shrewd, materialistic, planning Romans were unexcelled. The columnar Greek temple, which represents Hellenic architecture at its highest, was not a unit suited to indefinite elaboration and expansion. The Romans devised the type of highly complex public building still in use. This may best be seen in the great public baths or in the imperial residences on the Palatine Hill, which were a perfect labyrinth



THE ARCH OF TRAJAN



ROMAN FORUM AND SURROUNDING BUILDINGS

Modern painting showing the scene in Augustus' time.

(facing page 176)

of offices and living- and dining-quarters, reached by a maze of corridors.

One might lie at ease in the huge vaulted halls of the baths of Caracalla or Diocletian and read a book from the adjoining libraries, stroll into the auditorium and hear a lecture on philosophy, and perhaps see a play or endure a poetry-reading, or check one's clothes with a final flourish at the door and spend the day in a round of hot and cold, vapor and plunge baths, at intervals buying food of the hawkers who passed from room to room. All the pleasure, in fact, of library, theater, art gallery, bath, and tavern could be enjoyed under one roof, so various were the resources of these complicated structures.

The arch, Rome's great contribution to the art of building, has already been mentioned. Haltingly employed by Egyptians and Assyrians and Lydians, this form came to the Romans perhaps through the Etruscans, and was by the Romans called into universal use. By it they threw bridges across rivers or carried water-mains over valleys. Through an elaboration of the arch they reached the architectural triumph of vaulting and groined vaulting, a style of construction in which two barrel vaults intersect at right angles, and not least, the dome, a magnificent example of which still stands in the Pantheon. The Romans were also familiar with the principle of the interior and exterior buttress, later more fully developed by Gothic architecture, as a means of relieving wall-strain.

The origin of the Romanesque cathedral, with its many bays and choirs and vaults, has been a question hotly disputed. Some discerned its genesis in the Roman bath or in the Roman basilica, which affords the features of central and side aisles, of apse and clerestory lighting common to the later Christian churches. Others have pointed out that the subterranean basilicas used by the mystery cults, such as the one near the Porta Maggiore in Rome which was apparently as early as 50 A.D. the meeting place of a neo-Pythagorean group with Orphic tendencies, present the characteristic elements of narthex, nave, aisles, terminal apse, central seat for the officiating priest, and perhaps a font for holy water.

However this may be, the similarity between the rows of

many-storied houses with shops on the ground floor and apartments above as seen in Pompeii and elsewhere, the similarity between these and our own street-fronts is evident, not to mention as well the swaying wooden tenement buildings in Rome where the rent became lower, not higher, as one ascended toward the tiles and the insects. The atrium or hall with a water tank, which constituted the central feature of the Roman private house, had a most interesting development in mediaeval Europe. In such buildings as the convent of the Vestal Virgins below the Palatine and permanent headquarters of soldiers everywhere it was customary to throw a group of rooms about a central quadrangle or court. This fashion lead by natural stages to the cloister style of architecture, so commonly and often so badly imitated on our own college campuses. Two further modern features were found in the Roman house: glass windows and hot-air furnaces.

CONSTRUCTION AND DECORATION

As can be seen from the foregoing account the Romans paid more attention to construction than to decoration. Construction was in the hands of trade-unions or guilds, constituting a closed corporation enjoying subsidy from the State and united in the worship of a single deity. Trade secrets were jealously guarded in the form of symbols unintelligible to outsiders and handed down thus from generation to generation. Custom compelled these guilds to donate labor for State projects, but private citizens were obliged to pay through the nose for organized construction work on a large scale, since the guilds practically controlled unskilled as well as skilled labor.

Basic work was done in concrete or brick or squared stone, over which oftentimes a marble surface was placed. The term concrete is somewhat misleading. The Romans did not use actual concrete, mixed outside the mold, except for lining aqueducts and reservoirs and constructing terraces. For domes and vaults and wall-work they used layers of crushed stone and mortar tamped firmly into the mold, which was composed usually of timber, though sometimes of a preliminary brick support tied

together with quick-setting cement. Outside decoration consisted largely of the ornamental façade with its long lines of columns and pilasters and arches. For columnar work the Romans used, and sometimes with hideous lack of taste, the three Greek orders, Doric, Ionian, and principally Corinthian.

AQUEDUCTS

The drainage systems by which the Romans reclaimed marshy ground and lakes seem to have been borrowed from the Etruscans. But the Romans carried them to a perfection not previously known. The emperor Claudius used thirty thousand men and eleven years to drain the Fucine Lake by a conduit three miles long, which had to be constructed by leveling and tunneling a mountain.⁶ In Augustus' time there was a navigable canal draining the Pomptine Marshes south of Rome, but gnats still abounded there, if we may trust Horace.⁷ Indeed, with all their attention to drainage and sanitation, the Romans seem never to have realized the danger lurking in mosquitoes. Horace thinks the use of a mosquito-net is worthy only of an effeminate Mark Antony, not of a real Roman.⁸ While we are on the subject of canals, it may be worth while to remark that Nero planned to cut through the Corinthian Isthmus, a project finally carried through by the French in the XIXth century. At the signal of a trumpet the great artist and melodramatist broke first ground with a mattock and hauled off a basketful of dirt on his own imperial shoulders.⁹

The carrying of water by the fourteen aqueducts which poured their millions of gallons daily into Rome was effected sometimes by tunneling through mountains, sometimes by throwing arched supports with many intermediate piers—the Romans avoided the wide-flung arch—over a valley. Sharp angles were frequently resorted to in order to check the flow of the water. The pressure system was used in the city, where concrete-lined reservoirs through lead and terra-cotta and wood pipes fed the faucets of public buildings and private houses. During Nero's day a

⁶ Suetonius, *Life of the Deified Claudius*, XX.

⁸ *Epodes*, IX, 16.

⁷ *Satires*, I, 5, 14.

⁹ Suetonius, *Life of Nero*, XIX.

huge dam was built for retaining water at Sublaqueum (modern Subiaco). The wall, which was about fifty-two feet thick, lasted nearly thirteen hundred years.

In laying foundations under water, the Romans definitely anticipated the modern methods of coffer-dam partitions, draining by dredges, and lining the bottom of a drained area with lime. Roman highways are still a standing shame to modern sand and concrete racketeers. Nearly three thousand miles of good roads radiated through the Empire in Augustus' time from the Golden Milestone in the Forum. Though usually not more than ten feet wide, these roads were built to last. Layers of small stones and concrete with octagonal basalt paving blocks on top made up a roadbed three feet or more deep. The Appian Way, begun in the fourth century B.C., is still in use. Over these highways galloped the imperial couriers, making on an average fifty miles a day by dint of changing horses at regular post-stations maintained at government expense. Thus the long arm of Rome could speedily reach robbers who lurked in wood and cave to kidnap or murder travelers, could wipe out rebellion among the provinces, and support in its steady routine the increasingly bureaucratic administration.

LATIN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

The genius of the Latin tongue may best be described in connection with the literature written in it. What concerns the modern student more closely is the survival and revival of Latin as a living mode of speech. When the pope delivers in clerical Latin a speech heard over the radio by the whole world, we listen to an unmistakable proof that the tongue of Cicero is still universal in scope, and that so long as the Catholic Church survives it will doubtless remain so. So much is obvious to any one. The relation, however, between late or popular Latin and the Romance languages, which in their present form are essentially Latin rather than pure native dialects, needs a little explanation.

While the Western Empire was still a vital force, the provincials more and more spoke Latin. When the Western Empire fell and Teutons or Tatars overran Roman soil, the inhabitants of Italy,



ROMAN AQUEDUCT NEAR NÎMES (ANCIENT NEMAUSUS),
SOUTHERN FRANCE



RUINS OF THE COLOSSEUM, THE ARCH OF TITUS IN THE FOREGROUND
(facing page 180)

Spain, and France retained not their own native dialects, not the dialects of their most recent conquerors, but the language of old Rome which in its modified form Roman traders and soldiers, intermarrying with native women, had already diffused. This, one must hasten to add, was a good deal different from the formal language of Cicero. Even in the comedies of Plautus, two hundred years before Christ, we observe that the tongue spoken by the man in the street differed widely in structure, even in pronunciation from the meticulous language of the orator's platform. These colloquial tendencies, visible thus far back, became intensified as Latin blended with and triumphed over the native dialects.

Summarily speaking, we may say the classical vocabulary was changed in many vital respects, that certain consonants were differently pronounced, while the old distinctions in vowel quantities gradually disappeared, and finally that verb structure became analytic rather than synthetic. Regarding changes in vocabulary, the late Latin for horse was *caballus*, not *equus*, whence we get the French *cheval*. Vulgar Latin used *testa* (pot) rather than *caput* to signify head; from this comes the French word *tête*. Changes in pronunciation, also illustrated by the above examples, may be definitely shown by the following: The Latin word *flamma* (flame) becomes *llama* in Spanish; in Italian *flos* (flower) becomes *fior*. The Latin word *sic* (thus or yes) yields Italian and Spanish *si*; while *hoc* (this) plus *ille* (that) curiously enough gives Old French *oïl* and current French *oui*. Latin (*ad*) *hanc horam* — up to this hour — becomes Italian *ancora* and French *encore*. *Hodie* (today) added to late Latin *diurnum* (French *journée*) makes up part of *aujourd'hui* (on the day of today). As for the analytic tendency in verbs one example will suffice. The late Latin verb form *scribere habeo* (I have to write) gives by contraction the Romance future, for example, Italian *scriverò* (I shall write). The process might be indefinitely illustrated by examples from the French, Spanish, and Italian tongues in a variety of forms. The fact is plain: The Romance languages are essentially late Latin, with some infusion from learned Latin, colored by native characteristics.

THE PERSISTENCE OF LATIN

When literary men outside England began to write in the vernacular, that is to say modified vulgar Latin, they addressed not the uneducated, but men who might reasonably be expected to know some literary Latin as well; hence they frequently imported into their pages a number of learned Latin words. In England until the Norman Conquest Anglo-Saxon, almost untouched by Latin—though King Alfred translated Bede's *Ecclesiastical History* out of the Roman tongue into the vernacular—was the common vehicle of speech and literature. But after the conquest French and Latin words poured into the national treasury.

All this is quite aside from the survival and revival of classical Latin as a written, and to a less extent, as a spoken tongue. A long line of churchmen, Tertullian, Augustine, Bede, Abelard, Erasmus produced fairly correct and even immaculately Ciceroian Latin. As late as the end of the XVIIth century it was felt that no scientific work had a chance of survival unless it was couched in the Roman tongue. Bacon, Harvey, Newton—all published their epoch-making speculations in Latin and the language of scholars is still, in many countries, the dialect of Caesar and Augustus and Cicero. Churchmen, scholars, men of letters, scientists in every land have all contributed to carry on the classical tradition. It is no matter for wonder, then, that more than half the common words in everyday use in English speech are of Latin origin, and that in learned English the percentage is far higher, the terminology of the sciences being almost wholly Greek and Latin.

"There are tears," said Virgil,¹⁰ "for human suffering, and mortal sorrows touch the heart." His epic phrase may fitly be applied not only to the *Aeneid*, but also to some of the best of other Latin poetry and prose. For one finds there, perhaps, a homelier thrill, a more genuine sense of standing on native human soil than one gleans in the elfin fields of Greek literature. Humanity is there, humanity joyous, sorrowful, not untouched, sometimes, alas, spoiled by rhetorical spots—humanity accom-

¹⁰ *Aeneid*, I, 462.

panied by consummate urbanity and an abiding sense of the majesty and dignity of mortal effort at its highest.

In prose Cicero not only formed the literary style of Europe, but transmitted almost the whole cultural coinage of Greece to the modern world. It is a liberal education to read his orations — those eloquent and abusive documents which throw such brilliant light into the dark corners of the ancient living room and court of law; to read his letters where the actor and literary man who plays sometimes not very successfully at politics throws off the black robe and indulges in slang, to follow the course of Greek philosophy in his *Offices* and *Tusculan Disputations* and to witness in formation there the philosophical vocabulary of the modern world, to read all these and close then with his essays *On Friendship* and *On Old Age* where, with pathetic conviction engendered by his political career, Cicero maintains that virtue is the only true foundation of friendship and resigns himself to the thought that life like all other things must have a limit.

POPULAR LITERATURE

The history of Rome before and after Cicero was written by Livy, Tacitus, and Suetonius, whose *Lives of the Caesars* delighted Mark Twain with its malicious gossip. Not one of these men is a Thucydides, yet Livy, if occasionally over-eloquent and patriotic, may stand at times a comparison with the great Greek. We should be sorry if Tacitus, who professed to write without partisan zeal, had lived up to his claim in his grim denunciation of contemporary vices, just as the modern world would be poorer off by many pretty legends had not Suetonius peeped through imperial keyholes. Through the pages of Petronius' *Satyricon* a beginning was made with the picaresque novel, the story of the typical vagabond, and no one who has followed this author through the lowest inns and taverns can ever forget his experience. In Petronius' *Trimalchio*, we observe the newly rich who makes his millions on a limited educational outlay. From Petronius one may turn to another and later novelist, the African Apuleius, magician and rhetorician, charlatan and yet sincere Platonist. In his story *The Golden Ass* one encounters an odd

assortment of hostlers, witches who cut men's throats, mill-slaves blinded by the fumes of the flour, begging priests, robbers hiding in caves, and, most fantastic of all, a hero who, all for love, turns into a donkey and after countless sufferings is restored to human form. Yet turn but a few pages of Apuleius and you pass from this earthly rogue's gallery to the celestial portraits of Cupid and Psyche.

This is not the place to praise in detail the multiform art of Virgil, whether exhibited in his *Aeneid* or in that exquisitely beautiful pastoral, that passionate plea for a return to the soil, the *Georgics*. We may only stop further in passing to single out the names of Catullus, Horace, Ovid, and Juvenal. Catullus brought into European literature for the first time, perhaps, the utter despair of a man sincerely in love with a worthless woman. The experience broke his heart and doubtless hastened his death, but, having before us the lines which his suffering for Lesbia produced, we can almost say we are glad he suffered. Horace's *Odes* have been throughout the history of education the urbane gentleman's guide to the pleasant, if not the high life. His epistle *On the Art of Poetry* gave to literary criticism a wealth of familiar terminology and provided a major impetus for French neo-Classicism. Ovid's charm as a story-teller captivated the Middle Ages and has largely shaped the modern conception of classical mythology. In a pleasant, sometimes almost a flip and popular manner, he discourses in the *Art of Love*, enlarges on his own amorous affairs, expatiates on early Roman religion, and retells the stories of the Greek gods. Though his position as unofficial poetic chaplain to the faster set in Rome cost him ten years of exile in the barbarous Black Sea country, Ovid has not for that reason been ostracized from polite literary society.

SATIRE

In oratory, history, and philosophy, in the epic and lyric the Romans acknowledged the Greeks as their masters, but satire they claimed as a form all their own. And Juvenal in the second century A.D., whether the Romans earlier invented the prose-verse type of satire or not, certainly made of satiric preach-

ing in hexameter verse a fine and caustic art. With an indignation which sometimes serves as a pretext for dragging in details unsavory to moral nostrils, Juvenal describes and excoriates the vices of contemporary Rome. The times, if one listens to Juvenal, are completely out of joint. Rome is so noisy and dangerous that it is no longer fit to live in. Rumbling carts, cattle bawling and drovers cursing outside the window, the constant threat of fire make night hideous for the poor man, tossing on his ragged couch in a vermin-infested tenement house. If you can get through the traffic alive during the daytime you are likely to have your teeth knocked out by some gangster at night. The only safety lies in an unscrupulous conscience and a full purse.

For Rome now worships the unofficial deities Wealth and Vice. Men no longer ask what you are, but how much you have. Poor poets and scholars are glad to get the *sportula*, or "morning hand-out," from a newly rich freedman who gambles and gorges all night and sleeps all day. There are few virtuous philosophers and almost no decent women in Rome. Riches, drunkenness, foreign ways, and foreign vices have ruined the morals of the Roman people. All things now are a vanity and a vexation of spirit.

The morals of the upper classes may, as Juvenal says, have decayed. Certainly the Western Empire crumbled and made way for the Church. Physical Rome was sacked by barbarians, but the literature of Latin poetry came again and again to fresh bloom, in Ausonius and Claudian, in the sensuous mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux and the rollicking student songs of the Middle Ages. Juvenal was, in fact, hardly dead and burned to ashes when Florus, the historian and poet of Hadrian's reign, enshrined the court of Venus in the *Pervigilium Veneris*, *St. Venus' Eve*, the most delicate expression of gracious melancholy in the whole imperious language of Rome.

This symphony in miniature opens with the festal line, "Tomorrow let him love who never has loved before, and he who has loved let him love tomorrow" —

Cras amet qui numquam amavit, quique amavit cras amet.

To this insistent refrain the court of Venus is marshaled in that trochaic meter which Tennyson was to use in his all-too-

well-known verse "In the spring a young man's fancy," etc. "Tomorrow is Venus' festival. Tomorrow the goddess herself holds court with the Nymphs and golden Cupid. Tomorrow the roses born of Love's blood and the kiss of Venus will be joined in marriage. For this bridal, Heaven and Earth and the flocks upon it, for this bridal Heaven and Earth and Sea prepare. The nightingale sings of love. . . . She sings, but I, the poet, am mute. When shall I my long silence break?"

Hearing this brief break in fancy's silence, looking back over the road of classic culture we have traveled far too swiftly, bearing in mind the achievements of these men of elder days and the languages in which they embodied them, one may reassure the poet whose muse drooped wearily after so short a poem that his past is not dead. Those who through long study or sudden discovery have come to admire the men of classical antiquity for their greatness and for their weakness may with real conviction repeat St. Venus' festal line —

Cras amet qui numquam amavit, quique amavit cras amet.

CHAPTER VIII

CHRISTIANITY



“THE SECOND EMPIRE”

CHRISTIANITY IS THE SECOND, OR OTHER, OF THE TWO CULTURE-civilizations of the western world. In contrasting the Occident with the Orient, it appears that the World Spirit or Reason, God or man, has made two distinct attempts to civilize the man of the West, the European. In the eastern world there is no parallel to this, for in Asia we find no one social order undergoing first one, then another form of civilization, but a number of independent cultures, Hindu and Persian, Chinese and Japanese, proceeding immemorially along organic lines of development. Hence we must expect to find a radical contrast between the histories of Europe and Asia. The peculiarity of the situation in the West, where civilization has been twofold, appears in various forms and provokes as many contrasts. Viewed broadly, the dualism of European civilization is that of ancient and modern. Considered from the standpoint of religion, it suggests the difference between paganism and Christianity. From the cultural point of view, it is the difference between Classicism and Romanticism. Now the peculiarity of Christianity is discovered in the way it fused its Hebrew content of religion with Greek philosophy and Roman politics. Often it seems strange to us that St. Augustine should refer to Plato and Thomas Aquinas to Aristotle, but it is just as strange that they should refer to Moses.

There have been two empires, as Ibsen expressed it in *Emperor and Galilean* (1873): the empire of the flesh and the empire of the spirit. Now, as it seemed to Ibsen, “The old (classic) beauty is no longer beautiful and the new (Christian) truth no longer true.” And as the empire of the flesh was swallowed up in the empire of the spirit, so the second shall succumb to the “Third Empire.”¹ Ibsen does not tell us definitely what the Third (or

¹ *Emperor and Galilean*, Act III.

post-Christian) Empire is to be or when it will be founded. He refers to it generally as a new religious order which will come into being when "the right man," or superman, appears. The hero of the world-drama seems to conclude that the Third Empire is impossible and thus falls back upon Christianity. The Third Empire may be thought to be appearing in Socialism, but the prospect is neither inviting nor plausible. Hence, it is sufficient for us in referring to Ibsen to make use of no more than the historical distinction between the First and Second Empires which he makes so dramatically. Then we can realize in a new way that we have before us a thousand years of paganism and nearly twice as long a period of Christianity.

The "Second Empire," as we may call it here, was not ushered in as a great religious movement comparable to that inaugurated by Moses or that even of Mahomet. "The Kingdom of God came," as it was said, "not with observation." Still less was Christianity the establishment of a formal philosophical school like the Academy of Plato and least of all was it an organization in any wise resembling the Caesarean Empire. Christianity was largely a new spirit accompanied by a novel point of view, in which sense it is best compared, if comparisons be demanded, with Buddhism. Christianity, however, showed more enterprise and less of the purely contemplative; in time, when the Apostle Paul set forth into Europe, it became propaganda and then crystallized into an ecclesiastical organization. Now, because of its original serenity and mystical character, it is difficult to identify the Christian religion with any special form of western civilization and culture. Of the two, strange as it may seem, "Christian Culture" seems a more likely idea than "Christian Civilization." We can think of Christian ideals more easily than we can discourse upon Christian institutions. Suppose we consider Christianity first as a form of culture.

CHRISTIAN CULTURE

In the case of Christianity, both civilization and culture are masked by religion, a religion which did not assume the usual form of a national faith, but, like Buddhism, aspired to become

a world-religion. But, since Christianity has been reduced to theological and ecclesiastical forms, it is difficult for us to identify its essence and appreciate its value. Its exponents are so professional and have treated the Good News in such a professional way that we cannot easily tell what Christianity really is. It has the appearance of a small park in a large city; a bit of nature encompassed by artificial civilization. However, we do find certain naïve interpreters of Christianity in both the mediaeval and the modern period. We have St. Francis d'Assisi and to some extent Dante. Among modern philosophers, we find "apostles" of Christianity in Kant and Hegel, as also in Pascal and Chateaubriand. In our age, poetic minds have adopted widely divergent views of Christianity's value, hence we find the pathetic affirmations of Tennyson and the crude denials of Thomas Hardy, the hectic approval of Tolstoi and the equally maniacal disapproval of Nietzsche. The men of genius who have treated the subject of Christianity simply and sincerely are few in number, and who indeed are they?

When, as is here the case, we strive to consider Christianity as a form of culture, we encounter more than one difficulty. First, Christianity has not assumed the intellectual and aesthetical to be expected in a culture, although it has suggested philosophical ideas and artistic motives. Then, the course of Christianity through history has not resulted in the identification of it with any specific period of culture; certainly not with Scholasticism, and still less with the Renaissance. The Rationalism of early modern thought was in definite opposition to traditional Christianity, so that there is practically nothing left by way of a parallel except Romanticism. But here, again, one hesitates to attribute any real affinity between ancient Galilean mysticism and early XIXth-century emotionalism. There is a possible affiliation in the case of Chateaubriand and a more theoretical relationship with Schleiermacher, yet neither of these romantic minds was in a mood to express the inward meaning of the Christian religion.

What is distinctive of the Christian spirit of culture, and how does it differ from that of Classicism? We recognize at once the difference of *motif* when we contrast Doric architecture with the Gothic, the low and mundane with the lofty and well-balanced;

not so easily do we distinguish between the inward spirit of the "First Empire" and the "Second Empire." In like manner, art reveals the contrast between the graceful form of Apollo and the pathetic figure of Christ; the beauty of art cannot obscure the difference between the mobile, tranquil forms that Pheidias placed upon the frieze of the Parthenon and the straining, striving shapes that Michelangelo fixed in fresco upon the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel in the Vatican. But these objective and artistic differences are more inspiring than illuminating; they give us contrasted feelings but do not accompany them with comparative ideas. What, then, is the difference between Classicism and Christianity, between the ancient and the modern?

CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICISM

At the outset, when we consider the distinction between the Gospels of Christ and the Dialogues of Plato, we feel that there is all the difference in the world. In Greek thought we come upon something formal, static, and without due presentiment of an enormous future. Classicism was a closed system, Christianity an open one. In Christianity, we find what is dynamic, vital, and progressive in the form of a coming Kingdom. Remote in its origin, Christianity is just as far-flung in its future. Thus it is both aboriginal and apocalyptic and its Founder is the Alpha and Omega of all things. Aristotle seems to have been under the impression that classic culture, if not all culture, was complete and needed only to be analyzed and summed up, while Christ was apparently dominated by the idea that culture in the form of the growing soul had just begun. Perhaps we may be allowed to state this in the form of an analogy according to which Classicism was like a large but closed circle, while Christianity resembled a narrow tube open at both ends.

When we reduce this difference in historical conception to psychological terms we find that Classicism consisted in the possession, Christianity in the pursuit of the desired object—happiness, goodness, beauty, truth. The Greek ideal was that of permanent possession—*ktēma es aei*; the Galilean aspiration that of the perpetual quest of the Kingdom of God. Yet the pagan

possession of the desired object did not mean a mere resting in this, except perhaps in the case of the Garden of Epicurus; it meant the ceaseless but tranquil view and review of this in accordance with what Aristotle called "the energy of contemplation." In like manner, the Christian conception of ceaseless quest was not meant to be taken romantically as so much restless, resultless pursuit. The search was something to be rewarded; hence, the saying, "Seek and ye shall find." This *motif* gave Christianity its futuristic turn, colored as this was by the fondly tormenting idea of the second coming of the Lord. These contrasted moods of paganism and Christianity were reflected in their respective systems of morals.

The moral ideal of life according to the Greeks was based upon the general conception of the Good and expanded into the forms of the cardinal virtues—temperance and courage, wisdom and justice. In a general but none too vigorous manner, a Greek like Plato tended to identify the Good with God, but there was in all this the idea that the Good is self-sufficient and needs not the will of God to render it effective. The Christian conception of life was quite at variance with this. There is none good save God. How could there be a dallying virtue like temperance with its moderations when one had given up completely his life in the world? Or what use was there for such a virtue as courage when the believer had resolved upon a course of non-resistance and love of enemies? Wisdom was condemned by the Apostle Paul on the ground that it had failed to yield knowledge of God, while justice was something that belonged to God, not man. The Christian could not fail to admire the virtues of the ancients, but he thought it in vain to pursue them; or, as St. Augustine expressed the matter, "the virtues of the ancients were vices, but such splendid vices—*virtutes veterum vitia splendida*."²

CHRISTIANITY A "CULTURE CONQUEST"

It would be without meaning to style Christianity itself a form of culture in the strict sense of that term; it were the greater folly to compare its cultural values with those of the Greeks. In the

² *De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 25.

actual culture that was to follow, as in Gothic architecture, the early Renaissance, and Victorian literature, there was something that might possibly be placed side by side with the arts of Greece, but for the most part Christianity was a religious movement in which the aesthetic perfection of life was ever bound to be secondary. Culture, however, is more than the creation of arts and sciences. It is, as we know, the separation of man from nature and the distinction between the animality and the humanity of man. Just as much is culture the pursuit of remote interests in preference to such immediate ones as are absorbed by the questions "What shall we eat and drink; wherewithal shall we be housed and clothed?" Likewise is it the elaboration of an inner life instead of the mere building up of outer existence. These tendencies peculiar to culture are more Christian than classic and, although the name of Christ may not evoke the same aesthetic feelings associable with Apollo, the inward spirit of Christ, "sweet reasonableness" as Matthew Arnold styled it, is the animating source of culture in the western world.

Christ did not dwell upon the idea of Truth or Beauty; his interest was in Faith and Love. But he placed the mind of a man in a position where, in detachment from the things of this world and the cares of this life, it might itself pursue the true and beautiful. This does not mean that Christ's Hebraizing type of mind, all wrapped up in the idea of righteousness toward God, extended Hellenism or, still less, sought something intellectually and artistically superior to the Greek ideal. It means only that Christ achieved what, in another connection altogether, Goethe called a "culture-conquest." This idea of wresting something from nature, something that apparently Socrates and Sophocles each in his respective field sought to achieve, Christ expressed broadly and solemnly in his great text: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" It is undeniable that this tremendous text descends upon the soul with appalling weight and impresses and oppresses it with an awful sense of its divine vocation. But it is also true that the utterance in essence has its lighter vein, wherein the mind is shown that it possesses an inner life capable of more than one form of cultivation.

The attempt to elaborate the idea of Christian culture is ever made difficult for us by our inability to detach the Christian religion from the categorical considerations of morality and the ecclesiastical organizations that have taken charge of these. The ideals of righteousness and Church are inimical to the ideals of beauty and art. We do tolerate the idea of Christian civilization, the fruits by which the tree is known; not as readily do we give acceptance to the idea of Christian culture, the leaves on the fruitful tree, if one may express it that way. The immediate well-being of mankind in law, practical progress, charity, and the like — these we accept as the results of religion. Christianity is supposed to better both the inner and the outer man. But the arts and sciences, which represent the remote well-being of man — these seem distinct from the Christian consciousness, must take care of themselves, and should not be allowed to compete with righteousness. Thus the whole field of righteousness is engrossed with moral ideals; aesthetic ones are crowded out. When, therefore, one is exhorted to seek first the Kingdom of God, which covers a wide spiritual area, he is expected to seek it primarily and almost exclusively in connection with its righteousness.

There has been a multitude of scholars who have intuited Christianity ethically; the merest few who have seen anything aesthetical and intellectual in it. Fra Angelico, Botticelli, Perugino were devout artists; Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, religious scientists; but such men were not altogether conscious of their Christian culture. In our day, Ibsen saw in the great text of Christianity something suggestive of individualism, when he made Peer Gynt say that somewhere he had heard of a text to the effect that if you gained the whole wide world but lost yourself, the gain was but a garland on a cloven skull. But the introduction of this major maxim of Christianity was made in such a jocular spirit that it counts for no more than a suggestion. In a more serious mood, Wagner compared the tone world of Beethoven, if not of all composers, to the realm of righteousness disclosed by Christ, but it was chiefly with the idea of distinguishing his art from the others that he said, "Our kingdom is not of this world." But it is fairly plain that both Ibsen and

Wagner felt and appreciated the uniqueness and novelty of the Christian culture to which they contributed.

THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY

The essence of Christianity, like the spirit of modernism, was a late discovery. It was made by Immanuel Kant in the year 1793 in a book entitled *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*. The tone of this work was that of the Schoolmen, the Fathers of the Church, or even of the Apostles, but the form of it was modern and rationalistic. Kant proceeded upon the premise that the Christian religion is based upon moral values rather than metaphysical ideas, and applied his principles of ethics to a historical religion. Before taking up the problem of Christianity, Kant had said, "I had to destroy knowledge to make room for faith." Then he went to work. He attempted to deduce historical facts from philosophical principles, the doctrines of Christianity from his Categorical Imperative. But in thus seeking fundamentals, Kant had the good fortune to identify Christianity with the ideals of the fatherhood of God and the Kingdom of God. This generated a new type of theology, if theology it can be called; it made possible the development of critical literature devoted to the important idea—the "essence of Christianity." The result is recognizable in the much abused expression "the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man."

In grasping the essentials of Christianity, one must use both hands, so to speak. One must lay hold of the original Galilean program in all its rustic sweetness; he must apprehend the Gentile doctrine in its civic severity. First there was the idea of the Kingdom of God which was not of this world, but which none the less was comparable to all manner of small and interesting objects in the natural order and the everyday life of man: a grain of mustard seed, a farmer sowing seed, the leaven which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal, a treasure hid in a field, a pearl of great price, a net let down into the sea. Never was reference made to anything grandiose and beyond the reach of immediate experience, as the sea or sky, the tall mountain or long river, but always the delightfully commonplace. The

hearer of the parable descriptive of the Kingdom was supposed to intuit the doctrine by penetrating into his habitual experience, which he was supposed to raise to the second power.

The setting of primitive Christianity, with its Gospel of the Kingdom, was idyllic, its tone was naïve, its symbol a child. The natural mysticism of Christ made strict organization impossible. The disciples assembled in a house or boat; the multitudes gathered on a hillside or the lake shore. When there arose the question of a possible hierarchy in the Kingdom, Christ set up a child as the model ruler or prince of the new realm. Then he went on to declare, and that with great vehemence, that any one who sought to fetter and cripple the little ones, or baby believers, in the Kingdom might well have a millstone hanged about his neck and be cast into the sea. In default of a creed, the Master expected his followers to have faith; in place of ecclesiastical laws, he judged the members of his Kingdom upon a humanitarian basis — did they feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and visit those in prison? Faith and love — nothing else was pertinent or valuable, and as for the legalism of the Old Testament, all that the new believer had to do was to select from the book *Deuteronomy* the commandment to love God, from *Leviticus* the law of love for one's neighbor.

THE GOSPELS AND THE EPISTLES

But this is only one side of the story. When the disciples went forth to spread the glad tidings, they had to use forms, as though they were carrying in buckets the water that had bubbled up from the fountain of spiritual life. When, later, the Gospel was carried to Europeans, who had no sense or intuition of Galilean mysticism, the forms became unusually severe. This resulted in two distinct but perhaps harmonious types of Christianity. On the surface of the New Testament there seems to be a dualism of Gospels and Epistles, with *The Acts of the Apostles* serving as a flimsy bridge between them. The second Christianity, which contrasts so harshly with the first, is attributed to the speculative mind and missionary zeal of St. Paul, who is sometimes referred to as the real founder of Christianity.

The books of the New Testament were written, for the most part, in reverse order — first the Epistles of later Christianity, then the Gospels of the original one. These stand for what Lessing called “The Christian Religion” and “The Religion of Christ.” The Gospels, especially the synoptic ones, are expressive of Jewish belief in the Messiah and Son of Man. The Epistles, particularly the earlier ones of St. Paul, contain a record of Gentile faith in Christ, the Son of God. Jewish Christians in Galilee had glided into the new faith as though it were only a hyper-Hebraic doctrine promulgated by some new prophet of the old order, another John the Baptist or a leader on whom the mantle of Elijah had fallen a second time. Gentile Christians were offered a different kind of Christ and that by means of arguments adapted to their own type of mind. The Gospels relate the things said and done by the Prophet of Nazareth in Galilee and Judea. The Epistles assert what may be said of him and what should be done in his name. Jesus fulfills prophecy and goes about doing good. Christ is the one by whom the world of things was made and through whom the world of men is to be saved. It was the second or Gentile view that prevailed; the Jewish one passed away as a form of faith and was well-nigh extinct at the time *The Epistle to the Hebrews* was written. Now, it is the original, Galilean view that men of letters and advanced theologians wish to revive. They take this to be true Christianity and recommend some sort of return to the original Jewish Christianity.

THE RELIGION OF CHRIST

A great deal of the enthusiasm for what Lessing called “The Religion of Christ” is due to the historical spirit of the present age, which often prefers the root of an idea or institution to the fruit that has grown from it. Likewise is it attributable to our impressionism; we like to visualize a situation or have it made graphic much more than we care to think about it and get concepts out of it. Then, the world has been so fully supplied with theological Christianity that its appetite is nearly surfeited. Hence the suggestion of a free and formless Christianity is bound



THE ALTAR IN THE BASILICA OF ST. PAUL

Many of the early Christian churches were adaptations of the Roman basilicas.

(facing page 196)

to make appeal. These are some of the reasons why intellectuals are opposed to St. Paul, even when they themselves are among his converts. They overlook the fact that the Apostle to the Gentiles was a diplomat and, as an "ambassador of Christ," had to adapt himself to the foreign courts of faith. Indeed, one might say, in the jargon of the day, that St. Paul was a salesman who knew the real needs of those to whom he would "sell" his Gospel. He knew that there would be no spiritual market for Jewish Christianity even if it were put in an attractive form. Of all the Apostles, he was the one who understood what Christ meant when he spoke of new bottles for new wine.

In defense of the Apostle Paul, if defense be needed, it may be said that he adapted his message to his hearer and to the Greek became as a Greek. When, therefore, on his second missionary journey, he passed over into Europe by way of Macedonia, he felt that he had to prepare a message agreeable and suitable to the spiritual needs of the converts to be. Accordingly he closed his eyes to Jewish Christianity, even though he was, as he said, "a Hebrew of the Hebrews," and began to adjust his vision to the western world. The conversion of the Gentiles to a semi-Jewish faith was his supreme vocation and, as he said in his spirit of predestination, it was for this cause that God had separated him from his mother's womb. Now, to realize such an extraordinary mission and make the Gentiles real converts to Christianity and not proselytes to a kind of Jewish faith, he had to present suitable objects of belief. These were, in the main, the God in whom we live and move and have our being, not the Jewish Jehovah; the Christ of God, not the Messiah of Israel; the salvation of the world, not the restoration of the kingdom.

PAULINISM

When St. Paul presented this larger Gospel of spiritual Christianity, he found it expedient to minimize and even ignore the historical facts of Christ's earthly career and place dogmas in their stead. He had been criticized by the Twelve Apostles, or those who presumed to speak for them, because he had not seen the Lord with eyes of flesh in the days of his Galilean ministry. This

question of fact he meets with the sentiment of mysticism; he had seen the Lord with eyes of faith on the road to Damascus. This may not have satisfied the Hebraizing Christians in their realism, but it sounded well to the Hellenizing Christians in their idealism. St. Paul was evidently emboldened by his unhistorical but spiritual conception of Christianity, for in the same *First Epistle to the Corinthians* he goes so far as to assert, when he is giving directions for the proper administration of the Lord's Supper, that the actual participants in the matter had not communicated the facts to him, but, as he asserted, "I have received from the Lord that which also I delivered unto you."³ This single statement, in itself of relative importance only, may be taken and considered as the high-water mark in the anti-historical conception of Christianity as entertained by the great Apostle to the Gentiles. Grievous to the Judaizing Christians, it was doubtless welcome to the Gentile converts who, like their fond Apostle, accepted their Christ as a person wholly detached from time and place, tradition and circumstance.

So zealous was St. Paul for his own European evangel that he repudiated both the Jew and the Jewish Jesus. He initiated his literary work, in the *First Epistle to the Thessalonians*, by referring to his Macedonian message as the "Gospel of God." He blames the Jews for the crucifixion of Christ, for killing their own prophets, and persecuting him and his brethren.⁴ In the *Epistle to the Galatians*, he likens the Jew to the child of the bondwoman who was cast out; the Gentile, to the son of the free woman, and rightful heir to the promise of God. In the *Epistle to the Romans*, the Israelites are compared to the branches that were broken off the olive in order that Gentile branches might be grafted in to partake of the fatness of the tree. As for the "King of the Jews," the historical Jesus, St. Paul comes to the place in his idealism where, in speaking of the faith enjoyed by the Corinthians, he says, "henceforth know we no man after the flesh" and "though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him no more."⁵ These must have been severe sentences for the Jewish Christians to read and strident also in the minds of those who today strive to preserve the

³ *I Cor.* XI, 23.

⁴ *I Thess.* II, 15.

⁵ *II Cor.* V, 16.

connection between faith in Christ and the facts of actual life. But doubtless it was necessary for the Apostle to the Gentiles to take this trenchant point of view in order to establish the independence of the new faith.

TWO TENDENCIES IN THE GOSPELS

Did this duality of the Christian religion exist in the days of its Founder or was it a diremption created by the cosmopolitan Paul in his conflict with the provincial Peter? Apparently the Author of the Christian idea had two interpretations in mind — Jewish and Gentile. He sought to initiate a world movement, “beginning at Jerusalem,” and yet showed no disposition to Judaize the world. The testimony on this important point must be taken from the Gospels, which were written after both types of Christianity had expressed themselves. Now, the Gospels are not histories; they lack the spirit of objectivity; the Jewish tone of St. Matthew seems to reveal a Petrine spirit, just as the Gentile note of St. Luke, the only Gentile author in the Bible, is thoroughly Pauline. A striking instance of this difference is found in the fact that the Gospel of Matthew, in recording the sending forth of the Twelve Disciples, quotes the order given by their Master, who said, “Go not into the way of the Gentiles, but go ye rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.”⁶ To match this procedure, the Gospel of Luke records the fact that the Seventy, a number equal to the traditional number of the Gentile nations, having been sent forth, returned with great enthusiasm over their strange mission and evoked still further feeling from their Master, who said, “I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.”⁷ It seemed to him as though at last the “prince of this world,” the old ruler of the Gentiles, had been cast out in his name. Christ was enthusiastic about the Gentiles although he himself touched but the borders of their land.

However, in justice to the Gospel of Matthew, which seems to be so Jewish in tone, it should be noted that this conservative document does not fail to mention something recognizable as that major, cosmopolitan Christianity which St. Paul shaped

⁶ *Matthew* X, 5.

⁷ *Luke* X, 18.

and carried out of Palestine. This is recorded in connection with the episode at Caesarea Philippi, a week before the Transfiguration. There, up in the north country, the Founder of a new religion questions his disciples as to the impression he has been making, only to learn that his mission to the Jews gave the impression that he was a John the Baptist, an Elijah, a Jeremiah, or some nondescript prophet. Thereupon Christ abandoned his Messianic rôle as well as his socializing activity and began to adapt himself to the character which St. Paul exalted and by which he is known within the Church. From being Reformer, he became Redeemer; his Kingdom became less and less social, more and more spiritual.

Not only Matthew, but also the other two synoptic evangelists make mention of the episode at Caesarea Philippi; but they observe nothing extraordinary about it. But when the essence of Christianity and the life of Christ became independent topics of analytical study, the two phases of Christ's work were set into juxtaposition. The German Deist Reimarus (1694-1765) asserted that the aim of Jesus was purely political and that religion was used as a means to the end of setting up a theocratic kingdom. This flagrant view overlooked the fact that Christ refused to act as even a judge, escaped the multitude that tried to make him king, and declared that his Kingdom was not of this world. A much more temperate conception of the change from the political to the theological was taken by the German theologian Carl Hase, who, in the first scientific life of Christ ever written (1829), concluded that the Messianic rôle that Christ assumed and the reform he wished to inaugurate were only a "tragic error" and that the redemptive mission he adopted later was his true calling from the beginning.

THE POLITICAL INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIANITY

At the present time, after so much professional matter has been written about the essence of Christianity and the life of Christ, we find that the more advanced minds, as we may call them, are inclined toward the political rather than the theological view of Christ and Christianity. According to Tolstoi's views,

set forth in his work *My Religion*, the obvious aim of the Gospel was a communistic utopia of which the constitution will be the Sermon on the Mount. In the mind of Bernard Shaw, who expressed himself somewhat volubly and jauntily in the preface to *Androcles and the Lion*, the change from "communism" to "salvationism" was what Hase had previously called the tragic error in the career of the Nazarene. H. G. Wells has expressed himself in a more appropriate tone than that of his co-patriot and with just as much more wisdom, yet he does not fail to identify the Gospel with some sort of political propaganda:

"It was not merely a moral and social revolution that Jesus proclaimed; it is clear from a score of indications that his teaching had a political bent of the plainest sort. It is true that he said his kingdom was not of this world, that it was in the hearts of men and not upon a throne; but it is equally clear wherever and in what measure his kingdom was set up in the hearts of men, the outer world would be in that measure revolutionized and made new. . . . The whole tenor of the opposition to him and the circumstances of his trial and execution show clearly that to his contemporaries he seemed to propose plainly and did propose plainly to change and fuse and enlarge all human life."⁸

Such political and social conceptions of Christianity are quite interesting; amiable in tone and sincere in presentation, they reveal admirable traits in the minds of those who maintain and publish them. But do they rejoice in that objectivity which the true study of history requires? Outwardly are they anything more than examples of literary style, inwardly more than personal opinions expressed in behalf of political beliefs? Tolstoi seems to twist the Gospel to make it fit into his social scheme. Bernard Shaw would interpret Christ as a Fabian Socialist, while H. G. Wells appears to use the history of primitive Christianity to decorate what, while called an *Outline of History*, is just as much a monumental essay on the social situation in the XXth century. Doubtless we should have a more devout Church and a more decent State, since the present forms of ecclesiastical and political organization are far from ideal, but in our desire to create truer believers and better citizens we are not justified in turning the

⁸ *Outline of History*, Ch. XXIX, § 2.

four Gospels into so many pamphlets supposed to serve our political purposes. We must first be sure that we recognize the personality of Christ and realize the plan he proposed for the general betterment of mankind.

In order to identify the political plan or social pattern that Christ had in mind, we had better determine as best we can what manner of man he was. It is natural to style Christ a prophet and thus throw his personality back upon a Hebrew prototype. But the moment we do this we begin to realize that it was only in a general way that his mind was of the prophetic order. This it was doubtless in its ethical earnestness, but not at all in its psychological form. The mind of Christ was singularly wanting in visions as he in his prevailing mood was just as lacking in ecstasy. He had none of the "special, sudden moments" that Dostoevsky refers to in the instance of one of his religious heroes. Unlike Isaiah, Christ saw not the Lord upon a throne crowned with seraphim, and unlike Ezekiel he had no vision of the glory of God in the form of four cherubim and four wheels. Likewise, his conception of all men assembled in the Kingdom of God was in no sense comparable to Peter's vision of a vast sheet let down from heaven to earth and containing all manner of strange creatures. It was rather the homely simile of a net drawn up from the sea and containing a variety of well-known fish. He spoke with familiarity of the things above, but never for a moment did he talk like St. Paul, who claimed that once he was caught up into the third heaven, where he heard things unspeakable and impossible to repeat. Those who were associated with Christ had their visions, at his Baptism, Transfiguration, and Crucifixion, but these were absent from his mind. At the time of his triumphant entry into Jerusalem, he prayed saying, "Father, glorify thy son"; but when there came a voice from heaven saying, "I have both glorified it and will glorify it again," he said, "This voice came not because of me, but for your sakes." The voices that he heard and the visions he beheld were of an interior source and were marked by a moral rather than a mystical form. His consciousness of God was such as to render special revelations unnecessary.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHRIST'S MIND

The naturalism of Christ's mind, which Renan's *Life of Jesus* (1863) did not fail to observe, must not be allowed to escape us. We have observed already that the perceptions of Christ were directed toward the minor objects of nature. His art was akin to that of a Dutch painter, his appreciation of simple humanity quite in the *genre* style. Just as naïve was he with persons and cities. The cities that exalted themselves would be laid low; in the Day of Judgment, it would be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah than for Bethsaida and Chorazin. Exalted personalities did not impress him; Pilate and Herod, Annas and Caiaphas were but as shadows, for it was the fisherman, the ploughman, the child who had meaning for him. Such persons he treated with high regard and promised them the Kingdom, but his attitude toward men of high degree was that of irony, the irony of Socrates, of Molière, of Ibsen. Hence the true portrait of Christ was painted by Rembrandt rather than Raphael.

In noble default of emotional enlightenment peculiar to the prophetic mind, Christ employed ethical intuition and sympathetic insight. He made intellect and will, not emotion, the *modus vivendi* of his view and asserted no claim to any exceptional revelation from on high. In his mind, the natural and supernatural were both alike. But he did lay claim to direct knowledge of God and thus in the exaltation of prayer said, "O righteous father, the world hath not known thee, but I have known thee."⁹ In addition to this, he kept asserting that he spoke as his Father taught him and that he had been given a commandment as to what he should speak and that he spoke not of himself. This, he said, was the case with his works also. As the words that he uttered, so the works that he performed; the Father that dwelt within him by love showed him all the works of God, which Christ himself was expected to do and finish.

To Christ's hearers these claims seemed extraordinary to the point of being blasphemous, but in the mind of him who made them they were perfectly natural experiences and reactions. The

⁹ *John* XVII, 25.

Psalmist had an inkling of this spiritual secret when he declared that wisdom and strength were to be found in the mouths of babes and sucklings. St. Paul had a glimpse of it when he said that what was hidden from the wisdom of men might be found by the "foolishness of God." But Christ had the power and the will to gather these slanting rays of insight into a steady light of intuition. In order to gain sympathetic understanding of his psychological method, we do well to turn aside from the prophet and mystic and turn to the poet and moralist, since inspiration that enables one to "see life steadily and see it whole" and conscience which tends to make one aware of life's values are better guides than vision and ecstasy. From the point of view of a clear mind and strong will, the method of Christ, while never rationalistic, may be compared with the Socratic ideal of wisdom through self-knowledge and Kant's conception of moral insight by means of the Categorical Imperative. Christ's intuition was much warmer and more intimate; more fully was it surcharged with humanistic and practical motives, as though he would gladly have all men take his point of view and apply his methods; likewise, since he was not an abstract philosopher but a social teacher, his ideas were anthropomorphic. But the pure tone of the philosopher was ever that of his message.

CHRIST NO REFORMER

Christ was no more a hectic reformer than he was an emotional mystic. His main idea was that of the Kingdom of God. It was the only conception of nature that interested him and the natural order afforded him his best analogies to the forms and functions of the divine order—a grain of mustard seed, a grain field, a vineyard, things capable of growth. Plato preferred a world of ideas or intellectual patterns, Kant a table of categories as a guide for the human understanding. Modern science proceeds according to natural laws and statistical schemes. Shakespeare's drama rejoiced in the insight that came from poetical imagery; Ibsen's plays seek to penetrate life through symbols. Since man is pathetically finite, it is necessary for him to avail himself of ideas, formulas, images, analogies, and the like for

the sake of gaining insight into what exists and takes place in the world of forms and values. Hence the parables of Christ are not to be left out of account when one is making up his intellectual inventory of truth. Now it was in the world of human values rather than in the order of physical truths that Christ proceeded when he decided to use the idea of a divine realm as his guide. This was his Ideal Republic, his City of God, his Moral World Order. When we consider that the universe, where it is not empty space, is only clusters of gases or a series of waves, the idea of it as a kind of divine realm does not seem altogether out of the way.

But the practical application of Nazarene idealism to the developed state of affairs in actual civilization is another matter and a more serious question. If the second Adam had been in the place of the first one and the world had started along an idealistic line, the problem of the application of Christianity to civilization would not be confronting us. But when today we begin to talk about "applied Christianity," we have before us the traditions of Greek culture and Roman civilization, the subsequent history of Europe and the present condition of the whole western world, to say nothing of the Orient. How, then, can we consider the suggestions of literary men, such as Tolstoi, Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, and others, and assume the possibility of recasting the world in a Christian mold? Those who are attempting such recasting, as the Bolsheviki, are not using any religious pattern at all.

We are not certain just how Christ wished his words to be taken, even if he did conclude his Sermon on the Mount with a dire prediction concerning those who were only hearers and not doers of his word. How simple to repeat that epigram, but how difficult to heed it in any real way! Christ himself provided no program, gave no charter, wrote no constitution, nor laid down any really new law. He spoke loyally of the Mosaic law, declared that it must be fulfilled in every jot and tittle, and assured men that his aim was not to destroy but to fulfill. His idea seems to have been to excel and exceed the law. This spiritual excess he indicated in five particulars, which was the nearest he ever came to any sort of legislation. Thou shalt not kill—be not

angry! Thou shalt not commit adultery—lust not! Thou shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths—swear not at all! An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth—resist not evil! Love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy—love your enemies! Now, these can hardly be understood as commandments, for they are more like a set of virtues than a code of laws. They are indeed the characteristics of those who are in the Kingdom of God; the inventor of them laid them down as the logical conditions of entrance into that realm. Hence they are not to be taken in the spirit of Moses or any other law-giver, but more after the manner of Socrates and Kant.

There are places in the Gospels, evangelical episodes we might call them, where Christ seemed on the point of making a specific application of his spiritual principles. But does any one of these afford a case in point? The rich young man, who had always kept the commandments but was still seeking eternal life, was advised to get rid of his riches by giving them to the poor and follow the master. A master poet or painter might have given similar advice to a young man with artistic ambitions. The disciples themselves had left all, their boats and nets and offices, to follow him, but was that anything more than a practical adjustment peculiar to their new vocation? When it came to the question of open rebellion against the Roman government in Galilee, to take a different example, Christ took cognizance of the revolts staged by Theudas and Judas of Galilee, who resisted taxation,¹⁰ but showed more compassion for their souls than sympathy for their political acts.

CHRIST AND MONEY POWER

Christ was so constituted that he could have no feeling for money or respect for money power; he took no pains to conceal his contempt for the rich. How could one serve both God and Mammon? The famous story of Lazarus and the rich man was told apparently to show that Dives was condemned to torment chiefly because of his wealth. Like every idealist—philosopher, artist, scientist, and the like—Christ saw no value in wealth,

¹⁰ *Acts* V, 36–37.

since his vision was fixed on something remote and intangible. On the subject of public financing by means of taxation, he refused to be serious. When, for example, the question of personal taxation came up, he dismissed it with irony.

"What thinkest thou, Simon, of whom do the kings of the earth take custom or tribute; or of their own children or of strangers? Peter saith unto him, of strangers. Jesus saith unto him, then are the children free. Notwithstanding, lest we should offend them, go thou to the sea and cast a hook and take up the fish that first cometh up. And when thou hast opened his mouth thou shalt find a piece of money [*sic*]. That take and give it unto them for thee and me!"

The question concerning Jewish tribute to Caesar was far more important. It was brought up to trap the Nazarene idealist. This problem he took more seriously, answered the question more deliberately but with the same irony so reminiscent of Socrates. "Show me the tribute money. And they brought him a penny. And he saith unto them, whose is this image and inscription? They say unto him, Caesar's. Then saith he unto them, Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's. When they heard these words, they marvelled and left him and went their way." When we consider just how much in Christ's mind God would have to share with Caesar, the irony of the episode seems complete.

GOD AND CAESAR

How are we to draw the line between Caesar and God, political power and spiritual influence? We cannot change from the Constitution of the United States to the Sermon on the Mount, because the Sermon with its nine beatitudes and five laws does not furnish us with even the first principles of government and business. The Caesarean scheme of social life has not been a success, perhaps; when we see how it has led to greed and war, by allying itself with Mammon and Mars instead of God and Christ, we have a right to feel that it has been an eminent failure. But this does not justify us in feeling further that we should drop

Caesar altogether and turn State into Church. If Christ had worked out a code of laws like that attributed to Moses or drawn up such a constitution as Lycurgus was said to have given Sparta, the situation would be different. Then his plan could have been applied and tried out and, if it had been after the manner of his practical idealism, would doubtless have been a success. But the part of dictatorial legislator was one that he shunned. Indeed, he went so far as to refuse the function of judgeship which Solomon before him had exercised in such a brilliant way as to convince people of his divine wisdom. "Who made me a judge or divider over you?"¹¹ was his interrogative answer to one of his company who wished him to settle a matter of inheritance between two brothers. How, then, can we look to Christ directly to decide between nations, as France and Germany, China and Japan? How expect him to settle questions of prices, rents, wages, taxes? His office is obviously different; it is not anything political or economic; it is everything ethical and religious.

We cannot draw a vertical line placing the things that are God's to the right, the things that are Caesar's to the left. When that was tried, as at the communist church at Jerusalem and the Kingdom of God in Munster, the Caesarean things overwhelmed and finally destroyed the things of the divine experiment. But we can draw the line horizontally just as Christ himself did, and then we shall have the things of this Caesarean world—governments, laws, industries, courts, armies, and the like—below; churches, commandments, beatitudes, and other idealities above. If we draw this line, which is really an imaginary but true one, we shall be in a better position to understand the situation in the theologic-political world. When we do so separate the Caesarean from the Christian world, we do no more, but less, in theory than the nations of the world have long been and still are doing in practice.

Now, what part can Christianity play in a civilization where, strictly speaking, there are no Christian governments as such? Must it retreat to a cloister and let the world take care of itself? Not at all; Christianity has a decided part to play, although it is not a political one. The Kingdom of God proclaimed by Christ

¹¹ *Luke XII, 14.*

may be able to function like the Ideal Republic deduced by Plato. Between the two, there are certain analogies. The idea of the heavenly Kingdom was implicit in the Kingdom of David, that of the Republic, in the Spartan State. Both the Kingdom and the Republic called upon the individual to sacrifice his egoism for the sake of the general good, and both alike aimed at likeness to God; one through Love and the other by means of Justice. Then, both tend to interiorize the essence of the exterior order; according to Christ, the Kingdom is within the soul; according to Plato, the State is an enlargement of man, who is looked upon in a kind of anthropological manner.

THE IDEAL KINGDOM

The differences between the Hellenic and Hebraic ideals become apparent the moment one recalls the practical postulates of the Platonistic State—the threefold caste-system, the community of property and households, the aristocratic form of government, and the introduction of the ideal order by a philosophic despot who should create a new State partly by force, applied to the older generation, and partly by pedagogy, or the education of the youth in the principles of the new order. The results of such Platonistic politics in the mind of both its author and his followers is that the Ideal Republic is something that one should ever bear in mind but not attempt to carry out. The doctrine of the Republic should be normative, influential, and the basis of reform. Just such ideals spring out of the Kingdom, which consists not of meat and drink, proceeds not by force, and cometh without observation. Both Republic and Kingdom operate morally, not politically; both make for citizenship through character, not the State through law.

Another illuminating contrast, that of Stoicism and Christianity, helps to adjust the ideal of the Kingdom to the actualities of civilization. In Zeno, the founder of the school, we have the author of another Republic, a kind of "City of Zeus." In certain Roman Stoics, preëminently Marcus Aurelius, we find an ethics suggestive of Christianity. We observe also the principles of conscience and duty, which differentiated Stoical ethics from

the objective systems of Plato and Aristotle. Then, there is that Stoical "Cosmopolitanism" which forbade its disciples from distinguishing Greek from barbarian and urged them to view the whole world as their city. But the most suggestive thing in Stoicism is its political bearing. The remote ideal of virtue, the inward sanction of duty, and the general sense of world-citizenship would tend to make the Stoic an ineffective Roman citizen. His interests were elsewhere, almost anywhere else but in the actual State; why concern one's Stoical self about politics when one had his refuge in Nature, Reason, Virtue? It would be the Epicurean, placing his affair upon happiness and immediate welfare, who might be counted on to take up politics and make the world a satisfactory place for the realization of immediate satisfactions. But, as finely observed by Lecky in his *History of European Morals*, it was habitually the worldly Epicurean who remained aloof from public life and the unworldly Stoic who participated in practical affairs.


It is just such an attitude that the Christian can adopt and has ever adopted toward the State. The Platonist did not attempt to Platonize Athens, the Stoic to Stoicize Rome; why should the Christian feel it incumbent upon him to Christianize Europe or America? There were, however, Platonists in Athens and Stoics at Rome just as there are individual Christians and vast groups of these in the western world. But this is not to say that they should dream of placing upon the governments of the Occident any sort of Christian constitution that one might attempt to frame at this late date. However much one may desire to see more of the spirit of Christ spread abroad in society and the method of Christ instilled into law, one should realize that the State is a political organization and only indirectly can it be aesthetical or ethical or religious. But this is a matter of personal opinion rather than a historical view. However, we can observe that it is the present tendency in Protestant Christianity in America to veer from the theological to the political, from an ideal of individual salvation to a social gospel.

In its historical development, Christianity was destined to pass through three stages—the Galilean and Judean, the Graeco-Roman, and the Germanico-Gallic. It was first Palestinian, then

Mediterranean, and then European. After it had emerged from its Roman domination, it assumed the characteristic mediaeval forms of feudalism and Scholasticism. We must analyze these social movements for the purpose of observing how much or what form of Christianity was preserved and expressed by them.

CHAPTER IX

FEUDAL CIVILIZATION



THE ORIGIN OF FEUDALISM

IT IS BY NO MEANS SIMPLE TO IDENTIFY THE “KINGDOM NOT OF the world” with any form of Christian civilization; unusually difficult is this in the case of feudalism. In dealing with what was a definite period of history, from the IXth to the XVth century, we are in doubt about how to define it. When we refer to feudalism in terms of “civilization,” we are aware of the fact that the constituents of the feudal organization were not themselves thoroughly civilized men; they began as barbarians and were not wholly free from their raw condition when their system came to an end. If we speak of it as a feudal “system,” we cannot thus disguise the fact that the feudal period was one of mild and modified anarchy. Perhaps little better could be expected of Germanic tribes who had fallen heir to a spiritual religion, a school of philosophy, and a system of government that had come to them through Christianity, Greek culture, and Roman civilization. These are scarcely discernible in feudal civilization.

The very term “feudalism” is of obscure origin. It is often connected with the Latin word *fides*, faith, but it is more likely that it sprang from the Anglo-Saxon word *vieh*, meaning cattle. This derivation is rendered plausible by the fact that, among Teutonic nations, property was reckoned in terms of cattle or the number of head upon the land; and it was with property that feudalism was concerned. Now, this was property in the form of land, hence feudalism has been well described as “a complete organization of society through the medium of land-tenure, in which from the king down to the lowest landholder all were bound together by obligation of service and defense; the lord to protect his vassal, the vassal to do service to his lord; the defense and service being based on and regulated by the nature and ex-

tent of the land held by the one or the other.”¹ Feudalism of the landholding sort was most fully developed in England, where its influence is still discernible. Political feudalism was elaborated most extensively in Germany, but the most complete development of the system was in France, whence it was swept away by the French Revolution.

LAND TENURE

In order to gain as clear an idea as possible, we may refer to feudalism as a system of relationships; relations to things and persons, or landholding and personal relations. Like original civilization, feudalism was the adjustment of men to nature and to one another. The feudal rulers, having obtained land by confiscation or conquest or even by gift of the owners, found it expedient to make land grants to men of lower social position. The land thus obtained by the tenant from the lord was known as a “fief,” a “fee,” or a “feud.” The pay for the use of the land was in the form of “fealty,” or homage and service to be rendered by the tenant to the landlord. This was the personal relationship growing out of the relation to land. It was primarily the relation of suzerain and vassal. The relationship was celebrated by means of “investiture,” according to which the vassal-tenant exchanged fealty for protection. These services, it might be observed, were largely of a military character, so that there is a close connection between land tenure and military tenure.

It is easy to be perplexed by and provoked with feudalism, which seems to be out of keeping with the ancient civilization that had preceded it and the modern one which was to follow. But we can gain insight into and some sympathy for the feudal period if we regard it as the transition from the old order to the new, from the “First Empire” to the “Second.” Although the foundations of western civilization are to be sought in the ideas and institutions of Christianity, Greece, and Rome, the modern world was not built directly upon the ancient order. Those forms of culture and civilization could not be assimilated without effort

¹ Stubbs, “Constitutional History of England,” Ch. IX, in Robinson, *Readings in European History*, Vol. I, p. 187.

or the passage of time. The barbarians had first to comprehend them and then make them their own as best they could. In the interim, these raw citizens of Europe developed a civilization of their own, and this feudalism, as we realize now, was a means of passing from the old civilization to the new. The complex of ideas and institutions called feudalism made its own impression upon the modern world and in connection with social institutions has affected the type of civilization we call our own. We are modern, but are we not still feudal?

It is only by giving due historical weight to the feudal period that we can appreciate the importance of the Teutonic element in western civilization.² This contains a Roman element as well; indeed, it is a question, made difficult by the obscure origin of feudalism, whether there was not a certain amount of Latin civilization obtaining in the feudal system after the passing of the Holy Roman Empire. It was not the case of building a temporary culture which with the coming of the Renaissance would introduce anew the ideals of the ancient world in a pure form; feudalism was itself sufficiently Roman to prepare the way for the famous revival of the ancient mode of thought and life. However, our civilization is more Germanic than Romanic in form. Hence, in order to understand the present, it is necessary to consider the feudal period of transition as well as the grand system of Roman politics behind it. We are what we are today because the rude German invaders of Rome took what they could not understand, conquered what they could not comprehend. If we are to understand the complexities of our present existence, we must enter into the confusion of the feudal period. How is such feudalism to be understood? We may answer this question by saying it was a system of relationships.

The twofold relationship of person and person, and person to property makes it convenient to consider feudalism in a dual form—the political and the economic. The first relation centers in the relation of the landlords, or nobles, to one another and ultimately to the monarch. The other concerns the relation of the lord of the manor to the peasants who toiled on his domains, the serfs or villeins. The latter is sometimes called the manorial

² Adams, *Civilization during the Middle Ages*, rev. ed., Chs. IV, V.

system. Suppose we consider the political side of feudalism in immediate connection with the history of the period.

POLITICAL FEUDALISM

After the barbarian invasions of Rome, the political State declined, was resuscitated by Charlemagne, and then collapsed. Indeed, when the last of the puppet emperors of the Western Roman Empire was deposed in 476, the State as the Romans knew it and as we ourselves know it came to an end. To the contemporary mind, it seemed only that the Roman Empire had reverted to the original plan of a single emperor, with Constantinople rather than Rome as the center of power. In the words of Lord Bryce, the Western Empire was "reunited with . . . the Eastern so that from that time there was . . . a single undivided Roman Empire."³ Then the spectacular coronation of Charlemagne in the year 800 was similarly thought of as a restoration of the undivided Empire with Rome as its center again. How could it be otherwise? The collapse of the Empire was unthinkable in spite of the evident facts in the case. The Empire may have died, yet the Empire was immortal. So great had been the repute of Roman government, that men could not place it in the past and then consider some new polity. The attempts of Charlemagne were valiant, but in vain. It was impossible to reverse the course of history; hence this emperor's endeavor to reestablish the Empire was destined to fail. Otho the Great (912-973) made an attempt to reestablish the realm, which did drag out a sort of formal existence until modern times, when it was completely closed in 1806 by Napoleon.

FEUDAL LAW

The social situation after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire became such as to suggest a kind of pre-social or pre-political condition. It might perhaps be referred to as an example of the "state of nature" which, as we shall see in Chapter XIV, the political philosophers of the early modern period considered

³ *Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 59-60.

the real beginning of society and State. The decline of centralized political authority meant as well the decline of universal law, and with the passing of the Holy Roman Empire came the departure of the Roman ideal of law. From having been a public possession, law became a kind of personal privilege. There was what might be called *feudal law*, such as the codification of *Beaumanoir* in France, the *Sachsenspiegel* and *Schwabenspiegel* in Germany, as well as the *Libri Feudorum* in Italy. But these codifications, based on custom and expediency, afford only pathetic comparison with such a fundamental work as the *Code of Justinian*. Can we not say that here in the feudal period, there was a state of affairs not unlike that so laconically and yet so graphically indicated by the Hebrew writer in the *Book of Judges*? "There was no king in Israel and every man did what was right in his own eyes."

It was the Church which took up the task of curbing this anarchy and the ills that it entailed. The Church was in a position to do this, since it had modeled its own organization upon that of the Roman Empire before its fall. Its spiritual leaders, the bishops, had risen to positions of secular importance. Consequently, the spiritual leader was in a better position than the political one, like Charlemagne, had been to carry out the august traditions of the *Pax Romana*. The Holy Catholic Church was wiser than the Holy Roman Empire. What was the Church's equipment for this enterprise? It had something like a monopoly of intelligence and virtue, possessed unity and vitality, and was inspired by unselfish purposes. But should the rulers of the Kingdom of Heaven attempt to become as well leaders of a kingdom which was decidedly earthly?

In answering this question, we must observe that it was a question of ecclesiastical control or no control at all. True enough is it that spiritual participation in temporal matters, and the endeavor to render things to both God and Caesar, involved defects and engendered ills. When the bishops were the only functionaries who had genuine authority, they were wont to use their office or abuse it in the capacity of making and unmaking kings. This came to be an intolerable situation; it was bound to produce strife with the secular powers. This it did ultimately

in the famous conflict between Pope Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair (1268-1314). Philip, who sought the suppression of feudalism and the revival of Roman Law, attempted to levy taxes upon the clergy, an act which Boniface by the bull *Clericis Laicos* (1296) forbade, only to have Philip respond by forbidding the export of money or valuables. After a provisional reconciliation, the quarrel between Church and State was resumed in 1300 when Philip imprisoned the papal legate and, finally, imprisoned the pope himself and elevated to the papal seat Clement V, one of his own men, as we might style him. However, it was the Church and the Church alone that was able to preserve order within the State.

THE TRUCE OF GOD

A special and excellent illustration of the Church's activity in maintaining order in the disjointed Empire was the institution of the Truce of God. This was devised to check the private warfare that was all too prevalent in those anarchistic days. How did such impromptu warfare arise? We have observed that land tenure on the part of the tenant meant military tenure on the part of the lower class, who were supposed to be adepts with both plow and sword, pruning hook and spear. These underlings were expected to work and fight for their lords. The mediaeval army, if we may so style it, was organized and the thing to do was to fight. Fortunately for the men of that time the weapons were by no means deadly nor was military strategy at all scientific; yet such private, irrational warfare was a constant menace to peace, a barrier to progress. It had its glamour and now affords material for a romantic conception of human life, but the Church realized that it was little short of a pestilence.

The first steps to curb this nuisance, as we might call it, were taken by the Church in its provincial synods. The Church with its evangelical idea of "peace on earth among men of good will" was unable to prevent warfare entirely, especially as its subjects were far from being men of good will. But the Church was able to establish extended holidays free from fighting. An example of this heavenly truce is afforded us in the order promulgated by

Reginald, Archbishop of Arles. The naïveté of the document cannot hide its noble intention. It was to the effect "that all Christians, friends and enemies, neighbors and strangers, should keep true and lasting peace one with another from vespers on Wednesday to sunrise on Monday, so that during these four days and five nights, all persons may have peace and, trusting to this peace, may go about their business without fear of their enemies."⁴

Such a document, in itself perhaps trivial, is highly illustrative of the feudal period, if not of the whole matter of government. People desire generally "to go about their business" and are not interested primarily in the quarrels between monarchs or States. In the mediaeval period when, at length, really national kings arose and laid claim to absolute power, their peoples were ready to acquiesce in such pretensions on the part of their sovereigns, since the crown gave some assurance of stable government. Today we are confronted by the absolute State rather than the absolute monarch and the enforcement of law by police and court, fine and imprisonment and even execution. But this is as we would have it, for it is as though we ourselves had learned the bitter lesson of what can happen to society when it lacks the political organization of a State. Some members of the social order may desire to do what is right in their own eyes, but the majority desire laws that will permit them to go about their own business.

THE POWER OF THE POPE

But in the feudal period the Church did not stop with the Truce of God. Having made a beginning in the field of secular power, it continued to increase in sway until it reached its culmination in the pontificate of Innocent III (1198-1216). Now, Innocent III was a papal sovereign whose position and power were reminiscent of a Roman emperor. In the first place, as head of the Church, the pope was the supreme master of the whole body of ecclesiastics of whatever rank and in whatever land. On the other hand, this body of ecclesiastics was free from the control of the political power, being answerable to

⁴ Thatcher and McNeal, *Source Book for Mediaeval History*, p. 414.

ecclesiastical courts only and to a special body of law, the Canon Law. The claim was made also that the entire ecclesiastical body was exempt from taxation, an immunity which Church property also shared. This appears from the papal bull of Boniface VIII, the *Clericis Laicos* to which we have already referred.⁵ An earlier claim to exemption from taxation is to be found in a letter from Innocent III to a bishop.⁶ This was a privilege indeed, and made the clerical profession unusually attractive and, further, all that was needed to prove that one was a cleric was the ability to read, to read so little as a single line.⁷ Thus the clergy instead of being national in their citizenship were ecclesiastical; legally they were not French or English subjects duly subject to the laws and taxes of the land, but were responsible to a kind of spiritual "Rome." The Church was thus a State within the State, *imperium in imperio*.

CHURCH AND STATE

The situation, trying enough in itself during a period famous for political irregularities, was even a more difficult one. State and Church were badly confused by the fact that Church officers were likewise lay lords. They held fiefs, controlled their inhabitants, and had their feudal rights. They held their ecclesiastical positions but were none the less important members of the political organization. Who, then, was their rightful sovereign, pope or king? This question caused the confusion just referred to; more than that, it became the source of a conflict between Empire and Church on the subject of investiture — the right to invest the bishop with the insignia of his office. It became "confusion worse confounded."

The result of the conflict with the Empire was a sweeping victory of the Church over the Emperor Frederick II. The Empire, which claimed to be the successor of the Holy Roman Empire and hence to include all Europe, then disappeared. It was not the Church that had destroyed this feudal State; it was

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 311.

⁶ *Ib.*, p. 213.

⁷ Robinson, *Readings in European History*, Vol. I, p. 358.

the power of specific nationalism, particularly that of France. This new nationalism was personified in Philip the Fair, to whom we have referred already. The Church rejoiced in an old power, the State in a new one. Upon the basis of its authority, the Church put forth the claim that all power belonged to the pope and that the prince, or political ruler, derived his authority by delegation from the pope. Moreover, it was within the power of the pope to exercise general superintendence over a State and both excommunicate and dethrone its ruler. The summit of the papal claim to secular power was reached when Boniface VIII issued the bull, *Unam Sanctam* (1300). It reads as follows:

“Both the spiritual and material swords, therefore, are in the power of the Church, the latter indeed to be used for the Church, the former by the Church, the one by the priest, the other by the hand of kings and soldiers, and by the will and sufferance of the priest. It is fitting, moreover, that one sword should be under the other and the temporal authority subject to the spiritual power. Hence, the truth bearing witness, it is for the spiritual power to establish the earthly power and judge it if it be not good. Therefore, if the earthly power shall err, it shall be judged by the higher, but if the supreme power err, it can be judged by God alone. We, moreover, proclaim, declare, and pronounce that it is altogether necessary to salvation for every human being to be subject to the Roman pontiff.”⁸

This was the papal theory of Boniface, but it was Innocent III who most nearly put the theory into practice. He exercised governmental control of the papal possessions in Italy and similar control over Sicily. Important lay lords including John of England were his vassals. Sverre, king of Norway, became involved in a conflict with the Church, whereupon his followers were excommunicated and the king of Denmark ordered to take up arms against him. Besides appointing and deposing kings, we find Innocent actively supporting them. He wrote to his “beloved sons,” the magnates and barons of England, relative to the protests that produced Magna Carta saying, “We hereby

⁸ Robinson, *Readings in European History*, Vol. I, pp. 347-348.

condemn your conduct in these matters," and forbade further quarrels with John on threat of excommunication.⁹ In what today we should call the field of international relations, we find him frequently intervening in conflicts, claiming the right to arbitrate, seeking to promote peace and confirming agreements between rulers, and formally registering them; a procedure somewhat akin to that of the present League of Nations. Innocent further declared what constituted heresy, and commanded the monarchs and lay lords to crush it out. This was done in southern France in the case of the so-called Albigensians.¹⁰

THE SECULAR POWER OF THE CHURCH

But this secular supremacy rested on insecure foundations, as was to be clearly demonstrated. Events proved all too plainly that when an ecclesiastical organization "goes in for politics," it is itself the loser despite any initial appearance of victory. Animosities which are fatal to church harmony are necessarily created and in this case of Church and State it was shown that it was difficult to keep sacred and secular interests apart. Then, as is usually the case, political force will predominate over religious influence and tend to change the Church into a political machine alien in its operations to the religious needs of its adherents. But it is difficult for mankind to accept the results of such experiments as were tried in the days of feudalism. It required the faith and fortitude of Roger Williams and the statesmanship of Thomas Jefferson to teach America the wisdom of keeping State and Church apart, and even today there is a marked tendency on the part of Protestantism to thrust itself into politics. However, there can be no doubt that there is need of the religious spirit in international affairs, and here it must be observed that the western world has still to find a substitute for the principle of papal control that Innocent sought to maintain.

Feudalism must not be understood in an ecclesiastical manner as the secular power of the Church. This extension of the ec-

⁹ Thatcher and McNeal, *Source Book for Mediaeval History*, pp. 217, 219.

¹⁰ R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, Vol. V, Part II, Ch. 1.

clesiastical function was due to the historical fact that the public power of the State was so weak that it became necessary for a theological force to operate in a political manner, as it did in the days of the feudal system. The origin of feudalism is obscured by the lack of temporary records; was it originally of a Latin or a later German source? The use of the terms *benefice* and *precarium* would indicate something Romanic in what turned out to be characteristically Germanic. But, at all events, we can keep the feudal idea in mind by reference to the further notion of land and land tenure. The earth was the source of income and form of wealth in the early Middle Ages; such realty in large quantities was the property of the kings and great lords. The excess of such holdings was bound to produce a surplus of real property or far more land than its owners could cultivate. What were the royal owners to do with their vast holdings? They could only grant it to retainers who would cultivate it for them and further contribute military service by way of rent. The grantor of the land retained the title, so to speak, while the vassal-tenant had the use of it. This was the *benefice*; generally it became hereditary on payment of a "fine" when the vassal died, whereupon his eldest son entered into his father's possessions.

THE ESSENCE OF FEUDALISM

In the feudal system, the *precarium* was a form of the *benefice*. The smaller free-holder, himself unable to secure protection from the political power, sought such protection elsewhere, as from a neighboring stronger lord or perhaps from a near-by monastery. In order to do this, the small free-holder would surrender his holdings and become the "man" of the lord in return for the latter's protection. Some forms of the *precarium* provided that upon the death of the vassal the property would go to the superior, but the general practice was for the holdings to be inherited after due payment had been made by the heirs. A typical precarial will illustrates the nature of the transaction:

"I (name) and my wife (name), in the name of the Lord, give by this letter of gift and transfer from our ownership to

the ownership and authority of the monastery of (name) over which the venerable abbot (name) presides . . . the following villas (names), situate in the county of (name) with all the lands, houses, buildings, tenants, slaves, vineyards, woods, fields, pastures, meadows, streams, and all other belongings and dependencies . . . in order that under the protection of Christ they may be used for the support and maintenance of the monks who dwell in the aforesaid monasteries. We do this on the condition that as long as either of us shall live we may possess the aforesaid villas, without prejudice to the ownership of the monastery and without diminution of the value of them. . . . After the death of both of us the aforesaid villas with any additions or improvements which may have been made shall return immediately to the possession of said monastery and the said abbot and his successors without undertaking any judicial process or obtaining the consent of the heir.”¹¹

Another element which helped to constitute the feudal system was that of homage, a custom whereby the holder of a grant of land was bound to the grantor by special bonds of allegiance. The nature of the process is best indicated by a typical form of ceremony:

“That man should put his hands together as a sign of humility, and place them between the two hands of his lord as a token that he vows everything to him and promises faith to him; and the lord should receive him and promise to keep faith with him. Then the man should say, ‘Sir, I enter your homage and faith and become your man by mouth and hands, and I swear and promise to keep faith with you against all others and to guard your rights with all my strength.’”¹²

Evidently this was a process which in the course of time would result only in the substitution of a special personal relation between lord and vassal for the attachment of an individual to his country, as also the substitution of private protection which the family should have furnished.

¹¹ Thatcher and McNeal, *Source Book for Mediaeval History*, pp. 345-346.

¹² *Ib.*, p. 363.

This factor of feudalism, the element of loyalty and devotion, was one of its chief characteristics. "The feudal relation was not one of mere dependence or of mere advantage, but one of faith and loyal service."¹³ This feeling of a special bond between vassal and lord was characteristic of the feudal era, but not to that period of history alone. In a transmuted form it descended to modern times, and when an absolute monarch assumed the divine right of kings, he became an object of reverence and inspired an unusual sense of allegiance. So strong had this become in the days of Charles I of England that some of his subjects actually died of shock when that monarch was executed. Even today the same sense of allegiance operates although in the impersonal manner of nationalism or patriotism, devotion to one's country and love for its flag.

LORD AND VASSAL

In the feudal period, the relation between lord and vassal was established ultimately on the basis of rent. The most important feature of this rent was military service which was normally for forty days with a fixed number of armed retainers. On certain occasions, such as the marriage of the lord's oldest daughter, the knighting of the lord's oldest son, and the captivity of the lord, aids or money payments were made by the vassal. The lord had certain rights over his vassals, such as wardship, the right of guardianship of minor heirs, and the management and use of fiefs during the years of their minority. There was also the right to choose or be consulted in the choice of a husband for the female holders of a fief. "Relief" was the lord's right to exact a certain payment from the heir when he succeeded to a fief; "escheat" was the right to take back a fief into his own possession on the failure of heirs.

The essence of the feudal system was plainly that of service, or tilling the land and fighting. Only those whose service was of the military sort were regarded as of noble character and were set aside sharply from the bulk of the community. The serfs

¹³ R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, Vol. III, p. 25, and Part I, Ch. 1, *passim*.



FEUDAL CASTLE ON THE MOSELLE RIVER



FEUDAL WARFARE

Two portions of the Bayeux tapestry, showing the Battle of Hastings.

(facing page 224)

who were tied down to the soil they cultivated owed their servile duties. In the case of feudal military service, there came into being a warrior class made up of nobles whose sole excuse for existence was that of fighting. Side by side with the ecclesiastical "estate" they came to be recognized as a specially privileged "order" within the State. Ultimately a third estate consisting largely of rich merchants and master craftsmen arose in the form of the bourgeoisie. These were literally the city-dwellers or typical men of the present day. Much of modern history has been made by their attempts to attain political power. In the feudal period, political power as represented by the king had practically disappeared. The king was more than anything else a lord. The local officers of the realm chose to regard their administrative domains as so many fiefs and their relation to their monarch pretty much like that of vassal to his overlord. Their service in the king's army, their attendance on the royal court, and their service generally were feudal, not political. The State was thus feudalized and its political power threatened.

The institution of immunity put the finishing touch to what centralized political power still obtained. By means of such immunity, the holder of a fief, abbot, or monastery was given complete control over his holdings. That is to say, the royal taxgatherers, judges, and administrators could not pass over the boundaries of the fief and exercise governmental power. The result of this localization of authority was that the holder of the fief came to be practically sovereign over it and possessed, as the phrase had it, the high justice, the middle, and the low. The lord had his own courts, collected from his tenants all dues they were required to pay, controlled their military service, and sometimes went so far as to coin his own money. The following example of immunity will prove illustrative:

"In the name of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, Ludwig, by divine providence emperor, Augustus. Be it known to all our subjects, present and future, that our faithful subject, John, has come to us and commended himself to us, and has besought us to confirm to him the possession of lands . . . which he and his sons and their men have shared and occupied. He has shown

us the charter which he received from our father Karl the Great. We have consented to do this and have done even more; we have given him certain villas . . . granting that he and his sons and posterity may hold them in peace and security. No count, vicarious, or their subordinates, or any other public official shall presume to judge or constrain any persons living on these lands but John and his sons and their posterity shall judge and constrain them." ¹⁴

FEUDAL "ANARCHY"

Liberty thus came to be thought of as freedom from all political control, a conception further emphasized by the fact that all ecclesiastics were likewise subject to their own law and courts with ultimate appeal to Rome and not to the law of the land. When cities began to grow they, too, demanded and frequently obtained, whether by force or purchase, charters which secured for themselves more or less exclusive control of their own affairs. As a result of this situation, the right to rule came to be thought of as an incident, a dependency on land tenure. The king's power was not different from that of another lord's. He ruled in his own domains as their landlord, but was dependent on the feudal services of his vassals for taxes, military service, and court. This political phase of feudalism was far from being a passing one. Today the State is the successor to the king, just as in his day the king was successor to the feudal lord. Hence the State is frequently regarded as the supreme landlord with its power to condemn and take land as need may require. This power of the State is known as the "right of eminent domain." And the modern State maintains further, in quite a mediaeval manner, that it is an immunity in the sense that it denies the right of any other power or law to exercise jurisdiction or control over its "tenants."

The system of fiefs was unsatisfactory especially from the standpoint of internal order. The scheme of things might present a neat picture of vassals and lords, tenants-in-chief of the king, and the monarch himself; but the picture did not reveal the

¹⁴ Thatcher and McNeal, *Source Book for Mediaeval History*, p. 353.

actual conditions of uncertainty and confusion, the lack of control of vassals by their lords or of the tenants-in-chief by the king. Can we call such a social situation one of anarchy? Hardly that, although it was distinctly lacking in order. Dare we go so far as to suggest their feudal warfare was akin to our gangster warfare, their feuds like ours? Both forms of violence were a hindrance to labor and trade, both merchant and trader were so opposed to them as to seek peace at the price of absolute monarchy. In a manner somewhat analogous, we are willing to surrender a certain amount of individual liberty to various sorts of corporations to which we look for peace and progress. Our modern social philosophy for all its modernness seems to have derived some of its principles, some of its working programs from what seems so alien to our system as the feudal one. At the present time, we are in a condition not wholly unlike the disordered one of the Middle Ages and are casting about for a principle on which a more secure form of economic existence and social welfare can be based.

FEUDAL ECONOMICS

But feudalism was more than a political arrangement; order it can hardly be called. It was more of an economic scheme based on the manorial system. Wealth was in the form of land or agricultural property cultivated by peasant-serfs. These were almost literally attached to the soil in that they passed with the manor when it changed hands, although they could not be treated as slaves or sold at the wish of the lord. As a result of the manorial process, the territory of western Europe was parceled out into large holdings, so large as to produce a surplus. It was this surplus that was granted out as fiefs to other lords, the remainder being kept as practically the sole source of income for the economically nonproductive lord of the manor.

In general, the manor was divided into two parts: demesne land, which was cultivated directly by the lord's serfs and the land-services of his other tenants; and the land cultivated directly by the serfs on burdensome terms of rent, which the serfs paid in kind. These serf-cultivators lived in small, unprotected vil-

lages outside the castle walls. The agricultural land was divided into three great fields, one of which lay fallow each year, divided into long strips allocated to individual serfs and generally inherited by the eldest son on the payment of the so-called "fine." The terms on which the land was held were various, complex, and frequently of such a nature as to engender despair in the heart of the serf-cultivator. First of all there were payments that must be made in kind in the form of produce. Then came services of various sorts on the lord's part of the manor. Frequently the lord had a mill where the serf must grind his grain, or a wine-press where he must press his grapes. Special payments in eggs and poultry, for example, were payable at feast times. In general, as it happened, the serf had little left of the produce; only a bare subsistence after payments to his lord had been made.

An illustrative description of the dues and services owed by a man holding a house and thirty acres of land will serve to indicate the nature of the system. These payments and services may be itemized as follows: two shillings yearly, a cock and two hens at Christmas, two days harrowing with his own horse and one man, two days of hauling manure with his own cart and oxen, two days of mowing the lord's meadow at the rate of one acre a day, hauling beans or oats two days in the fall, two days of wood hauling, two days of cutting and hauling heath, and two trips to the neighboring town with grain. These constituted the rent the serf was required to pay. In addition to these privileges, his lord had certain rights over him, as in settling his disputes and collecting fines from him. The lord himself lived on the agricultural produce of his own domain and his rents. Naturally, the lord had to consume his produce on the spot and in case the lord had more than one manor he would journey from manor to manor to consume his produce and rents. As a result of this situation, no value was attached to nonconsumable surplus coming from surplus land; hence this excess of real estate was granted to other lords in the form of fiefs.¹⁵ What was the effect of such a system on the life of the lord who was to the manor born?

¹⁵ Guizot, *History of Civilization*, Vol. IV, Lecture VII.

FEUDAL ETHICS

The life of the typical lord was bound to be vacant and without purpose. Idle, ignorant, and gross, the lord found little to absorb his time save in war and the chase; it was thus that private warfare was a boon to a man burdened with ennui. But out of the failure of such a life to produce a proper outlet for energy there was evolved one of the most interesting of social developments—the system of chivalry. In certain ways, chivalry was akin to our system of lodges and fraternities with their initiations, regalia, oaths, and ritualistic practices. Like these modern organizations, chivalry was based on a sense of social superiority and polite prestige enjoyed by the members of the gentry who were not knights. But above all it gave the lords of manors something to do in an idle life, as it loaned color to what was really a drab existence. Chivalry has left a permanent and pleasing impression on the world in the form of the man who, no longer a knight, has the knightly characteristic of the modern “gentleman.”

The ethics, or morale, of chivalry might be summed up in the supreme word “honor.” The expression of this often assumed a physical form involving the additional virtue of courage, as also physical prowess. But there were more refined features of chivalry in the form of truthfulness that made a man’s word as good as his bond. The chivalrous attitude produced punctilious politeness peculiar to a highly developed and artificial social code, and involved high esteem for women and a readiness to protect the weak and defenseless. The generosity of the knight bordered on wastefulness and was not wanting in a desire for display. It is readily realized that such chivalry would tend to stress certain virtues and refrain from emphasizing equally important duties, but the civilizing force of such a spiritual system cannot be denied, for chivalry civilized the coarse and brutal Germanic chiefs who in their way were to be the creators of western civilization.

The feudal system as a whole was, however, a class-system in which the lord of the manor was supreme. The condition of the peasant was one of undiluted and almost hopeless misery. Little or no provision was made for the general welfare; famine and

pestilence were all too common. During the seventy years between 970 and 1040, France had forty-eight years of famine or epidemic. Burned huts and harvests, pillage, violence, and rapine were of frequent occurrence, and cannibalism was sometimes practiced. Our commercialism and industrialism may have much to answer for in the way of oppression and misery, but these mean more enrichment of the masses of mankind than feudalism ever knew. An industrial civilization like ours is not without its ills, but a purely agricultural system built upon class cleavage, privilege, and force is an unthinkable alternative.

FIEF AND TOWN

Such a system as that of feudalism could not last because it was limited by the narrow principle of immediate consumption, since the produce of the land could be utilized in no other way. It began to stand out in painful contrast to a civilization based on industry and commerce, trade and profit-making. Feudalism was based on the agricultural fief, commercialism on the industrial town. As the Middle Ages progressed, the town, with its site upon some old Roman town, around a castle or near a monastery, grew in proportion to its defensibility and its opportunity for trade. In both a militaristic and an industrial sense, the town was in a strategic position. It built a wall and sought a charter. By right of purchase, by negotiations, or even by force the town secured its rights of self-government and guarded its precious liberties. This resulted in a commune.

The essential feature whereby the town was made into a commune was that of feudal immunity. The jurisdiction of all other and alien political officers stopped at the walls of the city. This made the communes so many local states on a small scale, enjoying isolated existence. Ultimately, when the territorial monarch was more and more fully established in the supremacy of his realm, the little communes came into conflict with the superior power. There could be but one issue to such a conflict and at length the communes were destroyed. But the immediate effect of the town-movement was to weaken the local nobility on whose territory the town had grown up. Thus, when the communes were de-

stroyed or abandoned, and the inhabitants had grown weary of the internal oligarchy that had destroyed the feudal oppressor, the appeal was to the king. It is significant to observe at this point that, in France, the town-movement enlisted the support of the monarch, who wished to weaken the nobility and the feudal system in which it had grown up. The town was of importance in another particular — it became a haven of refuge for serfs escaping from the bondage of the feudal manor. A common provision of a charter was that any serf who lived in a town for a year and a day without demand from his lord for his surrender should be free. Thus it is important to observe that Frederick II should have felt constrained to promise the German princes that, as he said, "the serfs of princes, nobles, ministerials, and churches shall not be admitted to our cities."

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

As the cities began to surround feudalism, the institution of commerce invaded its precincts. The immediate effect of commerce was to increase currency and capital; the resulting money economy was fatal to feudalism. The very root of the feudal system, as we have seen, was payment in kind. The feudal lords themselves saw the advantage of payments in money rather than in produce or service, but the spread of money from the towns among agricultural laborers was bound to produce a more fluid labor market. In much the same manner, the demand for labor in the east in our time produced a general exodus of Negroes from the south where they had previously lived the life of "crop-sharers" on the lands of the southern landlords. Further, the increase of trade and the growth of capital placed a premium on social order, or the business of going about one's business. The robber baron on his steed was not consistent with the honest merchant on his mule; one lived by pillage, the other by peaceful bargaining. The baron lived in his inaccessible castle from which he could make sporadic forays, while the merchant required open roads, protected travel, and a peaceable fair where he could buy and sell. In short, one type of being required social confusion, the

other social order.¹⁶ In the end, it was the somber merchant on his mule who won in the tilt with the gay knight on horseback.

FEUDALISM AND THE CRUSADES

Finally, it was the most spectacular movement of the Middle Ages that turned the tide against the most characteristic and organized commerce. This was the crusades. With all their worldliness, the men of the Middle Ages had not forgotten the problem of human salvation, and the solution of this came to mean the redemption of the Holy City from the hands of the Turks. The same spiritual or emotional force that sent men into monasteries and made the relics of saints matters of unusual importance acted anew to set in motion thousands of crusaders led on by such royal commanders as Frederick Barbarossa, Richard the Lion-Hearted, St. Louis, and others. The feudal noble who knew no trade but that of fighting found in the crusades an opportunity to exercise his martial gifts. He was glad to escape the narrow confines of life in the castle for a wandering life of adventure and combat, as also with the possibility of material gain. Then, younger sons who did not succeed to their father's fiefs were only too eager to find a way of elevating themselves without becoming ecclesiastics. The crusades were most opportune.

The immediate result of the crusades — the establishment of a short-lived feudal kingdom in the Near East — was of no permanent significance. But solid results were not lacking. The narrow isolation of feudal life was broken down and intercommunication between the nations set up. The progress of learning was advanced by contact with Saracen civilization, which in many respects was superior to the Christian. There was none the less a tremendous influence upon commerce. New wants were created as the Europeans became acquainted with new commodities and new forms of food. Many of the old feudal families were wiped out by warfare, sickness, and other causes, and their lands passed into the hands of the rich bourgeoisie. Even when this did not

¹⁶ Adams, *Mediaeval Civilization*, Ch. XII.

happen, the lord of the manor frequently ceded to serfs or towns the privileges they could not recover even when they did not go so far as to pledge the fiefs themselves. In short, by participating in the crusades, the old feudal system committed suicide. By the time the crusades were over, the old order of things was dying and the modern State, if not the modern world was beginning to live.

CHAPTER X

SCHOLASTIC CULTURE



THE NATURE OF SCHOLASTICISM

THE VERY MENTION OF THE TERM "SCHOLASTICISM" IS LIKELY to arouse repugnance in our minds; we do not care to "look into the hole of the pit whence we were digged." To speak of a thing as "scholastic" is to condemn it; call it "scientific" and it is automatically proved. It was scholastic to consider how many angels could dance on the point of a needle, but it is scientific to compute how many germs could be placed on the head of a pin. Scholasticism, however, is more of a mental state than merely a historical period; it arises when the thinker is more intent upon form than content and believes, further, that most effective thinking can be accomplished by symbols. At the present time, there is a species of Scholasticism in researches of various sorts, in statistics, in the pursuit of pedagogical methods, and in the analysis of scientific method in distinction from scientific investigation. The thought of the XIXth and XXth centuries is quite different from that of the XIIth and XIIIth. Facts have taken the place of principles; investigations have supplanted arguments. Yet the passage of seven hundred years has not wholly delivered us from Scholasticism. Indeed, it is to be hoped that it has not, since Scholasticism, ideally conceived, means thoroughness of thought and consistency of reasoning. How did historical Scholasticism arise and how is its career to be evaluated?

There was Scholasticism among the ancients just as there is Scholasticism now. The term *scholastikos* is of Greek origin and crept into usage after Aristotle, when it was employed to indicate the professional philosopher. Its general meaning seems to have been that of the scholar and then, finally, the pedant. The spirit of Scholasticism was rampant among the Greeks in the form of sophistry, nevertheless that period, the fifth century B.C., and the great era of Scholasticism, the XIIIth century, were periods of popular enlightenment. When, therefore, we enjoy

the downright desire to get ideas out of history and take our goods wherever we find them, we find it expedient to eliminate as much prejudice as possible and treat mediaeval Scholasticism in the same spirit that we treated Greek culture and Roman civilization. Once that Scholasticism belonged to the Church, now it is the property of the world; and once a movement within the history of the Church, it has become a factor in the history of mankind at large.


THE SCHOLASTIC METHOD

Since it is our aim to get values out of historical periods wherever valuable periods are to be found, we must begin by praising and appraising the very formalism of the scholastic movement. The Schoolmen sharpened the tools of philosophy that later on were to be used by science. Scholasticism itself was not science, but it had the scientific spirit of reducing particular facts to general principles. What it needed was the clearer observation of those facts and their mathematical values as shown by experiment. This need was on the point of being supplied by Roger Bacon, a Franciscan monk, who desired to reform Scholasticism by the introduction of the sciences, but whose work was hindered by the outer power and inner influence of the Church. If, by some miracle of time, the work of Bacon had been carried out, the beginnings of modern science might have been anticipated by something like three centuries. But, on the other hand, if another temporal miracle could have been wrought so that the universities of the XIIIth century had dropped their Schoolmen, reached forward in time, and grasped a group of Empiricists and Pragmatists to fill their chairs, it would be difficult to see how modern science would ever have come into its own.

This is because modern science at its inception was not based upon "facts" and "consequences," but proceeded from something like the beliefs and dogmas of the XIIIth-century mind. Moreover, the field of this original science was not the earth, where facts and consequences are so evident; it was the heavens, where abstract ideas and unearthly principles are in force. The early modern period with its astronomy was in harmony with

the late mediaeval period in its theology, for the spirits of both periods were one in viewing the heavens as the expression of the divine intellect and will. Copernicus felt that he was honoring God when he considered the gorgeous sun the center of the solar system and believed it harmonious with God's nature to think of the planets as revolving in circles around it. Kepler was even more religious in his attitude when, with reluctance, he had concluded that the planets move in ellipses. He regarded the sun as God the Father; the sphere of the fixed stars as God; the sun and the aether through which, as he thought, the planets moved as God the Holy Ghost. The astronomy of the XVIth century did leap out of scholastic bounds, but now it is beginning to look as though the physics of the XXth century were on the point of leaping out of the boundaries set by all the classic physics of the past. But in all this, the intellectual spirit of Scholasticism must not be overlooked nor its importance allowed to suffer from the narrowness of its range. The spirit of Scholasticism was such as to include the intelligibility of the universe and the ability of the human mind to comprehend it.

It is not necessary to violate the traditional divisions of history in order to exercise intellectual sympathy for Scholasticism. As usual, we can date the whole period of mediaevalism from the fall of the Roman Empire in the Vth century to the fall of the Grecian Empire at Constantinople in the XVth. The part of the thousand years allotted to Scholasticism may be considered about one half. This period we may date, if we choose, from the birth of Scotus Erigena soon after the year 800 to the death of Duns Scotus in 1308. There were Schoolmen before Scotus Erigena — Bede and Alcuin; and there were scholastic thinkers after Duns Scotus — William of Occam and Nicolas Cusanus. Scholasticism as such may be considered in two forms, one peculiar to such a characteristic thinker as Abelard (1079-1142), the other forever associable with the name of Aquinas (1227-1274). Scholasticism began as a movement to rationalize the doctrines of the Church; it ended in an elaborate system of civilization and culture. A vine was planted, took deep root, and began to fill the land; the hills were covered with the shadow of it and it sent out branches unto the river and boughs unto the sea.



FAÇADE OF THE CATHEDRAL OF RHEIMS

Gothic architecture, an exemplification of Christianity seeking definite form and highly detailed articulation, is here seen at its best.

(facing page 237)

This scholastic vine, as we are calling it, may have been more leafy than fruitful; but it possessed life and showed itself capable of ramifying into all the nooks and crannies of Church and State. There was theology above and philosophy beneath it all, but between these chill poles expanded a sphere of enterprises and activities. Let us mention the most important ones and reserve a few of them for subsequent discussion.

SCHOLASTIC CULTURE

Outwardly nothing is more impressive of the XIIIth century than the cathedrals, the Gothic Cathedral, *énorme et délicate*. Inwardly this era expressed its yearning spirit in the foundation of universities. The artistic spirit spoke again in the frescoes of such masters as Cimabue and Giotto, in the naturalism of Giotto. Not only the brush, but the pen also was under the inspiration of the age, as one sees from *Reynard the Fox*, *The Golden Legend*, and *The Romance of the Rose*. In different vein were *The Cid*, *The Nibelungen Lied*, and the completion of the *Arthur Legend*, just as there was also *Parsival* by Wolfram von Eschenbach and the little story of *Aucassin and Nicolette*. Then, in lighter form, was the music of the Meistersingers and Troubadours balanced so majestically by such hymns as *Stabat Mater* and *Dies Irae*. There was, of course, the ponderous theology of Thomas Aquinas and his *Summa*, but the spirit of this was lightened and humanized by Dante in his *Divina Commedia*. The tone and tendency of such aesthetic products was neither mediaeval nor modern, but rejoiced in a delightful form of ambiguity and feeling of wistfulness.

In more practical ways the century witnessed the creation of the Friar Movement, that of St. Francis in Italy and St. Dominic in Spain. Out of the Dominicans was to come the speculative theology of Thomas Aquinas and from the Franciscans the more practical system of Duns Scotus and the subsequent conflict between Thomism and Scotism. In the affairs of state appeared the Magna Carta, the establishment of England's Parliament, and Bracton's collection of laws, which became the foundation of modern common law. In commerce, there was the Hanseatic

League of cities and the free cities with the modern ideal of self-government. There was also a delightful secularism being engendered by cathedral building in the form of an arts-and-crafts movement or what might be called technical schools, where the community received instruction in manipulating stone, wood, metal, glass, and the like. The social effect of this activity was seen in the formation of guilds which included merchants as well as artisans. The aesthetical or ethical result was that of self-expression through work. The plan of the cathedral was so exact as to suggest the rigor of scholastic theology, but the execution of the details as in the ornaments and appurtenances was such as to invite individual taste and private expression. In this sense of a fixed plan and the free execution of it, the Gothic arrived and for a while remained at the summit of ideal activity.

THE GOTHIC ERA

Before we are forced to consider the thin abstractions of scholastic culture, we are privileged to observe its counterpart in more concrete and beautiful forms. These we find in Gothic architecture. Already we have referred to it as though it were an exemplification of the scholastic spirit, but doubtless it is wiser to regard both the Scholastic and the Gothic as exemplifications of a common Christianity seeking definite form and highly detailed articulation. Both the scholastic and the Gothic tendency was to decide upon a definite plan and then carry this out in detail. In both alike was a certain touch of individualism—the Nominalism that released the particular person from the toils of Realism, the fineness and fantasy of decoration whereby the private workman expressed his genius in comparative independence of the general plan of structure. In the instance of architecture, it is difficult to conceive of a more perfect ideal of universality and particularity.

Most of us are inclined to gaze upon a Gothic structure as though it were only a very ecclesiastical form of architecture signified by pointed arches, stained-glass windows, and gargoyles. The spirit of the structure, however, is much deeper. Like all architecture, the Gothic must adapt itself to the downward force

of gravity and the rigidity of the building material. Prior to the creation of the Gothic this conflict between gravity and rigidity had been met chiefly by means of the heavy column and the thick wall. The effect, as in the case of a pagan temple or a Christian church, was impressive, but the spirit of the structure ponderous. It was the aim of the Gothic architect to solve his structural problem in such a way that slim supports might be able to lift the load to an unusual height and likewise provide for breadth of design. The arch was in vogue and even the pointed arch had been adopted, but the Gothic architect conceived of the idea of using a pointed arch made up of two sections of circular ones. In this chiefly lay the originality of his design. What is the Gothic?

Probably we can most fully grasp the Gothic idea if we consider the groined arch within the cathedral and the flying buttress on the outside. All true Gothic is the balance of the masses and forces that these arches and buttresses suggest. The function of the groined arch is to convey the load from the lines of the walls to the points of the pillars. Right at these points, the groining is executed in such a way as to carry sections of the load to corresponding divisions of the pillars below. If it were not a grotesque suggestion, we might imagine that the masonry above is like a huge vat whose thick contents is drained off downwards by means of pipe-like pillars. Commensurate with the downward thrust, accounted for by the groined arches, is the lateral thrust taken up at the same points by the flying buttresses, which carry over to the sturdy piers flanking the building. In this manner, the enormous structure keeps its balance. All parts of the Gothic, even the minarets which seem to rejoice in only decorative forms, have their part to play and play it in such a way as to make the truly structural appear spectacular.

With this rough word-sketch before us, we are now in a position to speak of the Gothic as an architectural system of thrust and counter-thrust in which, as it were, an active mass of material is realizing the third law of motion, of action and reaction. These thrusts are of three forms — downwards, sideways, and lengthwise. The direct, downward thrust carries its portion of the load on the great pillars resting upon the floor. The lateral

thrust, north and south, is accounted for by the striving system of flying arches and supporting buttresses. To the east, the longitudinal thrust is met by the towers with their gigantic bases, while to the west the same line of thrust encounters the well-buttressed apse. The whole structure when thus understood seems to take on a dynamic character which represents the effect of energy rather than the mere appearance of mass.

The artistic effect is, first of all, that of sincerity, in that the spectacular character of the edifice is in harmony with the structure that expresses it. Matter and form are one, and beauty is achieved by means of adequate expression; nothing is wanting, and all the material involved in the building is in its appointed place doing its appointed work. The aesthetic effect is such that the edifice becomes a work of art akin to a statue or painting or sonata. This effect appears outwardly in the exquisite carving, especially on the façade, but present high up among the flying buttresses also. Inwardly the impression of the painter's art comes forth in the stained-glass windows which occupy most of the wall space, giving the impression, as in the Sainte Chapelle in Paris, that the structure rests upon or is composed of glass. The motif of the decorations, likewise, is noteworthy for its naturalness; it is based chiefly upon floral designs rendered with the charm of simplicity and delightful earthliness. From the exact standpoint of time, the Gothic must be lodged in the mediaeval period, but the engineering principle involved in the structure and the sumptuousness of impression created are distinctly modern and are only two of the various indications of how wistful of novelty was the whole XIIIth century.

THE RISE OF UNIVERSITIES


Around the cathedrals there grew up schools; hence we can pass from Gothic architecture to scholastic theology and philosophy by way of the mediaeval university. In this institution we find much that still survives in the higher education of the present. We have still the university with its colleges and schools, the degrees of bachelor, master, and doctor, the cap and gown and the conflict between "town and gown." Our curriculum is



CANNON OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

And the marchaut was angry, for he also coude speke
no frensch, but wolde haue hadde egges/ and she vnderstode
hym not/ And thenne at laste a nother sayd that he wolde
haue epen/then the good wyf sayd that she vnderstod hym

FRAGMENT OF CAXTON'S PRINTING FROM HIS EDITION OF THE
Prologue to Virgil's Aeneid



NOTRE DAME CATHEDRAL, PARIS

The flying buttresses, pictured here, are characteristic of
Gothic architecture.

vastly different from that of the original university, but the form of the institution still abides; so that we are scholastic in spite of ourselves. The mediaeval university was a spontaneous affair and seems to have started as a guild made up of teachers and scholars. In Italy, as at Bologna, the government of the university was in the hands of the students, while at the University of Paris the control was exercised by the teachers. The basis of study was logic, the method of instruction oral, and the method pursued was that of discussion rather than of study and research.

The original institution was known as *studium generale*, and it was not until its members formed an academic corporation that it became a university. The spontaneity of spiritual freedom of these universities is shown by the fact that a school grew up, was recognized publicly, and sometimes attained to great fame before it received ecclesiastical recognition. We observe this most strikingly in the case of the University of Paris. As far back as the end of the XIth century the great William of Champeaux gave lectures on theology in the school of Notre Dame, but it was not until the beginning of the XIIIth century that the University of Paris was incorporated. It was recognized as such by a brief of Pope Innocent III in the year 1211. and then became the great mediaeval university.

The development of the university idea follows a chronological line from Italy to France, England, and Germany. What may be called the first university in the world was that of Salerno, which was a more or less famous school of medicine in the IXth century. From medicine, the emphasis changed to law when, about the year 1000, there was a revival of legal studies in Bologna, where a second university was started. This one branch of study did not make a university in the true sense of that term, but by the year 1200 medicine and philosophy were introduced; it was not, however, until the middle of the XIVth century that the pope proclaimed Bologna a *studium generale* in theology. As for Oxford, attempts have been made to date the founding of this venerable institution back to the days of Alfred the Great, but actual history yields no more than a record to the effect that in 1167 Oxford was recognized as a *studium generale*. Oxford seems to have been modeled on the University of Paris, rivaled it in the

study of theology, and reclaimed from it certain of its more eminent English students. Oxford imitated Paris likewise in the founding of separate colleges—University College in 1249; Balliol, 1263; and Merton, 1264. We mention these since they are still in existence; we stress the importance of Oxford since Matthew Arnold suggested that it was the last stronghold of Scholasticism in modern times.

THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS

But it is still the University of Paris that must be kept before the eye if we are to visualize the scholastic situation. This mediaeval institution came into prominence through the lectures of William of Champeaux (died 1121), the great exponent of mediaeval Realism. Paris was originally the authoritative center of scholastic theology, but afterwards developed all four of the great departments—theology, philosophy, law, and medicine. These have been called the four Parisian faculties. Paris developed its system of colleges, the first of which was the Sorbonne. These colleges suggest not only their counterparts in mediaeval Oxford, but also our modern system of dormitories, if not the more advanced system of “houses” introduced at Harvard and Yale. The purpose of the college was to provide board and lodging for the student and furnish him further with the supervision of a master. These provisions seemed as necessary then as they do now.

The influence of the University of Paris is attested by the division of the student body into “nations,” which have been spoken of as though they represented most of the civilized world. The four nations at Paris were France and England, Picardy and Normandy. “Though this division is mentioned for the first time in a public document in a bull of Innocent IV of 1245, it existed, at any rate as a working arrangement, in the XIIth century.”¹ There were famous students among these academic “nations.” Abelard was a pupil of William of Champeaux; Peter Lombard, author of the dogmatic *Sentences*, was a pupil of Abelard. It would be using the jargon of popular history to say

¹ Tilley, *The Literature of the French Renaissance*, p. 81.

that students "flocked" to the great Parisian university; it would be worse than jargon to state some of the figures supposed to indicate the size of these academic "flocks," and, in the case of smaller university towns, to state further that "gown" was much greater than "town." Apparently the boast based upon numbers is mediaeval as well as modern, but in dealing with the enrollment at the typical scholastic university it is wiser to speak in terms of thousands than tens of thousands. In speaking of the greatest of the universities Tilley says, "We shall thus on a most liberal computation get 5000 for the number of persons, including men, youths, and children, engaged in the work of education at the University of Paris at its most flourishing epoch."²

Instead of quoting extensive and impersonal figures with the idea of enhancing the glory of mediaeval learning, we had better state that, in addition to the names already mentioned, the list of students at Paris included the names of such Englishmen as John of Salisbury, Alexander of Hales, Robert Grosseteste, and Roger Bacon. Among the Italians who might be claimed as alumni were Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, Dante, and his teacher Brunetto Latini. Those were days when men were greater than the things they taught and students far superior to their studies. But with the advance of learning and the development of science, the reverse is true today. Our science like our civilization towers above us and we occupy a place in a culture and civilization which we are unable to fill.

If a university student in the year 1232 could rise from the dead and converse with a member of the class of 1932, the two would have mutual difficulty in making themselves understood. The mediaeval student would know everything about his narrow curriculum; the modern, who had "majored" in this, "minored" in that, and "specialized" in the other, would disclaim all academic responsibility for anything outside his "course." The mediaeval student inherited the old *trivium* — grammar, dialectic, rhetoric; the *quadrivium* — geometry, arithmetic, music, astronomy, dating as far back as Varro in the second century. These "seven liberal arts" included a little more than these titles indicate, but there was nothing practical or vocational about them.

² *Ib.*, p. 192.

The modern student would show himself much better informed than his scholastic brother, but would have to confess that he had but touched the periphery of the academic circle, whose courses cannot be expressed fully even by using the term *centrivism*. The student of the old order had the mill, but not the grain; the modern student has inherited a rich harvest of knowledge, but is not so well equipped with a mill to grind it fine. What was the nature of the scholastic mill?

MEDIAEVAL REALISM

If we wish to grasp Scholasticism and appropriate its value, we can do no better than lay hold of its great horns — Nominalism and Realism. The Schoolmen found this double-edged doctrine in Boethius (470-525); Boethius found it in Porphyry (233-303), who took it from Aristotle, who himself had found it in Plato, as Plato learned it from Socrates. From Boethius the doctrine went forward to such professionals as Roscellinus, William of Champeaux, and the delicious Abelard. At a later period of Scholasticism, Albertus Magnus seemed to settle the question, or draw it out of the field of discussion, so that scholastic differences thereafter were drawn along different lines when the Dominicans and Franciscans came to verbal blows. When Socrates taught his disciples to think in terms of universal ideas, little did he realize that he would start a mediaeval controversy, and just as little do we realize that the question concerning the nature of these Socratic universals is still with us. Before we can appreciate our Nominalism and our Realism, we must see how the Schoolmen felt about the matter.

Of course, their orthodox interest would be in the universal idea in all its solidarity. Their interest in the great issues of life — God, Man, Church, Sin, and Salvation — and their indifference to the minutiae of existence as we find these in metals, plants, animals, and the like would make them Realists. This term, by the way, had a meaning the very opposite of what it enjoys today and can better be understood in the form of "Idealism," Platonistic or objective idealism which means the reality of ideas. In the controversy over the nature of universals, the Nominalists insisted

that these were but convenient names, abstractions, or symbols. Apart from particular elms, pines, and palms, there would be no Tree; if it were not for the existent Peter and Paul, there would be no Man. The Realist, however, was of the opinion that the individual thing is only a specimen of the species, so that Man, Tree, and Metal mean more than just this Peter or that elm or the other bit of gold. When the ideas in dispute were those of God and Man, Church and Salvation, Realism became unusually important. If only the individual is real, God amounts to only the three separate persons in the Trinity, Man was not lost in Adam and saved through Christ, and the Church is not really Catholic, or universal. Roscellinus (c. 1050-c. 1122) insisted on Nominalism and rejected the idea that there was the same divine essence in the three persons of the Trinity even when he was driven to the doctrine of Tritheism. He was just as insistent in the case of Man, whose sin, he contended, was not the original, solidaric sin of Adam, but personal transgressions here and there.

It is not difficult to understand how the Church adopted the Realism taught by William of Champeaux, who all but did away with individuals and made so much of the one Universal as to approach Pantheism. Abelard helped matters somewhat and put the difficult doctrine in a more acceptable form. He was too much of a philosopher to agree with Roscellinus in saying that only particular things are real; he was too much interested in the affairs of this life, as his love affair with Eloise, to blot out all individuality as William of Champeaux had done. Hence Abelard invented a kind of Conceptualism according to which the universal is only a concept until it enters and exists in the individual, whereupon it becomes real. Later on Albertus Magnus pointed out that a thing has a nominalistic form when perceived, becomes conceptualistic when thought about, and is itself realistic in its metaphysical character.

If we wish to draw the line between mediaeval and modern, we can do so lightly and waveringly by attributing Realism to the Schoolmen and Nominalism to the scientists. There were Nominalists then as there are Realists now. They had their bold Roscellinus at the beginning of the period and their sharp William of Occam at the end. But the difference between the two Nomi-

nalists was this: the Nominalism of Roscellinus was a challenge to the scholastic spirit and ends in a triumphant Realism, while that of Occam was an invitation to the modern spirit to cultivate separate languages, develop special sciences, found independent States, and break up the old Caesarean-Catholic tradition. This new Nominalism was the spirit of the Renaissance and the Reformation, for it sought to release individual genius and private conscience.

REALISM TODAY

How does such a scholastic distinction affect us now that we are safely ensconced in Modernism and seven or eight centuries removed from the original conflict? It affects us practically whenever we are confronted by any sharp contrast between the individual and organized society. We may live day by day from hand to mouth after the manner of an irresponsible Nominalism emphasizing the inviolability of the individual and the self-determination of individual nations. But in time of war, the State assumes the form of Realism and exercises all manner of domination over the individual citizen, subjecting him to conscription, taxation, and the like. In a time of peace, such as has followed the World War, the Nominalism of nations is questioned on the ground that justice demands a League of Nations with authority over its nationalistic members. In special cases, as that of the German Empire before the war and the Russian Soviet since, the effects of Realism are observed in the way that a supreme and impersonal organization called "Reich" or "Soviet" assumes such an authority as to create the impression that it is a kind of entity in itself or something distinct from the individuals who compose it. As with mediaeval Realism, so with modern; it is when an organization, theological or political, desires to exercise supreme authority that Realism is resorted to. The difference is that mediaeval Realism was a conscious concept worked out by means of classic Conceptualism and scholastic logic, while modern Realism is less conscious and less rational.

The popular mind, which has no conception of scholastic philosophy, involves this Realism in matters that have interest for it.

In the spirit of mediaeval Realism, we refer to the Law as though it existed in independence of particular law-makers and individual statutes. At the present time we are complaining that there is little respect for Law, although we do not take pains to stipulate what law we have in mind. In like manner, we of the commercial age refer to Wealth as an entity apart from commodities and the prices we command. So fully convinced are we that Wealth exists that we refer to the desirability, the power, the menace of Wealth, and the like. In spite of individual liberties and states' rights, we talk about the Government as though it were a thing or even a person to be praised for prosperity and blamed for depression. Even when the religious community is divided along the heavy lines of Catholic, Protestant, and Jew, and subdivided into a manifold of Protestant sects, we are ready to speak of the Church and assert that it is behind the times or not doing its duty. We are inclined to regard the stock market as a reality and read reports to the effect that the Market was "steady" or "nervous" or "dull." When we try to think scientifically about society, we refer to it as a "social organism" or a "social consciousness," paying very little attention to the heterogeneous collection of individuals who compose it. In the same manner we say that Science says this or that, when science itself is made up of physics and chemistry, biology and psychology in their various branches.

MODERN NOMINALISM

On the side of modern Nominalism, we find the bold doctrines of individualists like Emerson, Max Stirner, Nietzsche, and Bernard Shaw. Men of this type see nothing over their heads but the blue sky — no Church or State or Society. They resist classification and refuse to be subordinated to an idea. In their minds, these circles of classification are like iron rings; hence they are inclined to say, "Let us burst their bands asunder and cast their cords from us." Emerson expressed this American Nominalism a century ago when he said, "Unhand me"; "the world is governed too much"; "good men must not obey the laws too well"; "keep the universe open"; "embroil the confusion." Such

Nominalists will go to extremes, as Max Stirner did when he said, "The truth is my truth." Stirner regarded the social order as a spook, just as Ibsen spoke of the solidaric traditions of society as "ghosts." But are we not haunted by the "ghosts" of Realism and Nominalism, systems that were supposed to have expired centuries ago?

These scholastic ways of handling fundamental ideas cling to us or we cling to them because they still represent true situations in the mind. Most of us are inclined to side with the Nominalists, who seem much more modern than the Realists; moreover, the Nominalists rejoiced in a spirit of independence which we gladly share. But deeper insight into the nature of things reveals the reappearance of Realism, although in an altered form. The great, general example of this Realism is in the modern conception of Natural Law, which latter must be taken to mean a real mode of behavior on the part of nature rather than a verbal statement of this made by the mind of man. A more specific example of modern Realism appears in the principle of evolution, which is to be understood as a force actually transforming inorganic matter, plants, and animals, and not a scientific theory, like *Insensible Variations* or *Sudden Mutations*, supposed to account for this. History also is deserving of a realistic interpretation in the sense that history is not merely a nominal record of events, but a realization of a force whereby these events come to pass. Our Nominalism is a constant protest against undue authority and excessive dogmatism. Beneath it is our Realism, which may be appreciated in the form of classic and scholastic universals in actual operation in nature and the civilization of mankind.

Our inability to entertain intelligent sympathy for mediaeval culture is due for the most part to the scientific education of the last four hundred years. In things pertaining to religion and political and social life, we are not so different; hence it is more our ideas than our values which have changed. In lesser ways, the popular mind shares the mediaeval spirit, so that the old notions of astrology, magic, and theosophy dog our steps in the form of our astrology, our numerology, and our Christian Science. It is chiefly in matters of faith and reason that we differ from the Schoolmen; we have neither the faith nor the logic that

once was theirs. We feel that we have emancipated ourselves from authority, and such in fact is the case, but we have fallen under the spell of the leader, the demagogue, the expert. Hence the advance that man has made since the end of the XIIIth century is but a fraction of what it is commonly believed to be.

THE FUSION OF PAGANISM AND CHRISTIANITY

From a purely cultural point of view, the mediaeval mind achieved something which has been impossible since: it brought about a fusion of pagan and Christian thought until finally, in the system of Thomas Aquinas, it raised the works of Aristotle to the authoritative rank of the books of the Bible. In a purely theoretical way it may be said that this indicates the ideal of European culture and that we are indebted to such a Schoolman as Aquinas for having made this fusion. The first period of mediaeval thought, used to mysticism, united Platonism with Christianity; this we observe in St. Augustine and Anselm. The second period employed Scholasticism to fuse the principles of Aristotle with the doctrines of the Church. The difficulty that was found with this pagan-Christian fusion was that it involved too much logic and metaphysics and too little science and art. The Church adopted Plato and Aristotle, but ignored Pheidias and Archimedes, with the result that, when the modern period set in, the tendency was to drop Plato's and Aristotle's syllogisms and lay hold of the lever of Archimedes.

We of the modern period are fond of referring to the narrowness of the mediaeval mind, forgetful of the fact that the Fathers of the Church and the Schoolmen were so intent upon truth as they conceived it that they were all but indifferent to its sources, whether pagan or Mohammedan. When the humanizing movement within the Church was inaugurated by the Franciscan and Dominican Friars, there was an acute demand for secular knowledge which, as they imagined, had to come from Aristotle's scientific works; but at the time these were available in only Arabic versions. However, the hatred of Christian for Mohammedan did not deter the scholastic Humanists from making good use of the Arabian Aristotelianism of Avicenna and Averroës. "The

large portion of the philosophy of Aristotle," said Roger Bacon, "received little attention either on account of the concealment of the copies of his works and their rarity, or on account of their difficulty or unpopularity, or on account of the wars in the East, till after the time of Mahomet, when Avicenna and Averroës and others recalled to the light of full exposition the philosophy of Aristotle."³ Now the rediscovery of Aristotle in the XIIIth century was akin to the rediscovery of Archimedes in the XVIth century. It made Scholasticism a complete system of thought.

AQUINAS AND ARISTOTLE

It was the work of Thomas Aquinas to round out scholastic culture, as it had been the office of Aristotle to summarize the thought of Classicism. Their positions in history are analogous and their methods akin; both alike rationalized the knowledge of their respective ages, and both fell short in the same particular—in astronomy and the mechanical conception of the universe. It is true that Aristotle accepted the idea that the earth is round, but he still maintained that it is the center of the universe, and his authority in this matter had much to do with checking the advance of the heliocentric theory surmised by the Greeks and later established by Copernicus. It was obvious that Aquinas should follow his ancient master in the more convenient doctrine of astronomy. But this shortcoming in the doctrine of Aquinas should not blind us to the merit of his intellectual achievement, which in itself was gigantic. For this great master of scholastic culture aspired to divide the whole universe into the realm of nature and the realm of grace. In dealing with the natural order, he proceeded historically and united the principles of Greek philosophy with the doctrines of Christianity. His method of theological procedure, conducted according to the logic of sacred history, was such as to relate the Creator to the creature and thus systematize the spiritual order. The result is that, while we do not follow either Aristotle or Aquinas directly, we have at our disposal the classic method of the one and the scholastic method of the other. These we may use as historical categories or forms of thought.

³ *Opus Majus*, tr. Burke, p. 63.

The Schoolmen went to Aristotle for the purpose of getting back to nature as a systematic whole, a cosmos worthy of the Creator. But with more patience and more scientific curiosity they might have developed their own philosophy of nature. Their Gothic architecture in its decorations revealed their interest in foliage and plant life generally. Roger Bacon's investigation of optics revealed interest in and insight into the phenomena of light and color. The pious naturalism of St. Francis is only another example of interest in the physical world. He who felt kinship in natural phenomena and could call the sun, the wind, and fire his brother, and the moon, the rain, the earth his sister could easily have been a guide in things natural as well as things spiritual. But the Church needed as an accompaniment for its spiritual order a well-organized mundane system, and that it found ready-made in Aristotle. If he had conveyed to the Church those physical conceptions—the mechanics of Archimedes and the atomic theory of Democritus—they might or might not have been accepted on the authority of the ancient master who supplied the mediaeval mind with its cosmic conceptions. If Aristotle had mastered ancient mechanics and the Schoolmen had adopted his views, modern science would have begun at least two centuries earlier.

ROGER BACON

The science enjoyed by mediaeval culture can be summed up in a name—Roger Bacon (c. 1214–1294). The name “Bacon” is unfortunate for the reason that it is commonly associated with that of Francis Bacon, who appeared three and a half centuries later and received credit for the introduction of intellectual novelties peculiar to the Bacon of the XIIIth century. If Francis had lived in the days of Roger, he would never have done any of the latter's work except perhaps Part Three of the *Opus Majus*, which has to do with “The Study of Tongues.” If Roger had lived in the age of Francis, all of the former's glances in the direction of experimental science would have become full vision. Roger availed himself of such opportunities as he had and initiated what may well be called the scientific method. Francis, who affected

interest in science and spoke enthusiastically of its powers, was not the type of mind to appreciate actual research and mathematical calculation. The two men differ on the most important point in modern science—the application of mathematics to all problems. Roger accepted this, Francis rejected it.⁴ The modern Bacon refused to accept Copernican astronomy and, defective as he was in modern physics generally, he failed as well to measure up to the new ideal in politics expressed in the notion of *jus naturale*, for the term *jus* in the sense of a rational principle of rights distinct from any legal code does not appear in his writings.⁵ Hence, when comparisons are made, all the advantage is upon the side of the Franciscan Friar of Oxford. The Bacon whom we are to bear in mind in the history of science is thus Roger, not Francis.

The intrinsic importance of Roger Bacon is likely to be measured on the basis of sympathy for his spirit and age. The Catholic will extol his greatness and make of him a *doctor mirabilis* indeed; the Protestant, already pledged to Francis, Lord Bacon, will be inclined to regard the Franciscan Friar as little more than a curiosity. When, however, we take a historical point of view we find it difficult to deny genuine greatness and a distinct touch of modernness to a man who, in the heart of the XIIIth century, was dreaming dreams that came not true until more than centuries had passed. In paying tribute to *Fratri Rogerio dicto Bacon*, we must admit his limitations. These were the scholastic inhibitions of his own mind and the ecclesiastical prohibitions of his own age. He was not allowed to investigate beyond the shadow of the Church, but he did not care to. He accepted the absolute authority of the Scriptures, regarded theology as the queen of the sciences, and after having glorified, in his *Opus Majus*, mathematics and experimental science, concludes with an attempted proof of transubstantiation. However, if we are forced to consider Bacon the child of his age, his quasi-modern ideas are such as to evince the advanced intellectuality of his age. What matters it then if other Oxonians of that period, Robert Grosseteste and Adam Marsh, were equally adept in mathematics

⁴ *Novum Organum*, Lib. II, 5.

⁵ Lermnier, *Histoire du Droit*, Int. 113.

and science generally? They with Bacon speak for the science of those cloistered days.

Roger Bacon's desire to reform learning within the Church expressed itself in Part One of his *Opus Majus*, where the author considers "The Causes of Error." These are four in number: submission to faulty and unworthy authority, the influence of custom, popular prejudice, and the personal concealment of ignorance. Roger Bacon cites these intellectual obstacles to truth-finding with no such flourish of rhetoric as one finds in Francis Bacon's discussion of the four idols, the famous *Idola*. Indeed the earlier Bacon makes mention of these mental faults as things that have long been known and finds the equivalent of them in a number of sacred and profane writers, whom he cites. The only possible criticism of the man whose mind was keen enough to discern such impediments to knowledge is that his mind was not so strong in overcoming them in the case of his own thinking. For he followed authority and was influenced by custom, although he was not so susceptible to popular prejudice and personal pride.

The chief merits of this XIIIth-century thinker were intellectual enthusiasm and scientific imagination. He set for himself as the boundaries of his intellect the walls of the Church and the covers of the Bible, but within those self-imposed limits his thought intensified itself. He accuses the men of his day, the *moderni*, of neglecting mathematics, which he regards as the gateway to the sciences. "For the things of this world cannot be made known," said he, "without a knowledge of mathematics." Bacon believed in the application of mathematics to astronomy, or "theoretical astrology," and geography. By such means, Bacon pointed out the error in the contemporary calendar and calculated that it had gained one day in every one hundred and thirty years. He calculated the size of the earth. He accepted the Biblical idea of the rainbow as the divine promise that the earth would never again undergo a deluge, but then proceeded to give a geometrical explanation of the phenomenon.

For the most part, Bacon's science was of a wistful character or that which could be if only we were in possession of the proper

instruments. He made a thorough study of optics and observed the magnifying power of lenses, but seems to have had no telescope or microscope. "In this way," said he, "a child might appear a giant, and a man a mountain. . . . So also we might cause the sun, moon, and stars in appearance to descend here below."⁶ In his *Opus Tertium*, Bacon refers to the possibilities of gunpowder and seems to anticipate the invention of explosive shells all too well known today. In like manner, he mentions the possibility of mechanical boats which might be propelled at tremendous speed, as also of flying machines. But these things, as in the parallel case of Leonardo da Vinci, are spoken of on the authority of imagination rather than upon the basis of practical reason and inventive power. His very limitations are of interest to us in that they testify to the state of that culture which he shared with his most enlightened contemporaries.

DANTE

The vital conception of mediaeval culture, or Scholasticism, was such as to provide an adequate place for the poet Dante. It is the fashion to speak of this supreme poet as a detached figure or a personality that merely happened to be born, but any intimate acquaintance with his *Divina Commedia* will suffice to show that his verse is more in harmony with the theology than with the poetry of his day. At the risk of being inaccurate for the sake of being clear, let us say of Dante's poem that it was the theology of Thomas Aquinas set to music. The Gothic architects could make art out of Scholasticism, Dante was able to create stanzas out of Thomism. Theology encompasses his poetry, but within this framework, which seems never to have irritated him, there is the pure poetry that we recognize in his earlier efforts, when as a troubadour or first of the sonneteers he wrote more lightly of his lady love. The worldliness of this orthodox poet appears throughout his poem much after the manner of naturalistic decoration and delicate adornment in an awful Gothic cathedral. This appears at once in the introduction of a pagan poet rather than the Christian Savior; it appears again, in the *Paradiso*,

⁶ *Opus Majus*, tr. Burke, p. 582.

when Dante is saved by a contemporary Florentine woman instead of the eternal Virgin Mary.

The realism, or naturalism, of Dante is likely to be overlooked by those who are impressed by his awful vision of the Catholic hereafter in an Inferno, Purgatory, and Paradise. We are wont to believe that the poet should choose poetical, that is, beautiful and impressive, objects to supply the figurative forms for his verse, and this does Dante do in the guise of earth and sky, sea and mountain, river and tree; each of the three books ends with the word "stars." But not these alone, for his imagination leads him into regions where even a Shakespeare would have difficulty in poetizing the inconspicuous and repulsive things of the terrestrial order. The genius of Dante, enamored of the splendid things in life — angels, princes, and beautiful women — balks not at the mention of the gross and contemptible — cats, dogs, gnats, flies, eels, frogs, mice, lizards, crabs. Indeed, in one of the most sublime portions of the *Commedia*, where Beatrice leads the poet into Paradise, Dante cannot avoid a rather unlikely comparison of stars and fish.

The appearance of Beatrice herself is likened to the rising of some new star in the firmament. When her face beams upon the skies, the other celestial orbs, entranced by her beauty, flock about her and in full chorus exclaim, "Behold one who will increase our loves." This is delicious boldness on the part of the bard and certainly not bad poetry. But not content with this celestial similitude, Dante presses a very earthly analogy, for he likens the celestial enthusiasm of the stars to the hunger of fish which are wont to swarm to some likely spot when any one with food appears on the shore of a lake.⁷ Dante's naturalism goes even further. He beholds the redeemed souls leaving the last circle of Purgatory and preparing to enter Paradise. They rush together and greet one another with a holy kiss. In the poet's fancy, this assembling and greeting seems like a group of ants coming together and rubbing muzzle to muzzle.⁸ All in all, these touches of realism in our sense of the term indicate both the penetrating intuitions of a XIIIth-century Dante and the century's longing for nature. However, Dante did not emanci-

⁷ *Paradiso*, V, 97-102.

⁸ *Purgatorio*, XXVI, 25-30.

pate himself from Scholasticism nor did he for a moment wish to; what he did was to make a pilgrimage through the mediaeval State and Church and School. It is the account of this that we have in the form of the *Divine Comedy*. But the sun of modern thought was beginning to shine even then, with the result that it is in a formal way only that we can refer to Dante as mediaeval. He wrote in a modern language rather than in Latin, and his six-hundred-year-old poem is readable to the modern citizen of Florence. Dante was exceptional, different, modern; we return to stated Scholasticism when we refer to its realism.

THE OLD SCHOLASTICISM AND THE NEW

We were not specially concerned with the scholastic quarrel between the Realists and Nominalists until we discovered that we, too, have our modern Realism in the social sciences, our Nominalism in egoistic rebellions. Just as little and just as much are we interested in the famous dispute between the Franciscans and Dominicans on the subject, "Is the good good because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good?" Theologically we may be free from such a dialectical entanglement, but psychologically we are highly implicated. This is because the view taken by the Franciscans exalts the will to the extremes of voluntarism and irrationalism, while the more staid conception of the Dominicans lifts the process of cognition above the sphere of action. Let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind which he prizes more highly — his analyzing, defining intellect or his active, creative will. List some of your intellectualists and you will find Kapila of the Sankhyam school in old India, Socrates, Plato, Spinoza, Hegel, and idealists generally. Make out a parallel list and there appear the names of Patanjali of the ancient Hindu Yogins, perhaps Aristotle, St. Augustine, Duns Scotus, Kant, Schopenhauer, and the Pragmatists. It was Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308), the Franciscan monk and professor of theology at Oxford and Paris, who precipitated this XIIIth-century problem. It seemed to him that the personality and freedom of man were at stake.

Duns Scotus, like Kant, was intent upon saving free will in

both God and man. He desired to exalt omnipotence above fate and necessity. It would have been possible, he argued, for God to have created a different kind of world or no world at all. "The will is superior to the intellect — *voluntas superior est intellectu*." In the sublime instance of the Divine Being, it is well known, argues this humanistic Franciscan, that God revised the law of Moses in favor of the law of Christ; and He has as much authority to exempt us from the moral law that now is, in favor of some future law. Scotus saw this in the light of the Church's indulgences, but we may choose to regard it as a futuristic way of passing from old duties to new obligations. In a certain sense, the futurism of Ibsen and Nietzsche is implied by the voluntarism of this bold Franciscan.

If we are timid, reactionary, conservative, we will cling to our Thomism and repose in the idea that the great issues of life are settled. If we are bold, radical, and progressive, we will rejoice in our Scotism with its supremacy of the will. In the historic case of Duns Scotus, while he himself escaped the charge of heresy but was never canonized, the way for the future was cut. The Deity was allowed to provide a new form of religious life for mankind, while man himself received thereby the privilege of being free to choose among both doctrines and acts. Scotus himself did not fall back into the formalism of Realism and Nominalism, since his thought was too energetic for such passivity. As a Schoolman he had to express himself in the terminology of his time; hence he calls Realism and regularism by the name of *quidditas*, reserving the name of *haecceitas* for the individualist. Our *Quidditati* are the regulars, the stand-patters; our *Haecceitati* are the individualists, the non-conformists. No matter which party is in the right, the haecceitism of Duns Scotus was modernistic. It prepared the way for the vehicle of another of those delightfully human Franciscans — William of Occam (? - c. 1349). His was a living Nominalism that led mankind into the modern world.

In leaving Scholasticism behind us, it will be well to repeat what we said at the beginning — that Scholasticism is more of a mental state than a historical period. Intellectual formalism, for that is what it is essentially, has long been in the world and

shows a tendency to continue. Is there any Scholasticism at the present time? Certainly not in the mediaeval sense since we rejoice in different methods, yet our Scientism is not wholly innocent of scholastic tone. So pronounced is this that Bergson laments the rise of "a certain new Scholasticism that has grown up during the latter half of the nineteenth century around the physics of Galileo as the old Scholasticism grew up around Aristotle."⁹

⁹ *Creative Evolution*, tr. Mitchell, p. 370.

CHAPTER XI

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN MIND



ARE WE MODERN?

ARE WE OF THIS AGE "MODERN"? IF SO, WHAT DO WE MEAN BY that term? These look like simple questions and the answers to them appear forthcoming, but such is hardly the case. We cannot apply the term "modern," still less relish it, until we have identified and analyzed it. The intellectual history of Europe shows us that the term was used in the VIth century by Cassidorus and that it appears here and there in the writings of the Schoolmen, as Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon. The idea of modernity was vivid in the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation, although both artist and religionist revealed a tendency to revert to the past — to paganism, to primitive Christianity. The contrast between ancient and modern was brought out in the French literature of the XVIIth century in the famous quarrel between *les anciens* and *les modernes*, conducted upon the alleged superiority of the modern over the ancient poet and *vice versa*; a quarrel between Fontenelle and Boileau, to mention only the outstanding figures involved therein. The distinction between ancient and modern was made clear psychologically by Schiller in his essay *On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry* (1795). In the year 1800, Friedrich Schlegel made this distinction the basis of the difference between the ancient Classicist and the modern Romanticist. Of course, the chronological interval between ancient Greece and modern Europe had not escaped anybody's attention, but the inward differences between the two cultures had not been appreciated.

We are different from the Greeks and Romans, but in what ways? We refer to them as the "ancients," but as an accurate statement of fact the word "moderns" seems out of place with us. Were not the Greeks the moderns in their youthfulness, and are not we in our maturity the true ancients? As far back as the

days of Priscian (VIth century), something of this sort was suggested in connection with the idea that knowledge is such a steady growth as to provide for the accumulation of wisdom. Roger Bacon furthered the idea when he said, "Priscian says . . . that there is no perfection in human discoveries and adds, 'the younger the investigators the more acute,' because the younger, that is these of a later age, in the progress of time possess the labors of their predecessors."¹ But these mediaevalists only implied what was stated in the early part of the modern period, as we must call it, by Giordano Bruno (c. 1550-1600) and Francis Bacon (1561-1626). These moderns, as we are bound to call them, asserted that in reality we are the ancients. All four thinkers would convey the impression that a present age, VIth or XIIIth, XVIth or XVIIth century, is the wisest because it represents the sum total of knowledge up to that time. We are not so certain of that, but we are reasonably satisfied to apply the term modern to ourselves and our predecessors in the last five hundred years.

This introduces a second question: when and where did modernity begin? In attempting an answer, we must realize that history as a force moves forward in time and is written backward as a record. Time is an irreversible process, hence we can only think back and cannot go back to an earlier period. The historical process of thinking back may lead to an occasional illusion. We might imagine Homer as saying, "I am an ancient poet"; or fancy that Dante might refer to himself as a "mediaeval bard" in the way that Goethe would surely have referred to himself as a "modern maker of verses." But doubtless Homer and Dante in their respective ages thought of themselves as quite up-to-date, or as moderns in their own world. Furthermore, in ages to come, these distinctions that we make so easily, so confidently, may be blotted out by the historians of the far-flung future. But let us see if we can fixate modernity in time and locate it in space.

The geographical location of modernity may be settled at once by saying "Europe." Asia has had a much longer history, but it is not broken up into a threefold division such as we see in the

¹ *Opus Majus*, tr. Burke, p. 15.

western world. From our point of view, all of Asia, except where Occidentals have modernized it, belongs to the ancient order. America, on the other side of the world, has nothing but modern history; its mediaevalism and antiquity do not count. If, now, we choose to be more precise, we might locate the beginning of modernity at the place where antiquity left off — in Italy. This would identify the inception of the modern period with the Italian Renaissance and might convey the impression that our age at its beginning was only a revived antiquity, a rebirth of some sort, a scientific and artistic revival. This is an impression we desire to avoid, although in doing so we would not for a moment try to unseat the Renaissance from its lofty position. What we desire to point out is that the mediaevals approached the Renaissance and that the true moderns left it behind, so that this little transitional period betrays the shade of Scholasticism on the one side and the light of modern science on the other.

FEATURES OF MODERN THOUGHT

Why were not the Schoolmen the *moderni*, as they called themselves? Why did not the Renaissance begin in the XIIIth century, when Europe was building its Gothic cathedrals and founding its universities? Why could not Dante have been the aesthetic prophet and Roger Bacon the scientific guide? Doubtless there were inherent reasons for the delay in inaugurating the modern era, but there was also an exterior one — the XIVth century. By the time it had arrived, the mediaeval mind had exhausted all its resources. The age had its Niccolo Pisano and Petrarch, its Cimabue and Giotto. But what we like to call the stream of history did not flow smoothly from period to period. It tarried a century between the end of Scholasticism and the beginning of the Renaissance and experienced both plague and battle, the Black Death and the Hundred Years' War. But the presence of exhaustion, disease, and conflict was no more conspicuous than the absence of things that were to make up the Renaissance. Something positive and new was needed.

The general features of the modern movement were the Italian

Renaissance and the German Reformation. Associated with these were the Revival of Learning and Humanism. These were expressions of the new movement and they operated in the capacity of both cause and effect. They were conditions without which modernity could not have come into existence. If these overlapping and interweaving movements confuse us, they were not any clearer to those who lived through them. The minds of those days were aware that something was going on about them, the way people of today are sensible of what is happening in connection with Evolution, Relativity, Radio, Aircraft, and the League of Nations. They, like us, appreciated what they did not understand, and probably they were inclined to say in their own way, "We live in a great age."

The ingredients of the new movement so European in tone had still something oriental about them. This appears in the Chinese art of paper-making, the manufacture of gunpowder, and the art of printing. The same oriental leaning appears in the zeal for navigation, which led to voyages on the sea, as the crusades had led to journeys eastward by land, and it was for the purpose of reaching the East by a long westward passage that Columbus set forth. The Near East influenced the new movement without meaning to, when Constantinople fell into the hands of the Turks, whereby the more scholarly of the one-time Christian population rushed to Italy bearing Greek manuscripts, although Greek scholars had come to Florence in 1438, or fifteen years before the fall of the Eastern Empire. The old European world figured in the new enterprise. The physics of Archimedes displaced the metaphysics of Aristotle and the geographical or astronomical basis upon which circumnavigating voyages were made was the old Greek idea that the earth is round. Copernican astronomy did not appear until the middle of the next century, or 1543, and was not made an issue until Galileo tried to popularize it and Kepler had reduced it to the principles of natural law. It was in 1609 that Kepler published his *Astronomia Nova*, a quarter of a century later that Galileo was imprisoned for insisting upon his vision of the new heavens.

The early modern or pre-modern mind was furnished for its work by art and religion, the products of Italy and Germany

expressed in the systematic historical form of movements — the Renaissance and the Reformation. Modernity as such was destined to be a much sterner matter, based upon physics and politics. But the sentiment of early modernity, the tone of the age in which we ourselves are living came forth in a genial manner, breathing the air of freedom due to the emancipation of the intellect and senses. Moreover, it was necessary for the modern age to be financed. Greek culture had been made possible by the profits of slave labor; the enlightenment that began in the XIXth century followed upon the wealth afforded by the Industrial Revolution; the Renaissance had its purse in the wealth of the Indies that followed upon voyages of discovery. But the new movement itself can be identified in the simple form of books and pictures, fruits of the new arts of printing and painting.


THE ART OF PRINTING

The modern mind, as something public and democratic as distinguished from private and aristocratic, was manufactured by the printing press. At the present time, reading is almost coterminous with living, so that we are inclined to take from the printed page what otherwise might be acquired by our own powers of attention and memory. The "Press" in the form of newspaper, magazine, and book makes our modern existence extensive, but this often at the expense of the intensive and original. We cannot think or live without "reading matter," as we call it. But this was not the case five hundred years ago, when the modern mind was beginning to emerge from Scholasticism. The reading matter with which in some measure we could dispense was the very thing needed to nourish the modern spirit; hence the importance of the first printing press. When, therefore, we are calling the restricted roll of pioneer names and are making mention of Columbus and Copernicus, Leonardo da Vinci and Martin Luther, we should not omit the name of Johan Gänßfleisch, who is better known by his patrician name of Gutenberg.


Gutenberg's printing press, set in operation at Mainz about 1450, deserves to be compared in point of effect with Watt's

steam engine of some three hundred years later. Prior to the Gutenberg press was the xylography, or wood-printing, of Laurens Janszoon Coster in Haarlem, and prior to this noted Hollander the Chinese with the block-and-page printing or stamping. Like Gutenberg, who borrowed from him, Coster used an alphabetical form of printing in the form of separate letters made first of wood, then of metal; but the combination of alphabetical type and a printing press was the work of the great Gutenberg. There was nothing amateurish in the mind of this first printer nor did he regard his new machine as a toy. As soon as its few simple parts were assembled, he made it "strike off" none other work than the Bible! This was the Latin version and it made its appearance at about the time Constantinople was falling and its Greek scholars were flying to Italy with those Greek manuscripts about which we hear so much.

The art of printing was a Germanic affair with its centers of activity in Mainz and Strassburg, as also Haarlem, just as the art of painting was an Italian matter located at Florence, Venice, and Milan. But there were printers in Italy also before the great masters had touched their canvases. William Caxton gave England the typographical art when, in 1477, he printed *Dictes and Notable Wise Sayings of the Philosophers*. The multiplication of presses and the spread of printed works were extraordinary. This we may gather from the work of modern bibliographers who have catalogued the *Incunabula*, or Cradle Works, which include the books printed before the year 1500. The number of *Incunabula* enumerated by Hain in his *Repertorium Bibliographicum* (1828-1838) was 16,299, but it is probable that a complete list would increase this to 20,000. This typographical activity was checked somewhat by conflicts peculiar to the Reformation and was retarded by the Civil War in England as well as by the Restoration, so that the press as a machine underwent little improvement until two centuries had passed, when it was remodeled by the Dutch mechanic Willem Jansen Blaeu. But the original press, as comparable to a modern high-speed rotary printing machine as a wheelbarrow to an automobile, had done its work. It was indeed a "cradle" for infant books, and now its children overrun the whole earth.



"MOSES." MICHELANGELO



DETAIL FROM THE "LAST SUPPER." LEONARDO DA VINCI
(facing page 265)

MODERN PAINTING

But there were pictures as well as books, and the art of painting served to free the senses in the way that the art of printing had released the intellect. The way for the proud parade of Italian painters had been prepared in the XIIIth century by the frescoes of Cimabue and Giotto. It was not to end until it had seen the appearance of Leonardo da Vinci's *Last Supper* on the wall of the Dominican convent of Santa Maria delle Gracie in Milan, Michelangelo's frescoes on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, and Raphael's *School of Athens* and other frescoes in the Vatican. While it is here inconvenient to give an account of Italian painting, it is refreshing to recall the names of those who made the Italian Renaissance immortal in beauty. In Florence we see the work of Masaccio, Filippo Lippi, Botticelli, Verrocchio, Ghirlandajo, Lorenzo di Credi, Piero di Cosimo, and others. In Venice and the north we have another list including Mantegna, the Vivarini, the Bellini, Giorgione, Palma Vecchio, Lorenzo Lotto, and Titian. To these names must be added those of Dürer and Holbein in Germany, Rembrandt and Frans Hals in Holland, Rubens and Van Dyck in Flanders, Murillo and Velasquez in Spain. Their works are evidence that Europe was living in a new world, although perhaps a world it did not fully understand.

It would be grievously misleading if we pressed the analogy between printing and painting to the point of styling the works of the old masters as *incunabula* in art, and even with the Italian primitives any such suggestion of imperfection would be out of place. In science it is quite natural to advance step by step from a stage of lesser to greater enlightenment, since science corrects its errors, overcomes its shortcomings, and advances to the new that is believed true. But in art there is no such evolution. Each age completes its work and lets another begin *de novo*, hence we cannot consider Renaissance art superior to Gothic architecture; still less can we regard the modern painter as more "advanced" than the old artist. Nevertheless we are privileged to make comments upon old canvases for the purpose of placing ourselves in a position properly appreciative.

Something by way of criticism has been indicated already by our impromptu distinction between the old "artist" and the modern "painter."

In making this general distinction, we may observe further that the artist of the older school seemed to be more interested in what he painted than the way in which he executed his work, or in subject matter rather than technical treatment. Technique there was as one sees in Florentine drawing and Venetian coloring, technique of a high order in the modeling of Michelangelo, the composition evident upon a canvas by Raphael, and both lighting and perspective in the superb art of Leonardo. Likewise was there some indifference to subject matter with Rembrandt. But for the most part the artist of the Renaissance was not so given up to mere brushwork that he felt free to ignore the merits of the object his brush was to place upon the canvas. That is a tendency distinctly modern in our sense of that term and it is impossible to think of any one of the old masters being inspired by the aesthetical ideal of "no representation of the recognizable." Perhaps these old masters were not "painters," but merely "illustrators," just as their ideal of aesthetics was not such as to have them make painting an absolute art. But we may be thankful that they gave full expression to their "mediævalism" four hundred years before painting passed into the hands of the Naturalists and Impressionists, the Cubists and Futurists. Their paintings did lack life and atmosphere, but this is atoned for by the authentic presence of grace and dignity.

THE SPIRIT OF THE RENAISSANCE

If we wish to feel the difference between the Renaissance and modernity, we need only distinguish between art and science. If we would stipulate more exactly, we can attribute the art of painting to the one and the science of physics to the other, for the Renaissance gave us beautiful canvases, modernity presented us with maps, charts, and formulas. There was some science in the earlier period and some art in the later one, but the overlapping of these areas cannot obscure the distinction between them. The combination of the two enterprises is found best in

the brain of that great Renaissance individual — Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519). He produced no work comparable to Newton's *Principia*, but he wrote a notebook which in a way might be compared with the *Opus Majus* of Roger Bacon before him. Both thinkers, scholastic and renascent, betray a wistfulness; neither is in a mood or a position to go to work in a distinctly modern way.

This enthusiasm for the new age not yet defined or developed is shown by Rabelais (1490-1553), who sensed the age and sought to interpret its spirit. This was expressed so deftly in "Gargantua's" letter to his son, "Pantagruel," that his words are worth quoting at some length:

"The age was still dark and smacking of the unhappiness and calamity of the Goths, who had destroyed all good literature; but by the grace of God light and dignity has in my time been restored to Letters, and now I see therein such improvement that at present I would hardly be admitted to the first class of primary pupils, I who in my prime was not unjustly regarded as the wisest man of the age. . . . The whole world is full of savants, learned teachers, ample libraries, so that it seems to me that not even in the time of Plato, Cicero, nor Papinian was there such facility for study as one sees now. Now all studies are restored, the languages installed: Greek without which it is shameful for a man to call himself a scholar, Hebrew, Chaldean, Latin; these exact and elegant printed books invented in my time by divine inspiration just as, on the other hand, artillery by diabolical suggestion."²

THE GERMAN REFORMATION

The German Reformation differed from the Italian Renaissance in the sense that the religious movement was destined to become an integral part of modern life, while the artistic one was to lead to something less effulgent and then itself subside. From the Protestant point of view, the Reformation was intended originally to correct abuses in the Church, primarily the sale of indulgences. From the Catholic standpoint, such a cor-

² *Pantagruel* (1532), Ch. VIII.

rection was thoroughly justified on moral grounds. The consistent Catholic has no defense of the corruption that had crept into the Church. The only question in the Catholic mind is whether such a moral motive should have led to revolt and schism.³ The effect seems indeed much greater than the cause. The early Protestant seemed to seek revision of dogma as well as reformation of morals within the Church, but it is a question whether the Protestant was any more liberal than the conservative he was opposing. Was Calvin any more agreeable to the modern heart than Aquinas had been to the mediaeval spirit? The disinterested observer is likely to conclude that the change effected by Protestantism was not the change from authority to freedom, but the change from the authority of the Church to that of the Bible. It is significant to observe at this point that it was the Germans who effected this change. A German printer inaugurated his art by printing the Bible, a German translated the Bible for the Reformation, and it was German scholarship that, by means of a critical study of the Scriptures, began to lead us away from blind bibliolatry. The neutral observer is likely to conclude, moreover, that Protestantism, as we still call it, was not due to any isolated cause in Christendom, but was only a phase of the whole movement toward modernity.

So much has been written about the ecclesiastical side of the Reformation and so little about the economic aspect of the movement that it may be well to consider how the reformer affected the shop as well as the Church. The usual causes of the Reformation have been ascribed to something ethical and intellectual in connection with the conduct and thought of the XVIth century. Thus it is assumed that the Reformation arose as a desire to correct moral abuses and provide for private judgment, both matters of conscience. Doubtless there was need of these two improvements throughout all Christendom, but the movement sprang from something more than the desire for better living and clearer thinking. On the ethical side of the question, the history of the papacy suggests that the Church was most worldly two centuries before the Reformation began. Then, the German princes were no more moral than the Italian, while the reign of Henry VIII

³ Article "Reformation," *Catholic Encyclopedia*.

showed that scandals could flourish in countries that had freed themselves from the yoke of Rome as well as in those that were still under the domination of the Eternal City. The ethical seems to have been the best way of presenting the new cause, the most feasible way of rationalizing the new movement, since the ethical appeal is direct and universal.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL AND THE ECONOMIC

On the intellectual side, in the matter of a free conscience and private judgment, there is no reason to believe that the Church stood in the individual's light, certainly not in matters of science. Copernicus was allowed to publish his revolutionary work on science; indeed, the Church published it for him and thus began what some have called "Catholic astronomy," which, we might add, was rejected by Luther and Melancthon. The Inquisition had not developed an *index expurgatoris* and before the Fifth Lateran Council books were not subjected to censorship. Moreover, a kind of gentle skepticism with a fringe of heresy was a mark of good breeding among even high officials in the Church, and to Leo X is attributed the comment that Christianity was "a highly profitable fable." We may feel assured that Rome, like every large city, was probably more tolerant of intellectual differences than Wittenberg or Geneva. The intellectual cause of the Reformation is even more inadequate than the ethical one.

An explanation of the Reformation has been advanced in such a way as to make the movement a political one springing from an economic cause. This appears in Germany's refusal to pay tribute to a foreign power, a conscious opposition to the transfer of wealth from Germany to Rome by the sale of benefices, dispensations, and indulgences. Another grievance was forthcoming in the enormous landed estate of the Church, as also its uncontrolled and arbitrary policy of taxation. The foremost proponent of this theory is Henry C. Lea, author of *On the Eve of the Reformation*.⁴ In this essay, the author calls attention to the fact that, in the indictment of the papacy drawn up by Ulrich von Hutten and addressed to Leo X, in 1517, there is absolutely

⁴ *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. I, Ch. XIX.

no mention of faith or doctrine but rather the bitter accusation that the Church was using its power to enrich itself and impoverish Germany. As a matter of fact Luther himself gave clear expression to this motive.

"How is it," asked he, "that we Germans are found to suffer such theft and exploitation by the Pope? . . . I think that Germany gives much more now to Rome and the Pope than it did former days to the emperors. Yes, many of us think that every year 300,000 gulden go forth from Germany to Rome purely in vain, and in return we get derision and abuse. And then we wonder that princes, nobles, cities, and monasteries laud and people grow poor! We ought rather to wonder that we still have something to eat. . . ." ⁵

This was in Germany, and it must be remembered that Church exactions were not so great in other countries as, for example, in France, where by the XVIth century a strong monarchical and national power had arisen which saw to it that there was no large transfer of monies to Rome. There are still other considerations which suggest that the passionate piety of the Reformation as a movement, and the Protestantism that came out of it, had certain strong roots of a worldly sort. This appears in the old question of usury. It is by no accident that the first systematic defense of interest was made by Calvin. Catholic ethics and canon law forbade the charging of interest on the ground that it was usury; but without the right to charge interest and thus create the commercial use of money, there could have been no commercial expansion and, therefore, no capitalistic economy. Now, Calvin in his famous letter on interest defended the right to charge the same on the ground that lending money was both a form of self-denial and a risk. This was a decided change from the Catholic point of view, from Catholic ethics; that is, as far as the element of risk was concerned. St. Augustine, in attempting to prove "that the saints in their loss of things temporal lose nothing at all," quoted from the Sermon on the Mount with the well-known injunction, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth." ⁶ But such a mystical attitude toward wealth was not in harmony with the demands of the new commercial economy.

⁵ *An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation.* ⁶ *City of God*, Ch. IX.

PROTESTANTISM AND CAPITALISM

In the development of the modern system of economics, Protestantism played an important part in connection with the modern idea of work as well as with that of wealth. Man was supposed to work for the glory of God and fulfill the ideal of a divine will by the constant exercise of the human one. But under Catholic economy this was no simple matter, since there were more than a hundred holidays in the course of a year and in them man was not supposed to labor. How could industry flourish under a regime in which a third of the time was devoted to leisure? Here, again, the demands of an expanding economy were bound to cry out for a reform that was as much social as religious. "Protestantism, by changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays, plays an important part in the genesis of capital."⁷

Probably the most significant work on the economic aspects of Protestantism has come from Max Weber and his *Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*.⁸ In this exhaustive and highly detailed work, the author traces the interrelation between the spirit of economic enterprise and the Protestant ideal. The thesis that he maintains is that the Protestant ethics which regards "restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling as the highest means to asceticism" functioned in a concrete way "as the most powerful lever conceivable for the expansion of the spirit of capitalism." Weber tries to steal a march on the economic interpretation of Protestantism by claiming that, since the spirit of capitalism flourished before the existence of the capitalistic system and since Protestantism gave rise to the spirit of capitalism, it is therefore more accurate to say that Protestantism was the cause of capitalism than the reverse.

There is a connection between these ecclesiastical and economic movements in early modern times. But what suggested to Weber the idea that Protestantism brought capitalism into being? There was this: the historical fact that capitalism with its rational economic technique had developed primarily in Protestant countries. To look at England and Ireland, Germany and France is to

⁷ Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 303.

⁸ Eng. trans. by Talcott (1930).

realize this. But even more important for Weber's thesis is the observation that, in general, workers brought up in an intensely evangelical atmosphere were inclined to take their work more seriously, labor more diligently, and live more frugally than workers in the old, traditional environment. Weber seems to feel that this correlation was more than accidental. We ourselves can appreciate what will happen when a man's religious faith makes him work more faithfully and live more frugally than one of another faith is doing. He will naturally make more money and spend less; the result will be accumulated wealth for investment.

Now, by capitalism Weber does not mean the impulse to acquire wealth or sharp business practice in so doing. These are the characteristics of men generally in every economic system and cannot be attributed to capitalism in particular. Capitalism is the pursuit of profit in the form of "forever renewed profit by means of a continuous rational enterprise." By the spirit of capitalism Weber means a social ethics which permitted the rise of rational economy and which opposed traditional restraints to the accumulation of wealth as these were derived from feudal Catholicism.

An illustration of the ethical side of capitalism is furnished by the writings of Benjamin Franklin. Weber does not fail to note that Franklin tended to inculcate a social morality based upon the idea of getting ahead in the world. Time is money and wasting time the "greatest prodigality." All the virtues such as industry, frugality, and punctuality are means of saving both time and money. When Franklin enunciates the maxim that "honesty is the best policy," the old copy-book motto, he departs from an ethical sanction of goodness in itself for an economic principle of policy. In like manner, beauty is subordinated to utility and work becomes an end in itself. From Weber's point of view, the emergence of such an ethics was necessary as a precedent for establishing the increase and productivity of labor without which the accumulation of capital could not take place. But how did such a commercialized form of ethics arise? Weber answers this question by attributing capitalistic ethics to the dogmas of the Protestant sects.

CALVINISTIC AND PURITAN ECONOMICS

The essence of Calvinism and Puritanism is found in the way it tends to arrange life in the form of general or worldly asceticism. The Protestant sects rejected the idea of special or monastic asceticism peculiar to the Catholic faith and introduced instead a general and evangelical form of ascetic practice. All the world became a kind of monastery; all of life in even its secular employment a kind of divine calling. Only the pursuit of this calling, only this narrow life could be pleasing to God. Man could not win grace through the Church with its sacraments, still less by leisure, enjoyment, and meditation; man could win grace only by the labor of his hands after the manner of Him who said, "I must work the works of him who sent me while it is day." From this general presentation of Protestant belief, Weber goes on to analyze the writings of Calvin, Baxter, and Wesley, which reveal to him their faith in the concept of a divine calling of all men on earth, as also the way in which such methodical devotion naturally led to the accumulation of wealth. From this line of reasoning, Weber draws the conclusion that the chief efficient cause of capitalistic development was the new Protestant faith.

When we consider Weber's thesis in connection with the rise of Protestantism, we are bound to be impressed by the suggestiveness of his argument. We ourselves observe that large amounts of wealth are in the hands of Protestants rather than of Catholics and, as has been observed, that Protestant lands are usually industrial and wealthy while Catholic countries are just as often agrarian and poor. However, at best, Weber has done no more than uncover a certain connection between capitalism and Protestantism, but it may be questioned whether this connection is a necessary one. Before the Reformation, the spirit of capitalism existed in northern Italy and the Netherlands, and Europe did not have to wait for Luther and Calvin to inaugurate the new mode of producing wealth. It is thus more plausible to assert that both the spirit of capitalism and the ethics of Protestantism were the consequences of changes in the whole socio-economic environment. These changes were bound up with the discovery

of new lands, the rise of a world market, the influx of gold and silver, and the improvements in mechanical technology. The Reformation may have influenced the development of capitalism without having been the cause of it, but the Reformation itself, whether primarily ecclesiastical or economic, was a distinct sign of modern times.

THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION

The modern mind has been made by science, as ancient thought was fashioned by philosophy and the soul of primitive man inspired by religion. As we have seen, the beginnings of modernity appeared in printing, painting, and voyaging, but it was not the book, the picture, or the map that was to represent the modern mind. The modern mind was to express itself by a *formula*. Hence it would hardly be amiss to state that modernity, with all the versatility of its mind and the variety of its ramifications, was made by mathematics, the application of mathematics to nature and human existence. The observation of nature as a whole is as old as mankind. The study of nature dates back to Archimedes and the Greeks. The desire to examine natural phenomena and experiment upon them was expressed in the XIIIth century by Roger Bacon and by Leonardo da Vinci in the XVth. But neither the primitive mind nor the Greek intellect, scholastic thought nor Renaissance curiosity effected scientific results. For science is primarily measurement, and the act of measuring nature did not take place until well into the XVIth century. This was the work of Copernicus and Kepler.

The "Copernican Revolution" gave the modern man a new heavens, as the Renaissance had given him a new earth. But the man who effected this great change in cosmic outlook was not fully possessed of the modern mind. Dampier-Whetham, in his *History of Science* (1929), places Copernicus in the Renaissance, and there were moods or frames of mind in this astronomer that suggest a survival of Mediaevalism if not of Classicism. This modern astronomy was scholastic in its tone of piety, classic in its feeling of mathematical harmony. It seemed to work backward through Scholasticism and St. Augustine to Plato and Py-

thagoras rather than look forward toward a new order of things, such as was indeed to follow. We style Copernican astronomy "sun-centered" or heliocentric to distinguish it from the Ptolemaic plan of an "earth-centered" or geocentric system. If we are ultra-modern and accept Relativity, we can adopt either astronomy provided we make the changes necessary for the frame of reference adopted.

Copernicus (1473-1543) took the heliocentric point of view because of its relative simplicity, just as it was because of its "simplicity" that Claudius Ptolemy had adopted a geocentric system.⁹ But not simplicity alone was the animating spirit of this unique astronomer, for he was animated by the glory of the heavens and the brightness of the sun. "In the middle of all," said he, "dwells the Sun. Who indeed in this most beautiful temple would place the torch in any other or better place than one whence it can illuminate the whole at the same time? Not ineptly, some call it the lamp of the universe, others its mind, and others again its ruler — Trismegistus, the visible God, Sophocles' Electra, the contemplation of all things. And thus rightly, inasmuch as the Sun, sitting on a royal throne, governs the circumambient family of stars. . . . We find, therefore, under this orderly arrangement, a wonderful symmetry in the universe, and a definite relation of harmony in the motion and magnitude of the orbs, of a kind it is not possible to obtain in any other way."¹⁰ It was no wonder that Pope Clement VII heard of Copernicus and requested him to publish his work — *De Revolutionibus Orbium Celestium* (1543).

MODERN MECHANISM

The systematization of the new astronomy was achieved by Kepler (1571-1630); its popularization, or the publicity given to it, was the work of Galileo (1564-1642). In citing the four great names connected with the new heavens, it is better to stress the importance of Kepler and Newton, although the work of Copernicus may appear more spectacular. We are saving Galileo, so to speak, for a more effective work than that of putting Coper-

⁹ Dampier-Whetham, *History of Science*, p. 53.

¹⁰ *Ib.*, p. 121.

nicus before the Church and the world, but while his name is before us we may make mention of what he did. Galileo popularized the Copernican astronomy and made it look plausible by means of an amateurish telescope. Through this crude instrument he beheld the moons of Jupiter, which he took to be extra planets, revolving about that orb. Why, then, could not the planets of the solar system revolve in like manner about the sun? That was something the human eye of mundane man could apprehend and appreciate and that cast a new face upon the whole system of astronomy. Apparently Galileo was lacking in tact and diplomacy, if not in modesty, and just as apparently the Church was lacking in enthusiasm for a scientific revolution. The result was the "martyrdom" of a zealous, talkative scientist, who was compelled to recant and then pass about a dozen fairly peaceful years in prison.

It was Kepler who made Copernican astronomy what we might call a "going concern." Like Copernicus before him, Kepler considered the new heavens with the eyes of both science and religion, for it was the mathematical simplicity and divine harmony of the new astronomy that appealed to him. "I have attested it as true in my deepest soul," said he, "and I contemplate its beauty with incredible and ravishing delight."¹¹ But Kepler did not exhaust with mere emotionalism his enthusiasm for the skies. He was modern as well as mediaeval; he sought facts and laws as well as beauty and harmony. The facts came to him from the data gathered by Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), who had "nibbled" at the planetary paths. This empirical astronomer gave Kepler one year of his life and then bequeathed to him his facts about the planets. It was a unique heritage and we may wonder what Kepler thought about it. For ourselves, we must look this celestial gift horse in the mouth.

If we were to conclude that Kepler derived his laws of planetary motion from the observed facts furnished him by another, we might be compelled to admit that the majestic science of astronomy had been founded upon Empiricism. We prefer and are more inclined to believe that the Copernican Revolution was made by a major act of thought rather than by a minor one of

¹¹ Dampier-Whetham, *History of Science*, p. 139.

the senses. But we have the facts of the one astronomer and the theory of the other. But, as Cohen points out, "Tycho Brahe's astronomic tables did not in themselves show Kepler's laws; indeed they suggested quite different laws to Brahe himself. Kepler could see these laws only after he brought to his vision certain speculative ideas of Apollonius (on conic sections) and of Plotinus."¹² There was more of the ecstatic than the empirical in the mood and method of his investigation. He felt that God must have created the world in the form of perfect numbers whose mathematical harmony produced the music of the spheres when the morning stars sang together. He was disconcerted to discover that the planets did not move in godlike circles, but became reconciled to the idea that ellipses also might be worthy of the divine activity.

Kepler's mystical mathematics led him back to the Pythagoreans and Platonists, but his famous second law of planetary motion is purely mathematical and modern. It is to the effect that the planets revolve about the sun harmoniously but at an ever varying rate of speed; or they traverse equal areas described by radius vectors in equal times. It is as though, in the case of a planet like the earth, the sun spread out fans, some long and narrow, others short and broad, and moved these in equal amounts of time. Since the planets were driven round their ellipses by the will of God, they should move with uniformity, and doubtless Kepler was not wholly pleased when he was forced to conclude that this was determined by the area swept by the radius vector instead of the line pursued by the planet. Mysticism and mathematics were in conflict and the ancient ideal was in opposition to the modern method; but modern mathematics won the victory. But if Copernicus and Kepler had confined themselves to nothing but modernism, it is a question whether they would have given us the new astronomy.

GALILEO AND MODERN SCIENCE

Modernity as such had still to appear. The minds of Copernicus and Kepler, which gave us our astronomy, were motivated

¹² *Reason and Nature*, p. 77.

by a certain degree of mysticism and operated in the celestial world. The descent to modernity was made by Galileo, the first modern mind in science, for it was he who brought the principles of astronomy to bear upon terrestrial problems and seemed "with magical incantations to charm the new planets out of the sky."¹³ Galileo showed himself to be Italian and artistic, or technical rather than speculative. He proceeded by means of devices—a telescope, an inclined plane, and the like. "Modern science," says Bergson, "is the daughter of astronomy; it came down from heaven to earth along the inclined plane of Galileo."¹⁴ It is a question whether modern science could have developed in the reverse order and have proceeded from the terrestrial ideas of Galileo to the celestial ones of his predecessors. Apparently Kepler had to come before Galileo, for modern science was unable to move up the inclined plane of Galileo from earth to heaven.

As the first modern scientist, Galileo makes a picturesque figure. We see him confirming the Copernican astronomy by looking through a crude telescope at the moons of Jupiter. Again he is found dropping iron balls of different weights from the top of the Leaning Tower at Pisa. In church, he observes the swing of a chandelier and hits upon the principle of the pendulum and, as Bergson suggests, he gives us our modern mechanics by rolling balls down an inclined plane. Finally we see him suffering mild incarceration for his novel and rather magical notions. But these playful performances of this eccentric man need not obscure the merits of his mind nor divert us from observing his unique service to science.

The result of Galileo's conception of nature was to establish its utter physicality; it was a system of things independent of all mind, divine and human. The universe seemed able to take care of itself, so that, as in the case of the solar system, the planets required no outside force to keep them in motion. The nature as well as the movements of things came to be regarded as purely physical. This idea Galileo expressed by distinguishing the primary from the secondary qualities of things. The primary qualities are the inseparable, spatial, and measurable ones; the second-

¹³ Dampier-Whetham, *History of Science*, p. 142.

¹⁴ *Creative Evolution*, tr. Mitchell, p. 335.

ary are the psychological ones, such as color and tone, taste and odor. "Hence I think," said he, "that tastes, odors, colors, etc. on the side of the object in which they seem to exist, are nothing else but mere names, but hold their residence wholly in the sensitive body, so that if the animal were removed, every such quality would be abolished and annihilated."¹⁵ Now it was these discarded qualities which were to become the subject matter of another modern science—the science of psychology. It was the work of Descartes to transform this practical distinction into a theoretical dualism.

CLASSIC PHYSICS

Modernity in physical science was achieved by Galileo; he arrived at the modern idea of mechanism and went to work upon it directly, without elaborating a system of physics. That was the work of Newton, who was born the year that Galileo died, 1642. The difference between this pair of modern minds and the other one made up of Copernicus and Kepler was in their appreciation of mathematics. Copernicus and Kepler looked backward and in mathematics found mysticism; Galileo and Newton glanced forward and in their mathematics found mechanism. Their idea seems to have been that when phenomena assumed a mathematical form in the mind, those phenomena were necessarily of a mechanical nature. Their leading concepts were those of matter and motion, their supreme idea of procedure that of matter in motion. They came too late in the history of science to persist with the idea that matter was vital; they came too early to look upon it as electrical. Thus they made the modern in the form of a machine and created what, for two centuries, was to be "classical mechanics." We may allow this system just that length of time, since there were almost exactly two hundred years between the publication of Newton's *Principia* in 1687 and Ernest Mach's *Die Mechanik* in 1883.

Newton's system was successful, if we may thus speak of scientific theory, because it rationalized the results of Kepler and Galileo and accounted for both a revolving planet and a falling

¹⁵ Dampier-Whetham, *History of Science*, p. 147.

apple; successful was it likewise in the way it rationalized everyday perception. It was both astronomical and anthropomorphic. It realized the meaning of Kepler's Second Law and fulfilled the expectations of the common man. This latter it did when it made liberal use of such common concepts as space and time, matter and force. We know or think we know space as the medium which everywhere envelops us; its three dimensions are determined by our position and the movements we make as these are recorded by the semi-circular canals within the inner ear. Time, likewise, seems familiar in the simple form of past, present, future; as also in the perception of movement and growth, in the personal experience of ageing. Matter is something we believe we perceive more or less perfectly, while force is something that we ourselves exert. Newton magnified and systematized these familiar concepts. His world was one in which common sense feels at home, as it does not in the world of Relativity, in which matter and force are absent, in which space and time are no longer absolute.

The modern mind in its scientific form was fully established after the publication of Newton's *Principia*. This was to our period what the philosophy of Aristotle had been to the ancient order, what the theology of Aquinas had been to the mediaeval period. The modern mind had arrived at the idea of what we are knowing, referring to it as "classic physics," something out of date and largely historical. We have been in a kind of post-modern period since the beginning of the century. As for the orthodox system of science, it may be said that it solved the problem of nature in the form of mechanism, but none the less did it create a number of new problems. Newton achieved a physical synthesis of things, but had to leave man out of his calculation. It was not long before the contrast between nature and humanity began to appear. The "secondary qualities" of Galileo, indeed the "secondary" or psychological phenomena, were soon to be heard from. At first these qualities, such as color and tone, taste and smell, were things that physical science could not measure and thus had to reject. But in time the secondary qualities were adopted by the new science of psychology, which had need of them.

MODERN DUALISM

It is no easy task to draw a circle around modernity, especially as the modern era is far from being complete, but it is possible to draw a line through it. As a matter of fact, from the beginning, modern thought has proceeded like a plow piling up masses to right and left. This modern movement, so different from ancient or mediaeval procedure, has progressed by a series of dualisms. We shall appreciate these splits if we select four from the speculative field and as many from the practical world. On the theoretical side, we find the field of discussion divided into the areas of mind and body, understanding and sense, freedom and determinism, religion and science. The practical realm is just as completely bifurcated in the individual and society, labor and capital, virtue and pleasure, optimism and pessimism. It is the same mind that thinks now this way, then that; it is the same will that is motivated from within or from without; but it is only by constantly shifting the view or the value that the modern mind can comprehend itself and its world. It may be the task of the future in a post-mortem period to restore upon a higher plane the original unity of western thought and thus reconcile microcosm to macrocosm, but our present task is to consider how this dualism came about.

Modern thought began with the separation of man from the world in which he lived. Of course, this separation was not actual, nor was man rendered homeless; he continued to eat and drink, work and sleep on the same earth and under the same skies. But his conception of his world and himself underwent radical change. Before modern mechanics came into being, man had felt a kind of kinship with the world generally, both earth and the heavens. He had yielded the notion that the stars were vital things more or less like human beings, but had yet to think of their behavior as wholly different from his own. With St. Francis of Assisi, he still thought of the sun as his brother and the moon as his sister. At any rate, there was some sort of kinship between man and nature that prevailed. Now it was the rise of modern astronomy and the development of modern mechanics that dispelled that attractive myth. It was not merely

that the universe was larger than man had imagined; it was seen to be different from what he had expected. The universe had become a machine.

The general breach between nature and man had been in the air from the beginning. The world in which man had lived and of which he had felt himself a part gave way to a purely physical order made up of time and space, matter and force; a world for scientists perhaps, but not for human beings. The old connection between world and man was kept alive by religion and poetry, by practical life and moral ideals. For in spite of the overwhelming argument in favor of mechanism, man is forced to believe in life, consciousness and freedom. The only human aspect of the modern natural order has been that suggested by the human understanding. Man may not be able to live in the world as his spiritual home, but he is able to measure it and, in some degree, to understand it. We are now coming to the place in the XXth century where we realize that we cannot account for nature by assuming that it consists of bodies in motion, but it was this simple explanation of things that gave us the classic conception of modern life.

MIND AND MATTER

We will consider this breach between man and nature in the form of philosophical dualism and we must prepare to be annoyed. This dualism when stated simply concerns the way we receive the world and the way we react upon it. According to dualism, both the reception and reaction are impossible! How does this double distress come about? It comes about in connection with our sensations and motives. According to the dualism initiated by Descartes, sensation should be produced by stimulus, but the stimulus belongs to the physical order while the sensation is ensconced within the mind; hence, there can be no commerce, no exchange between things that belong to different realms. It is just as bad in the case of our motives. They arise within us as spiritual or, at any rate, psychological events, but much good it does them, since they cannot break into the tight physical order and produce motions. Between the physical and

the psychological such a great gulf is fixed that no event in nature can produce a corresponding event in mind and *vice versa*. The practical conclusion should be that man is both unconscious and inactive.

The layman who has paid no attention to the modern problem of mind and body has a right to be surprised at such modern reasoning. The unphilosophical person has a right to insist that man is distinctly conscious of the world about him and enjoys sensations that the men of the pre-modern period knew nothing about, as the intensified sensations produced by telescope and microscope. In like manner, the lay mind has a right to urge that the modern man enjoys possibilities of action undreamed of before his day and that these he has realized in the machinery he has created. No matter how "impossible" the connection between the modern mind and the modern body or the modern man and the modern world, consciousness has increased in clearness and the will in power. Man perceives things and performs acts impossible under the old scientific regime. His deadly dualism seems very much out of place; it seems indeed the very reverse of good sense.

If the mediaeval mind had come to the conclusion that it saw nothing and did nothing, we could understand such a philosophy, but it is difficult to understand how the alert and active modern mind should have laid down theoretical premises leading to such a lamentable conclusion. Only a few of those who started with the theoretical premise were willing to draw the practical conclusion. Spinoza did this when he summed up the whole meaning of life in the form of "acquiescence." One of Descartes' immediate followers, Arnold Geulincx, was even more emphatic in his conclusion, which was to the effect that the moral life consists in nothing but renunciation and the most perfect attitude of man toward his own mind is that of self-contempt — *contemptus sui*. But moderns with practically no exception have come to the opposite conclusion and have argued that the modern view increases the powers of perception and activity. The original dualism, however, remains to puzzle and perplex the speculative mind.

In the interest of our instinctive desire for unity in our thought,

we desire to rid ourselves of this painful dualism. Idealism does this nobly when it attempts to reduce all reality to the mentality that makes man aware of it and enables him to study it. Materialism keeps reminding us that in the world things exist as so many *facta bruta* wholly independent of our way of perceiving or thinking about them. If we assume the mechanistic point of view, we place ourselves in a paradoxical position. It is as though we invited the human mind to elaborate a perfect system of physical operations only to find out that it had thought its own self out of the total scheme of things. The mind of the modern man has worked wonders in the worlds of stars and atoms, but at the moment when it might appear to be at its best, it seems to be at its worst. It is as though the mind were a philanthropist who had bestowed all his wealth upon the world only to render himself bankrupt. The things that man has accomplished in his modern science would give the impression that he possesses the mind of a god, but when this physical reasoning is applied to psychology it creates the impression that man's mind is only that of the beast. Man has invested heavily in nature, but he has come to the place where he realizes that his mental wealth is in the form of frozen assets. However, it may be suggested that the physical science of the XXth century is showing us how these vast holdings may be liquidated.

FREEDOM AND MECHANISM

The same paradox that we have just observed in the conflict between thought and thing appears again in the character of freedom and law. It is the opposition between motivation and mechanism. Apparently the modern man emancipated his intellect at the expense of his will, for he elaborated a scientific mechanism in which the will has no place. It is such a situation that "puzzles the will" and, as far as human deeds are concerned, makes them "lose the name of action." If the thinkers of the ancient and mediaeval orders had argued against freedom, which was seldom the case, we could understand their feelings, since they were dominated by both the physical and political, the world and nature, the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church. But in-

stead of contending against their free wills, they calmly cherished the liberty with which they lived. We do the same today no matter how thoroughly we believe in a mechanistic order, but when we try to balance our beliefs, we discover a vast sea of Natural Law which tends to swallow up the tiny stream of freedom.

The present tendency of the modern mind is away from the settled notions of mechanism. We are ceasing to dogmatize about cause and effect and are trying to maintain the balance between them without asserting that there must be just as much of one as of the other. Even the idea of Natural Law, as we shall see, is undergoing such changes as to make the world appear much looser than it did throughout modern science up to the close of the XIXth century. But, since our aim is to fixate the modern notion, we may assume that, from the days of Galileo until a generation ago, the modern man elaborated a view of things that we recognize as "classic physics." In the history of mankind, that conception will take its place in line with the classic philosophy of the ancients and the scholastic theology of the mediaevals.

THE ENCYCLOPEDIC TENDENCY

A divisive as well as a dualistic spirit was destined to become characteristic of the modern mind. This may be identified as the encyclopedic tendency in modern thought. The idea of extending the various fields of knowledge by making significant observations, recording facts, and making experiments occurred first in a clear way to the mind of Francis Bacon. It was the natural outcome of the inductive method he advocated; the idea contained in it was adopted by the French Encyclopedists of the XVIIIth century. But theirs was not the Baconian spirit. He had advocated the encyclopedic view with the aim of getting away from Scholasticism; they adopted his general plan, but for the purpose of elaborating a different philosophy—that of Mechanism. Now it is the encyclopedic in the sense of inclusive knowledge rather than encyclopedia in the sense of "circular instruction" that marks the modern mind. It was in the

way that knowledge, proceeding inductively, began to ramify in various directions that created what we are calling the divisive spirit.

When the course of knowledge followed the deductive method of Classicism and Scholasticism, it used the principle of investigation with the aim of corroborating a preconceived plan of thought. The fact was supposed to corroborate the idea. Inductive thinking, while it is not innocent of theoretical considerations, places the emphasis upon the fact; the theory that follows is dependent upon preliminary observation. The result of such procedure has been to create various branches of knowledge which are supposed to be coördinated in the most feasible manner. It is easy to exaggerate the reverence for facts and devotion to mere induction, but it is undeniable that this broad, miscellaneous method has prevailed in modern times. Having broken with philosophy, it remained aloof from the metaphysical, and it is only in the present century that the task of acquiring knowledge from nature has made it expedient to develop a theory of knowledge based upon the mind. The return of philosophy to science has been brought about largely by the conflicts between new and old systems of physics and psychology, between mechanism and vitalism, evolution and dogmatism. Philosophy is appealed to with the hope that it may be able to construct a unified form of thinking, a scientific methodology.

What we have before us at a time when modern thought has come to a climax is an intellectual Tower of Babel with its confusion of tongues. When modern thought abandoned the principle of deducing consequences from conditions and began collecting the results of experience, its investigations extended in various directions. This has brought about a ramification of the various forms of knowledge, so that schools of science are not unlike schools of art. The one have different methods; the other, different kinds of technique. In science this ramification has resulted in a number of different ideologies. This term is used in a sense other than that of French philosophy in the XVIIIth century. There it amounted to little more than the sensational philosophy of Cabanis (1757-1808). Today an ideology means a special way of reasoning in a particular field of

investigation, with a tendency to extend the method into other and alien fields. These ideologies are mental patterns which are neither true nor false in themselves and amount to no more than useful fictions in the interpretation of the special facts in the particular case. They are the most characteristic features of modern thought as it shapes itself today.

MODERN IDEOLOGIES

In the idea of mechanism with its pattern of a machine we find one of the most persistent of modern ideologies. At bottom, mechanism is a theory that everything which occurs can be explained in terms of material parts and particles in motion. The picture of the universe as a machine facilitated observation and experiment without itself being proved by such empirical methods. This mechanical fiction does no harm as long as it remains within the field of physics where it is ever subject to correction, but it has proved misleading when, by force of analogy, it has been applied to the fields of biology, psychology, and sociology. It is not at all plausible when we attempt to model mind on the pattern of matter and then regard man, mind, and society as "machines."

In the field of psychology there have been various ideologies, as "soul," "mind stuff," "brain," and "behavior." The pattern in vogue at present is that of behavior, according to which psychology, like physiology, may study the relation of stimulus to response without considering how, if at all, this bodily transaction effervesces in the form of individual consciousness. There can be no scientific objection to this ideology until behaviorism, having itself dispensed with consciousness as a factor, proceeds to dismiss it altogether. Another form of psychological ideology is found in the mental mechanism of "complexes" of psychoanalysis. These are understood as consolidations of emotions, especially those associated with sex. Doubtless we are more emotional than we realize, but the mind has a way of making allowance for its feelings. It discounts them in such a way that the course of cognition and the process of reasoning are not seriously disturbed.

In the practical world, a characteristic ideology appears in the form of "economic determinism." If the study of matter and mind led to their mechanistic ideologies, there is no reason to be surprised that the study of industry and economic value should lead to a corresponding ideology. There can be no doubt that in its own field the economic factor should be uppermost; the economist should consider how man makes a living, how wealth is produced and distributed. But economic reasoning is not so secure when it makes its private pattern the model for all historical activity. Just as the actual machine in modern civilization tempts us to believe that everything in nature and man is subject to mechanical control, so the importance of a livelihood and money is such as to make us feel that the economic motive in life is supreme. But to reason in such ways would be to commit the ideological error. Such a system of ideologies is inherent in modern thought, with its tendency to investigate in various directions. Indeed, the very idea of Natural Law, without which modern procedure seems impossible, is not lacking in the ideological.

It is now our task to follow the branches of modern thought as these appear in the various enterprises of modern civilization as well as in the various disciplines of modern culture. We shall observe the modern mind at work elaborately in the fields of science and politics, in philosophy and economics, and shall mark its achievements in developing national types of civilization and culture. This will bring us to the present with its startling outlook and may permit a forecast of the immediate future or the civilization and culture of the XXth century.

CHAPTER XII

MODERN SCIENTIFIC METHOD



THE MAGIC OF SCIENCE

NOTHING IS MORE SIGNIFICANT OF THE MODERN MIND THAN science, scarcely anything more characteristic of the modern man than his belief in a form of knowledge he does not fully understand. In the past, the popular mind was wont to attribute to religious belief the most extraordinary possibilities in the domain of both spirit and flesh. At the present time, which is famous for the automobile and radio, there is an equally devout belief in the power of science to answer all questions, supply all wants, and even cure all ills. This is not a question of physical science as such, but one that concerns social psychology. Are we not in a condition of scientific enthusiasm bordering on hysteria? If so, the correction of the error and the cure for the complaint may be found generally in history, in the development of man and man's opinions. Once we assume the standpoint of historical perspective, we realize that, as Talleyrand said, "everything happens," and realize also that the shining present is only one ray of light in the sun; that the present present, so to speak, is only fractionally different from almost any past present. Once we assume the standpoint of historical trends, we realize that science is not solitary in the spiritual life of man; there, however, it occupies a unique position.

The nature of science, which is chiefly mathematical, makes us despair of common perception. Like Faust, we are inclined to cry out, "Where can I grasp thee, thou Infinite Nature? — *Wo fass ich Dich, unendliche Natur?*" With just two eyes and just two hands, how can we grasp, how comprehend the natural order, whose secret seems to repose in the hands of those who are adept in the higher mathematics? The quantitative aspect of the universe baffles us; one moment it expands to a sphere whose diameter, given in terms of light-years, yields a row of figures for which we have no name. Then, turning on itself, as it were,

the same universe contracts to a point expressible in terms of so many decimal places. Our minds are adapted to neither the macroscopic nor the microscopic universe; and unfortunately for us, science is mostly measurement. But the quantitative form of the world is not all, for there are varieties of things which have their unique modes of behavior. Hence, it is only the expert working intensively who can hope to master any of the sciences, and we have at least four of these—physics and chemistry, biology and psychology. Over these arches the dominant science of mathematics; in and around them is the science of sociology, which seeks to relate them to civilization. How can we hope to present the subject of science within the scope of a single chapter when the range of the study might well form an encyclopedia?

We begin where man began—with the general notion that science is knowledge of the universe. Primitive man had “science” in the form of general, practical observation, for he had come to the place in his evolution where he needed it. He could calculate direction and distance; he realized that land was different from sea, that some things lived and others were inert, and that there was a difference between mere surfaces and the three-dimensional objects he could handle. This man of some thirty thousand years ago rejoiced in what Bergson calls “natural geometry” and what, in addition, we may call “natural mathematics” and “natural mechanics.” His work in fashioning weapons and tools showed him some properties of matter and some powers of the brain. Man was beginning to come to a practical understanding with the world in which he lived. But we can hardly speak of such knowledge as science, since scientific knowledge to be conceived and communicated requires symbols and these did not appear until the Phoenicians devised the short alphabet and the Hindus arranged what we call the Arabic numerals. But from what the primitive man did and did not know, we can infer that science is a kind of symbolism. “Science,” says Eddington, “aims at constructing a world which shall be symbolic of the world of commonplace experience.”¹

How shall we laymen, who know only the rudiments of a

¹ *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. xiii.

science here and there, place ourselves in the attitude of that superman we have come to know as the scientist? Why, in just that way; that is, by assuming the scientific attitude and by giving things a knowing look. We can at least be curious about them and not surrender to the utter practicality of life. There are other attitudes we must assume in the study of human civilization and culture, the point of view in history, philosophy, politics, economics, art, and the like. We do not intend to dabble in science or be merely dilettant, for we want no smattering idea of such an important subject. Suppose we follow the analogy of the critic who is not a painter or a poet, but who can get at the value and meaning of pictures and poems? Or one can be like a lawyer whose flexible mind adapts itself to all sorts of cases and who can master enough of their content to put the law into them. One who desires to understand and appreciate science might even regard himself as a tourist who, guidebook in hand, observes the points of interest in various lands without any idea of settling down in any one of them. Without specializing, we can still arrive at the specific point of view in science and perhaps the sharper angle of each separate body of scientific knowledge.

THE VALUE OF SCIENCE

Probably the best thing to do is to appreciate science, or feel its values before we measure its truths. The critic is supposed to do that with the book or canvas; the analysis of the artist's technique can come later on. The lawyer does that with his client who seems to have a case; just how that is, is to be shown after cases and courts are studied more carefully. Of course, we must accept science since it is a definite phase of our civilization and has given so clear a tone to our culture. Then, we are almost required to be familiar with its leading theories, such as those of energy, evolution, and relativity, since these are matters of popular discussion which have come down to the newspapers. But being impressed by science and being appreciative of its merits are not quite the same. It is for us to find out what science really amounts to or what value it has for mankind. We might

go so far as to consider science a kind of commodity and then raise the question whether it satisfies a human want in our civilization.

Our civilization is not a natural one like that of primitive man, a philosophical one like that of the Greeks, nor has it the religious character of the mediaeval State. Our civilization is a scientific one; at any rate it is that more than anything else. When we survey it outwardly as it appears today, the effects of science are omnipresent. Practically all our comforts and benefits come from scientific machinery. What these immediate values are we will not presume to state; their name is legion and it is difficult to think of a want which science does not satisfy, a desire it does not grant. The difficult thing to do is to think of anything, like spring-water or firewood, that is not a scientific product. Our faith is based upon scientific law; our hope lies in what science can accomplish for us. There used to be and still is a "conflict between science and religion," as far as views of the world are concerned. Now there seems to be competition between the material and spiritual on the basis of the human values they can supply. People believe in religion for what it can do for their souls; they are now believing in science because of what it does for their bodies. Until there are deeper religious needs to be met, people will feel that science satisfies. Something like this seems to be the popular feeling.

Science has improved our earthly condition beyond any possible estimate of value, but has it improved us? We have a better world, but are we better men? Our society is a much smoother affair, but has the roughness of human nature been reduced by any known scientific process? According to Karl Pearson in his *Grammar of Science*, science justifies itself in the promotion of sound citizenship. This claim for science is not made upon the basis of any special discovery as though science had unearthed the perfect State or discovered the perfect law, but to the scientific temper. This is engendered by facts — the finding and collecting and connecting of facts. "Modern science," says he, "as training the mind to an exact and impartial analysis of facts, is an education specially fitted to promote sound citizenship."²

² *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

FRIEND OR FOE?

But does not science make scientists rather than human beings? What science lacks is the warmth of humanity, the sense of human values. It is much more fair to nature than to man. The intensive cultivation of it seems to lead man out of his human nature into a vast, impersonal field where nothing but science is thought of. The result is that the mind which is bright to truths in the physical order is opaque to the things of the spirit. We observe this when a scientist proceeds to give his views on such humanistic topics as art and religion, ethics and politics. Usually he carries his authoritarian spirit and proceeds to tell us about the what-should-be in the same way that he has been telling us about the what-is. And the difference between the scientific field of facts and the humanistic order of values is that one deals with what is, the other with what is to be. Hence matters of taste and belief, of ideals and laws are entirely different from those things that are found in the realm of time and space. If the spirit of science were allowed to work its way into man's blood instead of going out after a nebula or an atomic order, its practical value would be what Pearson declares it is.

At its very best, science is only neutral; its account shows neither debit nor credit. What it has done for industry, it has undone in warfare. Its anaesthetic gases which prevent pain are in their effect neutralized by the poison gases which inflict pain and cause death. On the one hand it produces the tractor for the grain field, with the other the tank for the field of battle. Its explosives are useful in mining, but deadly in their militaristic connection. We are better off in times of peace and worse off in times of war. When it comes to promoting the peace of the future, science is noncommittal. It waits until the unscientific mind in a State decides what the State wants to do, then science is ready to serve as either the friend or the foe of mankind. The intellectual neutrality of science arises from the fact that science takes nature and man as they are and then attempts no more than a matter-of-fact relationship between them. Nature is not looked upon as a poor copy of a perfect universe or man regarded as an inferior specimen of a perfect species. All ideals, all likes and

dislikes, all beliefs and values are set aside for the sake of a neutral and objective point of view. We are supposed to be satisfied with the facts in the case.

THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF SCIENCE

Science is a natural social thing. It is like a universal language, or music. A system of philosophy is for an individual Plato and the Platonists; Kant and the Kantians. A system of politics is broader and applies to nationalistic groups of human beings in the form of Democracy, Fascism, or Sovietism. Science is the Communism of the human intellect, the Ideal Republic of free minds. Its laws appeal to all and are recognized by all who take a rational point of view; its laws apply to all phenomena as these are found in time and space. There is no private standpoint left for man, no special consideration shown for nature, but all thoughts and all things are subject to scientific law. Science is humanistic in the way that it furthers man's intellectual ambitions and enhances his powers. It came into being at a time, the early modern age, when on all sides of his nature, in art, religion, and politics, man was anxious to emancipate the spirit within him. To extend man's view and enhance his life — the science of the day is a highly speculative way of exploring time and space, matter and mind, the whole universe and the atom; it is a desperately practical way of inventing machines to render life on earth more endurable. When we speak of science as embracing all nature and all mankind as such, we begin to wonder which of the pair should receive the emphasis, the outer world of things or the inner life of thoughts. Where is the place of knowledge, and where shall science be found? In "facts"! That is the popular point of view and the practical estimate of science.

"The facts speak for themselves." In the minds of most people the eloquence of existence is so emphatic that the mind needs only listen. After there had been so much scholastic reasoning and so little actual observation, it was quite natural for Bacon to attempt scientific propaganda in the form of downright discovery, but now that we are able to look back upon the development of science we realize that mere fact-finding has had little to do with

it. From time immemorial, men had observed that bodies float, sink, or are partly submerged in water, but it was Archimedes' thought about that fact which gave us the principle of a body's specific gravity. And just as long had men noticed that apples and other things tend to fall to the ground, but it was Newton's mathematical way of regarding such a homespun fact that gave us the principle of gravity. At the present time, the facts in the case of the universe at large and the situation within the atom are ascertained by such refined forms of observation that we suspect there is more to the observer than the observed.

When science deals with facts, as it does in a most desperate way, it is usually careful to discriminate among the multitude of things spread out before its gaze. In addition to that, science does not simply look, but is on the lookout for its facts; where is the planet or chemical element or plant species we are seeking? It is the knowing look that counts, the look that is directed by the theoretical powers of the mind. In the last analysis, nature does supply the facts, but she is not in the habit of thrusting them upon us. Moreover, nature does not count or relate or reason. These are processes that go on in the human mind, which insists on seeing a connection between disconnected phenomena, as the moon and tides, malaria and the mosquito. Science, then, is man's science, the work of his reason.

IS SCIENCE SUBJECTIVE?

Is science subjective or objective? Is it concerned with the thoughts of the mind or the things of the world? The moment we raise that question, it seems to answer itself in terms of the objective; natural science operates on the outside and, as it were, in behalf of nature. When we consider the subject matter of science, the case for objectivity, nature, and thinghood seems complete. How is man's private interest concerned or what has he to say about the facts in the case? Has not modern science given up ancient idealism and mediaeval dogmatism? If we were to heed the popular and, often, professional view of science, we should conclude immediately that science gave everything to nature and saved nothing for man. The laws of matter and

motion are naturistic, not humanistic; they concern things rather than men. In drawing the scientific picture of the world, man has to leave himself out. Now, there is so much about science that is objective and so much matter-of-fact outside us, we need say no more about this great Not-ourselves. It can take care of itself now just as well as it did before it produced the human brain. It is ourselves we must consider, lest we be submerged in our own thought about the universe.

When we consider ourselves, we observe that we are not dealing with a science that merely photographs the world generally and takes snapshots of its movements. Our modern mental process is more than anything else a scientific method. That method is our own. We can hardly think of any other than the scientific one, although now and then we find it refreshing to assume an artistic or religious point of view. As for scientific method — it is distinctly human. This does not mean that we intend to relapse into anthropomorphism, although that very human way of thinking keeps dogging our steps. What we do under the circumstances, peculiar to the fact that we are finite human beings, is to put on the best face in the matter and make our anthropomorphism that of the *homo sapiens*. We give nature the best man that is in us. We know that we cannot leap out of ourselves and become pure knowers of the world, so we keep enlarging and purifying the human understanding. In so doing, we exercise the belief that the view of the world entertained by a Newton, a Kant, or an Einstein will be good enough.

In addition to this confessed anthropomorphism of the better sort, we admit the presence of the human quality in natural science as this obtrudes in other forms. As has been observed, we take results of nature and employ them for human benefit in the form of applied science which ends in industry and its pleasant fruits. Is not that a species of humanism, of subjectivism? In addition to that human way of using nature, we often make our feelings the models for natural occurrences. Energy is something that we ourselves feel, and it may be that the energy of nature is not at all akin to the work of our wills. We speak of what seems to be going on in the natural world as though it

were a struggle for existence and, again, we are using a human analogy. In like manner, we refer to the affinity between chemical elements which unite here but not there, and look upon this valence somewhat after the manner of our own preferences. Even when we speak broadly of the conservation of energy, we are using a mode of expression that suggests something in the way of human thrift.

In larger and more abstract ways, we insinuate our human point of view into the world of space when we indulge in more than one kind of geometry. In the narrow realm of terrestrial magnitudes, where human operations like surveying and building are going on, we prefer the old Euclidean geometry with just one line parallel to another, but when we raise our eyes from earth and our work on it, we find it expedient to adopt a non-Euclidean form of spatial measurement. All seems to depend upon what we have in mind. The old, anthropic ideas of the world still hold in their own sphere, or in what the most advanced science calls the "frame of reference." We live and act and arrive at some measure of truth just about as men did before modern science dawned and then blazed forth so blindingly. "Even today," says Karl Pearson, "we all go through the greater part of our thought and action as did the people of pre-Copernican days. The Ptolemaic system still holds as a valid concept in a limited range of phenomena."³

The human point of view shifts with ease from things to the connection between them and asserts itself in the domain of causality. If the universe were only a system of bodies in motion, like billiard balls on a table, we should have no trouble with them, but things are magnetic and biologic also. Hence we have to modify the idea of the necessary connection between things doubted by Hume and dogmatized by Kant. No longer can we say, "Out of this particular cause comes this particular effect," but "From these general conditions result certain other general consequences of an appropriate sort." We cannot "bind the influence of the Pleiades or break the bands of Orion"; all the binding and breaking that we do must take place within our own minds.

³ *Grammar of Science*, p. 385.

MAN THE MEASURER OF ALL THINGS

It seems, then, that even in science man cannot eliminate himself, but he can emancipate his mind from temperament and prejudice. His mood can be as important as his method. The scientific mind dares not relapse into the sophism of saying, "Man is the measure of all things"; but it must use a sort of scientism, according to which "man is the measurer of all things." Science is measurement; its method par excellence is that of mathematics, and this is man's own product. Nature does not calculate nor weigh nor rationalize herself in any manner whatsoever. Hence, when we say certain phenomena are "given," we had better speak of them as "taken." In the science of geometry, man takes space out of the whole complexity of nature and studies it as dimensions. He pours time out of it and considers it in a static form. Of course, there is no such space in nature. The mass of a body is just as fully taken out of the natural order; the body whose mass is being studied is under other influences than that of gravitation, but these others are set aside theoretically in order that mass may be known. This knowing, as we are calling it, is measuring, human measuring, the discovery of Arabic numerals in the things of this world. "We have found," says Eddington, "where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind put into nature. We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the footprint and lo! it is our own."⁴

When we say measurement we are inclined to think of numbers, but it means more or less than that according to the way we look at it. Measurement means the interrelation, the interlocking of space and time; not space in the sense of the place where things are found nor time as the course which events follow. No, science understands space and time in the form of relations; the relation of coexistence and that of sequence. Science in the strictly modern sense began when Galileo interrelated space and

⁴ *Space, Time and Gravitation*, p. 200.

time in the special case of falling bodies. This means that, as science now suggests, we must superimpose upon or fuse into our old space-geometry a new time-geometry. Naturally we hate to do this since our old geometry of fixed forms was so reliable and comfortable; its forms, such as the square and circle, were there waiting for us to draw pictures of them and prove propositions about them. But we have come to realize that these forms have to be generated, so that the flowing point draws a line, the line swings around into a plane, and the plane itself makes a swing that produces the solid. At any rate, that is the way it looks to those who stand on the outside of the mysterious world of mathematics.

OUR FOURTH DIMENSION

Now all this brings us dangerously near the question of the fourth dimension and we wonder what that can be. It strikes us as being uncanny; we feel that we have no "open sesame" to open its door. However, we are dealing with the fourth dimension daily, only we do not recognize it as an old friend like the other three. We are told that the fourth dimension of space is none other than time, which seems to mean that length, breadth, and thickness are the other three dimensions of space. Our main trouble is that we cannot picture a four-dimensional body the way we picture those that have only three. We can see those but, at best, we can only believe that time is added to them to make the figure complete. Suppose we try to picture different bodies with all four dimensions included. We can do this by visualizing a star, a stone, a tree.

When we look at a star, we see only two dimensions at a time, but we can easily add the third one by thinking of the star as a solid. Can we not add the fourth by thinking of it still another way? We can do this by realizing that the light which for us is the star has been a certain number of years on its way to earth, ten, a hundred, a thousand, or a million, and can realize further that the star is we know not exactly how many millions upon millions of years old. Are we not seeing or at least apprehending time in the simple act of seeing space? In the case of

the stone, what we see in the old spatial way as a solid is really something that has existed we know not how many thousands of years. And these years we see in a way when we look at the aged stone. In the case of a tree that has been sawed down and now exhibits as many rings as it has lived years, we behold, as Alexander points out, both the spatial and temporal of the tree; its three usual dimensions and the unusual one of time which, by the way, was responsible for these. In most cases, when we are not interested in gaining a complete view of an object, we omit the fourth dimension, but our complete experience is bound to include this. The table at which we sit and the man with whom we talk seem to have only three dimensions, but a complete view of the table and the wood of which it is made and the real nature of the man who has grown into full stature involve the time factor. Time made them what they now appear to be.

SCIENCE MORE THAN MEASUREMENT

Science is measurement, but not this alone. It is a way of reasoning about things, a method of obtaining knowledge that otherwise would remain hidden. If we think in terms of hundreds, we have no need of arithmetic save as this puts our knowledge in a convenient form; but if we try to deal in millions, we find it necessary to resort to mathematics for our ideas. In like manner, if we are considering the distance between two points that are not so far apart, for instance, the cities of New York and Philadelphia, we can appreciate the space between them by our experience. We have ridden by train or motored or even walked from one of these cities to the other, so that the idea of ninety miles is almost superfluous; it is only a symbolic way of representing what we already know. But if our mind tries to dwell upon the idea of the distance between the earth and Sirius, it has to avail itself of the expression, "nine light-years." We have no impression or experience or intuition capable of bringing the celestial distance to the mind.

The same ultimate resort to mathematical measurement is made in the dynamic field. One knows what is meant by twenty pounds, since he can easily carry that much weight. His ex-

perience he can enlarge until he knows the meaning of a hundred pounds and can extend his sense of strain until, after a fashion, he can estimate the weight of a ton. But when the problem is to weigh the earth on which we live or, worse still, to arrive at the weight of the sun or a much larger star, we must reason by measuring and draw real conclusions from abstract ideas. This was appreciated by science at the beginning, when Kepler arrived at the laws of planetary motion by making mathematical calculations to the effect that the radius vector of a planet sweeps over equal areas in equal periods. But when Galileo related space to time in the case of falling bodies, it seemed as though the mathematical form of this perceived fact amounted to no more than drawing out what the mind had already put in. Now, the lay mind in mathematics is in the habit of thinking of mathematics as just so much counting up of what one already has, as a kind of numbering of things. But even the lay mind is now in a position to realize that measuring means more than computing; it means drawing conclusions that could be arrived at in no other way. We are forced to this admission by what is being accomplished in the macroscopic and microscopic orders of existence; in the stellar universe and in the atom. Now the grand conclusion that may be drawn from measurement is that of the unity of the world.

THE UNITY OF THINGS

As soon as we raise the issue of unity in nature a question is bound to arise: where does this mysterious unity come from? Is it a kind of center in the circle of all reality? That looks very much like our human geometry. Is it the main office or clearing house of energy? That seems like a human institution. Now science, be it remembered, is more a matter of method than of material; or as Karl Pearson says, "The unity of all science consists alone in its method, not in its material."⁵ This method is our own human method; nature goes her own way and carries out her operations to perfection. We consider these and express the whole matter in the form of unity. This author whom we

⁵ *Grammar of Science*, p. 12..

have quoted goes on to say further that the universality and absoluteness of scientific law, conditioned as it is by the perceptive and reflective faculty in normal human beings, is relative to the human mind. We behold the unity of nature after we have observed the unity of knowledge.

How is this human unification of the natural order brought about? We do not draw a circle around the universe with earth as the center. We do merely feel or intuit unity as a suitable ideal for Creation; if we ever do this, it is for the sake of the inspiration that comes from the feeling that nature is one and we are one with it. Our method of getting at the unity of things is chiefly by the organization of our sciences. Of these we have four, assignable to a double pair of twins — physics and chemistry, biology and psychology. Above these four arches and superintends our method, which is that of mathematics. Beneath that firmament of mathematical forms are two different sorts of sciences, and these come up for measurement. Physics yields forms of energy; chemistry, kinds of matter; biology, organisms; and psychology, these organisms looked at, as it were, from the inside. How can we unify these four sciences under the form of the mathematical abstraction we have set up as a norm; how measure them according to some common denominator? We cannot. That is, we have not been able to run the mathematical line through all four of them. It starts out well enough with physics and chemistry, but becomes a kind of dotted line indicative of direction but not distance when it presses on into the biological and psychological sciences.

But let us observe clearly what the modern man is trying to accomplish by the unification of nature. He does not dream of dividing the universe up into four distinct fields and placing them side by side. He does not attempt to arrange them in the form of a four-story edifice with physics at the bottom and psychology at the top. Nature does her own arranging, her own building. All that we can do is to watch nature and unify our separate sciences as best we can. We are to proceed from the mood to the method of unity. We do this by thinking clearly and cogently about our subject matter as we perceive it. This gives us our sciences, and nature knows nothing about them. The result of

our attempts at unification is more like a republic of scientific minds than a kingdom of science. When we realize that it is man working with a yardstick and not nature operating with a light-ray, we appreciate our problem more keenly, more fully. Here we must be prepared for paradox.

THE SCIENTIFIC PARADOX

The heavens give us no trouble. The stars in their courses may have fought against Sisera, but they carry on no warfare with science. Our trouble is with ourselves, our bodies and minds. They bother us both morally and mathematically, for we have as much trouble in measuring their processes as we have in ruling their tendencies. They are as irrational as they are immoral. The paradox is this: the farther away things are both physically and psychologically, the nearer they are mentally, and *vice versa*. We can depend upon a star, a planet, and even a comet, but we cannot depend upon organisms. There is no telling what organisms are like or what they will do. Physics and chemistry are foreigners, but we have made friends of them. Biology and psychology are of our own kith and kind, but we cannot come to an understanding with them. Marvelous to relate, the most perfect science is astronomy; the least perfect is psychology. We have no interest in stars nor they in us, but we understand them; we rejoice in accurate observations, definite measurements, and a high degree of predictability. We have all interest in our sensations, but the best we know about them is that we feel them. Doubtless this is the reason why astronomy was the first science to be developed, psychology the last. When it comes to a question of measurement, there is no comparison between them.

Our trouble is with the earth or its leading citizens. The physical and chemical are everywhere in the universe; the biological and psychological are here on the earth alone. It may be that the principles of measurement that apply so grandly to the universe at large may be made applicable to the infinitesimal amount of life in the universe, but it does not seem likely that the mathematics that is ready to go out to the infinite is as willing to adapt

itself to such a vulgar fraction of things as life. There is, of course, the general relation of more and less, large and small, but this is not anything like the impressive system of mathematical powers and decimal places that we find in the inorganic world. And it is with the inorganic that our mathematics finds a home, not in life, certainly not in us.

We must decide, if we can and if we dare, whether the mathematical system of measurement comes right down to us in our lives. In a way we hope it will stop before it gets to us. We must decide whether such a federal system of scientific law is repeated in the local ordinances of our little life-community. We are inclined to hope that it does not, for we do not wish to bear the weight of laws meant for galaxies. Is there one scientific law or are there two; do we find the same law with only different applications, or two different kinds of laws? We might escape this predicament, as is so often done, by saying, "In a way it does and in a way it does not." But then we might be bothered by the question, "In what way does physical law apply, in what way not?" Or we might say, "Authorities differ on this subject." But then we should have to meet the question, "In what way do they differ?" We know that there is a difference between life and inorganic matter, between the quick and the dead, but we do not know just how this difference will figure in our sciences.

PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

The attitude of those who work in the sciences seems to be something like this: the mechanists in physics and chemistry, being sure of themselves in their own field, are inclined to condescend toward the would-be mechanists in biology and psychology. They presume that their systems of measurement apply or may come to apply to organic realms as they have worked so splendidly in the inorganic field. In this spirit of toleration, J. Arthur Thompson says, "In regard to one order of facts, the application of scientific methods has gone far; in regard to another order of facts, it has just begun, but the incipient science has no need to be ashamed beside her full-grown sister. An exact science is

like a solar system; a young science is like a nebula.”⁶ But this only postpones the settlement of the question and what we want is a more immediate answer to the question, are organic sciences just like inorganic ones?

The would-be mechanist in the vital field will assert that they are. He has been impressed by the astounding achievements in physics and chemistry, which have grasped both the macroscopic and the microscopic world, and desires to imitate the manners of those elder sisters. The little vitalist is like Cinderella longing to attend the great ball. But as it is now, biology is at least one remove from the field of exact measurement; where such measurements are made, it is only by reducing biological processes to physical and chemical ones, which is like putting one's savings into the great stock market. Psychology, which used to rejoice in its possession of the knowledge that comes by introspection, follows the lead of biology and, *moi aussi*, wants to glean a few straws from the rich harvest of measurement. The result in biology is mechanism, which dismisses the vital process as such; in psychology, it is behaviorism, which has made headway only by throwing out consciousness.

But the difficulty with such a vigorous principle of unification is just this—it calls upon us to sacrifice quality to quantity; the quality of the organic to the quantity of the inorganic. Practically everything about the inorganic world of physics and chemistry can be appreciated by mere quantification. By means of the how-much we can measure matter in gross or in fine; by such means we can also manipulate matter in building and engineering. Matter is only interesting, useful energy and we have no feeling for it. Not so with life, for life is in us and we in it. Measuring and manipulating are all very well, but there is about life something that we experience and enjoy, hence the idea of measuring seems inadequate and disappointing. In particular, when we try to make ourselves the measurers of all things, organic and inorganic, we find that our vital data are not so definite; they have not the stability of atoms. They drift away from our measuring rods, hence we can only approximate to the quanta we are seeking. They do not arrange themselves with

⁶ Article “Science,” *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

the precision of earth and sun or oxygen and hydrogen; the relations among them are loose. The inorganic world runs on tracks; the vital order does not, and that is why we have trouble in calculating its processes.

Now, was it not for the very purpose of measurement that early modern science separated the secondary qualities from the primary, spatial ones in order that these might become the subject matter of exact science? How, then, can the organic sciences hope to neutralize that act, how return to the state of affairs wherein both organic and inorganic alike were treated without sharp discrimination? Suppose we regard an organism from the standpoint of space; the geometrical view throws little light upon the nature of the living body. Spatiality is the very genius of inorganic matter, which has, we might say, an affinity for geometry. Into space, matter spreads out to stellar size; by space it is pervaded down to the very atom. But spatiality has no such significance with an organism. Or, let it be energy. Inorganic matter proceeds by expending energy, by turning it into heat and diffusing it. Organisms live and work by saving energy; by storing up and using the solar energy thrown off with such prodigality. If it is a question of mass, so important with matter, the organism is under such an incessant process of change that we cannot count upon any stable mass. Both organic and inorganic move in time, but movement in the cell is not the same as movement in a molecule. Both matter and organism are capable of work, but there is no real thermo-dynamics of the steam engine in the living body. The temperature at which it does its work shows that. Indeed, everything about the organism makes it difficult to carry out the classic idea of "measure for measure." Just as we seem to have reached the mathematical summit of things, the old system of measurement breaks down. To appreciate that, we have only to glance at the rebellious science of the XXth century.

RELATIVITY

If we have had trouble grasping the old science, what hope have we with the new? Or, as the prophet expressed it, "If thou hast

run with the footmen and they have wearied thee, then how canst thou contend with horses?" We were just on the point of laying hold of the universe when now it seems that there is nothing substantial to seize. At last we had grasped the atom, but now it has melted into the electron, and as for the old space in which we felt so much at home—even that has failed us. We do not occupy it as owners, but have only a long lease on it since it took on the fourth dimension of time. What we used to call things in space are now only "events" in space-time, and the gravity that used to be such an omnipotent force has now become a matter of geometrical form. The universe has left us, but still it seems to be around. The whole affair seems to be like the situation in *Faust* after the departure of Mephistopheles—"The Evil One has departed, but Evil still remains." This state of affairs is summed up in the word "Relativity"! We must solve that acrostic if we can.

Relativity of what? we ask. Not of mind or knowledge or man or anything in particular but just this: relativity of measurement. Now that is somewhat encouraging because we agreed with ourselves when we took up the perplexing problem of science to consider it a system of measurements. The shadow of Mephistopheles is still with us and we will try to discover its length. Suppose we lean on the old scientific symbol or monogram of C. G. S.—the centimeter-gram-second system of measurement. The centimeter means space, the gram matter, and the second time. Then Relativity will mean a new way of measuring space, matter, and time. After we have once adjusted ourselves to our new world, our world of Relativity, we shall be in a mood to consider gravity. These four things will be the north, south, east, west of our new sphere.

From time immemorial, space had been looked upon as a box or general container of things. Galileo made modern science possible by changing space into a geometrical thing, or mode of measurement. Newton regarded it as the absolute background of movement, and after his days scientists filled it up with what they called "ether." The peculiar thing about it was that it could be made infinite or infinitesimal, macroscopic or microscopic, large enough for any possible universe or small enough

for any atom. Space seemed to fit matter very loosely; indeed, the amount of occupied space was so small as to be inconspicuous. The universe seemed like a town all mapped out but not built up. The older science was so interested in the process of building up that it let the rest of the universe go by with the cavalier-like assumption that space extends in all directions to what it called "infinity." But Relativity has changed all that.

Relativity tells us that space is not absolute or infinite in itself; it warns us that space is not independent of time or matter. Space is not absolute in the sense that an object is here or there; it is neither here nor there; all we know about its location is that it is just so far from other objects. Space has now become an interrelated mesh of distances. Position is not everything; in fact it is not anything, since it is distance that counts. The space that is supposed to contain matter is not infinite. If it were, it would exhaust and reduce to nothingness the matter that radiates out into it. If we think of matter-energy as a fire, we realize that it can heat a large room, but not all outdoors. Nor is space independent of time, for we cannot get the position of an object unless we know the date when it is supposed to be there. All that we get out of the state of affairs is an "interval," a term applicable to space or time taken together in a unity.

THE SPACE-TIME CONTINUUM

As long as the new system of measurement is thought of in relation to such things as galaxies and atoms, it does not bother us, but when it lays hold of yardsticks and clocks we begin to feel concerned. For this is what Relativity does; it disobeys the commandment "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmark." It did just this with the landmarks of the old physics, which consisted of rigid measuring rods and steady clocks. When, under the auspices of the classic system, Michelson attempted to measure the motion of the earth through the stationary ether, no motion was discernible. The line that represented the direction of the motion was just as long as the one drawn at right angles to it, when, of course, it should be shorter. But the theory of Relativity was equal to the emergency; it took the body

to be measured and put it into a Procrustean Bed, which it called a "frame of reference." The body to be measured was stretched out or shortened as the exigencies of mathematics demanded. When, therefore, a body is moving at a high rate of velocity, the measuring rod on it contracts in the direction of that motion, so that it is still a yard or mile or light-year, but in a contracted form due to the direction of its motion. This was called the Fitzgerald Contraction, and it was remarkable that the amount of it should have been equal to the shortening which the experiment demanded. It looked as though the scientist were playing a trick on the layman or, worse still, as though nature were playing a much larger trick on the scientist. Later on, it was insisted that the electronic structure of matter, which took away its old-time rigidity, made such a foreshortening actually possible, and the fixed yardstick was supplanted by a more flexible one.

The old-time clock was affected in the same way. It was not that clocks vary in their way of keeping time, but that the time they keep undergoes change. When a moving body increases its velocity, the passage of time on that body becomes longer to compensate for this, so that a clock on that swift-moving body runs slower when its hours are measured from a second body moving with less speed. All the clocks on the earth may run at the same rate of speed, but from that chronological fact it does not follow that they synchronize with the clocks on the planet Mars. There is no simultaneity or absolute Now. There is no fixed rate of duration in a system of things where various bodies move at different velocities. There is no absolute coexistence of events, since from the point of view of some other part of the universe our "simultaneous" may become their "before and after." It is only within a particular or local frame of reference, such as the earth, that we can maintain coexistence in space and simultaneity in time.

MATTER AND GRAVITY

Our idea of matter has had to undergo parallel changes and these have been observed in what we have had to say about space and time and in the new yardsticks and clocks we have used.

Matter is no longer the stuff-like, doughy thing it used to be. Its nature is distinctly porous. We knew that when we considered how the universe was chiefly empty space for all the stellar systems that tried to occupy it here and there. We learn that when we are taught that an atom is a kind of solar system whose porosity is akin to that of the universe at large. Since matter does more than occupy space and move in space, it is, as we might expect, something energetic, so that we are not wholly surprised to learn that it is made up of electrical charges rather than grains of materiality. Now all these revisions in the fields of space, time, and matter are bound to affect our view of the most inclusive law of the universe—the Law of Gravity.

After Newton had elaborated the Law of Gravity, which he did in a surprisingly simple form, there were certain things about it that seemed strange. If the law was supposed to control a “force” of nature and regulate a “pull” of some sort, it was really too good to be true. In the first place, it was omnipresent and had none of the local and specific qualifications of natural laws, such as those of heat, light, magnetism, and the like. Then, it acted, as it were, instantaneously, as though it were not satisfied with even the high velocity of light. Finally, it was a force, or the like, that could not be interfered with. We can screen a body from the light, shield it from heat, and insulate it from electricity, but there is no such screening or shielding or insulating in the case of gravity. It goes on in a manner strangely independent of things to which it adapts itself, *noblesse oblige*, with perfect indifference as to the constitution or condition of these things.

What has Relativity done to gravity? It has taken the teeth out of the law; that is, it has made it unnecessary, aye, impossible, for us to regard it as a force of any kind. In general, we may think of gravity as a phase of the space-time framework that makes up our universe or as the *status quo* of things in general. If, then, we inquire, “What has become of the ‘force’ of gravity?” we are told that it means increased curvature in the path that a body follows. The old gravity, so to refer to it, was indifferent to matter, but this is not the case with the new space, as we may style it. Space and matter have gone into partnership and have taken gravity in with them, also. If there were no matter,

the universe would be flat and motionless. If the universe were all matter, it would be a tightly wound sphere in ceaseless motion. But where, as is the case, there is some matter, we find a kind of wrinkled space or a combination of the flat and the curved.

What were the losses and gains in passing over from the XIXth to the XXth century? We yielded the idea that gravity was a property or gift of matter whereby it was able to exert a strange pull on things. We have acquired the notion that where there is matter in the space-time framework it produces curvature in that structure, or gives it a wrinkle. When we apply these contrasted views to the solar system, we find that, as Bertrand Russell expresses it, "The sun is, so to speak, at the summit of a hill, and the planets are on the slopes. They move as they do because of the slope where they are, not because of some mysterious influence emanating from the summit."⁷

THE NEW ATOM

Now we must not lose sight of the idea that science is primarily a question of measurement. That golden thread we have tried to follow throughout the history of mankind, especially in the great scientific eras — the Newtonian and Einsteinian. When we followed the thread into Relativity, it tangled terribly; and now that we come to the atomic world, it threatens to snap like the thread of the Norns in Wagner's *Twilight of the Gods*. Relativity in the macroscopic universe meant confusion. Quantum Physics in the atomic world means "confusion worse confounded." We will approach this tantalizing subject by making the random statement that, as atoms had always existed in discrete or separatist forms, it was to be expected that the energies radiating from them would operate in the same way. That appears to be the essence of the Quantum Theory — that atomic energy goes by leaps and bounds, rather than in accordance with the old rule *in mundo non datur saltus*. Hence we are forced to avail ourselves, as others have done, of the idea that atomic energy proceeds according to a kind of staircase instead of a ramp, and goes forth by drops instead of in a stream.

⁷ Article "Relativity: Philosophical Consequences," *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

The atom in its porosity has been compared to the solar system, with the proton for the sun and the electrons for the planets. This analogy helps us for a while, but when we dwell upon it at any length we observe that the laws of the macroscopic order do not descend to the microscopic one, or the little solar system is anarchistic in its attitude toward the larger one. The electrons are the real wanderers, or planets, in the universe of matter. They have their orbits but do not stick to them; they seem to pass jauntily from one orbit to another without having been any place between orbits. These jumps seem to depend upon the amount of energy involved. When the electron absorbs energy it approaches the proton, but when it radiates its energy it follows an orbit farther away.

When it comes to computing atomic energy and indicating electronic paths, the question of measurement becomes a painful one. The measuring rod is the light-ray. Under ordinary circumstances, or with large objects, we have no trouble with the apparatus; but when the entity under measurement is of the same dimension as the scale employed, the difficulty arises. When we attempt to study the behavior of the electron, the light-ray that we use, being of a very small, finite wave-length, disturbs the experiment and makes it impossible to get definite results. This lack of definiteness of measurement in microscopic nature leads to indeterminism; we cannot be sure of our electrons and their orbits. This leads to a statistical view of nature. At first the microscopic world appears in the orthodox fashion of being without form and void; a state of affairs in which the atoms or molecules of a gas may have all possible velocities. But by using a large number of these, we arrive at the appearance of Natural Law, just as an insurance company can predict how many members of the population will expire at the age of, say, forty-five, but cannot tell just who they may be.

MAN REMAINS UNCHANGED

In conclusion it might be suggested that the new physics of Relativity and the Quantum Theory, working in the macroscopic and microscopic orders respectively, have unsettled the universe

rather than man. Like all science, this new departure is just a question of measurement and man is still able to maintain himself as the measurer of all things. All depends upon his position in the universe. Once he has settled that, he can let the universe pursue any velocity it chooses and suffer things to assume any size they prefer. "Our measurements of space and time," says Karl Pearson, "are conditioned by our assigning to ourselves the velocity zero, and by our basing our metrical space and time on phenomena in bodies at rest relative to ourselves."

This makes science an extremely personal matter and seems, also, to throw us back upon the anthropomorphism from which science had promised to deliver us. Like Hamlet each one of us can say, "I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a king of infinite space," for that is about the way the microscopic and macroscopic universes appeal to us. As for the anthropomorphism that follows us as though it were our shadow, we may conclude as did Socrates when he was informed that "man is the measure of all things," that under such circumstances we should be careful what kind of man we choose for the measurer. "And so, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend (Protagoras) and have not yet assented to his doctrine that every man is the measure of all things—he must be a wise man who is the measure."⁸ In our case, the wise man happens to be the scientist and we let him be the measure of all things.

Is man standing in his own light and is his anthropomorphism defeating his rationalism? It might seem so, but that is not the case after all. For there is a method of correlating all these anthropic measures so that they maintain a consistency in themselves and point to a more fundamental Absolute. By means of this, we can carry our calculations from one system to another just about as we translate ideas from one language to another in spite of verbal differences among them. The wise man is the interpreter of these various languages. His science is the gift of tongues. His language is scientific, but his message contains a kind of philosophy.

⁸ *Theaetetus*, 183.

CHAPTER XIII

THE INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY



EVERYMAN'S PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY IS OF SUCH A VAGUE CHARACTER THAT IT SEEMS TO exist in either the clouds or an abyss. Its breadth and depth make one despair of mastering it. Yet the very extent and profundity of philosophy often invite the intellect, since the mind at large is capable of moods that tend to range over and fathom a sea of speculation. Man is more often philosopher than scientist, and inclines to morals rather than aesthetics. His reflective moods tend to make him inquire concerning the meaning of things and the value of his own experiences. To have such experiences with the things of this world and enjoy them as the issues of life is not enough for even the average man. His thoughts and interests come up before his mind for approval, and so he philosophizes. This general brooding is discernible, although often dimly, in the minds of major thinkers like Socrates and Descartes, Plato and Kant. These minds availed themselves of logical technique, but behind this as though it were casting shadows was vision, or a certain genius for truth. Out of this at last came the ideas of Plato, the categories of Kant.

All of us are "philosophical" and are nobly inclined at times to take things "philosophically." We are in possession of the adjective and the adverb, although not always the noun and the verb of the subject matter. We are philosophical when we accept the world and take things as they are. Ourselves we treat philosophically when we adapt ourselves to the vicissitudes of individual life and the changes that take place in the exterior order. "O well; that's the way things are." "Such things are bound to happen." When one talks that way, he is not far from the Kingdom of Philosophy, although the hardest part of the journey, the technical phase of it, is now in front of him. But when one stops saying, "As I see it," or "From my point of view," his philosophy is fairly well under way and is out in the

offing. One has arrived at the fundamental principle in all philosophy: Universals! Philosophy itself is just that — thinking in terms of universals rather than particulars. The philosopher is not content to observe the ideas that go together here and there; he is in search of the ideas that belong together everywhere.

But it is much simpler to show that man in his private capacity has a certain avidity for philosophical reflection than to indicate the particular ways in which this has borne fruit in the field of the world, in culture and civilization. Philosophy tends to lay down the laws of logic and establish the entities of metaphysics, but between these opposed yet similar poles extends the actual world of human beings in which the Law of Identity and the Being of Things are lost to view. "Everything is beautiful seen from the point of the intellect, or as truth," said Emerson; "but all is sour if seen from experience. In the actual world, the painful kingdom of time and place, dwell care and canker and fear." How could man live and work simply by declaring, "Whatever is, is," or "Whatever happens has a cause"? And yet how can he really live unless he bears these laws in mind? Man cannot build his cities just by repeating the axioms of geometry on which they are based. But in the final analysis the axiomatic and self-evident generally are victorious. They become the very bulwarks of being and the true orbits of activity.

NO PHILOSOPHIC FIELD

The peculiarity of philosophy is that it has no special field of investigation, unless we are willing to call this "the mind." The physicist has matter, the chemist the atom, the biologist the cell, the psychologist consciousness or behavior. Even such elusive things as aesthetics and religion have their palpable forms of art and worship. The philosopher is ever trespassing on the preserves of others. He attempts to theorize about the fields investigated by their rightful owners. He gives us a theory of physics in the form of metaphysics, analyzes the ideas of matter and mind, and attempts a philosophy of religion and art. The philosopher may well be compared with the lawyer. Both rejoice in flexible minds adaptable to a variety of subjects not one of

which is proper to philosophy or law. The lawyer has no property, has not been sued, and has committed no crime, but he makes the deed, the suit, and the defense his own. He knows the law and applies it wherever the application is needed. Likewise, the philosopher; he is not a physicist or chemist, a psychologist or artist, but he knows logic and is in a position to apply the laws of judgment to these fields of nature and human life. As the lawyer can tell what is just in the eyes of the law, so the philosopher can tell what is true according to logic. His philosophy of Idealism and Realism, of Rationalism and Empiricism has its place in the civilization of mankind.

What is philosophy? Definitions are often vacua which, like nature, man should abhor. However, we may venture to state that philosophy is the reasoning that seeks the ground of the world and the goal of life. It is both theoretical and practical; it springs from the intellect and leaps forth from the will; it concerns both ultimate thinking and the deepest source of doing. The two parts of it, although not exactly in Siamese formation, coöperate. The idea of something quivers with a possibility of corresponding action — food, beauty, a new continent, Rome. On the other hand, an act that has gone forth spontaneously tends to revert to the mind and seek the motive. Why eat or carve statues, what is the good of modern America or ancient Rome? Now, the actual life of the individual goes on with only flashes of ideation and touches of motivation, just as the existence of States proceeds with only a minimum of inquiry concerning the origin and destiny of an Athens or Rome, a Germany or America. In this country especially is man most heedless of the foundations on which individual and national thinking and doing are built up. But philosophy, like wisdom, ever puts forth her voice.

THE GROUND OF THINGS

Now, in strict philosophy, the ground of things is primarily physical; the search for it raises the question, is the last word matter or mind, one being or many things, a changeless substance or a deep river of reality known as Becoming? In like

manner, the philosophy of the life-goal is ethical. Does man seek pleasure or virtue? Should life stress the social or the individualistic? Out of this double question have come systems of metaphysics, with theories of knowledge hovering over them, and systems of morality often accompanied by aesthetical and religious considerations. Philosophy itself considers its field from the double standpoint of forms and values; the forms that the intellect lays down as ideas, the values it aligns as interests. Of course, we cannot be philosophizing all the time. That would be a case of "all carving and no meat." But if we neglect philosophy and live our individual and national life without fundamental thinking, it will amount to "all meat but no carving."

For our present purpose, it will be most feasible to consider philosophy from the standpoint of its twenty-five hundred years of history. This should have some significant lessons for us. But here we could not gain our desired insight by mentioning the names of philosophers and the ideas for which they stood. We cannot hope to succeed in the interpretation of philosophy even if we trace the course of speculative schools, the streams in which the major thinkers jutted out and changed the course of the river. We must proceed broadly and identify philosophy massively. In it we must observe something gigantic in its influence upon general thought and scientific investigation. The most obvious thing to do is to contrast ancient and modern philosophy.

THE SPIRIT OF INTELLECTUALISM

Over the spirit of ancient and modern philosophy alike broods the spirit of intellectualism. We feel that it could hardly be otherwise, for what else but intellect can solve problems? However, if the course of culture had been like the course of civilization, and the Hebrews and Romans instead of the Hindus and Greeks had directed it, the philosophy of the western world might have been not Rationalism, but Pragmatism. Europeans would have built, or tried to build, their philosophies upon practical consequences instead of primary principles. Science, likewise, might have concerned itself with practical projects upon earth instead of theoretical patterns in the skies or in space itself.

Rationalism, with its belief in the supremacy of the intellect, has given us philosophy and science as such; if we can discover no special services that speculation has rendered, we can at least credit it with this—with intellectualism. It is something that has come down to us along the Indo-Graeco-Germanic line, and the *logos* that we enjoy has been in word and idea, in philology and philosophy.

Greek philosophy, wholly independent in origin and development from such Hindu systems as the Vedanta and Sankhya, proceeded according to forms, patterns, ideas. Even at the beginning, when it was only a crude naturalism, thinkers like Thales and Anaximenes sought form in some inclusive principle, as water or air. Later, after philosophy had been disconcerted by the dispute between Parmenides and Heraclitus, thinkers like Pythagoras and Anaxagoras sought anew for the everlasting form in number or *nous*, meaning mind. But it was Socrates who made the question of form definite and articulate. True thinking, taught he, is formal; it proceeds from general principles. It does not consist in what some one here or there may think, but in that which every one everywhere must think. There can be no knowledge, he insisted, without universal definitions. Hence, when Socrates gathered a group of disciples about him and explained how knowledge consists of class terms or universals, the deed was done. The scattered details of things, the temperament of a man, the leaf-formation of a tree, or the characteristics of a unique city like Athens, were ignored. In place of Alcibiades, the elm, or Athens, the Socratics were expected to think about Man, Tree, City. Now, it is only common sense and everyday experience that saved men from the empty universalism of Socrates.

Plato proceeded further and built up the city of philosophy that Socrates had planned. "If there is to be knowledge, there must be universals"—so spake Socrates. "If these universals are to be true, they must be real!"—thus spake Plato. Such high-handed procedure does not seem at all plausible, but if we watch our own faculty of knowledge in action we shall begin to realize that it Platonizes. All of us tend to use universals when we speak; we make mention of the forest and overlook its

elms and oaks. We speak of man and pay little attention to Peter or Paul. We prate about life heedless of its complications and confusions, and talk of wealth in terms that are innocent of dollars and cents. Our dictionaries are Platonistic in that they contain words that cover innumerable instances. Our geographies map out sea and land, river and mountain, but place the whole globe upon the basis of the imaginary lines of latitude and longitude. Science does the same Platonistic thing when it refers to what it calls matter.

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

Plato himself presented the system of ideas pictorially in the *Allegory of the Cave*. In a sort of underground den, its mouth open toward the light, sit men so shackled that they cannot behold the blazing light outside, but must content their vision with the shadows of things as these are reflected upon the inner wall. It is only when one of the prisoners, the philosopher, is able to unchain himself and make his way out into the bright world of realities that he and subsequently those others whom he enlightens know things as they are. Then the mind comes into possession of true knowledge and realizes that the things of the sensible world are "seen but not known and the ideas are known but not seen." One sees a just man, but knows justice; beholds a beautiful object, but thinks beauty; draws a square or a circle, but describes the absolute geometrical figures in a way which the mind alone understands. Plato refers to these ideas as "existing," but in strictness of language they should be spoken of more critically. The ideas have being, they subsist or obtain; existence is only that kind and degree of reality that thrusts its way out into the immediate order of space and time.

The spell of Plato's system was not broken by Aristotle even when this more realistic and practical thinker did not readily assent to the doctrine of ideas. To Aristotle, the idealistic doctrine, with its conception of heavenly patterns in which earthly things participate, seemed more metaphorical than metaphysical. Why multiply by two the number of things that exist by adding their ideal realities to them? And what evidence is there that

such ideas exist and, further, what possible part do they play in the workings of the world? But Aristotle did not really reject Plato's ideas. He connected them logically in the form of judgments with ideas in the position of subject and predicate, and further employed them scientifically to show how nature arranges things in groups, or genera, which come to be known to us in the form of class terms, such as vegetable, animal, man. But it is in his idea of mind active, *nous poetikos*, that Aristotle is most eminently Platonistic. Active mind is related to passive mind, *nous pathetikos*, about the way ideas are related to things; it is in a superior, regal position and itself is free and immortal.

Like Aristotle, the modern thinker only appears to break with ideas of Plato, although the modern with his scientific culture and civilization has made various changes in the doctrine. Ideas are now regarded as Relations, which look different but have the same features of universality and necessity. The ancient thinker said, "Ideas are realities"; the modern reverses the order of this statement and changes its inward character when he says, "Things are laws." To the ancient thinker, reality was a pattern such as an artist might follow; to the modern, it is a form of procedure which a scientist observes. The spirit of the ancient thinker was nobly dogmatic; his belief in the existence of ideas made him so. The spirit of the modern is just as critical; the modern watches his mind and its object and keeps changing his psychology and physics. Compare a modern like Kant with an ancient like Plato and let German meet Greek. What is the result? Plato asserts that there are eternal ideas in the world. Kant insists that there must be necessary categories in the mind. In one case we find forms of being, in the other modes of thinking. The tone of ancient thought was categorical, that of the modern hypothetical. In a certain sense, the modern idea of philosophical category or scientific law is that of a loosened idea, or an idea that has been unwound so that now it assumes a linear rather than a circular form. In this we find the True. This is not the True in the ancient sense of some one gigantic fact; the True that we find in our knowledge is chiefly a true way of thinking, or mental metal with a true ring to it.

THE GOAL OF LIFE

In practical as well as in theoretical thinking we are able to discern the likeness in the difference between ancient and modern thinking. In ethics, the ancients created the ideas of the Good and Virtue; the moderns have developed the principles of Duty and Conscience. The difference between the modes of moral reasoning in these cases is that, where the ancient spoke of his ethical ideals as existing things, the modern refers to them as things that ought to be. In this modern spirit, Bishop Butler referred to conscience saying, "If it had strength as it has right, if it had power as it has authority, it would absolutely govern the world." In a similar tone, Kant referred to the Good, not as to something that enjoyed actual existence, but as to that which tended to operate according to the law of the Categorical Imperative; hence the only good thing in the world is the good will. Just as the general principle of modern thinking is that of relations between things rather than things themselves, so the modern tendency is to exalt the values of objects and institutions or the interests we have in them. In these values we hope to find the Good.

The practical result of such differences in ethical thinking will appear best if they are stated in an exaggerated form. The ancient moralist rejoiced in the solution of problems he had never proposed; the modern is bothered by ethical questions he cannot answer. One found without seeking, the other seeks without finding. When it was a question of the Good, the ancient felt that he needed only a little intellectual exercise and the Good was properly defined. The modern, on the contrary, has no such clear notion of goodness but he is anxious to promote, to enforce it. So is it with the softer ideal of happiness. The ancient believed that enjoyment was to be found in the possession of the desired object, while the modern has to be satisfied with the pursuit of this. The supreme commandment in the old world was addressed to the intellect. "So think as to know thyself!" Such was the Socratic spirit so eminent with all good Greeks "So act that by thine act of willing thou canst make the maxim of thy conduct a universal law." Such was the Kantian spirit;

it has been followed generally by modern moralists even when they have not shared Kant's rigoristic ideal. One observes it in hedonist, utilitarian, and social moralist. The difference thus observable in this sketched contrast of ancient and modern ethics is that of thinking ethically and doing morally.

ANCIENT AND MODERN ART

The same contrast between the categorical tone of the classic thinker and the hypothetical mood of the modern one appears in the two types of aesthetic consciousness. State it broadly and you have this—the ancient had art, the modern has aesthetics. The divergence is that of the creative and the critical, the objective and the subjective, beauty and taste. It could hardly have been otherwise. Ancient art was formal and plastic; it expressed itself primarily in architecture and sculpture. Even its poetry and drama seem to have been built or carved out, hence the exactness of its verse and the severe unities of its drama. The prevailing ideal was that of imitation, the copy of an object or Platonistic imitation of the idea. The result was something static; the object betrays scarcely any motion and the intensity of emotion on the part of the beholder even of tragedy is supposed to be at a minimum. Aristotle stated this almost authoritatively when he referred to the tragic effect as something cleansing, *katharsis*, or soothing.

The modern artist excels in painting and music, lighter and more lyrical types of beauty. This marks the passing or melting of the solidity so discernible, so appreciable in Greek art, and inaugurates aesthetic forms that are more easily absorbed by the beholder who, as it were, can drink them in and make them a part of himself. The ideal, no longer that of imitation, is expression or something that proceeds from within outward and then objectifies an idea or feeling in the form of a canvas or sonata. Indeed, some schools of art as expression, like that of Croce, insist that the physical objectification of a beautiful feeling is a thing apart from beauty, which itself can be expressed in the form of intuition. A random instance of this sentiment may be found in Keats' famous *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, wherein

it is suggested that "heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter." This was hardly the Grecian spirit, which in its noble realism would not have recommended the composition of "ditties of no tone." It is eminently modern in that it exemplifies the ideal of beauty as subjective enjoyment instead of objective perfection. In all such expressionism we expect to find the Beautiful.

Now these modern modifications of the ancient ideas, the True, the Good, the Beautiful, are suggestive of the grand distinction between the old and the new ways of handling the common intellectualism. We can best appreciate the contrast by plunging into the problem of the soul. How far from the naïve views of Plato and Aristotle have we been urged by modern physics and psychology! And yet, when we forget our science and relapse into common experience, we can exercise unusual sympathy for the idea that the soul is the animating spirit of the body. Experience, especially when it is emotional, makes us feel that the ancients then were with us as we are now. They knew no physical laws nor were they in possession of psychological practice; they lived and felt and thought. So do we also when we forget our analytical sciences.

THE PROBLEM OF THE SOUL

Plato¹ felt that the soul was the source of life and power of breath. He realized that it was tied or even "glued" to the body from which philosophy was supposed to deliver it because of its superior value. Aristotle was more technical and thus produced something that, in the case of his *De Anima*,² might be called a psychology. But even in such a connection, Aristotle was unable to advance from the general and figurative to the specific and analytical. The soul itself is relatively independent of the body in the sense that a sailor can move about in his ship. It is itself the life of the body, a bodily entelechy, or form-giving principle. Furthermore, the soul is the realization of the body or the whole man in the sense that "cutting is the realization of the ax and vision the realization of the eye." At this point, it is

¹ *Phaedo*, 83; *Cratylus*, 399.

² Bk. II, Ch. I.

interesting to point out that Bergson, fully aware of modern psycho-physics and its problems, has seen fit to express his view in a like manner. "The consciousness of a living being is inseparable from its brain in the sense in which a sharp knife is inseparable from its edge."³

Ancient philosophy rejoiced in a sense of unity which it found without any toilsome search such as we today are experiencing in our ideals of the unity of thought and the uniformity of nature. All the little streams of classic culture flowed serenely into an inland sea. The philosophic spirit of modern times has been that of dualism. It is not that we seek duality any more than the ancients sought unity; we have this duality thrust upon us. It began when physical science detached itself from knowledge as a whole, and had its most definite origin in Galileo. This unique mind was not that of the philosopher, still less of the psychologist; it sought practically nothing but physical measurements or the mathematical forms of natural laws. The mind of Galileo created the modern ideal that what is knowable is measurable. Now, in order to perfect the ideal of Quantity, it became necessary for Galileo to detach the spatial and measurable from experience as a whole. "Divide and rule — *divide et impera!*" In order to rule the physical world according to law, it became necessary for Galileo to divide experience into the quantitative and the non-quantitative, into the physical and the psychological, into body and mind. His conception of physics everywhere implies this; what psychology he possessed stated it definitely in the form of the primary and the secondary qualities of sensations. What Galileo wanted was the primary, spatial qualities of things in order to measure them. The secondary ones, like color, were cast adrift and later became the subject matter of psychology.

THE MODERN VIEW

The essence of matter consists in extension; it is all a question of space, of size. Such was the beginning of modern thought in both science and philosophy. Our galactic system and the countless extra-galactic nebulae behind it; the stars themselves with

³ *Creative Evolution*, tr. Mitchell, p. 263.

their celestial history, intense heat, colossal weight, and giant energy; the earth, whose private system of evolution has required millions upon millions of years; the work of mankind in arranging the surface of the earth to suit its needs and fancies—all is just so much extension! Now, the answer that physical science gives when challenged for its superficiality in spatializing the universe is that under no other conditions could the matter in the universe be measured. It was no wonder, then, that some two hundred years later, Kant came to regard space as merely a mode of representing the outer world whereby we may expand space or contract it as the understanding pleases and behold a gigantic star as a speck of light and think of an atom as a solar system.

What was left after the universe had been spatialized to make it scientific or measurable? After the primary qualities had been so splendidly isolated, only the secondary, the psychological ones remained. Out of this scientific refuse the modern was supposed to construct his psychology. Now, if our language is to be strict, we should speak of “primary quantities” and “secondary qualities,” since physics is a mathematical thing, while psychology includes the experienced and enjoyed qualities of sensations, percepts, feelings, and the like. Descartes attempted to adjust the disjoined realms, or the two parts of the split soul, by definition. Body he styled *res extensa*, mind *res cogitans*. We have just intimated that body, or matter, may well be more than mere mathematical extension; we are privileged to feel that mind may amount to more than cogitation. But Descartes was intent upon parallel definitions just as, later, Spinoza was to become infatuated with the idea of parallelistic relationship between *extensio* and *cogitatio*. Indeed, that is just what came of this original movement in modern thought, physics and metaphysics alike, as initiated by Galileo. It endeavored to close the breach between body and mind by the solidaric theory of parallelism. So much mind, so much body; or, as Spinoza expressed it, “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”

If we were to carry out the implications of such psycho-physical parallelism, we should have to regard every mental state as hav-

ing something physical about it. This would be satisfactory for the special psychology of the sensations, but would not work so well with the psychology of cognition about which the brain has little or nothing to say. If, further, we were to be consistent, we should have to attach some sort of feeling or consciousness to every bit of matter and that would be inconvenient for physical science. What we do when we are not thinking of any parallelistic theory is to follow the lead of experience. Then we realize that, with beings like ourselves, animals and not angels, there must be some bodily basis for consciousness. Once psychology has paid that tax, it discovers that it is by no means bankrupt; it has any amount of mentality that it may invest in pure thought and practical intelligence — science, philosophy, politics, economics, and the like.

The attempt of the psychological philosopher to keep up with the mathematical physicist resulted in what Kant called a "coarse dualism." Another and finer dualism was being engendered at the same time — the dualism of sense and understanding and the claims put forth in their behalf by Empiricism and Rationalism. We can identify these geographically by setting the British Isles off against the continent of Europe. We can contrast them racially by mentioning the English, Irish, and Scotch here, the French, Dutch, and Germans there. Biographically they are known by the names of their leading exponents: the empirical Locke, Berkeley, Hume; the rationalistic Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz. But the differences between the two schools and their competitive claims cannot be appreciated until their respective principles are examined. This appreciation of particular points comes best after we have identified their fundamental tones.

EMPIRICIST AND RATIONALIST

First of all, one might imagine that the Empiricists, with their inclination toward matter, would have rejoiced in and made abundant use of the results of physical science as these had been worked out by Copernicus and Kepler, Galileo and Newton. To be sure, these men had proceeded in a rationalistic manner by means of deductive procedure, but the beginning and end of

their investigations had to do with the physical and perceptible; with the experienceable. But in place of physical stuff, we find with the Empiricists a corresponding amount of psychological material. There is no real mention of the sun and its planets, the nature of the earth, or the general behavior of matter. Instead of such quasi-empirical data, we find any amount of discussion concerning sensation, impression, idea, memory, reflection, and the like. The whole school of Empiricism reeked with psychology. It came to a climax when its most brilliant member, David Hume, endeavored to destroy the validity of the most important of all scientific principles—causality!

On the other hand, one might expect the Rationalist to have indulged most thoroughly in the psychological stuff that had been left over after the primary, spatial qualities had been extracted from experience. Descartes started out psychologically by surrendering all to introspection, an action which made him aware of the self, the self that says, "I think, therefore I am." But the kind of self that Descartes discovered was not a human being at all. It was allowed but a minimum of emotion and was surcharged with a maximum of reason. The Cartesian self was thus a scientist much like Descartes personally; in a certain sense it had no psychology at all. The spell of such scientism affected Spinoza. Personally he seems to have been somewhat intuitive and mystical, but his expressed system of philosophy, worked out after the manner of geometry, was far removed from psychology. So, also, Leibnitz, with whom psychological matter was only so much "confused" reason. All in all, the Rationalists, who might have been expected to espouse the cause of the mind, devoted their thoughts to the body, the physical. It was the Empiricists, supposedly interested in the body, who developed the mind.

Suppose we lay the Empiricist and the Rationalist down side by side and see how these strange bedfellows differ in their philosophic dreams. We have distinguished them already as the respective exponents of sense and understanding. One will incline toward the immediate and perceptible; the other will prefer certainty in thought to clearness of impression. In all likelihood,

there is no such person as the pure Empiricist or the pure Rationalist. Both alike are dependent upon their senses and the various contacts with earth that human life demands. Both are inclined to transcend the limits of what is given in experience and elaborate theories which themselves are not matters of experience. The pure Empiricist would be a superior animal, the pure Rationalist an inferior angel.

However, for academic purposes we may distinguish the two schools by observing that Empiricism moves upward toward a proposition by following the principles of induction, going from the particular instance to the general principle. Rationalism moves downward from a universal premise to the particular application of it and thus realizes the logical possibilities of deduction. These look like very different processes; they seem to justify much of the warfare between the inductive Empiricist and the deductive Rationalist. But when we look coolly at the two processes they seem to be pretty much the same at heart. One talks about a, b, c, the other refers to the alphabet. Here it is a question of the parts, there one of the whole. The individual plant or rock or star amounts to nothing intellectually until it is worked into botany or geology or astronomy. These general sciences are nothing apart from the individual plants, rocks, and stars that form their data.

a priori AND *a posteriori*

Rationalism and Empiricism agreed to disagree upon another question — that of the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. The distinction was made by the Schoolmen, who emphasized the temporal idea of before and after experience. It was glorified by Kant, who made the *a priori* equivalent to the universal and necessary, as in the science of mathematics. Today, the same *a priori* stands for the necessary connection of universal ideas. The *a posteriori*, like the poor, is ever with us; we find it in things, facts, events, and experiences generally. Hence, it is the *a priori* that seems at once precious and problematic. We feel sure of it in mathematics; how could arithmetic and geometry depend upon the observation of special cases and particular forms? We are not

so sure of it in physics and chemistry. Why should a body fall just sixteen feet the first second or oxygen have the atomic weight of sixteen? But once we have made allowance for empirical facts and turned those sciences over to mathematics, the *a priori* appears again. In ethics, we seem to have a self-evident principle in the idea of the Good and happiness; we know without appeal to experience that these are preferable to the Bad and misery. In political thinking we assume that justice is right or, at any rate, we know of no way to prove the principle of justice except by itself. The actual life of an unjust man or an unjust State may be more successful than that of just men and just States, and yet we cannot yield to the idea that justice is not right. It is *a priori* in its own way. Naturally we need experience to incite the idea of universal and necessary truth. Just as naturally do we turn to experience to exemplify the *a priori*, but between these empirical *termini* the *a priori* stands by itself.

But experience does more than set up the boundaries of pure reasoning in a finite mind. It filters through the abstract premises and gives thought due volume. The astronomer calculates with his mind, then observes with his eyes. He spreads out before us both his formulae of the skies and photographs of the stars. He moves back and forth between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. The discovery of the planet Neptune illustrates this most clearly. When, in 1781, the elder Herschel discovered the planet Uranus, he observed that its orbit was not such as one would expect in the gravitational field of the sun and the other known planets. In 1846 the orbit of Uranus was calculated more closely by J. C. Adams, who concluded that there must be some other planet outside the orbit of Uranus drawing it from its celestial course. The planet Neptune was seen immediately afterwards, but not definitely identified. In 1864, U. J. Leverrier made a similar computation, whereupon the planet was immediately identified. Now, the line of reasoning in this spectacular case leads from the *a posteriori* in the known planets to the *a priori* in the case of the one whose position in the skies is calculated, and then back to the *a posteriori* when the planet is actually observed. The same fusion has been at work recently in the discovery of the planet Pluto—the theoretical computations of the astronomer

Lowell and the actual appearance of the planet upon the telephotographic plate.

The combination of *a priori* and *a posteriori* appeared on a smaller scale, but with no less *éclat* in connection with the discovery of the Periodic Law. Mendelieff charted the then-known chemical elements, arranged horizontally according to their atomic weights, vertically according to their physical and chemical properties. Each element was given an atomic number from its place in the table, ranging from 1 to 92, and it was then discovered that there were certain gaps in the chart. Pure theory had places for practical things which had no existence, as far as the knowledge of them was concerned. But from the position of the unknown elements in the chart, their atomic weights and properties could be determined approximately. They needed only to be discovered to make the chart complete. The actual discovery of the missing elements, the last of which has recently come to light, completed the theoretical table, and *a priori* wisdom was justified of her *a posteriori* children. Again, it was a course of reasoning from the empirical to the empirical, but not in a straight line; the course of cognition looped up into the thin air of theory.

If men were only as rational as atoms and States as wise as stars, there might be some hope of applying the *a priori* to human life in both individual and society. Perhaps something of the sort can be done. We know, as has been noted, that the mind decides without argument in favor of goodness and happiness as against badness and misery. We approve of truth instead of error even when we have had little experience with the former. We decide in favor of life in contrast with death when we personally have not tried death. We are pledged to the *a priori* and no amount of empirical small change seems worth the smaller weight of thought in gold. However, this small-change philosophy was destined to appear in time; it was discovered in America.

PRAGMATISM

The course of modern philosophy, which had been flowing on for nearly three centuries between the Scylla of Rationalism and

Charybdis of Empiricism, has been disturbed by the appearance of Pragmatism. In a certain acceptable sense, Pragmatism is an American philosophy of the XXth century, and rejoices in a kind of here-and-now effect. It dates back well into the XIXth century and, in a certain loose sense, is as old as man himself; but it is supposed to be a new theory of knowledge fit to be placed beside Rationalism and Empiricism. In its general character, Pragmatism pretends to be an innovation; in its more radical form, it assumes to change the old standards of verity. The Pragmatist is something like Molière's *Doctor in Spite of Himself*. The philosophical patient protests that he has always heard that the heart was on the left side, the liver on the right; the pragmatic physican asserts with confidence, "We have changed all that — *nous avons changé tout cela*." Now, if we can rid our minds of the idea that Pragmatism is a great intellectual innovation, we shall be able to appreciate the presence of the pragmatic in the traditional ways of thinking as well as in the general habits of the mind. We are all Pragmatists in spite of ourselves, Pragmatists in both politics and philosophy. But we keep our Rationalism to the left, our Empiricism to the right. We have not changed all that at all.

Pragmatism would have us extend the ideal of the True until it embraces something of the Good; it would have us attribute more content to the old form. Then, in place of theoretical conclusions we shall have practical consequences. The spirit of Pragmatism is expressible in terms of a comment long attributed to the emperor Vespasian: "The most monstrous hypothesis which produces results is better than the neatest, trimmest theory from which nothing follows." Copernican astronomy was originally a "monstrous hypothesis," but it produced results in the study of the solar system. Darwinian evolution was another such "monstrosity" of the mind, but it led to fruitful consequences in anthropology. Kant's conception of space as a way of representing the universe rather than as a property of matter appeared absurd to common sense, but it explained how science had been able to reduce the universe to geometrical form. Einstein's doctrine of Relativity is the scientific monstrosity of the day and by no means as "neat and trim" as Newtonian mechanics, but its

fruitful results are constantly appearing. Planck's theory of the radiation of energy by fits and starts, as it seems to the lay mind, instead of in a smooth and continuous manner, still seems rather ridiculous to those who were brought up on classic physics, but it seems to be telling us the secret of the atom.

We welcome all such monstrous hypotheses because they tend to explain things to us, yet we exercise the faint hope that in time, after they have been integrated into or absorbed by our intellects they will assume the neat and trim form of classic theory. It is too early to judge the fruits of the tree; after they have ripened, we can decide whether our truths are really rational or only pragmatic. Pragmatism is a theory of knowledge which attempts to arrive at truth or find the quality of verity in things by the way ideas work. Does Pragmatism itself work? Can it take its place in the world as one of the forces of civilization and culture?

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

Philosophy is a part or phase of human life but is more a matter of private interest than public concern. If Plato had had his way and the rest of Europe had imitated a Platonized Athens, kings and emperors in the Old World and even presidents in the New would have been philosopher-rulers. But the philosopher is more likely to consider the State than its ruler is to consult the philosopher. What is there in philosophic method that the State can apply? What philosophic school—Empiricism or Rationalism, Idealism or Realism—could be taken over and installed by any government? Of course, such questions are absurd, and yet did not Plato wish to base a republic upon ideas? But the philosopher has done other things; an Aristotle worked out a theory of politics, a Grotius a philosophy of rights. The philosophico-political value of these men consists in this—that they combined theoretical principles with practical conditions. Aristotle condemned Plato's rational *Republic* because it failed to reckon with such existing things as private life, private property, and the separate household. Grotius, on the other hand, criticized the *République* of Bodin because it did not distinguish the science

of law from mere statecraft, and ignored Natural Law for the sake of the arbitrary conventions of particular nations. Aristotle proceeded from the premise that "man is by nature a political animal," and then sought to determine in what form of State man could be most fully human; that is, most virtuous and happy. Grotius used even more definite philosophical procedure when he attempted to prove the existence of *jus naturale* by both *a priori* and *a posteriori* reasoning.

But political procedure does not always pursue the strict methods of logic that Grotius applied to international law. For the body politic is not supposed to follow the Law of Nature the way particles of matter obey the laws of physics. Nature and society are different. In time to come, men may obey the law of justice the way material bodies obey the law of gravitation, but that utopia is far below our present horizon. In the State, where men must be controlled and commodities administered, the practical legislator cannot wait until a complete philosophy of rights has determined the right relation of man to man, and society to the things of this world. A radical American may have lost his faith in the divine character of democracy, but he can proceed better by recalling that ideal than by endeavoring to recast the State according to a theory. An enlightened Englishman may no longer subscribe to the doctrine of the divine right of kings, but with such a vast State as that of Great Britain the ideal of monarchy is a sufficient guide. As we have observed in the case of Aristotle and Grotius, the theory of the State should be both rational and empirical; rational in its regard for the ethical principles of politics, empirical in its concern for existing constitutions and current conditions. Perhaps the present plight of democracy is due to the failure to balance these momenta, or due to the preponderance of the empirical factor in statecraft.

The application of the pragmatic method to the State is obvious, but none the less obnoxious. Legislation shows this. The layman is in the habit of thinking that laws are framed the way conclusions are drawn. He assumes that a law is the conclusion drawn from the major premise of justice. Instead of such philosophical politics we find pragmatic statecraft, which results in the passage of laws by the thousands until they aggregate

almost unto millions. The layman would like to regard particular laws as so many parts of the State and legislation as the natural consequences of justice. Unable to exercise such a vision of State and law, he falls back upon political Pragmatism and assumes that there is a difference between what is lawful and what is expedient.

Pragmatism conducts or beguiles us from the Intellectualism of the Athenian to the Humanism of the American, changes the tone of philosophy from aristocracy to democracy, and tends to substitute the needs of the heart for the ideals of the intellect. In a certain historical sense, the Pragmatist of today is akin to the Sophist in the days of Socrates. Or all of us incline toward the spirit of Protagoras since we tend to make the individual "man the measure of all things," believe in money, and are proud of our sophistication. It is hard for us to learn the Socratic lesson of true self-knowledge and moral restraint. The Pragmatist has taken advantage of the present confusion in physics and politics, morals and religion and urged his theory upon us. Or, to take a more favorable view of his scheme, he has supplied us with a form of thinking adapted to suit the contradictory conditions of contemporary thought. But is Humanism sufficient; will it stand the pragmatic test and work out fruitful consequences? Two pairs of philosophic problems, modern and also time-honored ones, should serve to reveal the shortcomings of the pragmatic method.

TESTS OF PRAGMATISM

Suppose we consider modern astronomy and modern biology and their philosophic effects upon our idea of the earth and man. These sciences tend to degrade the earth and belittle the importance of man. Long ago, man gave up the idea that the earth was the static center of the universe; more recently has he yielded the idea that the sun lies near the center of our galactic system, our own universe. Then, likewise, our universe is only one among others. When the controversy began three hundred years ago, everything was on the side of Humanism, man's interests, beliefs, and ideals; little or nothing ranged up alongside

theoretical science. If humanistic Pragmatism had been the ruling philosophy, as it was indeed the leading tendency, modern science could hardly have come into being. Modern science struck man a terrible blow, but it was aimed at his heart, not his head. Man's recovery, which is still going on, has been due to the fact that his leading interest is a rationalistic rather than a humanistic one. If man had kept asking, "Does this idea make any difference to me?" we should not have had our present astronomy. The new astronomic idea did make a difference to him in his anthropomorphic faith and narrow belief in himself, but he resolved, in the case of the wiser mind, that the new idea should not make any difference after all.

"Is not just the self-diminution of man, is not his will to self-diminution ever since Copernicus making irresistible progress?" said Nietzsche. "Alas, the belief in his dignity, his uniqueness, his irreplaceability in the rank-sequence of beings is gone; he has become an animal, an animal without likeness, allowance and reserve—he, who in his former belief was almost a God ("Child of God, God-man"). . . . It seems as though man, since Copernicus, had slid upon an inclined plane,—he ever rolls more rapidly away from the center. Whither?"⁴

One may feel surprise that Nietzsche, an avowed irreligionist, should feel such an antipathy to Copernicus, whose views were quite commonplace in 1887, when Nietzsche wrote his *Genealogy of Morals*. His hectic words are quoted simply to convey the abiding sense of human regret that man's habitat had been relegated to an inconspicuous position in the universe at large and he himself made to appear contemptible. Now, it was because man followed the older methodologies of Rationalism and Empiricism and, incidentally, fought his inherent Pragmatism, that astronomy adjusted the earth to something like its proper position in the skies. Hence it seems out of place when a sober scientist like Jeans, who is no mad rhetorician like Nietzsche, speaks of January 7, 1610 as a "fateful day for the human race," and refers to this date further as something that "proved to be the most catastrophic in the history of the race."⁵

⁴ *Genealogy of Morals*, tr. Hausemann, III, p. 216.

⁵ *The Universe Around Us*, pp. 1, 6.

Dies Irae! On that day Galileo looked at the stars through an amateur telescope! Was this a catastrophe for the rational mind?

Nietzsche refers to the "dignity," "uniqueness," and "irreplaceability" in the order of existence as though these attributes of man had been taken from him. This bitter sentiment carries us over into the second great scientific movement of modern times — Darwinism. Again we must insist that, if one would maintain a humanistic, anthropomorphic point of view, Darwinism will prove disastrous to his pride and pretensions. The new astronomy changed the position of man's habitat, but did not disturb his own nature. This was done violently by the general Theory of Evolution, which connected the life, consciousness, and even character of man with the existence of other species. All that is human and temperamental within man tends to cry out for a return to the strictly human estimate of the human race; its godlike descent and spiritual destiny. But what is rational within man assents to a perplexing theory as that which is most in accord with the facts in the case and the rational interpretation of them. When, therefore, we are called upon to choose between the desirable and the thinkable, the humanistic and the rationalistic, we decide in favor of the latter.

In the case of more desirable ideas, such as God and the soul, we have to consider that the human appeal made by these ideas is not the ground of belief in them. Here we must observe that certain types of mind are not so favorably impressed by these spiritual ideals. Or under conditions of political disorder, such as we observed in Russia, the national mind generally is not in favor of God and the soul. Where there is a settled political order, there is usually theological peace of mind, and *vice versa*. When the order is changing, Church as well as State is affected, so that the radical in politics becomes the radical in theology. The result is that the radical mind, almost always that of the doctrinaire, in setting up an anarchism thinks it necessary to set up an atheism. The result is that the anarchist or communist speaks of himself for short as an "atheist." The fact of the matter is that his preoccupation with political questions has not given him opportunity for the study of theological ones. Never-

theless, he insists upon being an "atheist." Hence follow his negative views of God and the soul.

Now, Intellectualism in both its rationalistic and empirical forms is bound to insist that one's personal and political views, religion and irreligion, have practically nothing to do with the credibility of one's ideas. We may dislike Copernicus and Darwin, but our feelings have nothing to do with astronomy and biology. The ideas of God and soul may or may not appeal to us as worth while, but the truth or plausibility of these ideas depends upon a metaphysical conception of them. When Pragmatism abandons its purely humanistic attitude, as it seems to be doing now, and takes a relativistic point of view, we are more inclined to accept it. Since the field of knowledge is so vast, we can hardly expect to experience it; and since the conceptions of things in that field are undergoing such changes, we can hardly hope to rationalize our experience. We are pragmatic *pro tempore*, but we hope to become more rationalistic as time goes on. All philosophy springs from the human understanding. Where this is "all-too-human," we have Pragmatism; when the understanding itself is emphasized, the result is Intellectualism, the field of philosophy *par excellence*.

CHAPTER XIV

THE POLITICAL FACTOR IN MODERN CIVILIZATION



THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED

MODERN POLITICS IN CITY AND STATE, IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL forms is now such a complicated affair that we tend to lose sight of its fundamental principles. The political, like the scientific and philosophical, the industrial and economic, is a way of living, a way of living well. The political principle is the same now as it was at the beginning of civilization; its form has changed, but its essence has remained the same. A modern machine made up of innumerable parts is enormously different from a stone tool manufactured thousands of years ago, but both serve the same purpose—the lengthening of man's hand, the extension of his powers. The political State is a similar extension of man's being and influence, so that, in the case of some eminent political philosophers, notably Plato and Hobbes, the State is thought of as only an enlarged man. Both the body politic and the private person are supposed to desire the same thing; both aim at what is harmonious with their respective and similar natures. This may be expressed in a pleasing and plausible manner by stating that government rests on the consent of the governed. It is the earliest and the latest conception of politics.

In Hebrew religion, Greek philosophy, and Roman law, the consent of the governed was a fundamental principle of politics. The religio-political conception of life according to the Hebrews is expressed pointedly in such a statement as the following: "And Jehoiada made a covenant between the Lord and the king and the people, that they should be the Lord's people; between the king also and the people."¹ This, however, was only an unusually definite expression of the covenant-idea of the Old Testament, according to which Jahweh is represented as saying,

¹ *II Kings* XI, 17.

"I will be your God and ye shall be my people." In a certain sense, this religious conception embodied the modern idea of civil government by contract. The Deity was to contribute divine care in consideration for human worship, or the Promised Land for the pure worship of the national God.

Among the Greeks, Plato with his aristocratic system of politics would hardly be expected to stoop to the idea of government by consent and yet his later political philosophy does not omit this precious principle. Plato gave some expression to it in connection with the proper principles of rule and obedience in governments, and states that according to nature there should be a "rule of law over willing subjects and not a rule of compulsion."² He indicates further that a just government is one of "voluntary rule over voluntary subjects." The Roman conception of government by consent was suggested by the anti-monarchical work *The Grounds of Rights against Tyrants* (1579), in which, as this work is elucidated by Dunning,³ it is asserted that the relation of king to people is one of contract. The people or their representatives ask the king whether he will rule justly and, upon receiving a satisfactory answer, agree to give faithful obedience. This, as the work suggests, is the true foundation of all royal government; tyranny consists in the violation of the contract which the monarch has made with his people.

Did the Romans base their idea of the State upon this notion of compact or was this merely the idea of the anti-monarchical work just referred to? Dunning, whom we were following in this connection, does no more than state that such was the opinion expressed in *The Grounds of Rights against Tyrants*, not that the consent of the governed was a practice in Roman history. Mommsen was somewhat more explicit, so that from his *History of Rome* we are able to extract the following sentence by way of illumination: "The community did not owe fidelity and obedience to the king until he had convoked the assembly of freemen capable of bearing arms and had formally challenged its allegiance."⁴ Yet the consent of the

² *Laws*, Bk. III, 690.

³ *History of Political Theories*, Vol. II, p. 53.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 97.

governed is something we are more likely to accept as the ruling sentiment of a people rather than the actual practice of a State. The body politic for all its vastness and variety seems to contain the ingredients of human nature. It is a grouping of individuals and the assembling of things, is comprised of persons and property, and attempts to govern one and administer the other. "A State," said Aristotle, "is one of the works of nature, and man is by nature a political animal."⁵ We may not care to express our conception of man in just this way, since the political seems like an extra touch applied to the life of mankind, yet we may rest assured that man is by nature a social being out of whose social nature the political can be formed. Men tend to group and gather things around them, and these activities relate them to one another as also to the things of this world. The political and physical relations thus engendered provoke the development of an organized State.

PLATO'S REPUBLIC

The State in the form of these natural, growing relations had existed for ages before it became the subject of analytical study. There was, of course, before the science of the State arose, a practical study of its needs as also of the best ways of governing and administering, to say nothing of rather extensive legislation. But there was no political science until the coming of Greek philosophy and no political theory until Plato elaborated one. The remarkable thing about Plato's *Republic* is that it is at once the earliest and the latest theory of the State, for what he said twenty-three hundred years ago about an ideal Athens is now being considered in the form of an ideal or rational Italy, an ideal or scientific Russia. Plato was not concerned with the scientific question of how the State came into existence or what are the necessary conditions of a real State. His concern is with the question why there should be a State and how it may best be thought of. Plato deals with theory rather than history, with values rather than facts. His first step in the direction of an ideal

⁵ *Politics*, Bk. I, Ch. II.

order is a step away from the real one; that is, he begins by repudiating the natural origin of the State in the family, the origin of the *polis* in the *oikos*. His ideal State is based upon the principle of community of wives and property. Having severed the State from its natural origin, Plato was free to develop it according to an ideal end. The communistic arrangement of the *Republic* and the caste-like division of the State into orders of men, which Plato discarded in the *Laws*, reveal the extreme rationalism of his political system.

In the development of the *Republic*, which was really a work on justice, Plato ignored history for the sake of reason and indulged in theoretical premises at the expense of practical conclusions. His method of political procedure was that of philosophical division, which seemed to promise a rational republic and a wise plan of justice. The dialectical division is the three-fold one penetrating his system. The cosmos is made up of body-soul-mind, man of appetite-desire-reason; the virtues that follow are temperance-courage-wisdom, while the classes of men who possess these faculties and are expected to exemplify these virtues are the workers-warriors-rulers. The virtue of justice, which finds no place in the cosmos and belongs to no class in the State, is supposed to dictate the divisions and preside over the whole system. The historical example which Plato seems to have in mind was the government of Sparta, the desired application of the plan concerned Athens, while the actual counterpart of the three classes was suggested to him by the Phoenicians and Egyptians at the bottom, the Thracians and Scythians in the middle, and the Greeks generally and the Athenians in particular at the top.⁶

THE REALIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC

Both idealism and historical realism seem to have been at work in Plato's mind when he devised his startling political plan. On the side of philosophy, Plato's belief in the reality of the universal idea and the shadow-like existence of particular things inclined him to view the State as of supreme importance,

⁶ *Republic*, Bk. IV, 435.

the individual as of only relative worth. On the side of history, he realized that the ideal of citizenship exemplified in the constitution of Sparta was an approximation to his theoretical conception of the State; for Sparta had a degree of communism, a system of classes, lax marriage, and no private property. Athens was intensely individualistic and stood in need of political reform, which Plato would carry out, it seems, by a radical remolding of the whole political system. This was to be the Ideal Republic. On the positive and favorable side, the philosophical premises led to the idea of the perfect State, in which each individual was a citizen. On the negative and unfavorable side, the same premises brought the political philosopher to the conclusion that the individual parts, or human beings with their personal lives, personal property, and domestic relations were matters of no concern. The State was for all and yet for none.

What were the ways and means of this hypothetical order of politics? How was Plato or the political Platonist to put it into effect? More than one answer was given to that important question of practical detail, of *modus operandi*. These answers to the question "how?" may be summed up in the form of the philosophical, political, and social. The philosophical principle on which the new Republic was to be based found expression in the well-known saying in the fourth book of the *Republic*, "Until philosophers are kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, then only will this our State have a possibility of life." The political expedient consisted in having a despotic philosopher introduce the ideal State by force and then realize its possibilities by educating the children up to the new ideals.⁷ The social method was that of general reform, expressed in the *Laws*, which abandons communism and endeavors to fill up the gap between the ideal and the real. To these three devices might be added the idealistic view of the Republic, in accordance with which the philosopher considers "the city which is within him," acts according to its ideals, and is fairly oblivious of the feeling that it will never find its real counterpart in the world.⁸

⁷ Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, tr. Hough, § 79, 6.

⁸ *Republic*, Bk. IX, 591-592.

MAN A POLITICAL ANIMAL

Now, it is this real counterpart to the ideal polity that Aristotle sought in his work called *Politics*. Unlike Plato, he did not attempt to take the real State apart and put it together again according to an ideal pattern; rather did he accept the given content of government and seek to interpret it according to principles of reason. The difference between Plato's Ideal Republic and Aristotle's Household-State indicates the difference between Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Peripatetic School. In one we find a system of ideas based upon the Good; in the other a scheme of entelechies, or living causes, working toward Happiness. Moreover, the philosophy of Aristotle is marked by the presence of the Golden Mean, which insured him intellectually from the extremes and contradictions of the real and the ideal as these keep competing in Plato's system. In other words, Aristotle's politics is the rationalization and the improvement of the historical State, or the political form of developing society.

The fundamental characteristics of the Aristotelian State, instead of being framed upon the triple dialectical divisions of body-soul-mind are found in the threefold natural divisions of household-village-State. Indeed, we ourselves used these three to indicate the nature and growth of the political order. The kind of society which nature herself has formed for daily support is called a family (*oikos*); the society of several families instituted for mutual advantage is called a village (*komé*); and when many villages join in one society in order that men may live happily, the result is the State (*polis*). Although this is the chronological order, the logical arrangement is the reverse, for the State is prior to the household and the individual. Although Aristotle bases his theory of politics upon nature, he makes no room for the so-called "State of Nature" which, as we shall see, played such an important part in modern political theory. Since, according to Aristotle, man is naturally a political animal, it follows that a creature so imperfect as to be incapable of society or so complete as to have no need of it is "either a beast or a god."⁹

⁹ *Politics*, Bk. I, Ch. II.


THE BEST STATE

But Aristotle was not satisfied to show that the State was a real thing; he desired to indicate further that it was good; hence he inquired concerning the nature of the best civil society. It was, of course, impossible for him to avoid examining the merits of Plato's ideal communism. He began to dismiss this in a summary manner by proposing a set of three alternatives—having all things in common, having nothing in common, and having some things in common. It would be impossible to have a social State with no things in common, for there must be at least the common place of habitation or the city. But should citizens have in common all things, including their wives, children, and property? Aristotle did not fail to point out what indeed Plato realized: namely, the practical difficulty to be experienced in changing from a real State to an ideal one. He observed, further, that Plato's Republic would not be likely to produce the unity it aimed at, since the unity it proposed was more a metaphysical oneness than a moral unanimity. What Aristotle's criticism really amounted to, was that the children who belong to everybody belong to nobody and, as to property, what is everybody's business is nobody's business.¹⁰

The realism of Aristotle's *Politics*, based upon the study of a hundred and fifty and more constitutions,¹¹ is of special value in its presentation of the kinds of government—monarchy, aristocracy, commonwealth, which have regard for the interests of the community. When government becomes excessive and men are ruled too much and the political interest pertains chiefly to the ruler, there arise three perversions—tyranny, oligarchy, democracy. Aristotle distinguishes these three forms of government with their perversions by an appeal to the idea of quantity. Monarchy is government by one; aristocracy, government by more than one; and commonwealth or polity, government by the citizens at large. Aristotle, however, does not mean to be so obvious and mathematical; accordingly he makes his distinction anew by stating that tyranny means the

¹⁰ *Politics*, Bk. III, Chs. I-V.

¹¹ Dunning, *A History of Political Theories*, Vol. I, Ch. III, p. 50.



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(facing page 345)

despotic power of one person over many, which latter become as slaves; oligarchy arises when the supreme power of the State is lodged with the rich; democracy when the government is in the hands of the poor. Here, of course, the natural assumption is made that the rich will be few in number and the poor many.¹² We moderns cannot help feeling interest in what Aristotle said about the power of money in politics; we Americans are curious to find out what he had to say about the commonwealth, or what he usually called "polity."

DEMOCRACY

Aristotle takes up the question of who or what shall rule in the rational State by asking in whose hands the supreme power of the State should be placed. He answers the question none too clearly by pointing out the difficulties that arise in connection with each of the three leading forms of government—of mass, of class, of monarch. Under mass-rule of democracy, in his sense of that term, there is the danger that the poor may lay violent hands upon the property of the rich. In an oligarchy of class-rule, there is the danger that the wealthy may tyrannize over the poor; while in a monarchy, if the power of sovereignty be in the hands of one person, the many will go without the honors and offices of the State. If we, in following Aristotle as patiently as we can, assert that it is not any person or class of persons, but the Law which should be sovereign, there remains the difficulty that the Law must still be administered by men and, as he says, "if this law appoints an aristocracy or a democracy, how will it help us in our present doubts?"¹³

What interests us in Aristotle's political system is the thing he has to say in favor of vesting the supreme power with the many; it is the essence of democracy, as we understand that term. Aristotle inclines toward this, but does not take it for granted as we are in the habit of doing. He refers to it as "the middle state," regards it as a political mean between extremes, and pronounces it the best. Such a Golden Mean in

¹² *Politics*, Bk. III, Chs. VII–VIII.

¹³ *Ib.*, Bk. III, Ch. X.

politics is determined by placing it between "the most perfect in the abstract" and "the best suited under any given circumstances." The third or intermediary polity is that which is best fitted for all governments and thus, while not being utopian, is "imaginary"; it is a sort of average polity.¹⁴ The reason that Aristotle gives for vesting the supreme power with the many instead of the few or the one is found in a kind of collective logic. The many taken together have more wealth and more virtue than the few, just as they have more functions and greater variety in the power of discrimination. The man is like a multitude of men with "many hands, many feet, many senses," or a conglomerate audience of men who in their collective capacity are the best judges of poetry and music.¹⁵ Accordingly Aristotle concludes that the middle state is the best in both ethics and politics. In the ideal-real State, there should not be a majority of those who are handsome and strong, noble and rich, or a majority of those who are poor, weak, or mean, but a large middle class of average persons.

POST-CLASSIC POLITICS

Plato and Aristotle give at the beginning what might be expected much later on in the development of politics—the ideal of a perfect State, but they develop the superstructure rather than the foundation. Yet it is hardly enough to think of mankind as so much raw material for a republic or to speak of man as naturally a political animal. There must be in human nature some political principle out of which the State may grow. The modern thinker, as we shall see, found this in Natural Rights, *jus naturale*. Now this conception of *jus naturale* as something distinct from *lex civilis* had not really escaped the Greek mind. Their tragic poets were unusually fond of contrasting the innate principle of natural justice, *phusis*, with the artificial expression of it in established law, or *nomos*. The *Antigone* of Sophocles presents this contrast in a most spectacular manner. And not the poets only, but the philosophers also; Aristotle distinguished between justice and law when he contrasted natural with legal

¹⁴ *Politics*, Bk. IV, Ch. I.

¹⁵ *Ib.*, Bk. III, Ch. XI.

right, or the *phusikon* with the *nomikon*. Yet the principle of Natural Rights had still to appear.

The theoretical distinctions the Greeks had made, the Romans put into practice. In elaborating the impressive system of Roman Law, the imperial jurists were called upon to distinguish between the private law of Rome and those principles of natural equity that had grown up in connection with subject people and foreigners generally. Thus the Roman jurists observed that, as the rights of Roman citizens were guarded by *jus civile*, so the customs and rights of non-Romans were supervised by *jus gentium*, which came to be identified with the broader and deeper principle of *jus naturale*. "The scientific work of the jurists," says Dunning, "was to systematize and to blend into harmonious unity the *jus civile* and the *jus gentium*. Under the latter head were included all the various systems which, by the edicts of the successive praetors, had developed in the court for aliens at Rome and in the provinces."¹⁶ It is doubtful, however, whether Roman politics put into practice that which Roman Law had developed in theory.

The Garden of Epicurus and the Porch of Zeno the Stoic could not be expected to excel or even equal in general philosophy the Academy of Plato and the Lyceum of Aristotle. But perhaps the Epicureans and Stoics advanced in political practicality. This indeed they did and, although the pattern of modern States even today is either Platonic or Aristotelian, the procedure of political thinking has been influenced by Epicureans and Stoics. Epicurus states in a radical form the general idea of government by consent when he insists that "justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual agreement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury." The Stoics were inclined to consider government in just as loose a manner, but not in the Epicurean form of self-interest. On the contrary, their anti-classic conception of government was such as to generate the ideals of world-citizenship, a cosmopolitanism far different from the trim and narrow ideal of an Athenian Re-

¹⁶ *History of Political Theories*, Vol. I, p. 127.

public or a Greek State. In this large and loose conception they anticipated the Christian ideal of the State.

THE CHRISTIAN STATE

It was not to be expected that a mystic like Christ with his belief in a Kingdom of God not of this world should perfect or even attempt a political system. The principle of organization, except as it might be involved in selecting two small bands of disciples, The Twelve and The Seventy, was absent from his mind. He distinguished sharply between the things of Caesar and the things of God, and devoted himself utterly to one at the expense of the other. St. Paul continued this distinction, but was more inclined to be diplomatic toward secular power, with which he was well acquainted and for which he as a free Roman citizen had due respect. Hence the Apostle to the Gentiles dealing with the Roman citizens in the Christian community advises obedience to magistrates, saying, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God."¹⁷

How did the growing Christian community adapt itself to the established State? At first it adjusted itself as best it could, practiced passive obedience, and endured some martyrdom. Later it sought to take possession of the State and founded the Holy Roman Empire, only to yield to the idea of separate, secular national governments, with the effect of producing a semi-political and sometimes a semi-religious conception of the Church. In the mediaeval period with the impressive mass of theology there was also a certain amount of political material. This we may consider as it appears in the systems of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. In one we find a pessimistic, in the other an optimistic view of the State.

The pessimistic politics of St. Augustine (354-430) was based upon his theological views, especially those of the Fall of Man and his redemption. At the same time, the author of *The City of God* makes a significant but cynical observation upon the history of the race as he understands it. This is that Cain built

¹⁷ Rom. XIII, 1.

the city of Enoch after he had slain his brother Abel, and that Romulus founded the city of Rome after his murder of Remus. These traditions lead St. Augustine to observe that evidently civilization was founded upon fratricide; they suggest to us that there is still an unfortunate connection between civilization and war. The political idea couched in *The City of God* is that the State is made necessary because of man's sinfulness; the redeemed, who belonged to the *civitas dei*, have no need of its offices, which apply to citizens of the *civitas mundi*. This political pessimism was accompanied by a kind of utopianism in that, with the complete redemption of the race, the State is destined to become useless. However, it is the actual condition of things and the exigencies of historical situations that make the State necessary for fallen man and that in the form of a necessary evil. This was a political conception far from the usual one but, as we shall see, it was restated in modern times by none other than Thomas Paine. The extremes of the sacerdotal and the secular met in pessimistic politics. Both the devout theologian and the radical politician were driven to the conclusion that man stands in need of control by the strong arm of the State.

Between St. Augustine and St. Thomas there was a lapse of more than eight centuries. These witnessed the fall of Rome, the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire, and the development of feudalism. Unlike the great Father of the Middle Ages, the great Schoolman had before his eyes no declining empire, but a growing political order. Hence it was natural for Thomas Aquinas to view the social order with much more complacency than St. Augustine had enjoyed. The secularism of Thomas did not induce him to follow his master Aristotle into the paths of natural philosophy, but he did accept pagan leadership in the direction of political thought. Thus he concludes that man, by virtue of his helplessness, his social nature, and power of speech, was destined for political life and further stands in need of some ruling power over him. In addition to such obvious principles of politics, St. Thomas discusses certain details of statecraft, as cultivation of the soil, the fortification of cities, and the conduct of commerce.

MODERN POLITICAL THEORY

Modern political theory was inaugurated by Machiavelli (1469-1527); his famous work, *The Prince*, was published five years after his death. Machiavelli was the founder of modern politics just as Galileo, another Italian, became the founder of modern physics a century later. As Galileo eliminated the human or secondary qualities from the physical world in order to make it the subject of pure science, so Machiavelli reduced the idea of the State to the principle of force or purely material power. The result of this was not political science so much as it was "politics" in the cynical sense of that term. Unlike Aristotle long before him and Grotius, who was to follow him, Machiavelli based his idea of the State upon statecraft rather than upon a political principle like justice. He introduced into politics a principle which has since developed all too fully and one which today we are trying to reduce to a minimum — the principle of diplomacy.

Although Machiavelli's spirit was thoroughly anti-ecclesiastical and his method distinct from that of mediaeval thought, his political theory was of no value to the Reformation. In like manner, the political weapon that Machiavelli forged was of no service to the anti-monarchical thinkers who appeared after the death of Luther and Calvin. Hence the two great movements of the XVIth century, one opposed to the Pope and the whole Petrine principle and the other in opposition to the Prince and the Caesarean idea, proceeded without support from the fundamental work on modern politics. Thus the layman is often at a loss to comprehend the reputation that the name of Machiavelli enjoys. In behalf of his ideal "Prince," he sought to make a political art of tyranny, which was the very thing both ecclesiastical and political thinkers were seeking to avoid.

PROTESTANT POLITICS

The anti-ecclesiastical and anti-monarchical movements of early modern times were not productive of impressive works in the science of politics, but they contributed a spirit and a method.

In the case of the German Reformation, the sentiments of Luther involved a philosophy of rights although this was not based upon the principle of *jus naturale*. These sentiments were expressed in his tracts *The Freedom of a Christian Man* (1520) and *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* (1520). Unlike Machiavelli, Luther in opposing the Catholic Church was not thereby opposing the idea of the Church as the community of believers. And in contrast with the anti-monarchical thinkers who were shortly to appear, he did not question the right of secular power, but upheld the idea of passive obedience. A more theoretical conception of politics was advanced by Melancthon, who based his theory of the State upon Natural Law, *lex naturae*, as this is implanted in the heart of man by the Deity. The Law of Nature became the basis of the secular government that Luther had done no more than take for granted.

The political principle was a part of and an essential ingredient in Calvin's comprehensive system of theology. In his *Institutes* one finds a kind of Protestant parallel to the *Summa* of Aquinas. In Book IV of his classic work, Calvin makes abundant room for secular government, looks upon it as indispensable, and attributes to it the functions of preserving life, safeguarding property, and keeping order. He was far indeed from the modern idea, put forth a century later by Spinoza, that theology and politics are distinct in nature and should be kept apart in their operations. In the case of Calvin with his severe doctrine of predestination, it is hardly possible to see how a paralyzing theology could become a vivifying principle of political rights. "People have sometimes wondered how the Calvinistic doctrine of Election . . . could have been held by men of the most vigorous character and should have been the religious stimulus and education of the very nations which struggled most stubbornly and most successfully for civil liberty. Consider to what the doctrine was opposed and the mystery is explained. The salvation of the individual depends solely on the eternal and unalterable decree of God . . . it depends not at all on the will or act of any ecclesiastical authority, of any human authority whatever. The doctrine of Election robs the priest of his power; it is the appeal from man to God."¹⁸

¹⁸ Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, Ch. I, pp. 18-19.

In addition to these examples of special pleading exhibited by the Protestant in his political opposition to the pope there were similar pleas put forth by both Protestant and Catholic.¹⁹ These were directed against the secular ruler; they assumed the form of anti-monarchical documents. They sprang from Huguenot sources and were inspired for the most part by the massacre of St. Bartholomew. The historical phase of this political movement of pre-modern times cannot concern us here, but we must not fail to observe that in the course of the controversy over tyrants the political thinkers found it expedient to make use of ideas which were to become the very foci of modern political philosophy—the original State of Nature and the subsequent formation of government by Social Contract. These were by no means novel, although they were forgotten ideas when they were advanced by the political thinkers of the XVIIth century. We have observed already that something like government by consent of the governed as also the idea of a State made by mutual compact were ideas not absent from the theological and political literature of the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans. There was also in the ideas of Eden, the Golden Age, and the pre-political condition of mankind generally, some suggestion of the dominant idea of early modern politics; namely, the State of Nature. These ancient ideals of the State were recalled during the Renaissance; the Reformation resurrected the Hebrew idea; the Revival of Learning restored the Roman conception of government by contract and gave the thinkers of the Enlightenment certain historical patterns to follow.

THE STATE OF NATURE

The political notion of an original, pre-political, and even pre-social condition of mankind was so spectacular in its day that it is worth some detailed consideration. The exponents of the idea that the life of the race began in a State of Nature had a weak conception of history, no idea of evolution, and no data of modern anthropology. They proceeded according to tradition or conjecture. Tradition supplied some general conception of primitive

¹⁹ Dunning, *History of Political Theories*, Vol. II, p. 47, note.

times like "the good old days" or a period of savagery. For the most part, the political thinker of the Enlightenment was inclined to conjecture what the State of Nature must have been by considering what modern man would be if law were removed. Thus the *status naturalis* of mankind amounted to the *status civilis* minus contemporary law and government. This was most strikingly presented by Hobbes, in whose mind nature so dissociated men and set them at variance with one another that the State of Nature was "the war of all against all — *bellum omnium contra omnes*."

Yet Hobbes was by no means the first political thinker to base his theory of government upon such an anarchistic conception. Polybius (c. 204–123 B.C.), the Greek historian of the Roman Republic, had suggested that the starting point of civilization was from a pre-social condition in which men were unfamiliar with the arts of civilization. In the middle of the XVth century, the idea appeared again in *The Rise and Power of the Roman Empire* by Aeneas Sylvius (Pope Pius II, 1405–1464). The State of Nature according to this author was the animal-like existence of the first human family after the expulsion from Eden and until reason taught them to assemble in communities, build cities, and cultivate the arts of civilization.²⁰ A more agreeable picture of man's natural condition before the organization of society was painted by Juan de Mariana in his work *On Kingship and the Education of a King* (1599). In their natural state men lived like animals, sought food, and propagated their kind. Such a pre-social condition had its advantages in that nature herself furnished man with the requirements of food and shelter, while the disadvantages of private property were unknown. It was because of the increase of wants and the weakness of man that mankind grouped in the form of governments. This was a natural form of government, the rule of one man unrestrained by law, which in the course of time developed in an extensive and elaborate fashion.²¹

The modern political thinker found the idea of the *status naturalis* most convenient for his conception of political life, so

²⁰ *Ib.*, Vol. I, p. 283.

²¹ *Ib.*, Vol. II, pp. 68–69.

that it became a commonplace throughout the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. The State of Nature in its modern form did not play any essential part in the political theory of Jean Bodin (1530-1596). His conception of politics was too historical to let him develop the idea of any pre-social condition of mankind; he finds it more feasible to start with the organized family rather than the free individual. Something similar to this might be said in connection with Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who was of extraordinary influence in the development of the political idea in modern times. The position of Grotius is rendered ambiguous by the fact that, like Aristotle, he thinks of man as by nature social, so that his theory of politics makes no place for a pre-social condition. What Grotius does suggest is this: while society is as old as man, the State is not. This conveys the idea that Grotius provides for a pre-political but not a pre-social State of mankind. The units in this pre-political condition were not isolated individuals but separate families, which were under the provisional laws of patriarchal government.

THE WAR OF ALL AGAINST ALL

Now, it was with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) that the idea of the State of Nature assumed its most striking form. In discussing this notion of a primitive and pre-political condition of mankind, Hobbes employs what we are calling the method of conjecture rather than that of tradition. Like Kant, who was about the last of the Natural Rights School, Hobbes, who was among the very first, treats the whole political problem in the form of an "as if." That is, political society as we enjoy it today is as if it had been manufactured out of the raw materials furnished by the State of Nature. Why did Hobbes, a theoretical materialist, proceed in this idealistic manner? Perhaps because he realized that his picture of the State of Nature, preposterous as it was, could not be accepted as a true picture of primitive mankind. More plausible is it to suggest that Hobbes' conception of the State of Nature was in harmony with his general method, which was a deductive and almost geometrical one. If we bear in mind that Hobbes was a devout follower of Euclid, we can more easily

realize how it was that Spinoza, who perfected the *more geometrico*, should have followed Hobbes' principles of political philosophy. But what was the Hobbist State of Nature?

It was not an actual condition of things discoverable in the records of the past, according to Hobbes; for he had no great respect for history. The State of Nature was rather a supposed condition of things arrived at theoretically by a process of elimination. It was mankind minus the civilization that he had placed upon himself, or stark humanity; a state of affairs in which all men were equal. When Hobbes used that conventional expression, he spoke with more cynicism than sincerity, his idea being that men imagine themselves equal and strive by a process of leveling to promote equality. One may be stronger in body, another quicker in mind, so that the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest by some sort of mental machination. The causes of quarrel among men are competition, which makes for gain; diffidence, craving safety; and glory, which makes men struggle for reputation. These natural causes are operative in the State of Nature wherein men live without a common power to keep them in awe. Then "they are in that condition which is called Warre, and such a Warre as is of every man against every man. For Warre consists not in Battell only or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known." Hobbes then likens war to weather. "For as the nature of Faule weather lyeth not in a showre or two of rain but an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of Warre consisteth not in actuall fighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary."²²

Hobbes becomes more explicit in his description of the *status naturalis* when he states that it is a condition which affords no place for industry, culture of the earth, navigation of the sea, no architecture, geography, chronology, arts or letters, or society; "and which is worst of all, continuall feare and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short." In thus depicting the natural or pre-social condition of the race, Hobbes indicates very plainly that he is proceeding ac-

²² *Leviathan*, Ch. XIII.

according to "inference made from the passions," which deductive argument is followed by a bit of empiricism. It was in connection with experience that he describes the condition of an Englishman in the middle of the XVIIth century.

PESSIMISTIC POLITICS

"It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things that nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another. . . . Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey he armes himself and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep he locks his dores, when even in his own house he locks his chests, and this when he knowes there bee Lawes and publike Officers armed to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects when he rides armed, of his fellow Citizens when he locks his dores and of his children and servants when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words?"²³

The underlying principles of the Hobbist system may be stated in propositions as well as in this pictorial way. Hobbes the materialist was none the less a rationalist; his system of politics is decidedly wanting in principles of actual experience. According to his reasoning, there is a fundamental Law of Nature: seek peace and follow it. In contrast with this law is the instinctive principle of self-assertion, self-defense peculiar to animal life. The two laws of man's being thus arrange themselves in the form of sharp contrast between Natural Right, which leads to war, and the Law of Nature leading to peace; or *jus-bellum* and *lex-pax*. Now, as we have seen, Hobbes was more intent upon devising a scheme of politics for the present than of discovering the pre-political situation in the past. He will not listen to the conventional ideals of Aristotle and Grotius, who assumed the social nature of man, since he believed that nature does not group men gregariously but dissociates them, rendering them "apt to invade and destroy one another." His contempt for history in general is akin to his attitude toward natural history, hence he

²³ *Leviathan*, Ch. XIII.

can see no analogy between the social life of insects and that of men.

"Men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity which these creatures are not, and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground Envy and Hatred and finally Warre; but amongst these not so. . . . Amongst these creatures, the common good differeth not from the private, and being by nature enclined to the private they procure thereby the common benefit. . . . These creatures having not, as man, the use of reason do not see or think they see any fault in the administration of their common business, whereas amongst men there are very many that think themselves wiser and abler to govern the Publique better than the rest. . . . These creatures, though they have some use of voice in making knowne to one another their desires and other affections, yet they want that art of words by which some men can represent to others that which is Good in the likeness of Evill and Evill in the likeness of Good. . . . As long as they be at ease they are not offended with their fellowes whereas Man is then most troublesome when he is most at ease, for then it is that he loves to shewe his Wisdome and controule the actions of them that governe the Common-wealth." ²⁴

The contrast between Grotius and Hobbes in their views of man's social nature did not escape the eye of Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694). With the synthetic tendency peculiar to the German mind, he endeavored to harmonize the social and anti-social in the earlier thinkers. This he does by attributing society to the instinctively social nature of man, the political State to a direct and rational act on the part of man. Pufendorf does not make it clear whether the State of Nature is society minus civilization, as this may be conjectured, or society in its pre-political form. He does refer to it as a condition of society apart from political organization and is inclined to regard it optimistically as a general condition of peace rather than war. Furthermore, he declares that the State of Nature would be a satisfactory condition if men lived according to reason; but inasmuch as most men are ruled by selfish passion, the State of Nature would result in a condition making it necessary for men to live under the control of author-

²⁴ *Ib.*, Ch. XVII.

ity. There is indeed some sort of organization in the *status naturalis*, but not enough to obviate the necessity of civil society, or commonwealth.²⁵

THE HISTORICAL VIEW

In the hands of John Locke (1632-1704), the State of Nature is made the pre-political form of human existence which Grotius had suggested and Pufendorf reaffirmed. According to Locke, "men living together according to reason and without authority to judge between them is properly the state of nature."²⁶ In this primitive condition, men are aware of Natural Rights and tend to respect them, so that their inclination is toward peace rather than war; at the same time the State of Nature is so imperfect as to be intolerable. Locke, however, was so impressed by the possibilities of the Natural State as a possible condition in the history of mankind that he assumes to find traces of it in history. "Romulus at the head of a numerous colony from Alba was the first founder of the Roman State; this colony was in the original state of nature, free and independent of any dominion whatsoever."²⁷

The French manner of dealing with the notion that we are pursuing was quite different from that of the English, hence the State of Nature assumes a more dreamy, more delightful form. This we observe in Montesquieu and Rousseau. The "man" of Montesquieu was not the politician of Grotius, the beast of Hobbes, or the rationalist of Locke. He was more human, more genial, and filled with *esprit*. "Pre-social man is," according to Montesquieu, "a timid, trembling creature, occupied chiefly with panic-stricken flight from the dangers real and imaginary, which surround him."²⁸ The formation of society with the development of civilization and culture gives man strength and develops a state of war. This was the reverse of Hobbes' idea, according to which men progress from war to peace as they come forth from their natural condition. Moreover, it was preparatory for

²⁵ Dunning, *History of Political Theories*, Vol. II, pp. 319-322.

²⁶ "Two Treatises on Government," *Works*, 11th ed., Vol. V, p. 348.

²⁷ Fox Bourne, *Life of John Locke*, Vol. I, p. 148.

²⁸ Dunning, *History of Political Theories*, Vol. II, p. 397.

the genial ideal of Rousseau that the State of Nature is an idyllic condition, to which man should return.

ROUSSEAU'S ROMANTIC POLITICS

Rousseau (1712-1778) resembled his co-patriot Montesquieu in his genial conception of the State of Nature, except that he was not inclined to regard it as a condition that engendered fear in the human heart. In like manner, Rousseau resembles Hobbes in regarding the *status naturalis* as an idea rather than a historical fact; he differs from Hobbes in that his primitive man is a good savage and not a crude creature of force. Moreover, Rousseau is distinguished from all others who developed the idea of nature in that he was enthusiastic about it and considered it a condition to which, in a way, mankind might well return. Rousseau's optimism is thus a counterbalance to Hobbes' pessimism. In his *Discourse on Inequality* (1753), Rousseau paints a romantic picture of nomadic existence, in which the happy savage is quite nonchalant about his abode or the things that generally go to make up civilized existence. In this primeval condition, mankind found its perfect happiness, for man was independent of society and with other men rejoiced in the feeling of equality.

But mankind increases in number, differentiates into races, discovers industries, and develops the utilities of civilization. Fields are planted, tools made, houses built, and hearths with their fires installed. Then inequality sets in, due to the fact that some are stronger physically and can do more, others more acute mentally and can acquire more. The savage was beginning to be civilized. However, Rousseau does not wholly disapprove of such simple civilization, probably because he realized that it represented a more authentic picture of historical man than the State of the *bon sauvage* had given, and because, further, it was still far simpler than the civilization that he knew and despised. Indeed, the flexibility of Rousseau's methodology was such that, having begun by extolling the *bon sauvage* and having advanced from that to praise of primitive civilization, he ends by elaborating a doctrine of sovereignty. However, in going to the other extreme, Rousseau does not mean the sovereignty of the monarch,

but that of the general will or the sovereignty of the community. It was in this conception that he sought to fuse the natural with the civil, the ideals of natural liberty with the principles of political authority.

It was by no means extraordinary that the sentimental ideals of Rousseau should be adopted by the speculative thinkers of Germany, who might have built up their political doctrines on the native ground prepared by their own Pufendorf. The apparent reason why Kant, Fichte, and Hegel followed Rousseau is to be found in the fact that this talented but erratic French thinker detached the political ideal from earth and the domain of immediate existence and made it a sentiment about which one, like these transcendental Germans, might speculate freely. The political systems of these philosophers are of value in elucidating their respective philosophies, but of much less worth in the development of the political idea which had been completed before they began to consider it. In the case of Hegel (1770-1831), the conception of the State as an expression of Spirit or *Geist* was responsible for the development of the idea that society is an organism and that the State possesses personality. Hegel was of influence also in suggesting to Karl Marx that it is by the negation of one polity, like that of capitalism, that we proceed to the higher level of another, the communistic one. With the German thinkers mentioned we come to the end of the classic idea as far as the State of Nature is concerned.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Such in outline was the idea of the State of Nature as this prevailed during the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. We have devoted so much space to it that there remains little room for the companion concept—the Social Contract. However, little additional need be said about this second political ideal; it may be inferred from what has been said about the first one. In the case of those who handled these characteristic ideas, the analysis led to the synthesis. Reason had led them to divide mankind into parts and it was reason that then induced them to put the social parts together in the form of a political whole. The leading idea

was that primitive men came to realize that their anarchic condition was intolerable, whence they were led to consider the feasibility if not necessity of forming a *status civilis* to supplant the *status naturalis*. This produced the State; according to more radical theorists, it was the cause of society itself.

Already we have referred to the contract conception of government supposed to have obtained with the ancients, especially the Hebrews and the Romans. We have now to observe directly and briefly how this general idea received definite form in modern politics. Grotius might be thought to remain aloof from the contract idea, since his conception of man was that of a social being. Yet Grotius did not fail to state that civil society had been brought about by man; but how? By deduction from the very nature of man in which *jus naturale* is an ingredient, not by act of will on the part of man or even of God. For the Law of Nature would hold, said Grotius, even though there were no God—*non esse deum*. It would be a mistake to assume that this devout Dutch theologian placed politics upon an atheistic basis after the manner of the French and perhaps also the American revolutionists. Hence we had better attribute his bold assertion of the autonomous character of *jus naturale* to his extremely rationalistic methodology. Further to explain his conception of the State we might refer to it as something which in his mind was formed by a *quasi*-contract. Grotius was strong in naturalism, whereby he was able to assert the social nature of mankind, but correspondingly weak in his conception of sovereignty. In Hobbes we find the very reverse of this.

Hobbes is perfectly clear in his description of the contract and just as consistent in the deduction of it from the State of Nature, "that miserable condition of Warre." As he says, it is more than consent or concord; certainly it is not what we should understand as the consent of the governed. Perhaps we might regard it the way Emerson regarded all society—as a "foul compromise." In the direct language of Hobbes, the contract is "as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe to this Man or this Assembly, on this condition that thou give up thy Right to him and Authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in

one Person, is called a Common-Wealth, in latine Civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God to which wee owe under the Immortall God our peace and defense." ²⁹

THE GENERAL WILL

Unlike the anti-monarchists of the Renaissance, Hobbes does not provide for any covenant on the part of the monarch; the surrender is altogether on the part of the people, who are supposed to be satisfied with the security and peace which the *status civilis*, thus created, will provide. The subjects of a government cannot change its form nor the sovereign forfeit his power. No individual can protest against the sovereign, since that would automatically replace him in the original condition of war, wherein any one would have the natural right to kill him. No matter what the sovereign may do, his acts cannot be judged by his subjects; still less can he be punished for them. It is for the sovereign to judge what is necessary for peace in the State and what may be considered the private property of the individual subject. To the sovereign belongs also the right to decide controversies; hence the familiar laws of *meum* and *tuum* are out of place. He may at his own discretion make war and peace, choose as he will such counselors as these acts may require, and to these he may bestow such titles of honor as he may please. Now, it is only as we realize how the specter of war haunted the mind of Hobbes that we can account for such a drastic system of government. We may observe further by way of extenuating such political thinking that, in general, Hobbes proceeded academically somewhat after the manner of Plato and that, in particular, he referred to the fatal compact by stating that "as if" every man had entered into the political agreement in order to escape the possible ills of the State of Nature.

When we turn to Locke's conception of contract, we tend to return to the milder conception of Grotius. As Grotius had thought of man as by nature social, Locke regarded the State of Nature as a fairly peaceful one, certainly not the Hobbiist condition of uni-

²⁹ *Leviathan*, Ch. XVII.

versal war. Accordingly, Locke's social contract is much looser than the iron-bound one of *The Leviathan*. The difference between Locke and Hobbes is this: Locke's system calls upon the individual to give up some of his rights to the community, whereas Hobbes had called upon him, viewed as a malicious egoist, to surrender all of his rights to the sovereign. The particular rights that the Lockian individual surrenders are those of himself executing the Law of Nature and punishing offenses against it. Then, the community to which he has surrendered these rights is something of which he is a part. If there is to be a sovereign community, this is to be regarded as the public will, which in its own way is limited as the will or right of one individual limits that of another. Now, this amounts to saying that society is superior to government and the authority of the people greater than that of law.

Rousseau's conception of sovereignty affords trouble for all who look for logical consistency and are not satisfied with a glow of rhetorical expression. In the parallel case of Hobbes, we were not surprised when *The Leviathan* effected the transmutation from the anarchistic *status naturalis* to the tyrannical *status civilis*. The conclusion followed from the premises. In Rousseau's case, however, the state of affairs was vastly different in that the natural and pre-political condition of mankind was regarded as ideal and the departure from it regrettable. In Rousseau's logic, nature and the State, liberty and law are contradictions; the good and wise life has no place for civilization and culture. In spite of this view or mood on the part of Rousseau, he manages to deduce and delight in a conception of sovereignty in which the civil order destroys the State of Nature. His political premises should have led him to deduce perfect anarchy; instead of this he deduced perfect sovereignty. Hobbes seized upon the idea of absolute monarchy by wholly relinquishing that of liberty; Locke avoided both extremes, but Rousseau tried to reconcile them. How did he accomplish this?

By means of his idea of the "general will — *volonté générale*," not by means of a Leviathan. This general will is formed when each individual puts all of his personality and power into a common mass or, as it were, fund. In giving himself up to all

in general, the individual gives himself up to no one in particular. Since each person does this, each acquires over every other person what he himself lost or its equivalent. The kind of contract which safeguards the freedom of the individual is not the political one of Hobbes, but a social contract; and that which it creates is something acceptable to the individual's own will: namely, the general will. To the average reader of Rousseau, the general will being inalienable and inerrant, resembles the terrible Leviathan, or the Leviathan duly domesticated. However, in extenuation of the paradoxes involved in Rousseau's idea of liberty and sovereignty, we might suggest that his idea of social contract is exemplified generally in the formation of the United States, although to this day the idea of sovereignty is such as to leave a doubt as to whether it belongs to the federal government or to the individual states comprising it.

THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION

The idea of the State of Nature which we have been using as a guide to the later and larger conception of politics persisted through the Romanticism of the French and the Transcendentalism of the Germans and became a practical principle of political revolution among the Americans. The doctrine is recognizable after the passing of two centuries and with the practical changes which the Fathers of the Republic found it expedient to effect. It appears in the famous phrase in the Declaration of Independence wherein it is affirmed that "all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights." The Americans of the XVIIIth century were still in or had only recently emerged from a condition of nature, so that they did not deem it necessary to dilate upon the advantages of the Natural State. Likewise, their acquaintance with the American Indian had been such that they were in no mood to join Rousseau in praising "the good savage."

However, the original principle of their liberty was such as to suggest a state of existence in which men had enjoyed such natural freedom unmolested by a sovereign, certainly not a foreign one. Their conception of the Natural State of man was that of the pre-political condition or one peculiar to the Colonies before the for-

mation of the United States; not a pre-social condition, since the social was something they had long been enjoying. Furthermore, it must be observed that, in using the expression "inalienable rights," the American statesman indicated that in entering into a political compact he was not relinquishing his Natural Rights after the manner of the Hobbist or even the Rousseauan citizen, but seeking a means for preserving them. This was the expression of American individualism and was to the effect that the State was made for man, not man for the State. Such is the optimism of our political theory, although it should be observed that Thomas Paine, like St. Augustine, took a pessimistic view of the political principle. "Society," said he, "is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices."

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

The principles of politics that we have been examining assumed their most definite form in the XVIIIth century and reached a climax in the American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789. The rational theory of the State as something formed by political or social contract exemplified the ancient idea of the consent of the governed. Speaking broadly, we might say that this philosophy of rights worked well up to the period of revolution, but not so well afterwards. The people of the United States secured their rights and formed their government, but only by drawing the color-line, for the principles of rights did not extend to the red man or the black, since the Indian and the African Negro were not included within the precincts of the political State. In France, where the Revolution had released the nucleus of the French people, it did not provide a permanent organization of the newer sort. To realize this we have only to consider the violent return to Caesarism that we observe in the career of Napoleon. The old ideals—the State of Nature, the social contract, and sovereignty of the people—had made their bow, played their part and disappeared. More practical ideals of polity were to take their place.

In glancing at these post-classic systems, if systems they can be called, we shall miss the familiar principles of State peculiar to early modern times, or the Enlightenment. In place of them we find that politics has been supplanted by political economy, the idea of the State by that of government, and the view of man as a "political animal" in a separate nation by the general conception of man as member of a social order. If this were the place for it, we would discuss the political idea in the utilitarian form given it by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Austin (1790-1859), James Mill (1773-1836) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). But this conception of man and the social order was left stranded by the Theory of Evolution. This organic conception of human life has made necessary a different conception of political existence.

For the most part, the political conception has been so identified with the social, industrial, and economic that it is practically impossible to discuss it in the isolation it once enjoyed. The organic and evolutionary have taken the place of the inorganic and rationalistic. The most important principle of politics is that of Karl Marx (1818-1883), and in *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), which he prepared with Friedrich Engels, the most significant idea of government is that in the future the State will deal less and less with the control of persons, more and more with the administration of things; that is, it will be less political than economic. The political has to do, then, with the production and distribution of wealth whereas once it was concerned with the relation of person to person, people to sovereign. As far as people are concerned, it is connected with the relation of classes, primarily with the bourgeoisie or commercial and proletariat or laboring classes. Political history, according to the Socialist, has been the history of class struggle; its climax will be reached when the proletariat come into power and assume dictatorship. The bourgeoisie, or third estate, having taken the power away from feudal aristocracy, is now dominating in the form of tyrannic Capital. Such capitalism is to be itself overthrown by communism. To the Socialist, all previous classes as well as all distinct nationalities divide themselves into just two classes — Capital and Labor.

DICTATORIAL AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

The mention of communism is bound to remind us of the experiment now being tried in Russia in the form of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, established July 6, 1923 and now, since the death of Lenin (January 21, 1924), in the hands of Stalin. This form of politico-economic enterprise is now recognized specifically as the Five Year Plan, in operation since 1928 but adopted formally in May, 1929. Its immediate aim is the socialization of all agriculture and the expansion of industry. Thus far, the collectivization of industry has been a success from the Russian point of view and met with the approval of the Communist party which met at its biennial congress in July, 1930. In contrast with Sovietism, we find the Fascism of Italy which was formed by Mussolini to suppress communism and restore order in the country. On October 30, 1922, Mussolini, *il duce*, was made premier of Italy; in 1929 he made peace with the pope and terminated the sixty-year-old conflict between State and Church, and now has practically all political power in his hands. In Stalin and Mussolini we find dictators in control of widely divergent if not opposite types of politics; the one socialistic and cosmopolitan, the other anti-communistic and nationalistic.

If, finally, we return to our starting point in the contrasted systems of Plato and Aristotle and call them "dictatorial" and "democratic" respectively, we may observe the exemplification of them at this late date in Russia and Italy on the one side, Great Britain and the United States on the other. Germany and France lie somewhere in between. Sovietism and Fascism differ on specific points of polity, but both exhibit the Platonistic spirit of the State over all, with the necessary subordination of the individual. Great Britain and the United States keep the individual and his rights in the ascendancy even when they persist in their different types of government, of a "crowned republic" and an uncrowned one. The course of politics in the immediate future will have to test the respective merits of such Platonistic and Aristotelian forms of government. Which will gain that which lies at the foundation of the State — the consent of the governed?

CHAPTER XV

THE SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF LIFE



THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL

THE POLITICAL FACTOR IN MODERN CIVILIZATION MERGED, AS WE saw, into a more general conception of life — the social one. Hence we turn from the idea that man is a “political animal” to the conception of man as a social spirit. The political and the social cannot be wholly severed, but a distinction may be made between them. The social is the more comprehensive principle, as it is also the more natural one; the political is chiefly the work of man, although not in the deliberate form of contract. We feel that we are social beings and that, apart from established law, the community has its claims upon us. Furthermore, we believe that the civilization of the race is its socialization. Now, in rationalizing our civilization, as we are doing, we have observed the importance of the political idea; later we shall see that due analysis of civilization includes industry and economics, art and religion. At the present point, we must take cognizance of the social view of life, for, although the social is coeval with mankind, the conscious idea of sociability is not primitive or even ancient; it is distinctly modern.

The problem of man’s relation to himself, his thought, was taken up by Descartes (1596–1650) at the beginning of modern philosophy. The parallel problem of man’s relation to his fellow was being discussed at about the same time by Hobbes, who, as we have just seen, was such a factor in modern political philosophy. Both men were egoists, but in different senses of that term; they proceeded alike from the isolated, atomic self to something more composite. With Descartes it was nature, with Hobbes the State. Both assumed the reality and inviolability of the individual and then went on to show how this personal unit might become a part of the exterior order; here the physical, there the political. We of today are inclined to feel that our situation and our problem are the reverse of these, since we find nature and

society as complex wholes given in our experience. It is our problem to extricate the ego from the mass of the natural and social in order that, in some measure, one may live his own life and call his soul his own. But we cannot appreciate the transmutation of social ideals between the XVIIth and XIXth centuries until we have come to an understanding with the bold but thoughtless egoism of the earlier period.

THE ANTI-SOCIAL VIEW

We must make a fresh beginning historically by referring to Hobbes. His story has been often told and we are now familiar with it, but we must take into account certain additional features of his *Leviathan*, and observe its ethical significance. The miserable condition of man in the State of Nature from which, to end the war of all against all, man formed the commonwealth, was due to man's inherent nature. According to Hobbes, man is thoroughly selfish and to his self-love adds self-esteem. The idea that man may be social also occurred to Hobbes, but he dismissed it as something alien to mankind. The social principle, he observed, is dominant among insects, which live instinctively and automatically form a stereotyped society; it is not observable among men, who live according to competition and place the highest possible values upon their personalities. "Men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself."¹

Nature, as Hobbes had pointed out, "dissociates" men; in their disjoined condition, each seeks his own pleasure. The egoism that extends throughout Hobbes' work to the exclusion of the social reveals itself characteristically in Hobbes' conception of laughter. Aristotle had found the source of mirth in the sudden juxtaposition of the incongruous, and thus had made it something physical. With Hobbes, laughter has a social origin; it arises when one is suddenly elevated above his fellow and is thus able for the time to feel superiority. "Sudden glory is the passion

¹ *Leviathan*, Ch. XIII.

which makes those Grimaces called Laughter and is caused either by some sudden act of their own that pleaseth them or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.”² On the other hand, grief over another’s sorrow arises within one when he imagines that a like calamity may befall one’s self. Morality does not spring from the Good, but consists in utility only or natural necessity. In the State of Nature, where there is no society, there is no distinction between good and bad. In this manner, Hobbes challenged modern thought to prove the existence of the social and moral. He aroused or brought into being the Utilitarians and Intuitionists. How did England receive Hobbes’ egoism?

THE OPPOSITION TO EGOISM

The British system of morals was created almost wholly by the effort to correct the human egoism and ethical relativism of Hobbes. The Briton is at heart a gentleman, hence he cannot admit that man is naturally brutal and selfish. He is just as much a free man and cannot tolerate the idea that the difference between virtue and vice depends upon the will of the State. Nevertheless it was no simple task to repudiate the principles that Hobbes had set up with such ease and confidence; hence it may be pointed out that for a century and a half English ethics cast about for the obvious and then failed to find it. The obvious, as we are inclined to believe today, is the social. In our mind, this principle provides automatically the solution of the problems that troubled the early modern mind, that have bothered moralists ever since the days of the Epicureans and the Stoics—the adjustment of man to mankind, the relation of man to the moral law. Perhaps we should praise these British moralists for their ethical efforts in behalf of man before the discovery of the social idea, just as we are inclined to applaud the muscular activity of man before the invention of the steam engine. Let us observe briefly how these gentlemanly moralists tried to redeem the reputation of man after Hobbes had cast aspersion upon it.

The problem at hand after Hobbes had interpreted man as

² *Leviathan*, Ch. VI.

selfish was to attribute a social nature to him. Now, the way to attribute is to attribute. Hobbes had gleaned a number of egoistic facts and had asserted, "Man is egoistic." Two centuries later Comte and his successors harvested an array of social data and proclaimed, "Man is social." Between the egoism of Hobbes and the altruism of Comte, we find the most important members of the English ethical school trying to change the pattern of human nature from a circle with an individualistic center to an ellipse with the selfish and sympathetic as its foci. Indeed, after the initial work of Comte and the development of Darwinism, the gentlemanly moralists of England, Mill and Sidgwick, were still found attempting to "prove" that man is a benevolent being.

This work was taken up originally by Richard Cumberland in his *De Legibus Naturae* (1672), wherein the noble author insists upon the ideal of benevolence. The trouble with Cumberland as an opponent of Hobbes was that he attacked the heavy cudgel of the real with the light sword of the ideal and failed to lay the Leviathan low. Shaftesbury in his *Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit* (1699), was somewhat more realistic in his conception of human nature, so that he was able to approximate to the social ideal so dominant today. Shaftesbury approaches our ideal of the higher gregariousness by introducing such ideas as the "species," the "system of animals," the "animal order," the "Whole," and the like. His aesthetic intuition revealed the world to him as no "distracted universe," but as a proportionate and harmonious system.³ The moral ideal follows almost automatically — man should live harmoniously, as he may do by adjusting the selfish part of his nature to the sympathetic. The result will be harmony in society and happiness in the heart of the individual.⁴

THE IDEAL OF SYMPATHY

English ethics in the XVIIIth century indulged in enough moral realism to effect the transition from the brutal egoism of Hobbes to what we might call the brutal altruism of Darwin. At

³ *Op. cit.*, Bk. I.

⁴ *Ib.*, Bk. II.

first it was the supposed might of the individual; this has changed to acknowledged power of the social order. The semi-social conception of life was developed by Hume and Adam Smith in the form of "sympathy," a sort of *noblesse oblige*. Before they developed their ethical systems, Francis Hutcheson introduced the more amiable but less effective ideal of "disinterested affection." In his *Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1720), Hutcheson developed the ideal of a "moral sense" which sprang from man's noble nature and dictated benevolent affection. It was distinctly different from Butler's conception of a rational conscience with its authoritative sense of approval and disapproval. In pursuit of this ideal sense of sociability, Hutcheson intuitively human society as though its members past and present made up some happy English community or even some noble family. "Whence this secret chain between each person and mankind? How is my interest connected with the most distant parts of it? And yet I must admire actions which are beneficial to them, and love the author whence this love, compassion, indignation and hatred toward even feigned characters, in the most distant nations and ages according as they appear kind, faithful and compassionate or of opposite dispositions toward their imaginary contemporaries? If there is no moral sense, which makes rational actions appear beautiful or deformed; if all approbation be from the interest of the approver, 'What's Hecuba to us or we to Hecuba?'"⁵

But the social ideal of modern life was not advanced to any significant extent by such aesthetical conceptions of the polite mind. With Hume, however, there was more realism as also a historical sense; with Adam Smith, a more penetrating psychology plus economic insight. Both of these moralists placed their affair upon the idea of "sympathy." An egoism like that of Hobbes' could not fare well in the hands of a skeptic like Hume. Since he doubted the existence of the self, he could not be dogmatic about self-love. "So far from thinking that men have no affection for anything beyond themselves, I am of the opinion that, tho' it be rare to meet with any one who loves any single person better than himself, yet 'tis as rare to meet with one

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Sect. 1.

in whom all the kind affections taken together do not overbalance all the selfish.”⁶ According to Hume, it is not difficult to enter into the sentiments of others, since they resemble ourselves. Our own feelings partake more of our idea of them than of the feelings themselves, hence it is easy to enter into the idea of the feelings that other people have. Thus it comes about that “the minds of men are mirrors to one another.”⁷ In such a conception of social life in the form of sympathy, Hume anticipates Adam Smith’s conception of the moral sense and suggests Darwin’s psychology of conscience. Yet Hume does not fail to continue the English sense of human nobility aroused by the barbaric philosophy of Hobbes.

The contrast between the ethical and the economic appears in the philosophy of Adam Smith. The two factors appear to be at variance with each other. In 1759, Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments* developed the traditional idea that the basis of both moral action and ethical judgment is to be found in the sense of sympathy. In 1776, his *Wealth of Nations* placed the science of economics upon an egoistic basis. There is at least an apparent conflict between the ethical and economic theories of Adam Smith, just as there is often a contrast between the ethical and economic practices of the modern business man. In Smith’s case, however, it may be suggested that his ethics treats of things as they should be, while in his economics he considers things as they are. The principle of sympathy on which the ethical ideal is based has three characteristics—it is natural, mutual, limited. The naturalness of sympathy is attributed to the fact that it is instinctive. It is mutual, hence by means of one’s own feeling one can appreciate the feelings in another’s mind. It is limited by its own nature, so that one is in the habit of saying, “I am sorry, but I cannot sympathize with you.” He who in his excess of emotion craves our sympathy “must flatten the sharpness of its natural tone in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the emotions of those who are about him.”⁸ Within the breast of each one is an “impartial spectator” which by means

⁶ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. III, Part II, Sect. II.

⁷ *Ib.*, Bk. II, Part II, Sect. V.

⁸ *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part I, Ch. IV.

of sympathy approves or disapproves of actions, those of others and finally of the individual himself.

THE SOCIAL VIEW OF MAN

After the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries had groped about for the social ideal, it was discovered in the XIXth century by Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Previous thinkers had labored with the Hobbist delusion that man had emerged from a natural to a social condition by some artificial means, as social contract or moral reasoning. Comte obviated the difficulty of all such "proofs" by assuming the thing to be demonstrated — the social nature of mankind. He accepted this the way he accepted the subject matter of the physical sciences and abandoned the idea that the social State had been adopted because of its usefulness or moral value. "It is evident," said he, "that the social state would never have existed if its rise had depended upon the conviction of its individual utility, because the benefit could never have been anticipated by individuals of any degree of ability, but could only manifest itself after the social evolution had proceeded up to a certain point. There are even sophists who at this day deny the utility without being pronounced mad; and the spontaneous sociability of human nature, independent of all personal calculation, and often in opposition to the strongest individual interests, is admitted, as of course, by those who have paid no great attention to the true biological theory of our intellectual and moral nature."⁹

That which had stood in the way of the social ideal for mankind was the vague conception of society and the equally vivid appreciation of the self. It is a question whether Hobbes in his materialism or Mill in his associationism had enjoyed the right to premise an ego of any sort. Their speculative views were in opposition to such an ethical factor. Comte avoided the false anthropology and inconsistent philosophy of the whole utilitarian school. Instead of trying to reconcile the ego with society, he introduced the social ideal and let it crowd the ego out of the scene. If the sense of selfhood is strong and the feeling of sym-

⁹ *Positive Philosophy*, tr. Martineau, Bk. VI, Ch. V, pp. 498-499.

pathy weak, it is difficult to reconcile egoism with altruism. But if the social sense has instinctive strength within it while the sense of individuality is weak and vague, altruism will rejoice in an easy victory. So it was in the positivist system of Comte. "No doubt a cat or any other vertebrate animal, without knowing how to say 'I,' is not in the habit of taking itself for another. Moreover, it is probable that among the superior animals the sense of personality is still more marked than in man, on account of their more isolated life."¹⁰ With such a conception of the self, so vastly different from the speculative self of Descartes and the selfish ego of Hobbes, it was not difficult for Comte to establish the social ideal.

The methods by which the social principle has proceeded involved both the source and the sanction of the moral ideal. The source of the moral principle is to be found, it seems, in man's social nature. This was primarily the work of Darwin in the *Descent of Man* (1871). Unlike Herbert Spencer, who speculated about the Theory of Evolution, Darwin did not use his discoveries in the realms of plant and animal life for the furtherance of the social ideal as such. He was not a sociologist. Nevertheless, he sanctioned the social interpretation of the moral life and supplied us with what purported to be the evolution of conscience. Darwin did not identify conscience with any sort of social sense, but regarded it much after the manner of Butler and Kant. He himself summed it up in "that short but imperious word *ought*." The ingredients of such a conscience were, however, within the domain of his naturalism; they were sociability and reflection which, duly blended, were able to produce the moral sense. Man has inherited his social nature and much of his reasoning power from lower forms of animal life, but the rational interpretation of his social nature is something strictly human. The intellect, or what Butler's ethics called conscience or reflection, is the chief factor. Hence Darwin concludes that "any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man."¹¹

¹⁰ *Ib.*, p. 385.

¹¹ *Descent of Man*, Ch. III.

MODERN SOCIOLOGY

The social idea has been so definitely formulated by Social Science that we need say little about it; the subject is treated systematically in the science of sociology. However, it may not be amiss to examine this form of study for the sake of inquiring whether sociology is a science, as also whether it gives a just account of human life as this is found in society. According to the traditions of Comte and his school, modern sociology is not unlike mediaeval theology in that it aspires to be the "queen of the sciences." According to Lester Ward, "Sociology is an advanced study, the last and latest in the entire curriculum. It involves high powers of generalization and, what is more, it absolutely requires a broad basis of induction. . . . To understand the laws of society the mind must be in possession of a large body of knowledge. This knowledge should not be picked up here and there at random, but should be instilled in a methodical way. It should be fed to the mind with an intelligent purpose in view, and that purpose should be the preparation of the mind for ultimately entering the last and most difficult as well as the most important field of human thought, that of sociology."¹² Such a statement is likely to impress the student of science unfavorably; the tone of it, at once pretentious and apologetic, is quite different from that of a work on physics or psychology.

In such a treatment of sociology as we find in Ward, cosmology and biology, anthropology and psychology are referred to as the "simpler sciences" that constitute "a part of the data of sociology," to which must be added mathematics, astronomy, physics, and chemistry.¹³ This method of arranging the sciences in such a way as to have them serve the needs of sociology is another thing that is likely to make an unfavorable impression upon the student. He realizes that no one science stands alone, but must enter into relations with a similar one; astronomy demands mathematics, physics requires astronomy, chemistry necessitates physics, biology needs chemistry, and psychology, biology. Such interrelations are to be expected and have been found fruitful, but apart from the fact that mathematics runs through all the

¹² *Outlines of Sociology*, Ch. I, pp. 17-18.

¹³ *Ib.*, pp. 118-119.

sciences as a principle of measurement, there is no reason for placing any one of them in a superior position, for the idea of rank in a hierarchy is quite out of place. If we cannot crown the science of sociology, can we admit it into the royal family of science?

Now, the question whether sociology is a science or some other form of study may be set in a fairly clear light by distinguishing between the things that are historical and those that are not; the factor of time here becomes important. But what does this mean in the present case? It means that when we are dealing with numbers and geometrical figures we are dealing with things that are wholly unaffected by time, so that the question "*when?*" as also that of "*where?*" cannot come up for discussion. Mathematics is simply out of time. Pretty much the same thing may be said of the things that are considered in physics and chemistry; the ball that rolls down an inclined plane at a certain rate of speed and the atom of hydrogen that combines with an atom of nitrogen in a certain proportion represent transactions with which time has nothing to do. We ourselves may experiment today with the ball or atom, yet we realize that the time-factor that enters into our private experiment has nothing to do with the general principles of gravity or chemical combination. The ball is always attracted toward the earth; the atoms always combine. Even with biology and psychology, the same timelessness prevails. Hence we may assert that the animal possesses the faculty of locomotion, the muscles store up glycogen, the eye operates in concert with the occipital lobe of the brain, and the sense-organs register their specific qualities. These are given data of the psycho-physical organism in general and are, as it were, impervious to historical changes. To think of these functions as varying would be almost impossible.

SOCIAL SCIENCE

In the case of sociology, the element of change seems to enter in most decidedly, so that we are bound to view this "science" as a historical one. The questions that come up in this science are such that they have to be referred to some historical period

and due allowance made for that fact. When, therefore, we speak of sociology as being historical in character, we mean that its subject matter progresses in such a way as to keep creating the relatively new. Just as much do we mean that, in distinction from physical and chemical, biological and psychological transactions, the phenomena of social science cannot be repeated. They are parts of the general course of evolution and must be understood in a historical sense. There are, of course, persistent tendencies in all social life, as industry and art, language and religion, but the content of these keeps undergoing change. With a natural science we may cut down through the material and secure a typical cross-section, but with a social science we are compelled to take into account the direction and movement of the material as this is carried along on the stream of historical Becoming. We may fashion a system of social science and try to call it "social physics," but what we fashion is only a raft floating on the surface of the stream.

When we are dealing with natural sciences, we have an abstract mind dealing with detachable data; it is, again, the case of two bodies in the gravitational relation or two atoms in chemical combination. We isolate these data, study them in their independence, and draw exact conclusions. No matter how complex the world, such simplification is always possible. But with social science this is not the case; we cannot isolate our data, make out measurements, and ascribe our causes. It is for this reason that the use of inductive and deductive reasoning can be only general, more suggestive than conclusive. In fact, it is not so much scientific faculty of reason as it is the practical function of judgment that is involved. It is, as Cohen points out, the Aristotelian view "that while physical science depends on theoretical reason (*nous*), practical social science involves more sound judgment (*phronēsis*)."¹⁴ Nevertheless the social thinker is still under the impression that his field of investigation may be made into a science analogous to the sciences of biology and physics. At any rate, the social idea has become the subject of study, so that the only question is one concerning the kind of study its data and methods will permit.

¹⁴ *Reason and Nature*, p. 367.

THE SOCIALIZATION OF LIFE

The social concept, brought about as it was by ethical theory and social science, is no longer an academic matter; it is a living situation, a practical state of affairs. We live in an age that is both scientific and social, hence we think scientifically and work socially. In the ancient period of occidental life, man was dominated by the State; in the mediaeval age, he was subordinated to the Church; in modern times, he has been subsumed under the idea of Society. At the inception of the modern period there was an interregnum of individualism experienced in early Protestantism, expressed philosophically by Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*, and experienced egoistically in the ethical system of Hobbes. But, as we have seen, the social idea gained the mastery of the situation, so that the individualism of the last hundred years has been no more than a protest against social control. We observe it chiefly in literary movements like Romanticism, Decadence, and Symbolism, which have endeavored to exalt the idea of aesthetic personality. The leading idea of the present age when it deals with practical problems is the social one, just as its guiding star in theoretical considerations is the scientific one. Scientism and sociality are the poles of the modern sphere. We must consider the social idea in both its theoretical and practical forms and observe how we live in a period of both external and internal sociality.

The external socialization of the modern man has not come by thinking, but by acting; not by ethics, but through economics. This appears in the modern socialization of work. In accordance with the modern method of industry, the wills of men that had once worked in independence are now intertwining in the complex activities of a "plant." In the treatment of this problem, as it is taken up by the professional socialist, the socialization as well as the mechanization of labor comes in for both approval and disapproval. The socialist bows before the necessity of socialized industry as one observes it in a factory and admits that modern wealth can be produced in no other way. His criticism concerns itself with the distribution of the wealth thus produced and he does not fail to observe where wealth is

produced socially it is distributed individualistically. Now there can be little doubt that the next problem for the modern mind to take up is that of the distribution of the wealth which the modern has learned to produce. The physical question has been answered and nature has responded to the call for wealth. It is the economic or ethical question that now calls out for solution.

In order to save the individual from socialism, it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of individualism; one is a doctrine to the effect that a man is what he *has*, the other man is what he *is*. The one is the individual of commerce, the other the individual of culture. "You must confess," says the *Communist Manifesto*, "that by 'individual' you mean no other person than the Bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must indeed be swept out of the way and made impossible. Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation."¹⁵ Socialism, which seems thus to interpret the "products of society" as something both material and spiritual, further declares itself in favor of culture. "Just as to the Bourgeois the disappearance of class-property is the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class-culture is to him the disappearance of all culture."¹⁶ But even these admissions do not save us from the apprehensive feeling that the external socialization of life is bound to militate against the individual and his culture, the building up of his own inner life.

THE SOCIALIZATION OF WORK

The external socialization of the race shows itself directly in mechanized industry, and when the worker lays hold of the machine, the machine does not fail to lay hold of him. The result of this modern conflict has been in favor of the machine; Goliath has won the victory over David. The socialist protests that the individual worker owns no tools and does not participate in the profits of his labor. The thinker who is not committed to either the socialist or the capitalist theory is more likely to protest that

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, authorized trans., pp. 37-38.

¹⁶ *Ib.*, p. 38.

the individual worker does not possess culture and is in no position to develop character. The conflict between the socialist and the capitalist will have to be fought out along party lines, but also upon the basis of economic and ethical principles. Just now the quarrel is little more than one between the feelings of greed and envy. The student of the modern situation can do little more than observe that, no matter how the conflict may turn out, the present situation is one in which the social idea is dominant. Hence it is with the social concept that our thought must deal.

With the drab fact of industrialism before us, we are beginning to realize that the ethical call to altruism and the religious ideal of benevolence are hollow things, just as the social life of mankind is little more than a shell of existence. When we exhort the individual to engage in social service, we should realize that the majority of the population is thus indeed engaged, not from moral choice, but by physical necessity. Enforced "altruism" is the order of the day in which wealth is produced by large groups of men operating mechanically and socially in modern enterprise. The change that has come over human life since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution has been one from relative isolation to a condition of impersonal socialization in which one can hardly call his soul his own. Hence the problem of life, far from consisting in the duty to participate in the work of the world, is to find some means whereby the individual may deliver himself from the socio-industrial order that now envelops and enchains him.

The picture, as it engraves itself upon our minds, is far from pleasing and the realism of it seems inescapable. Just as the naturalization of modern thought tended to interpret the mind in terms of mechanism, so the socialization of life tends to change our existence and work into a machine. What once was a theory is now working out in practice. According to Descartes, man is a conscious automaton; in the mind of Helvetius (1715-1771), man is a machine. These were theoretical conclusions drawn from the general principle of mechanism, but these are now becoming practical consequences derived from the application of mechanics to steam and electrical engineering. Industry has made man automatic since he must imitate his machine and work

as a unit in an assemblage of fellow workmen. The physical and the social have thus become the millstones of industry. From this physico-social organization there has come a great economic good and the total outcome of modern effort may effect an equally great ethical good, but at the present time the economic is seen outstripping the ethical.

SOCIALIZED LABOR

The actual effects of modern industrialism may be appreciated when we recall what conservative capitalism keeps saying about radical socialism. The capitalistic critic of socialism warns us that the socialization of the distribution as well as of the production of wealth would lead to a dire condition in which individual initiative would be destroyed, private property abolished, and workers living in barracks. Now, it might be that socialism, once it had built up its system upon the ruins of capitalism, would land us in such a distressing condition. If so, individualism would oppose the new system as it now opposes the old. But, in contemplating the actual condition of our socialized population, do we not find that industrial life has already lodged them, a large portion of the population, in just such a condition? Viewed from the standpoint of living and life-loving individualism, the modern way of life seems to be becoming more and more intolerable.

The social ideal, which had its conception in ethics and its birth in economics, represents a view of life which prevails by sheer force of necessity; we can admit it as a fact much better than we can accept it as an ideal. For those who still cling to the ideal of an interior, self-directed life for man, and who can see no way out of the present situation, the most obvious attitude is that of pessimism. Indeed we are confronted by a state of affairs and a state of mind not wholly unlike that of the Middle Ages. Then those who despaired of the world abandoned it and sought consolation in the ascetic ideal. At the present time we find a large portion of the population despairing of their modern world, but, having no spiritual havens at hand, they relapse into general pessimism.

THE SOCIALIZATION OF MORALITY

In addition to the socialization of life in the form of actual existence, modern thought is now confronted with the life-ideal in the same social form. Morality is sociality — that is the last word in ethics. The ancient ideal of virtue in itself and the modern notion of an imperative duty dictated by conscience have given way before a socialized conception of the moral life. After the social idea had surrounded the modern, it invaded him; it was first his enveloping atmosphere, but now has become the air he breathes. The social principle, instead of being an ideal toward which one should strive by means of benevolence, has become a factor which realizes itself automatically. We can understand how a pioneer thinker like Hobbes, starting with the chaos incident upon a supposed State of Nature for mankind, strove to prove the existence of the moral and social by means of a social contract. But, after Comte had socialized all human existence, it is difficult to appreciate the effort of Mill when he attempted to give a "proof" of utilitarianism. Still less simple is it to understand why, at the end of the XIXth century, a traditional thinker like Sidgwick should find it necessary to resort to an "intuition of rational benevolence" as the basis of ethical theory. It is difficult for us to understand such philosophical procedure when the social ideal, reinforced by the method of evolution, took charge of human life and reduced all its ideals to social norms.

In addition to the academic work of the professional social scientist we must observe the operation of the social ideal in the literature of the XIXth century. Having done this, we may be led to believe that the dominance of the social has been brought about by the aesthetical as well as the scientific writer. The poem, play, and novel of the last one hundred years have often emerged from a social setting, hence we must encroach upon the history of literature to enhance our conception of the social conception of life. The polite literature of the period under discussion will be found somewhat indifferent to the aesthetic ideal of "art for art's sake" and just as fully influenced by a democratic spirit inspiring political reform and social improvement.

THE SOCIAL IDEAL IN LITERATURE

The social motif in English literature does not date as far back as the days of Richardson and Fielding, but does find a beginning in the XVIIIth century in *The Adventures of Caleb Williams* (1794), in which its author, William Godwin, illustrates the political views he had previously advanced in his *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*. We find none of this political expressionism in Scott, but it does appear in Shelley, whose *Prometheus Unbound* (1818) and *The Cenci* (1819) call out for some sort of political reform, or release from authority. Byron's political activity was chiefly of the emotional and explosive sort. He did attempt something direct and practical when, in 1822, with Shelley and Leigh Hunt he started a journal called *The Liberal*, but this was a brief and ill-starred venture. His participation with the Greeks in their revolt against the Turks was another indication of his political bent, but for the most part his poetic efforts were romantic, his political activity a romantic revolt. Poetic effort was more effective in the case of Elizabeth Browning (1806-1861) with *The Cry of the Children* (1844), a poem protesting against child labor, as also with her *Poems Before Congress* (1860).

The novel with its greater range of plot, character, and description was a more fruitful field for the socially minded Victorians. Most eminent among the social novelists was Dickens (1812-1870). From the mass of Dickensiana we may extract certain of these well-known works, as *David Copperfield*, which exposed evils of the debtor's prison, of child labor, and of certain practices of the English boarding schools; *Oliver Twist* with its "Faginism," or the underworld practice of training youths to be criminals; and other works depicting the social character of city life. Earlier than the appearance of these classics, Bulwer-Lytton wrote *Paul Clifford* (1830), a novel of crime and punishment, which dealt with the subject of prison reform. *Mary Barton*, by Mrs. Gaskell (1810-1865), took up the cause of the poor in the industrial centers of England. In somewhat the grand manner of Dickens, George Eliot (1819-1880) revealed an interest in middle-class life and a desire to emancipate the individual from its re-

strictions. Maggie Tulliver, in *The Mill on the Floss*, is an example of the self-assertive woman who follows her own desires rather than domestic direction. George Eliot's male characters, *Adam Bede*, *Silas Marner*, *Felix Holt*, and the like, are more individual persons than protagonists of any social or political movement.

The essayists of this period were in a better position to discuss economics and political reform; in this field, Ruskin and William Morris were the most thoroughgoing. The ethico-economic appears ever so often in Ruskin's works, but assumes its most direct form in *Fors Clavigera* (1871-1878), a series of monthly letters to workingmen. Ruskin himself seems to have had feudal, or Gothic, ideals; he interested himself in St. George's Guild, which sought to stimulate the development of agricultural and industrial colonies. Like Ruskin, William Morris (1834-1896) was interested in the fusion of art and industry and went so far as to found an organization, Morris and Company, for the manufacture of furniture such as the "Morris chair," wall-paper, stained glass, tiles, and the like. Morris revolted from the modern factory system that had grown up with the Industrial Revolution and sought to save in the best way he could the personality of the individual worker.

Earlier than these Victorians was Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), who was too much influenced by German thought, feudalism, and hero-worship to participate whole-heartedly in the social movement of the time. In considering the same, as we have done so briefly, we observe that Scott, Keats, and Browning held aloof from the social questions of the XIXth century and pursued literary art for its own sake or with general reference to nature and humanity. They seem to have been uninfluenced by the social movements of the day. Tennyson touched the socio-literary movement at certain points. In *The Princess*, he protests against the higher education of women; in *Locksley Hall — Sixty Years After* (1886), he bewailed the condition of England that commercialism had brought about. One is thus led to wonder which is the better type of literary art — that which uses itself as a means to an end, like the ethical, social, economic, or that which considers itself an end in itself.

THE THESIS-DRAMA

In addition to the Anglican writers just mentioned, some notice must be taken of certain Continental authors who raised the social question. Among the French, we might mention Balzac and Flaubert, Zola and de Maupassant, but these greater novelists were inclined to take the social situation for granted and as requiring only realistic description. With Victor Hugo (1802-1885) the case is different. In *Les Misérables*, the character of Jean Valjean is a study of the criminal and his relation to society. In Alexandre Dumas *filz* (1824-1895) we have a fine example of the thesis-drama exemplified, particularly in *La Question d'Argent* and *La Femme de Claude*. Dumas *filz* was preceded by Augier, whose main thesis-drama is *Les Effrontés*, and followed by Curel (1854-1928) and Brioux (1858-). The social drama with unusual psychological penetration has been represented by Paul Hervieu (1857-1915) and Octave Mirbeau (1850-1917). Anatole France (1844-1924), at the time of his death the foremost literary figure in France, can hardly be classified as a social writer, yet his attacks on established religion and government and his interest in the Dreyfus affair and the World War tend to associate him with something more than polite literature.

Among German authors, Sudermann (1857-1928) and Hauptmann (1862-) are associated with the problem of individualism, or the anti-social question. Yet such a play as Sudermann's *Die Heimat* or *Ehre* involves the social situation, which serves as a background for the egoistic revolt. In *Die Weber* Hauptmann is directly social, and social considerations enter into his *Rosa Bernd*, but his plays induce one to think of the individual rather than the social condition in which he finds himself. The Russian novel, which will be taken up in some detail when we discuss *Types of National Culture*, is decidedly political; the characters in it often seem as spokesmen for the radical authors who have no other way of venting their views. This was true of Gogol (1809-1852) in his *Dead Souls* and *The Inspector*, but all the more so with Dostoievsky (1821-1881) and Turgenev (1818-1883). The mere mention of *Crime and Punishment* by Dostoievsky and *Fathers and Sons* by Turgenev shows this. In

both these writers, Nihilism, a term coined in *Fathers and Sons*, is the leading political idea. Among the Scandinavians, Björnson's social play, *A Bankruptcy*, is of interest in the way it helped turn Ibsen toward the social drama. Strindberg's plays *The Father* and *Countess Julia* may be listed under thesis-dramas, but are just as thoroughly autobiographical in character. Ibsen's plays, especially the social dramas of his second period, move in a social atmosphere, but are best discussed in connection with the individualistic reaction to the social situation.

Contemporary writers on social problems are widely read and need but the brief notice we give them. In England we find a most commanding literary figure in Galsworthy, a modern epic in his *Forsyte Saga*. His plays, such as *The Silver Box*, *Strife*, and *Justice*, discover the dramatic in social inequality. Bernard Shaw is more than well known for the brilliant but perhaps jaunty way in which he has taken up contemporary problems and made comedies out of what is sometimes tragic material. In America, *Main Street* and *Babbitt* by Sinclair Lewis and *An American Tragedy* by Theodore Dreiser present social problems, but do not so fully indicate the solution of them.

INDIVIDUALISM—OPPOSITION TO THE SOCIAL

The opposition to the social conception of modern life has been taken up by modern individualism. Indeed individualism was armed for the conflict before the social ideal had received definite formulation. The individualistic movement of the XIXth century was carried on successively by Romanticism, Decadence, and Symbolism. Its particular methods were those of aestheticism, immoralism, and dilettantism. Its exponents were poets, musicians, and critics. Nowhere do we observe a direct argument between an artist and a sociologist, but almost everywhere throughout the XIXth century do we note the painful contrast between the drab social and the highly-colored individualistic points of view. The analysis and classification of these individualists, to say nothing of their divergence from orthodox sociology, is by no means simple. But we should be unjust to the remarkable century we have left behind us if we did not attempt an examina-

tion of the competitive view of life — the individualistic one. A future century writing our history will be able to do it much better, but we will attempt the task along the vague lines of aesthetic Romanticism, decadent Immoralism, and symbolistic Dilettantism.

The romantic school is famous in literature for the manner in which, breaking with classical tradition, it pressed backward into the past of mediaevalism and urged forward in the form of a nameless striving. It is not so fully recognized as a vigorous movement in the direction of individualism. It was so recognized in Germany, particularly by Friedrich Schlegel, the founder of the movement there. His thought was vague, the expression of it fragmentary and inchoate but it did receive a kind of formulation in his romantic doctrine of irony. This *Ironie* amounts to subjectivism and was supposed to have been sanctioned by such solid thinkers as Kant and Fichte. What it meant, however, was so much dreaming rather than thinking; or, as Novalis expressed it, "The dream becomes a world, the world becomes a dream." Schlegel, in his *Letters to Lucinde*, thinks of this delicious young woman as living in a world of her own aesthetic creation where she experiences the "enjoyment of a beautiful Present."¹⁷ The romantic ego generally, fascinated by its own inner life, can do no more than indulge "a restless striving after the New, the Piquant and Striking."¹⁸ After the French Revolution had done its deadly work and the Napoleonic reorganization had not helped the cause of the German Fatherland, it may have been natural for a poetic German to seek refuge in such a dream-world.

The eudaemonistic tone of Romanticism continued after the movement itself had ended historically and officially. We note it in Wagner's *Ring of the Nibelungen*, wherein Wotan is represented as failing chiefly because of his incapacity for joyousness and freedom just as his son, Siegmund, cannot carry on his father's noble work because he also is a prey to sorrow. When he should have been called Joyful, he was forced to style himself Woeful.¹⁹ Even in such a grim dramatist as Ibsen, with his

¹⁷ *Lucinde*, ed. Reclam, p. 61.

¹⁸ *The Valkyries*, Act I.

¹⁹ *Jugend Schriften*, ed. Minor, Bd. I, p. 95.

constant command to be one's self and live one's own life, the specific method of self-existence and self-expression is the romantic one of joy. It was by "the happiness of all through all" that Rosmer and Rebecca, in *Rosmersholm*, hoped to ennoble mankind.

THE PERSONAL PROTEST

Even in the naturalistic drama of Sudermann and Hauptmann, the romantic idea of selfhood through self-enjoyment still persisted. In *The Sunken Bell*, Heinrich the bell-founder fails in his noble work because, instead of working in joy, he labored in "nameless agony" and was not the master the community esteemed him simply because he was not happy. When, later, the beautiful Rautendelein pours her love into him like wine in his veins, he was able to say, "I am both happy and a master."²⁰ In Sudermann's *Dame Care*, the dutiful and obedient Paul Meyerhoeffer fails to succeed because he lacks the joy of life and is able to attain to selfhood and thus cast off the spell of melancholy only when, through crime, he experiences a joyful sense of human existence. In *Magda*, the pastor becomes a mouthpiece for Sudermann's eudaemonistic egoism when, addressing the bold and talented heroine, he says, "As you stood before me yesterday in your freshness, your natural strength, your—your greatness, I said to myself, 'That is what you might have been if at the right moment joy had entered into your life.'"²¹ Now, these are only the most obvious examples of the romantic doctrine that one is one's self in one's joys.

The decadent movement which followed Romanticism was no less fruitful of individualism. Decadence was more aesthetical than natural and sought the idea of selfhood in extraordinary states of mind rather than in purely enjoyable ones. Poe expressed the decadent idea in its aesthetic form when he declared that "just as the intellect concerns itself with truth, so taste informs us of the beautiful, while the moral sense informs us of duty."²² Baudelaire emphasized the individualistic form of Decadence when he laid down the principles of the *cult du moi* and

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, Act III.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, Act III.

²² *The Poetic Principle*, in *loc.*

distinguished the decadent method from the romantic one by placing emphasis upon sorrow rather than joy. Many of the poems in *Flowers of Evil* are intolerable except from the standpoint of poetic technique, but they have a suggestive value about them in that they show with what difficulty one can extricate himself from the social order with its idea of an average life. The romance of the decadent movement was exemplified in J. K. Huysmans, especially in his ideal of the solo life lived, for a time, by the hero in that fantastic tale *Against the Grain*.

A more serious strain of XIXth-century individualism is to be found in its theoretical doctrine of Immoralism. This does not mean immorality, since the ideal of Immoralism is more to transcend than to transgress the moral law. Friedrich Schlegel, the Romanticist, expressed it boldly when he said, "The first rule of the ethical is opposition to the legal."²³ Our own Emerson kept putting the intrepid ideal in epigrammatic form, as, "Every actual State is corrupt; good men must not obey the laws too well."²⁴ In his antinomianism, or hypernomianism as he called it, he insisted that "Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to this or that; the only right is that which is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it."²⁵ The pious Emerson went even so far as to say, "There is no man who is not at some time indebted to his vices, as no plant that is not fed on manures."²⁶ Under pressure, he was willing to regard himself as "The Devil's Child."²⁷

NIHILISM

In the form of the novel, the doctrine of Immoralism was represented most strikingly by the Russian Turgenev and Dostoevsky, although the idea had been used earlier by Stendhal-Beyle in *The Red and the Black* and *The Chartreuse of Parma*. Turgenev introduced the term and used the idea of "Nihilism" to express contempt for political and every other form of authority.

²³ "Ideen," *Jugend Schriften*, ed. Minor, p. 60.

²⁴ *Politics*, in loc.

²⁵ *Self Reliance*, in loc.

²⁶ *Considerations by the Way*, in loc.

²⁷ *Self Reliance*, in loc.

The supreme motive of his hero was "I reject." Dostoievsky was more violent. His hero knows no law, but proceeds according to the individualistic principle that the cultured man has the right to commit any sort of crime; but instead of creating the impression of the cultured man, the hero seems to resemble the prehistoric specimens from which we are descended. This appears in Raskolnikow, the hero in *Crime and Punishment*, in Rogozhin in *The Idiot*, and among the *Brothers Karamazov*, preëminently Dmitri and Smerdyakoff. In a philosophical manner, Nietzsche emphasizes and in a way enhances the immoralistic ideal in the Schopenhauerian form of "The Will to Power." With all such Immoralists, the categorical imperative is the opposite of the social rule of tenderness; it is that of strength and hardness.

On the XIXth-century stage, the immoralistic character appeared most strikingly in the plays of Ibsen. This character is usually feminine. We observe her in *The Doll's House*, where Nora Helmer concludes that a woman's first duty is toward herself and personally intends to find out which is right, society or herself. We hear this *immoraliste* speak in the words of Mrs. Alving, who asserts that all morality is "machine-sewn and unravels the moment you untie a single knot." Hilda Wangel, in *Master Builder*, is another emancipated woman, who calls herself a "light-haired little devil" and wants her hero, who seems to be suffering from a "sickly conscience," to have the "conscience of a viking" and the "ideals of a ruffian." Sudermann's stage, by no means independent of Ibsen's, was expressive of a similar antinomianism as, for example, in *Magda*, wherein the heroine, as if in imitation of Eve in Eden, asserts, "We must sin if we wish to grow—sin and then grow greater than our sin."

The individualism that accompanied the social science of the XIXth century did not stop with aestheticism and Immoralism; it sought to emancipate the human ego at the cost of irrationalism. In so doing, it made use of scholastic nominalism whereby it attempted to oppose the individual to the social order. We observe such logic in Emerson and in Max Stirner. Emerson advises us to resist the generalization that puts us in the position of subordination to an idea like that of the State. The function of the State is purely pedagogical; hence he says, "To educate the wise man,

the State appears; and, with the appearance of the wise man, the State expires." Stirner was still more irrational and goes so far in his egoism as to answer the question of Pontius Pilate by saying, "I am truth," and "I raise myself above truths and their power; as I am supersensual, so I am supertrue."²⁸ If these intrepid individualists had before them the idea of the social order that confronts us, would they have been less emphatic in their negations? But unfortunately for the individualistic movement, it had only poets, dramatists, and essayists to uphold the cause, not philosophers like Descartes and Kant.

Such protests against the excessive socialization of human life provoke the question whether the social concept, so dominant in the thought of the day, is adequate. Sociality, as we may call it, seems to give satisfaction to the contemporary mind to the same degree that classic Formalism, mediaeval Scholasticism, and modern Rationalism satisfied the spiritual demands of the eras in which they appeared. The amount of sociological material at hand in the way of data and the methods available also are impressive, hence it is no wonder that members of the leisure professions, who are not in direct contact with life, accept the social category as supreme. The extended view of life made possible by history, anthropology, and archaeology and the detailed conception of life revealed by our encyclopedic knowledge tempt one to believe that the idea of the social is the most enlightening one available. Art, morality, philosophy, and religion seem too formal and narrow to cover such a wide range of life. As far as the quantity of life is concerned, the social idea is able to represent contemporary civilization about as it exists. But it is a question whether the inward quality of life, or life's value, can be presented in a social form.

THE INADEQUACY OF THE SOCIAL

The idea of civilization that we have been following prohibits us from giving immediate and unqualified sanction to the social ideal as the supreme expression of the Good. After all, it is the Good that the nations of the world have sought even when

²⁸ *The Ego and his Own*, tr. Byington, p. 463.

they have not recognized it in this massive form. Chinese civilization sought the Good in the simple form of domestic virtue and made its adherents members of a household. Hebrew civilization sought goodness in the more devout manner of obedience to the Divine Will. In India it was the quest of the Good in a negative manner by the renunciation of earth and the desire for life. The Greeks sought it consciously in connection with a philosophy which exalted reason and tried to establish a rational republic of enlightened minds. The Christian Good was the Kingdom of God on earth, an idea which later became incorporated in a visible Church. The modern sought the Good in both a broad rationalism and a narrow nationalism and is now continuing the quest in an industrial civilization wherein the Good is material benefit and the good man an efficient worker.

The social conception of life has assumed the form of glorified gregariousness; it is the result of increased population, socialized labor, growth of cities; it has been furthered by the evolutionary conception of life, in which the idea of species predominates over that of the individual. The social idea is by no means the only one the world has known and is not necessarily the one that should be exalted at the present time. Still less is it possible to assert that it is the best possible conception of human life. It is open to theoretical criticism on the grounds that it does not afford the materials or lend itself to the principles of science. Sociology is not a science in the sense of physics and chemistry, biology and psychology. Still less is it to be considered the completion of these. It is rather a detailed description of the milieu in which these sciences are elaborated.

On the practical side, it is a question whether the social ideal is an adequate realization of the Good. On the surface, it seems to be in that it tends to express a common consciousness of human existence, fellow feeling, and coöperation. Beneath the surface, however, it assumes a different form. In the character of industrialism, the social principle places the individual in the position of forced altruism, since his mite of labor is taken to make up the conglomerated product of wealth, which assumes to be the Good. In the character of militarism, the same social morality conscripts the individual and makes him fight for a politico-

social principle which he does not understand and of which he is barely conscious. It is only by means of vigorous propaganda that his mind is at all illuminated and his heart inflamed by the cause for which he is expected to fight. "The 'social conscience' may enforce rules of conduct which are in reality anti-social. It may, as it did in the Classical culture, relegate masses of mankind to permanent slavery. It may, as it does still in the Indian culture, divide caste from caste; it may, as it has so recently done in our own culture, force men to share in a disastrous and suicidal war."²⁹

²⁹ Hoyland, *History as Direction*, p. 77.

CHAPTER XVI

THE ECONOMIC VIEW OF CIVILIZATION



HOW ECONOMICS AROSE

THE ECONOMIC QUESTION OF THE DAY OR THE WORLD'S BUSINESS is so complicated that we are inclined to forget that at heart it is a simple matter. The instinct to acquire and save is observable in the life of primitive man and is not absent from the life of the animal, as the squirrel. "Getting and spending" has long since been a common adventure of the race and has now become the all-important consideration; it reveals itself in the busy world, in the easeful retreat, if not in the most holy cloister. The love of money may be the root of all kinds of evil and the mercantilism of our civilization may seem to threaten us with materialism, yet we cannot dismiss the economic factor in life with a word or wave business away with an ideal. We must understand the economic principle, how the idea of property arose, and what is to be done about wealth today. This is economics, the "science of wealth," or the study of "getting and spending."

Originally the term "economics," derived from the Greek *oikos*, house, and *nemo*, manage, meant household management. Xenophon (430-360 B.C.), who wrote our oldest treatise on the subject under the title *Economics*, discussed the management of a simple rural household in which the activity that furnished the income coincided with the household in which this was utilized.¹ In modern times, however, the economic activity is so widely separated from the simple household that when such private economics is discussed it is in the special form of "home economics," quite different from the larger field of "business economics." Obviously, the general term economics comprehends both: (1) the ordering of the economic affairs of the household, and (2) the planning and management of business undertakings. In addition, it recognizes the fact that the problem of income

¹ *Oeconomicus*, tr. Holden (1895); Graux and Jacob (1886).

and expenditure is a serious question for the public as a whole as well as for the private citizen. And so it is also concerned with public "getting and spending," with (1) political economy, or the income and expenditure of the State, commonly called public finance; and with (2) social economy, or the income and expenditure of the people as a whole, commonly called social economics. Broadly speaking, then, economics may be defined as the science which is concerned with the communal problems of wealth-getting and wealth-using activities. It involves the study of how men produce the things they need, how they divide them, exchange them, and use them, and how these activities affect the welfare of the community.

While economics is commonly called a science, any acceptance of this idea must involve certain suggestions of tentativeness. In the first place, it must be remembered that economics is a social science and not an exact or biological science. Truth or fact in economics is relative, whereas in the exact sciences, and to a less extent in the biological, it is fixed and absolute. In the social sciences, few principles can be considered immutable or eternal. Economic behavior is constantly changing and consequently economic generalizations need to be qualified and limited to the culture or time to which they apply. Again, in the sense of a widely accepted body of independent and systematically coordinated doctrines, economics is a science which is at the moment in a state of considerable flux. Over the whole economic field, professional economists are turning traditional economic assumptions into problems for investigation. These scholars and teachers no longer deem sufficient mere simplicity and logical coherence in economic theory; they demand that economic theory be submitted to the inexorable test of its relevance to objective reality. Finally, it is impossible to delineate the economic field because the professional economists hold such widely divergent ideas as to the purpose, scope, and method of economics. As a body of knowledge, economics is distinguished more by the particular interests which have influenced the inquiries of economists, by the particular questions which they have tried to answer, and by their methods of attack than by the peculiarities or the characteristic nature of its subject matter.

The typical economic order of our present so-called western civilization and of most preceding civilizations is a business or money economy. The outstanding feature of an economic order which may be called a business economy is the fact that economic activities are carried on mainly by making and spending money. A business economy does not develop in a geographical or political locality until most of the material activities of that locality take the form of making and spending money. When men, instead of making goods which their families need, make money, and with their money-incomes buy for their own use goods made by other hands, then dawns a business economy.

MONEY-MAKING

Of course, the mere appearance and use of money as a convenient and widely accepted tool of exchange is not the most significant consideration, although a necessary one, in designating an economic order as a business or money economy. The paramount matter is the institutional organization of production, distribution, and consumption for the people as a whole upon the basis of money-making and money-spending. Money occupies the central position in a business economy because it is the medium in terms of which economic motives express themselves. In a business economy the material comfort or misery of a family, for example, depends more upon its ability to command an adequate money-income and upon its pecuniary thrift than upon its efficiency in making useful goods and its skill in husbanding supplies.² To the State, money-making is important chiefly because of its influence upon efficiency in production. In a business economy natural resources are seldom developed, mechanical equipment is seldom utilized, workmanlike skill is seldom exercised, and scientific discoveries are not applied unless the opportunity for money profit is available to those who can direct and supervise production.³

The chronological history of business or money economy harks

² Mitchell, *Business Cycles*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., New York (1927), p. 63.

³ *Ib.*, pp. 65-66.

back through the ages and into the haze that hides the beginning of humanity. In the far-off, dim stretches of time, men began to take their faltering first steps toward the use of money. Conjecture has it that man first began to exchange gifts and then to barter for the sake of goods. An animal fur may have been the first article ever bartered. A weapon for hunting, perhaps a stone club, may have been the next. Thus the modern fur dealer and sporting-goods merchant may perhaps lay claim to the greatest antiquity in "trade" as distinguished from "business." However that may be, it is certain that we cannot go back to the time when men did not barter—trade goods for goods. Amber, found only in the Baltic, was common in the earliest days of ancient Greece. And epochs before that, goods moved about the so-called pre-historic world in astounding fashion. Expert judges believe that certain stone axes, discovered in France along with other relics of primitive man, are made of a kind of jade found only in far-off Asia.

Obviously, barter begins with the exchange of superfluous goods. A man with a weapon to spare, say a tomahawk, barter it for a bundle of cord for tying up the hair. Later, as life becomes settled, the separation of employments or the so-called "division of labor" begins. The man who is particularly skilled in making weapons finds that his products are in demand by others and gives more and more time to that in which he excels. He discovers that he can build up a surplus of weapons and barter that surplus for his living necessities. Then, in all probability, the concept of ownership begins to take more definite form. Then, too, begin experimental efforts to express values in a common denominator and to use some commodity as money.

Anything, of course, can be money that will do the money-work, and curious assortments of things have been so used at one time or another—shells, iron ingots, blocks of salt, cubes of pressed tea, sheep, bullets, and so on. Generally, the natural products of a community are first used as money units. But commodity units are inconvenient. In the use of commodity units there is, of course, the difficulty of "coincidence" of wants, that important drawback to barter—each party having a thing to dispose of, but neither being able to provide what the other

wants. Then there is the difficulty of defining quantity and quality. No one sheep, no one slave is exactly the same as another. Commodity units are not conveniently homogeneous. Metallic money, whether coined or not, because of its convenience, inevitably makes its appearance.

At the dawn of history, certainly, coined money was in use. Abraham paid for the cave and field of Machpelah with "four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the merchants" — money coined of the metal that formed the standard money of England until 1816. The most generally accepted guess seems to be that the invention of money coinage — pieces of precious metal stamped and purporting to be of a certain weight — took place in western Asia Minor, Lydia, about 600 B.C. Coined money may have been used in Babylonia before that time, but in all likelihood early currency was confined to metal ingots that required weighing at each transaction. Gold coins were struck by the Phoenicians about 330 B.C. and were thereafter carried and popularized by these hardy seafarers throughout the Mediterranean world. The use of money and its influence upon the organization of economic activities developed rapidly in Phoenicia, Carthage, and Greece.

GREEK MERCHANTS AND PHILOSOPHERS

The Greeks were not primarily an industrial people. Nevertheless they developed the manufacturing of articles of fine aesthetic craftsmanship, they built up export industries, and they carried on an extensive foreign trade. "Table merchants," so called because they carried on their money-changing and money-testing at a table, became bankers, made advances of silver to farming peasants on the security of the debtor's land, and shared in the profits of trading ventures by lending money on "bottomry," on the security of a given vessel or cargo, for the voyage out or back or both. As early as 600 B.C. there existed an ever-increasing group of wealthy capitalists, private capital was employed in every direction, and the principle of joint-stock association was apparently well understood.

The two greatest Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, were

only incidentally concerned with economic inquiry.⁴ The Grecian philosophy was so bound up with the problem of the "good life" that it found small place for an examination of economic or industrial impulses. Economic activities were accepted as necessary but were considered scarcely to warrant a philosopher's attention. Labor was grudgingly respected as the pursuit of inferior men, while trade was largely left to the despised aliens and freedmen. Aristotle's theories taught that leisure was the "mother of culture" and as a consequence the citizen who lived in idleness was often held in high regard. In the *Republic* and in the *Laws*, Plato described an ideal State where private property was strictly limited, where interest-taking was forbidden, and where a simple household economy was highly praised.⁵ While Aristotle attacked the *Republic* emphatically, his own economic conception of an attainable State does not differ fundamentally from that of Plato. In the *Politics*, Aristotle also condemns money-making for its own sake, as well as any interest-taking whatever and most of the simple phenomena of money and exchange.⁶

Both philosophers considered economic problems from a juristic or ethical point of view; both judged and rated economic activities good or bad by their relationship to some "rational" or "natural" view of the general structure of society. So it is that Aristotle's strong conclusion to the effect that trading for gain, as contrasted with trading to exchange goods, is "unnatural" was merely the result of his theories on the nature of the family and the State. His interests were concerned with ethics and philosophy, and he developed no practical plans for the economics of production or commerce.

⁴ It must not be thought that a study of the Greek ideas is fruitless in an economic-background sense. The beginnings of many economic theories can be found in Greek literature and philosophy. For example, Aristophanes, in his popular play *The Frogs* (405 B.C.), makes reference to that monetary principle now known as Gresham's law — the principle which states that bad money always drives out good money.

⁵ The best translation of Plato is probably that of B. Jowett, 3rd ed., revised, Oxford (1888).

⁶ *Politics*, tr. Jowett, Oxford (1885). The more striking passages from Aristotle which deal with economics may be found in Monroe, *Early Economic Thought* (1924).

ROMAN ECONOMICS AND LAWS

The Romans, like the Greeks, were not primarily an industrial or a commercial people. Nevertheless, many of the elements of a business economy prevailed. Money-changing, money-lending, speculation, and simple banking became common. Associations of capitalists were carefully organized as partnerships or joint-stock companies managed on behalf of the shareholders by *participes*. The Forum, with its *basilicae*, was crowded with *publicani* and *negotiatores* haggling and closing speculative transactions in an immense stock exchange. In spite of the prevalence of slavery, many men worked for wages in the production of staple goods on a large scale and for a wide market. In the later Empire, fine shops were to be found on the Campus Martius and markets grouped themselves in definite places to such an extent that streets were named for particular trades, Grain Merchants' Street, Belt-makers' Street, Sandal-makers' Street among others.

In spite of the stimulus of a developing business methodology, the Roman thinkers formulated no important economic ideas. Like the Greeks they went little further than to praise agriculture and to deprecate trade. Cicero approved trade only on a scale large enough to permit a merchant to purchase an estate, retire, and live like a "gentleman." The Roman retailers were mostly freed slaves, aliens, and members of the lowest classes. They were looked upon with contempt, debarred from the legions, and assigned to the protection of the god of thieves.

Any real Roman contribution to economic thought came as the result of the subject matter and method of Roman Law. On the score of subject matter, Roman Law emphasized individualism, promulgated an absolute doctrine of private property, recognized the pecuniary character of assets, and accepted the idea of interest as well as rent. It emphasized a "natural economic order" and minimized the importance of labor in the productive process as compared with the place of nature. On the score of method, the Roman jurisconsults contributed and exemplified processes of precise formulation of ideas and facile uses of abstraction.

With the decline of the Roman rule, the pecuniary substruc-

ture began to go to pieces. The Gothic hordes poured out of the wilds of northern and northeastern Europe. The "Roman Peace" ended and darkness closed down upon the western world. Pillage became more profitable than commerce or industry, "petty warfare became a chronic misery; the admirable Roman roads fell into disrepair; commerce shrank to a dribble of luxuries for the powerful and a local exchange of indispensables like iron, salt, and tar for the commonalty; manufacturing for a wide market almost disappeared; coinage became scanty, irregular and incredibly confused."⁷ Business economy reverted to furtive barter.

MONEY IN THE MIDDLE AGES

The economic thought of the Middle Ages was dominated by the Church or Canon Law, first compiled about 1140 by the monk Gratian, and the scholastic teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).⁸ While these two bodies of writing were considerably influenced by a revival of interest in the Roman Law of the *Corpus juris canonici* and philosophy of Aristotle, they were Christian bodies of thought and great care was taken to purge ancient law and philosophy of any pagan or individualistic taint.

Private property was accepted and communism was declared a mere ideal made unattainable by the fall of man. An indifference to wealth was suggested and the social responsibilities of wealth were emphasized. Labor was highly regarded and idleness frowned upon. Nevertheless, only the labor involved in the physical production of consumable goods was explicitly commended. The *artes pecuniativae* were looked upon with suspicion and trading profits were only grudgingly condoned. It was considered improper to expect any money-compensation for the use of lent money — to demand anything beyond simple reimbursement. To be sure, in the later Middle Ages certain definite exceptions were recognized as suitable grounds for interest-

⁷ Mitchell, *Business Cycles*, p. 67.

⁸ The more important passages from Aquinas' *Summa theologica* may be found in Monroe, *Early Economic Thought*.

taking, such as missed opportunities for gain, loss incurred by or injury accruing to the lender, delay in repayment, and the like. The "just price" and the "just wage" were constantly referred to in the sense of standards. In fact, the "just price"—determined by constituted authorities independently of the trading advantages of the moment—included a return which would support the seller in a fashion "suitable" or "proper" to his station in life. However, by the beginning of the XIVth century commerce greatly expanded, the supply of money increased, and the restrictive philosophies of the early Schoolmen began to be severely strained. Nicole Oresme (1320-1382) offered some shrewd observations on the rôle and nature of money, condemned the debasement of the currency, presented an explicit statement of what is now called Gresham's law, and attempted to lay down principles to govern the practice of bimetallism.⁹ Throughout the period, however, the fundamental coloring of economic thought was furnished by moral, ethical, and religious considerations.

MODERN MERCANTILISM

The beginning of the modern era brought with it sweeping changes in the economic substructure of civilization. The growth of intertown and interregional trade and the coincident widening of markets became apparent. The spread of nationalism was rapid and led to the formation of large absolutist national States in the west: France, Spain, Portugal, England, and the later German territorial princedoms. The urban units of the mediaeval economy were replaced by unified national economic areas. Mercenary armies replaced the feudal militia; the centralization of administration established a salaried officialdom where feudal methods of self-government had prevailed.¹⁰ Slowly but surely the idea of estate-management for money-revenue instead of for subsistence progressed. Taxation and the processes of State credit

⁹ Important sections of Oresme's *De origine, natura, jure et mutationibus monetarum* may be found in translation in Monroe, *Early Economic Thought*.

¹⁰ Spann, *The History of Economics*, tr. Eden and Cedar Paul (1930), pp. 29-30.

tended more and more to be carried upon a monetary basis instead of by payments in kind.

For good or ill, by the latter part of the XVth century mankind in western and central Europe had begun to think for itself, to test the prescriptive rights and duties of mediaeval economic thought, to reject much of the old, and to adopt much that was new. Instead of clinging to authority as a guide, everywhere men set up "change" and "progress" as watchwords of their enduring conflict with the problems of economic existence. New beliefs, new values, and new institutions began to affect not only the intellectual life of Europe, the Renaissance, and its religious life, the Reformation, but its business life, the Commercial Revolution, as well.

These circumstances as well as others led to the expression, during the three hundred years following 1450, of a number of related economic ideas which are referred to as Mercantilism. Basically, the Mercantilists glorified the State as an economic unit, as the guardian of social interest. They held money in high esteem and foreign trade as well, for they considered commerce as the chief means of bringing money into the State. Consequently, they believed that the State should foster industry, the forerunner of commerce. As a group, they concerned themselves largely with the ways in which the State might secure and maintain a favorable balance of trade so as to conserve and increase its stock of money and precious metals. While they held that the chief object of gain to their native State in its transactions with other States should be gain in money or precious metals, they did not hold that money alone is wealth. They did not esteem money as an end in itself but on account of its productive effects. "Money begetteth trade," wrote Thomas Mun (1571-1641), and "trade encreaseth money."¹¹ Nevertheless, their esteem for money and their exaltation of artificial wealth above natural wealth represented an idea quite new to economic thinking. In addition, they favored the regulation of domestic production and consumption down to minute particulars, identifying the interests of the State with the interests of the merchants, and apparently thinking of the State as though it

¹¹ Spann, *The History of Economics*, tr. Eden and Cedar Paul (1930), p. 34.

were itself a great trading enterprise, profiting from the excess of its foreign sales over its foreign purchases.

While Mercantilism cannot be said to involve a systematic general view of economic processes taken as a whole, there was an essential unity of opinion in the writings of Antonio Serra (late XVIth and early XVIIth centuries), Antoine de Montchrétien (1576-1621, the first writer to use the term "political economy"), Thomas Mun, Philipp Wilhelm von Hornik (1638-1712), and Sir James Denham Steuart (1712-1780).¹² In spite of wide variations over time and space, and in spite of emphasis upon commerce in Italy, Holland, and England and upon industry in France and Germany, the central theme of Mercantilism influenced and expressed itself in the restrictive policies of such political statesmen and rulers as Colbert, Burleigh, Cromwell, and Frederick the Great.

THE PHYSIOCRATS

The first serious and systematic challenge to Mercantilism was presented in the ideas of a small but influential group of writers who called themselves *Les Économistes*, now referred to as the Physiocrats, who flourished in France in the second half of the XVIIIth century. The Physiocrats, or Economists, consisted of a small and devoted group of disciples and Dr. François Quesnay (1694-1774), their inspiring leader.¹³ Generally they are considered the founders of systematic economic thought because they saw the processes of economic life as a whole and because they were the first to study these processes from the point of view of law, principle, and causation. However faulty were the physiocratic laws or principles, the fact remains that the Physiocrats believed that questions should be asked and that laws and princi-

¹² Serra, *Breve trattato delle cause che possono far abbondare li regni d'oro e d'argento dove non sono miniere* (1613); Montchrétien, *Traité de l'économie politique* (1615); Mun, *England's Treasure by Forraign Trade* (1664); Hornik, *Oesterreich über alles, wenn es nur will* (1684); Steuart, *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy* (1767). Passages from Serra, Mun, and Hornik appear in Monroe, *Early Economic Thought*.

¹³ Passages from Quesnay's *Tableau économique* (1758) may be found in translation in Monroe, *Early Economic Thought*.

ples should be sought. Therein lies their principal contribution to economic thinking.

The real effort of the Physiocrats was to remove emphasis from commerce and industry where the Mercantilists had placed it. They contended that manufacture changes only the *form* of wealth and that the value of a finished product is no more than the value of the raw material and the value of the labor and tools used upon the finished product. On the other hand, they held that the former produces a value over and above the costs of production. Consequently, they believed that a State could not become rich by working up its raw materials and exporting them in return for money. Rather, they argued that the State profits most from increasing the *produit net*, the surplus of the raw produce of the earth left after defraying the cost of its production.

Deriving their concepts in part from Newton and in part from Stoicism, they sought the *ordre naturel*, a natural law as embraced in physical forces. In their search they came to believe that in the long run the individual interest coincides with the interest of the group and leads to the attainment of the *ordre naturel*. Thus, the minute and inclusive State regulations, characteristic of Mercantilism, were held to be contrary to individual interest, which it was thought desirable to foster. Free competition, free labor, and free trade were praised. The hoarding of precious metals was frowned upon and the production and exchange of natural riches under the direction of unimpeded self-interest was encouraged.

THE ECONOMISTS

To the Scotch philosopher Adam Smith (1723-1790), who published his monumental treatise *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* in 1776, the mercantilistic and physiocratic ideas were not entirely acceptable. Basically, Smith's interest was that of the Mercantilists: he endeavored to find out how national welfare and wealth might best be attained. Nevertheless, he was emphatic in his belief that the wealth of a nation does not depend either on the balance of trade or on the quantity of money or precious metals within its borders. He agreed with

the Physiocrats that the best policy of government in respect to industry and commerce is a "let alone" policy. He argued that the best national program is one of *laissez faire*, that if men follow their self-interest they will be guided as by an "invisible hand" to work the public good. Departing from the physiocratic idea, he argued that the real source of a country's wealth is its "annual labor" — not merely its agricultural labor — and that the best way to increase a country's wealth is to make its labor more effective and to husband and increase the products of labor. The specialization of tasks or the division of labor is the principal factor in increasing the fruitfulness of labor and thereby enhancing prosperity. In fact, to Smith the division of labor was more or less the starting point for the whole economic process.

From this starting point Smith's reasoning went on to declare that the further the division of labor is pushed, the more production comes to be carried on with an eye to the market. For purposes of the market, then, there must develop a general means of exchange or instrument of trade, such as money. Commodities are exchanged in the market through money acting as a medium of exchange and thus there develops an exchange-value or price of goods as contrasted with their use-value. The process of exchange is accomplished in line with exchange-value or price, and so price becomes of great importance since it affects the production of goods by the expectation of the price to be realized and the distribution of goods by determining who can buy them. Thus, we see that Smith made a notable step forward in individualistic economic thinking. He rejected the idea of productive circulation, an idea basic to both the Mercantilists and the Physiocrats, and for the first time directed attention to a theory of value and of price.¹⁴ The elaboration of Smith's foundations of classical economics was principally carried on by Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), a young parish clergyman; David Ricardo (1772-1823), a wealthy broker; Nassau William Senior (1790-1864), a teacher of political economy at Oxford; and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), an executive of the East India Company.¹⁵

¹⁴ Spann, *History of Economics*, pp. 99-100.

¹⁵ Ricardo's most notable work was *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817); Senior, *An Outline of the Science of Political Economy* (1836);

In his epoch-making *Essay on the Principle of Population*, Malthus presented the stern theory that human beings tend to increase more rapidly than does the food supply, that human beings increase in geometrical progression (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, etc.) and that foodstuffs increase only in arithmetic progression (2, 4, 6, 8, 10, etc.). These tendencies may only be held in check by (1) positive checks, such as war, pestilence, and famine, and (2) preventive checks, such as abstinence from marriage, abstinence from the begetting of children, and the postponement of marriage—deliberate measures, rationally conceived. Thus, Malthus infers from his law of population that governments should remove all hindrances to the cultivation of the soil and favor the preventive checks, and, in particular, the postponement of marriage. He believed that wages tend to sink to the level of the minimum of subsistence and that then the positive checks begin to apply. He recommended the reduction of poor relief because public charity took away the incentive to individual prudence, and called more mouths into the world without adding to the food to be put into those mouths. By implication, if not by direct statement, Malthus recognized the law of diminishing returns from land.

Ricardo held that the chief object of economic inquiry should be the distribution of wealth. In addition, he believed that of the three distributive factors, profits, wages, and rent, the last named was by far the most important matter for study. Out of the Malthusian theory of the tendency of population to expand, Ricardo fashioned his own famous law of differential rent. Observing the progressive resort to poorer soils and the more intensive cultivation of better soils he brought out very clearly the fact of diminishing returns in agriculture and his explanation of rent as the result of differences in the productivity of soils. On the score of wages, Ricardo accepted the Malthusian idea that they tend to seek the level of the minimum of subsistence. To a certain extent this idea represented the foundation of Ricardo's theories of distribution and his claim that the "natural" tendency in any country is toward an increase in rents and a reduction in profit while (real) wages remain constant.

Malthus, *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798); Mill, *Principles of Political Economy* (1848).

LAISSEZ FAIRE

Broadly speaking, Ricardo championed mobile capital, unqualified free trade, an "iron law of wages," and a tentative "quantity theory of money." It began to be plain that, after Ricardo, *laissez faire* would mean far more of a ruthless individualism than the Physiocrats had intended. Ricardo's positiveness of statement, his willingness to attack the burning questions of his time, his rejection of concrete induction, and his abstract but practical conception of economics coupled with his use of the deductive method combined to make him dominate his followers and embitter his critics.

John Stuart Mill stands out as the culminating figure in England so far as the so-called classical economy is concerned. His outstanding book, *Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy*, was brilliantly written and eminently logical. Unquestionably his principal contribution to economic thought lies in his expository restatement of the theories of the classical economists, in clarification and systematization, rather than in any very important originality. Apparently his major aim was to demonstrate beyond a doubt that economics offers a field for direct deduction and that economic and social laws are as genuine as those of physics or chemistry. Thus it is that we find in his pages very definite formulæ. Here is a clarified statement of the idea of market value as responding to demand and supply; of natural or normal value as fixed by the cost of production; of the Malthusian law of population; of the Ricardian law of rent; of Senior's principal and original economic contribution, the theory that interest represents the reward of abstinence, exercised by capitalists in refraining from currently consuming their incomes; of Ricardo's argument for free trade; and of the quantity theory of money, among others.

In important respects, Mill was less dismal in his outlook than the preceding classical economists. He was genuinely concerned about and sympathetic toward the poor and the downtrodden. Consequently he was not averse to a mild form of interference and intervention on the part of the State, such as the diffusion of property by means of the regulation and taxation of inheritances.

In a sense he was a gentle optimist, for he believed quite definitely in the continual improvement of human nature and that as human nature improves the whole distributive process grows better and better. He held that production was subject to inexorable laws beyond the control of men, but he believed distribution to be an arbitrary process, "a matter of human institutions solely."

As the so-called Industrial Revolution wore on, it became more and more apparent to many that the doctrine of *laissez faire* as a guiding economic principle under which to realize the individualistic purposes of life was scarcely adapted to many of the newer conditions of economic life. Conditions among the factory workers were deplorable. The low wages, long hours, and unbearable living quarters these workers had to endure and the sickness, plague, and even starvation which often resulted cast a dark shadow of suffering over the period. *Laissez faire* worked well enough so long as men could acquire control of the simple instruments necessary to carry on industry under a handicraft system. However, under a factory system it was neither satisfactory nor effective for the economist merely to lean back and tell the workers that they must rely upon their own competitive powers to improve their condition, that State intervention was unnecessary in the interests of the sufferers.

THE SOCIALISTS

Inevitably, then, there appeared a group of writers who hotly denounced the classical economic theory of *laissez faire* and who proposed that society take a hand in improving the lot of its individual members. The individual in society might still be the end of economic inquiry, but the weak and ill-equipped individual was to be considered as well as the strong and capable. These new writers, or Socialists, as they came to be called, in general believed that society should use one or more of the following means to relieve suffering: (1) destroy or weaken private property, (2) substitute a rational and systematic coördination of economic forces for free competition, and (3) establish human equality. In fact, in practically every shade of socialist

thought down to the present, one or more of these tenets is held important and fundamental.

The first socialist systematist of note was Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825). Although his disciples, Enfantin (1796-1864) and Bazard (1791-1832), anticipated most of the later socialistic ideas, Saint-Simon himself was content to advocate a sweeping reorganization of society with expert guidance and effective control carefully provided for.¹⁶ Then began a series of visionary socialistic schemes which were doomed to failure. Fourier (1772-1837) proposed voluntary associations of coöperative and self-sufficing communities called "phalanxes."¹⁷ Robert Owen (1771-1858)¹⁸ and Louis Blanc (1811-1882),¹⁹ to mention but a few, also hoped to realize some socialistic actuality through the establishment of small coöperative commonwealths. Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) sponsored the establishment of a bank of exchange, which was to buy from every producer the goods he had made, giving him in payment a note proportional to the amount of labor that had been expended, the bank giving credit without payment for the accommodation.²⁰ He argued that no one would then need to borrow from the capitalists and that they in turn would have to set to work themselves.

Building upon Ricardo, Saint-Simon, and Proudhon, Karl Johann Rodbertus-Jagetzow (1805-1875) organized the ideas of the Socialists and established them in Germany.²¹ He believed that the State should guide its own destiny, that private property should be abolished, that production should be organized for the satisfaction of social needs rather than for profit, and that labor was the sole factor in production. While he clearly systematized his theory, he could not bring himself to construct the vital program which it implied and ended by advocating mild State interference with economic phenomena. The most influ-

¹⁶ Saint-Simon, *L'industrie* (1817), *Du système industriel* (1821), *Nouveau christianisme* (1825); Bazard, *Doctrine de Saint-Simon, Exposition, Première année* (1828).

¹⁷ *Traité de l'association domestique-agricole* (1822).

¹⁸ *A New View of Society* (1813).

¹⁹ *Organisation du travail* (1839).

²⁰ *Système de contradictions économiques, ou philosophie de la misère* (1840).

²¹ *Die Forderungen der arbeitenden Klassen* (1885, posthumous publication).

ential of all the early Socialists was Heinrich Karl Marx (1818-1883), an intelligent, revolutionary-minded German Jew. Marx went back for his theoretical beginnings to Smith and Ricardo. From them he took what he chose, whatever suited his ends. Certainly from them he took his basic idea that labor creates all wealth. Smith and Ricardo, by making labor the source of value, laid the doctrinal foundation for Marx's argument that rent, interest, and profits represent deductions from the product which labor alone creates, and which therefore should go, undiminished, to the workers.

Marxian Socialism, outlined in the *Communist Manifesto*²² and rationalized in *Das Kapital* (1867), held that the struggle between the rich and the poor could be distinguished throughout history; that because of the institution of private property, the capitalist is able to control the instruments of production and to exploit the "wage slaves"; that free competition ruins all but a few very wealthy men; that the concentration of capital involves repeated disturbances of the market, consequent crises, and widespread unemployment. He contended that as the class struggle goes on, the proletariat, because it outnumbers all other classes, would eventually gain control of society, that it would take possession of the means of production and from the superfluity of products every one would receive according to his needs. However, he did not attempt to present a detailed description of the prophesied collectivist system, or to indicate how distribution was to be effected and his ideal society organized. At least until the present, it appears that Marx's permanent contribution to economics is one of method rather than of subject matter. Certain it is, that many of the more modern Socialists have broken completely away from Marx's theory and follow him only incidentally and especially in his desire for some type of social utopia. On the score of method, however, Marx rejected deduction and thought of economics as an inductive science which should study the changing institutions of a given economic order. His followers, in adopting his method, have formed various types of political parties, adhering in the main, however, to his ideas.

²² *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei* (1848, with Engels).

THE CRITICAL SCHOOL

Along with the protest of Socialism against the classical economists appeared the so-called "critical school" of thinkers who came much closer to meeting directly the orthodox and classical ideas. As a group, these "critical" economists occupy a position midway between that of the older orthodox economists and that of the Socialists, who denounced the older ideas that were inconsistent with their tenets as mere apologies for and products of the existing economic order.

The most influential thinker of this "critical school" was Simonde de Sismondi (1773-1842).²³ With the early Socialists, Sismondi criticized individualistic economics and free competition, but he cannot be numbered among them. He believed that all economists should be primarily concerned with human welfare and not with the production of wealth, and that the idea of a "passive" State was anything but "natural," historically speaking. He demanded systematic State action for the protection of the poor, but without any collectivization of production. Sismondi's point of view was shared by Charles Brook Dupont-White (1807-1878), who insisted that intervention by the State would most surely result in a higher level of general happiness.²⁴ Both Sismondi and Dupont-White made considerable use of history to sustain their contentions. However, a still more definitive historical angle of attack on orthodox classical theory was to be presented by the so-called "historical school" of economics.

THE HISTORICAL SCHOOL

The most important members of the "historical school" were Friedrich List (1789-1846),²⁵ Wilhelm Rosher (1817-1894), and Karl Knies (1821-1898).²⁶ List contended that history shows

²³ *Nouveaux principes d'économie politique* (1819) and *Études sur l'économie politique* (1817 to 1838).

²⁴ *L'individu et l'état, Paris* (1857), and *La centralisation* (1860).

²⁵ Friedrich List is often classified as a member of the "critical" school.

²⁶ List, *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie* (1841); Rosher, *Grundriss zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirtschaft nach geschichtlicher Methode* (1843), *System der Volkswirtschaft* (1854); Knies, *Die politische Oekonomie vom Standpunkte der geschichtlichen Methode* (1853).

that every nation may look forward to an evolution through the definite "economic stages" of: (1) hunting tribes, (2) pastoral communities, (3) the agricultural commonwealth, (4) the agricultural and manufacturing State, and (5) the agricultural and manufacturing and commercial State. In the first and the last stage, he argued that free trade is advantageous, but that in the intervening stages progress demands the protection of manufactures by the State. In other words, he believed in the idea of the relativity of economic policy.

While List appears to have been able to find in history only what he was looking for, Knies and others attempted to make the historical point of view the center of their thought. As an attack on the abuse of abstraction and deduction and an easy assumption of universals these early "historical school" economists contributed a great deal in method. Moreover, they set up an inspiration for the younger historical school headed by such eminent thinkers as Gustav von Schmoller (1838-1917), James Edwin Rogers (1823-1890), William Cunningham (1849-1919), and Sir William Ashley (1860-1927).²⁷

These younger economists stressed the idea that the structure of a nation's life is peculiar to a given nation at a given time, a product of its past. Thus the wisdom of particular economic policies is relative to place and time. General laws, therefore, need to be subordinated to an analysis of the actual facts of a nation's economic growth. Consequently these scholars gave themselves over to careful and painstaking historical research and inductive reasoning. As a result they have produced a large quantity of economic monographs which are vigorous in their realism.

Under the constant attacks of the several critical schools, the orthodox economics began to wither and wane until, after 1850, it had lost much of its prestige. Nevertheless, by 1870 a group of important writings began to appear which so far as method is concerned revived the use of abstraction. In spite of the fact that much of the methodological criticism of the Classicists cen-

²⁷ Schmoller, *Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre* (1900); Rogers, *The Economic Interpretation of History* (1888); Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce* (1882); Ashley, *An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory* (1888).

tered on the use of the abstract-deductive method of thought, the older methodology came to be defended and used. In what appears to be a rather remarkable display of similar and related ideas, more or less independently arrived at, these newer economists asserted a complete faith in the importance of abstraction in *pure* economic theory. For a basis for their abstraction they seized, in part at least, upon the hedonistic principle that man always seeks pleasure and avoids pain.

THE MATHEMATICAL SCHOOL

It is somewhat customary and usual to divide these newer economists who sprang to the defense of abstraction and adopted the hedonistic principle into two groups: (1) the mathematical school, and (2) the psychological school. Obviously this division is somewhat arbitrary and anything but mutually exclusive so far as an absolute classification of the various hedonistic writers is concerned.

The mathematical economists, best represented perhaps by Antoine Cournot (1801-1877), Hermann Gossen (1810-1898), William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882), Leon Walras (1834-1910), Joseph Schumpeter (1883-), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), Irving Fisher (1867-), and Henry L. Moore (1869-), sought a relatively high degree of abstraction and so turned to mathematics, the most deductive of all the so-called "exact" sciences.²⁸ These writers realized that quantities of an economic sort existed and were functionally related. In general, they concentrated their attention on the phenomenon of exchange in an attempt to reduce their data to the equational form, to formulate observed ratios of exchange. They held the notion that an economic situation at any time is the result of a complexity of shifting forces in constant search of equilibrium. Consequently they

²⁸ Cournot, *Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses* (1838); Gossen, *Entwicklung der Gesetze des menschlichen Verkehrs* (1854); Jevons, *The Theory of Political Economy* (1871); Walras, *Éléments d'économie politique pure* (1874); Schumpeter, *Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie* (1908); Pareto, *Cours d'économie politique* (1896); Fisher, *The Purchasing Power of Money* (1911); Moore, *Laws of Wages* (1911) and *Economic Cycles* (1914).

emphasized more clearly than any previous school of economists the distinction between a "static" and a "dynamic" economy. This clarification, together with some very important ideas concerning the combination of the factors in production, the relation of cost of production to price, and the functions of supply and demand represent their chief contributions.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOL

The psychological school emphasized the fact that economics is quite definitely concerned with human behavior. The Austrian writers Carl Menger (1840-1921), Friedrich von Wieser (1851-1926), Eugene Böhm von Bawerk (1851-1914) were the pioneers and they exerted considerable influence on such American economists as John Bates Clark, Herbert Joseph Davenport, Frank Albert Fetter, and others.²⁹ They brought to their inquiries a more subjective view of economics to the effect that the source of value is to be found in men and not alone in materials. This notion of subjectivity led them into a considerable preoccupation with the phenomenon of demand considered as a function of human wants. The fact of the satiability of human wants impressed their thinking and gave rise to their distinguishing contribution to economic thinking, the idea of marginal utility. This idea of marginism differed somewhat from the ideas of the earlier economic systems in that it compared units of want and feeling instead of units of things. It explains exchange values by states of feeling and of consciousness in general, but, in particular, by the use of least (*marginal*) fractions as a standard for determining the value of aggregates. To the marginist, wants are of varying degrees of urgency, satisfied by successive units of a good, and the unit that satisfies the least important want which is satisfied at all, is the unit that gives the value to every one of the other units. In spite of this emphasis upon utility as the end-all and be-all of economic science and the elaboration of the

²⁹ Menger, *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre* (1871); Wieser, *Der natürliche Wert* (1889); Böhm-Bawerk, *Kapital und Kapitalzins* (1884); Clark, *Distribution of Wealth* (1899); Davenport, *The Economics of Enterprise* (1904); Fetter, *The Principles of Economics* (1904).

old idea of value in use, the psychological school was essentially classical in its ideas. Its disciples did not destroy or replace the orthodox economics. They merely corrected, extended, and elaborated the earlier thinking.

Amid all this welter of controversy, this congerie of highly speculative and conflicting theory, it was but natural that some one should attempt to pick and choose in a purposive effort at compromise. Here the eminent English economist Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) made a native generosity, balance, and open-mindedness count in influencing the establishment of what is commonly called the "eclectic school."³⁰ His influence in England and on the Continent was widespread and only slightly less so in the United States, where Frank William Taussig and Thomas Nixon Carver may be roughly classified as disciples.³¹

Marshall attempted to show that it is possible to put a proper emphasis upon the interdependence of economic phenomena while still examining into the operations of the different parts of the economic mechanism, and while taking account of factors which make for change as well as of factors which make for stability. Undisturbed by the apparent conflict between the classical idea of emphasis upon demand, he proceeded to demonstrate that from a short-time point of view variations in demand must certainly dominate value, but that in the long run value must be sufficient to pay the costs of the "representative firm." With the same moderation in point of view, he utilized what seemed best in each of the schools, classical, critical, historical, and psychological. His whole effort seems to have been to raise his own work above the scene of current controversy, to resolve differences, to give a new certainty and scientific authority to economic theory, and to achieve a more realistic organon of economic thought. His method was a "qualitative" analysis of the kind of forces at work in economic life, an analysis which he hoped would furnish a basis for later "quantitative" analysis by statistical methods of the relative strength and importance of the various forces at work.

³⁰ *Principles of Economics* (1890).

³¹ Taussig, *Principles of Economics* (1911); Carver, *The Distribution of Wealth* (1904) and *Essays in Social Justice* (1915).

THE INSTITUTIONAL SCHOOL

One additional so-called school needs to be mentioned, the commonly-termed "institutional school." While there are many who insist that an institutional economics, "differentiated from other economics by discoverable criteria, is largely an intellectual fiction," in recent years it has been somewhat customary to refer to a number of economists who evidence an intellectual kinship to Thorstein Bunde Veblen (1857-1929) as constituting the so-called "institutional school."³² In no attempt to be exactly definitive or to imply the possibility of complete differentiation, Wesley Clair Mitchell, Walton Hamilton, David Friday, and John R. Commons may be mentioned as economists who call themselves, or are called by others, institutional economists.³³ Basically, it seems safe to say that the "institutionalists" seek to develop a new type of economic theory by quantitative, inductive investigations of the evolution and operation of economic institutions. Insofar as a core of agreement seems to exist among the institutionalists, they emphasize: (1) group behavior and the relevancy of psychological theory, (2) the phenomena of change, the idea that economic generalizations should specify the limits of culture and time to which they apply, (3) an advocacy of extensive descriptive work, whether quantitative or otherwise, (4) an attention to uniformities of custom, habit, and law as modes of organizing economic life, (5) an insistence upon relevance to control problems as the primary test of economic theory, and (6) a distant hope that the collection of economic facts will lead eventually to some integrated restatement of economic theory. While the so-called "institutionalists" exhibit a certain indifference to method except as related to specific researches, in general their desire actually to know the facts inevitably directs them toward a wide use of the statistical technique. In other aspects, their method appears to be an enrichment and expansion of the older historical approach. Certainly it rests upon an effort

³² Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise* (1904).

³³ Mitchell, *Business Cycles*, Berkeley, California (1913) and *Business Cycles*, New York (1927); Hamilton, *The Control of Wages* (1923) and *The Case of Bituminous Coal* (1925); Friday, *Profits, Wages, and Prices* (1920); Commons, *The Distribution of Wealth* (1905) and *Legal Foundations of Capitalism* (1924).

to secure a complete understanding of sociological, psychological, and historical backgrounds in order to provide a more penetrating and acute analysis of contemporary economic phenomena.

THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES

Such has been and is the course of economic theory and method insofar as this all-too-brief and incomplete treatment can present it. To the reader all may seem confusion, "sound and fury, signifying nothing." Indeed, it is certain that many non-professional economic overlookers in these days despairingly and honestly sympathize with the opinion of Mr. A. Edward Newton to the effect that "an 'eminent' economist is always wrong. No two," he says, "have ever agreed as to money, either gold or silver or paper, wages, credit, tariffs, or anything else; yet they remain 'eminent.'" While this statement is putting the matter too strong, it is symptomatic of the feeling of many a layman.

As a matter of fact, there can be no expectation of general agreement among economists as to the purpose, scope, and method of economics. From the beginnings of economic theory down to the present, about the only sure rallying point of inquiry is inevitably a general picture of a scheme of communal economic life, sufficiently ordered to make some analysis of it possible, and sufficiently imperfect to give point and purpose to such an analysis in spite of particular points of view and specific analytical methods.

The difficulties of the economist are legion. In the first place, the opportunity for genuine experimentation is sharply limited. As Frederick Alden Bradford puts it: "Progress in economics is handicapped in a manner which does not affect medicine and the physical sciences. It is concerned to a large extent with the actions of human beings. The inanimate working material of the physical sciences lends itself admirably to experiment while in medicine, bacteria and animals may be used in the laboratory for experimental purposes. Experiments in the economic field, on the other hand, are apt to prove dangerous. Should they go awry, as many would be bound to do, the results would not be pleasing to contemplate. Thus, while experiments have been

made and are still advocated from time to time by economists, most of us prefer to make haste slowly lest the treatment prove more harmful than the disease."³⁴

In his very approach to economic inquiry, the economist is beset with trouble. Because the essential unity of all science is today appreciated as never before, the economist finds himself entangled in a contemporary psychology which itself is still fluid, in sociology, in a maze of possible but questionable biological analogies, and so on. Moreover, he must choose as a method the systematic formulation of laws or principles by means of abstract deduction, or the accumulation and interpretation of facts by way of historical, quantitative, or descriptive observation and research, or some hodge-podge combination technique. Finally, there is the profusion and complexity of the economic groups, pecuniary transactions, productive activities, business organizations, marketing methods, customs, legal restrictions, and human incentives with which the economist must need deal, and all of which admit of orderly classification and treatment only with the utmost difficulty. No wonder, then, that generalized scientific explanations that are widely accepted are so few. No wonder, either, that the intellectual bent of the individual economist is so important to his contributions and efforts. Truly, we need to remember that there is no one field of economics exclusively separated from other fields, but rather that there are myriads of fields, even one for the individual economic observer.

Whether the economics of the future will consist of a body of doctrines, or a body of facts scientifically compiled, or simply a method or technique, or all three, time alone will tell with certainty. Nevertheless, the present guess, hazardous as it must be, is that the future will hold a place for each and all. Moreover, there is the hope that the newer economics will grapple with a more realistic point of view, will help to guide the uncertain steps of the nation, and will more definitely deal with the everyday practical affairs of the business world. Certainly a beginning has been made.

³⁴ "The Economist Under Fire," *The American Scholar*, Vol. I, No. 3 (May, 1932), p. 294.

THE "NEW ERA"

Economically speaking, a thousand years have elapsed since 1900, a century's span since 1906. The shoe began to pinch in 1907-1913. Buying power did not keep pace with increased producing power. The credit structure of the country had to be enlarged. A sound expansion of credit was made possible by the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. A more questionable expansion of buying power came to the rescue of mass production with the development of installment buying. In 1914 the war brought to American production that greatest of economic gifts — "a sellers' market." But it was also a speculators' market, and in it there was no attempt to relate production to consumption, nor to the purchasing power of the ultimate consumer. People bought everything they could, contracted with manufacturers for products which they hoped to sell and not to use. The bubble burst in October, 1919, and the "arctic night" of 1919-1921 set in. The liquidation of inventories began and the machinery of production came almost to a stop.

Faced with the new practice of hand-to-mouth buying and with decreased purchasing power, business struggled to set the factory wheels in motion. In 1921 began the period of high-pressure sales methods, and of generous and effective advertising. The new principle of "obsolescence" replaced the old principle of "wear" and the technique of shortening the style-life of products was emphasized and extended. The continued growth of installment buying converted future earning power into current purchasing power. Europe's industry was seriously crippled by the war and her needs beckoned to American productive capacity, especially as American bankers were only too ready to lend her money with which to pay for her needs. Once more business and industry ran smoothly on to peaks of profit.

Prosperity appeared to come to all and to sweep onward by irresistible force. Pseudo-economists prophesied a "New Era" and the fever of spending and speculation continued at an ever more rapid pace.

Abroad, the progress of industry continued to cause concern to many alert Continental and English economists and business

men. The idea of *rationalization* reared its head. Various used at first as a term, by 1928 it reached a kind of definitive expression from the pen of Oliver Sheldon, an English management expert.³⁵ Vague in its implications, it nevertheless seemed to hold out hope to many, to suggest, at least, a general method of procedure. At home, we gave scarcely a thought to the economic confusion going on outside our borders, continued to raise our tariffs, and we blindly followed the prophets of the "New Era." And then came the flood of 1929-1932, the debacle of the so-called "New Era." As these words are written, we are deep down in the trough of depression. All about us realistic, trenchant, and even bitter criticisms of our economic theories and our economic system abound. Bewildered, we avidly devour new economic plans — their number is legion³⁶ — only to reflect and discover their fundamental weaknesses. Their range is wide as well, all the way from the Russian scheme to the gentlest of tinkering with the present competitive and profit-taking system.

As nearly as balance and moderation can express it, we appear now to be in a stage midway between two systems: (1) a self-regulating, automatic, individualistic, competitive, unregulated, unplanned, and unplanning system, and (2) a system "under which future needs are estimated, production is directed and controlled, and distribution is organized." In this intermediate stage, as Sir Arthur Salter puts it, we have "lost many of the advantages of both" and have "failed to obtain the full benefits of either." Indeed, "without securing the advantages of deliberate planning, we have enough official control and private privilege and monopoly to impede the automatic adjustments, and to restrict the benefits of competition to the consumer."

³⁵ "Rationalization is the process of associating together individual undertakings as groups of firms in a close form of amalgamation, and, ultimately, of unifying, in some practicable degree of combination, whole industries, both nationally and internationally; with the allied objects (beyond what is possible to an industry divided into many competitive units) of increasing efficiency, lowering costs, improving conditions of labor, promoting industrial coöperation and reducing the wastes of competition." — "The Significance of Rationalization," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. VI, No. 3 (April, 1928), p. 268.

³⁶ An excellent summary of various schemes of planning may be found in Hugo Haan's pamphlet *American Planning*, published by the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia (March, 1932).

The way out is to escape the worst of both systems and to secure unto ourselves the best in each. Let Salter point the direction: "We cannot return to the unregulated competition of the last century; an unwillingness to accept some of its social consequences and the development of modern industrial technique together make that impossible. But we need not therefore aim at a regulated world from which both individual competition and freedom of enterprise are excluded. To take either course is to fail in the specific task of this age. That task is to find not a middle way but a new way, to fashion a system in which competition and individual enterprise on the one hand, and regulation and general planning on the other, will be so adjusted that the abuses of each will be avoided and the benefits of each retained. We need to construct such a framework of law, custom, institutions, and planned guidance and direction, that the thrust of individual effort and ambition can operate only to the general advantage. We may find a simile for our task in the arch of a great bridge, so designed that the stresses and strains of the separate blocks which constitute it, each pushing and thrusting against the other, support the whole structure by the interaction of their reciprocal pressure."³⁷

³⁷ *Recovery* (1932).

THE INDUSTRIAL FORM OF
CIVILIZATION

INDUSTRY OLD AND NEW

THE TERM "INDUSTRY" MUST BE MADE LARGE ENOUGH TO COVER the whole range of man's reactions to nature, from the work of a single savage making a stone tool to the labor of a group of modern workers manufacturing a huge machine. Every age in human history has been an industrial one, for it has been by industry that man has made himself man indeed. Without industry man would not have manufactured tools and weapons, kindled fires, made huts and tents, domesticated wild animals or tilled the soil. Industry was at work in the older civilizations of Egypt and Babylon, Greece and Rome. Nevertheless, we make no mistake when we apply the term "industry" to the type of activity characterizing western civilization in the second half of the modern period, or in the last two centuries. There we find the work of man so changed that we must refer to his new mode of activity as something that came about through the Industrial Revolution. This revolution is something we can identify at once by pointing to the steam engine, for it was this machine which changed the life of man as well as the face of nature. If, however, we desire to make our identification of the Industrial Revolution more adequate we can do so by referring to the three factors operative within it — Soil and Steam and Electricity.

The momentous change which created a cleft between the late modern era and all the previous history of the world was caused by two tremendous movements: one political and military, the other economic and social — the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. The French Revolution installed such a new order of things in the political world that since 1789 the term "government" has assumed an entirely different meaning from what it had enjoyed in the history of the world. The body politic was born again in the travail of the State. But, however signifi-

cant the power of that great revolt of the people and however far-reaching its influence, the French Revolution bears little comparison to the new form of activity that was taking place in the same age, since the Industrial Revolution of the XVIIIth century was destined to produce immediate and remote results in the lives of all classes of men in the western world. The tool was mightier than the weapon, the factory more important than the arsenal, and the worker more influential than the warrior.

The term "Industrial Revolution" is capable of more than one interpretation. Its most obvious sense is that of the transfer from hand labor to the work of an engine, or from man to machine. The social change that ran parallel with the industrial one was the removal of the seat of labor from the home to the factory; from an individualized, domestic type of work to a socialized and mechanized one. These two simple factors make up the intrinsic meaning of the term. But to these obvious determinants of the new mode of producing wealth we must add certain social, economic, and political variations — tremendous increase in population, world trade in imports and exports, vast accumulation of capital, rise of the middle class, and extended horizons of trades and vocations, thoughts and interests. Likewise was there projected into the new order of things a series of problems for the scientist, economist, and political thinker.

CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION

When we attempt to locate the causes of the Industrial Revolution, we begin by dismissing the idea that the great change just happened to come about in the course of human events. Further, we avoid the error of stating that the change came about at a certain time, as though it were down on the program of history. Before the Revolution as such took place, there was no little fermentation in the pent-up minds of men. The old order, even that of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, was changing. The science of the XVIIth century had won its battle for freedom and had acquired new heavens and a new earth. The politics of the XVIIIth century was laying a new foundation on the basis of liberty. Church and State were being forced to make room for

free men with free minds. The new scientific spirit, or the adventure of the modern mind, was inspiring men to explore the land as well as the sea and to experiment with old materials for the sake of finding new truths. Such was the intellectual atmosphere of the new movement in connection with machinery.

On the more material side was the extension of trade and commerce. England especially, being in control of the seas, was forced to exert herself to meet the demands of various countries seeking her manufactured goods. Most of these goods were still being produced by means of the old manual method in vogue from the beginning. France, likewise, in the years preceding the Industrial Revolution, was finding that industry and commerce were moving hand in hand; but she was somewhat more interested in the commercial than the industrial, due to superior opportunities in the domain of trade. Demand was in advance of supply, hence there arose the desire to improve, to enhance the conditions of manufacture, so that the production of wealth might keep pace with the desired distribution of it. Meanwhile capital had accrued and was awaiting opportunity for profitable investment. Hence the times were ripe for a complete clearance of old methods in manufacture and the inauguration of principles as novel in industry as the principles of the French Revolution had been new in government.

This does not mean, however, that the men of those times were as conscious of their condition as this appears to us in the light of history. They felt their needs better than they recognized them and experienced desires for their satisfaction more fully than they realized the methods that would make this possible. The state of affairs was thus psychological rather than rational, popular instead of professional. For most of the discoveries and inventions were made by average men in the lower walks of life, men who were interested in a few significant things bearing directly upon their own lives rather than what in our easy-going manner we style "scientific invention." How to plant and reap, how to spin and weave, and how to lengthen the arm of man — these were the practical issues that, in time, were to result in advanced agricultural methods and improved machines. Thus the great Industrial Revolution was not a miracle whose like the

world had never seen, but a slow, perhaps tedious movement, which now assumes the vast proportions of which those little builders were quite unaware. A distinguished English statesman has said, "If in the last hundred years the whole material setting of civilized life has altered, we owe it neither to politicians nor to political institutions. We owe it to the combined efforts of those who advanced science and those who applied it."¹

THE SOIL

The commonplace character of this greater movement is evinced by the fact that it started in the soil, for the necessity for new methods in agriculture and stock raising appeared and was coped with before the wheels of the Revolution began to turn. It was not only because agriculture was the foundation of all the industries that the beginning was made in the field; the demands for agricultural products during the Napoleonic wars had inflated prices, which offered a monetary incentive to improve farming by scientific method. If a tenant of a mediaeval manor had traveled through England during the first half of the XVIIIth century, he would have experienced but little surprise, since there had been few departures from the farming methods of feudal days. The land was still laid in grain for two years, and left fallow the third year for the recuperation of the soil. The live stock would have caused no comment, for it was the same in size and diversity as it had been in the preceding centuries. But this feudal farmer would have found living conditions greatly improved and a spirit of contentment springing up, quite unknown in his more meager and miserable days. Now, had this imaginary visit been postponed until the close of the century, the reason for this new spirit would have made itself manifest. Then he would have been surprised at the changes which were taking place, for in the very earth the Industrial Revolution was taking root, although there were many agricultural districts which were not penetrated until as late as 1817.

The agricultural pioneer was Jethro Tull, who devised the drill, investigated the growth of plants, and experimented with foreign

¹ Warner and Martin, *The Groundwork of British History*, p. 584.

grasses. This Tull planted his crops in drills or rows wide enough apart for a man to hoe and plow between them with a horse. In order to prove his contention as to the value of pulverizing the soil, Tull raised eighteen crops of wheat on the same land without using any fertilizer. Another of these Industrial Revolutionists, as we might call them, was Lord Townshend, George I's minister and the first lord of trade and the plantations. Townshend's method consisted in planting the soil with turnips every third year instead of letting the land lie fallow. This served the additional purpose of providing the winter food for the cattle and sheep and, incidentally, gained for the lordly farmer the title of "Turnip Townshend." On his Norfolk estates, the same Townshend installed a four-year rotation of crops which proved so successful a scheme that before the close of the century it was generally adopted throughout England. Another Norfolk farmer, Coke of Holkham, Earl of Leicester, introduced the use of oil cake and bone fertilizer and experimented with the food values of various grasses.

SCIENTIFIC FARMING

There was more of the scientific element in this new type of agriculture than the foregoing account may have suggested and almost as much of the Industrial Revolution behind the plow as in the machine that was to come. Tull published the results of his experiments with foreign grasses and the growth of plants. Agricultural societies arose and their proceedings, which involved reports of experiments in land cultivation, crop rotation, and the selective principles of husbandry, were published regularly. The various aspects of agriculture kept issuing from the press with unusual regularity. In addition to the interest in the soil, there was an incentive toward improving the breed of cattle upon a thousand hills. The most famous of the scientific breeders of cattle was Bakewell (1725-1794), who developed the famous breed of Leicestershire sheep. It is said that people flocked from various parts of the world to see his famous stock, especially his bull "Two Penny" and his ram "Two Pounder." In his very kitchen, he entertained none other than Russian princes, French and Ger-

man dukes, British peers, and, besides, all sorts of sight-seers. Bakewell's extraordinary achievements in this line were rivaled by those of other successful experimenters in England and Scotland, but all of these applied the principles of scientific breeding that Bakewell himself had discovered.

What had been achieved in a relatively short space of time may be observed when we note that in 1700 cattle weighed about 370 pounds, sheep about 28 pounds. But by the year 1800, if we desire to mark the flight of a century upon such a practical basis, the avoirdupois of cattle had advanced to 800 pounds while the flight of time was marked by the fact that the new sheep tipped the beam at 80 and 100 pounds. Was there a parallel improvement in the breed of men? All of these improvements in stock breeding had been made, moreover, on enclosed farms of moderate size, or the landed estates of the gentry. The promiscuous breeding of undersized or diseased stock could not be abolished while the live stock had the freedom of the common lands. Consequently the various Enclosure Acts and other like measures proved beneficial from the standpoint of both cattle breeding and agriculture. Because of the importance of these land enclosures, we must observe, although briefly, what such measures really signified.

THE ENCLOSED FARM

Until the latter half of the XVIIIth century, a large proportion of the land in England consisted of great common lands composed of waste, pasture, and arable soil. The cultivated land was still operated under the mediaeval system of three-field agriculture; that is, the available land of a village was divided into three broad strips which were subdivided into further strips about three rods in width. On this basis, farmers would work two pieces of land in each field; one of the three strips would be left fallow each year only to become the garden of all sorts of ruinous weeds. The more progressive farmer could do no better than follow the traditional example of his near-by neighbor. Consequently the land knew nothing better than wheat with an occasional variation of oats and barley; a few minor crops of other produce might be introduced, but the staples predominated.

How did such feudal farming satisfy the growing needs of the population?

To a certain extent the archaic system of agriculture was satisfactory; it offered the materials of food and fuel, clothing and housing. Then, in conjunction with the profits of home manufacture, carried on during the off-farming season, the population enjoyed a certain degree of economic independence. The village was more or less sufficient unto itself. But when trade and commerce began to feel the impact of the Industrial Revolution, when cities grew up and the population increased, the effect was felt in the soil. The ancient system of land tenure and the primitive method of agriculture were bound to feel the change. The effect of this was indicated in connection with wealth. Formerly wealth had been measured in terms of land, but now it began to assume the form of commodities, for gold was beginning to run in the channels of manufacture and commerce. Hence it was that progressive farmers and great landed proprietors insisted that agriculture should not lag behind but rather join in the general march toward prosperity. A more systematized and scientific farming would produce larger crops, and hence reap more profits. The old-fashioned feudal system of open land was wasteful, inefficient, and unsatisfactory.

The demand for better farms, as we might style it, crystallized in a modern form. The feudal system of land tenure had to be changed and the open field abolished for the sake of installing the general enclosure of the common lands. The argument that the waste lands made it possible for many small cottagers and laborers to keep their geese and goats, donkeys and cows at little or no expense was offset by the contention that the lands were overcrowded and as often as not good lands were allowed to remain idle. In the light of new conditions, the old system looked intolerable and quite out of date. It had bred dissension, litigation, and inefficiency of the worst sort. Little thought had been given to adapting the land to its proper uses or of utilizing it for dairy produce and garden truck; and this was especially the case when the land in question adjoined the rapidly growing towns. The changing state of affairs led thus to a change from the old system of common, open land to the new policy of enclosures.

ENCLOSURE ACTS

The progressive agriculturists of the day, in supporting their claims, pointed to the enclosed farms as the only ones that demonstrated the productive efficiency of the new methods in agriculture. In like manner, they contended that it was only the farmers with capital and large farms who were able to make farming a financial success. The cumulative effect of these contentions was such as to create a general demand for enclosures. Early enclosures had been made under the statutes of Merton (1235) and Westminster (1285). These enclosures added to the lands of the lord of the manor, although sufficient pasturage was left for the commoner's use. In the XVth century, other enclosures were made by various acts. By the XVIIIth century, however, the pressing necessities of the time were such as to demand a much more general application of the method and the abolition of the wasteful feudal system. A tentative method of enclosure had been adopted when a certain group of farmers agreed among themselves to enclose their lands, but this impromptu method proved impractical because the necessary negotiations were long drawn out by haggling over details. Something more systematic had to be done.

A new stage in the new system of land tenure was reached when appeal was made to Parliament. A long series of private acts during Queen Anne's reign and many more under the Georges had served to advance the new system of enclosures. In many cases these private acts were highly expensive to those interested in having them passed, and no wonder those interested were galled by the slow and heavy methods of parliamentary procedure. But when the tedious movement had at last gained headway, and those in authority had been led to observe its urgent necessity, Parliament responded with the General Enclosure Act of 1801. Yet it was not until 1845, when Parliament appointed a body of commissioners to execute the task, that the system of enclosures was carried out with any degree of speed and satisfaction. Then the farm became a "plant" in the modern sense of that term.

Such an industrial movement as that of enclosure was bound to work great hardship among the poorer farmers, rural laborers, and village cottagers. Some of the moving spirits of the En-

closure Acts, the lords of manors and institutions which received titles, were none too solicitous of the rights of those who were cast aside when the enclosures were made. Greed, fraud, and corruption, aye, all means worthy or disreputable, were employed to complete the designs of those who, with the apparent motive of superior methods in agriculture, sought to secure title to land. And the effects of these injustices are to be noted in the landed system of England today. All manner of evils have been attributed to the Enclosure Acts, particularly that of rural depopulation. It is difficult, however, to substantiate such a contention, since it was doubtless the attraction of high wages in the new urban industries and the appeal that the city made to the more enterprising villagers that had to do with the drift from rural fields to urban centers. The farming business as such began to assume the capitalistic form as both farm and market changed. During the Napoleonic wars, there was profit in agriculture, but when this modern warrior had been forced to desist in his particular kind of reaping and the soldiers who opposed him returned to the soil, deflation set in, causing the weaker planter to sell his little holdings that once had loomed so large to the great landowner. The result was a class division which was soon to show itself more ostensibly in the domain of manufacture—the sharp and severe division of rich and poor, of those who have and those who have not.

MAN AND MACHINE

But the revolution in agricultural method was not a circumstance in comparison with the change in the mode of manufacture. The old farm in its new form was in no sense so spectacular or influential as the new engine. So striking is the effect of steam when compared with the slow work of the soil that we can hardly help identifying the Industrial Revolution with the introduction of the steam engine. Nevertheless, the change in the method of manufacture began to be made while manual labor was still the *modus operandi*. The new movement was inaugurated by the application of invention to spinning and weaving. The loom anticipated the steam engine. Now, spinning and weaving are arts which trace back to pre-historic times and are about as

universal as the spread of the human race itself. Due to the nature of the fabrics made, there are but few examples of this primitive handicraft, yet they do not fail to show that the art of loom, spindle, and needle was thoroughly understood. Various knitted and netted fabrics as well as woven linen cloth have been recovered from clay beds where the Swiss lake-dwellers made their home in Neolithic times. Then, some fragments of wooden wheels, spindle whorls, and loom weights made of stone and earthenware have been recovered from the same beds. Other examples of the weaver's art have been found in Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, Greece, China, and Japan as well as other parts of the world. And here is the remarkable fact — that the essential principles of spinning and weaving do not appear to have undergone fundamental change from pre-historic days to recent times.

Weaving as a handicraft reached its highest point of perfection in Europe during the early part of the XVIIIth century, especially in France, England, and Italy. The social and economic status of the textile craftsman was higher during this period, particularly in England, than at any other time in the history of the craft. More often than not, he was a prosperous and highly respected tradesman whether he worked his trade in some obscure village or in one of the suburbs of the great towns. Due to economic causes, this prosperous craftsman of the XVIIIth century fell into a condition of extreme distress when the XIXth century had arrived. The plight into which this typical craftsman was plunged is illustrative of one unhappy change which the Industrial Revolution was to effect. The source of the situation is to be found in invention.

LOOMS NEW AND OLD

The chief concern of the inventor had been to enhance the perfection of the loom as a pattern-weaving tool. But in the latter part of the XVIIIth century a new motive invaded the mind of the inventor who sought to shorten the time of the operation and cheapen the cost of production rather than contribute to the fineness of the product. Hence, instead of having the weaver follow the design throughout the various stages of its development, the one-time weaver performed merely one part of the complete

operation. The artisan thus became a "hand." With the change from wooden to iron looms and the application of steam power, there arose the extreme division of labor and the mechanizing and socializing of a former handicraft. The revolution of the weaving industry did not take place in a trice, but required some one hundred and fifty years for its consummation. The earliest indication of coming changes in broad weaving was observed in 1687, when Joseph Mason patented a machine duly described by him as "an engine by the help of which a weaver may perform the whole work of weaving . . . without the help of a draught boy, which engine hath been tried and found to be of great use to the said weaving trade."

The honor of devising a means to overcome, if only in a partial manner, the driving and catching of the shuttle in the weaving of broad webs by power is given to John Kay, who, in 1733, invented a "flying shuttle" which could be thrown mechanically from one side of the loom to the other. Kay intended this invention for the hand loom, but it proved practicable for the power loom also. In 1786 a much superior power loom was produced by Dr. Edmund Cartwright. As far as the number of these new machines is concerned, it is estimated that by the close of the XVIIIth century there were 20 thousand power looms and 250 thousand hand looms in Great Britain. Of course, the arts of spinning and weaving reacted upon each other. When Kay's flying shuttle came into general use, the weavers were often compelled to wait until the spinners had provided them with sufficient yarn for the loom, whereas in the days of the hand loom the supply of yarn was in the excess. It was the swifter, larger power loom which used the yarn in such quantities as to cause spinner and weaver to proceed side by side.

The revolution in the spinning industry was due to an invention of Hargreaves, who in 1764 invented a wheel capable of turning sixteen spindles. This machine he named a "Spinning Jenny," in honor of his wife. In 1769 Arkwright introduced his method of spinning by rollers through water power. Then came Crompton with his "mule," which combined the essential features of the two former methods. As a consequence of these new appliances, one person could supervise hundreds of spindles. These machines

were of tremendous importance for civilization, yet the men who invented them were not Galileos and Newtons, but humble individuals who seemed to act for the great mass of mankind. They rejoiced in little technical education and had little capital but they were infinitely patient and practical. They gave impetus, however, to scientific research, and in time the textile industry branched out into bleaching, dyeing, and printing and gave England its supremacy in textile manufacture.

STEAM

The improvements in the methods of spinning and weaving would have made but a small chapter in the story of the Industrial Revolution if it had not been for the contributions of inventors working in totally dissimilar spheres. Mass production, one of the marked features of the new movement, necessitated the application of unlimited power to the new machinery. Earlier forms of power, such as hand and horse, wind and water power, were of no avail for the industrial demands of the new age. More than one man had been experimenting with steam power and a number of rude engines had been produced. But it was left to Watt to improve upon a former model and thus produce a steam engine for pumping, hauling, and driving. This machine was constructed at first for vertical motion and was used chiefly for drawing water. But it was not long before there dawned the idea of the adaptation of it to rotary and parallel motion, which made possible the use of steam power for machinery used in manufacture.

While spectacular movements were taking place in Europe, a more happy and fruitful development was being engendered and peace was competing with war for the attention of mankind. In 1812, while Napoleon was on the Russian campaign, a much more significant event than his march was taking place, for the *Comet*, the new steamboat, was proceeding down the river Clyde under her own power. Two years after this semi-conspicuous occurrence, Stephenson invented the first locomotive engine. And when the modern Mars reached the climax of his spectacular career at Waterloo, in 1815, Humphry Davy invented the safety


lamp for the use of miners, whose subterranean labors had become necessary in connection with the problem of fuel for steam engines. All the inventive activity with its application to trades old and new demanded increased production of coal and iron and thus there arose great metal and mining industries whose only rivals were in the domain of the textiles. The Industrial Revolution, which had started in the soil, was now boring its way deep down into the solid earth.

Many of these ironworks were built around some single individual whose foresight and enterprise had made them possible, just as in the case of the textile trades. Such an individual was "Mad Iron" Wilkinson of Bushham, whose ironworks were busy boring cannon for both English and French artillery, constructing iron bridges, and making iron piping for the new Paris waterworks scheme. The development of this industry is a striking illustration of the rapid strides the inventors were making in the iron industry, but not in that alone. Arnold Toynbee states that in 1737 "fifty mine furnaces in eighteen different counties produced 17,350 tons annually. It has been computed," he adds, "that we imported 20,000 tons. In 1881, we exported 3,820,315 tons of iron and steel valued at 27,590,908 pounds and imported to the value of 3,705,332 pounds."²


COAL AND IRON

As to fuel, charcoal had long been used in the smelting of iron and steel, but by the close of the XVIIth century, in England, timber for charcoal was becoming scarce. By 1740 coke was introduced, with the effect of reviving a languishing iron industry. After 1619, coal and coke for smelting iron had been experimented with, particularly by an English ironmaster named Dudley. But it was not until Darby, another ironmaster, won success in 1730 that the iron industry as we know it today was fairly started on its road. In 1756, Darby declared that his furnace, "at the very top pinnacle of prosperity," was producing twenty-two tons a week. But by 1760 his Coalbrookdale furnace had managed to produce forty tons of pig iron in a week.

² *The Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century*, p. 26.



GREEK SMITHY, PAINTED ON A
GRECIAN VASE



Ewing Galloway, N. Y.

MODERN AMERICAN STEEL MILLS

(facing page 437)

As to the metal itself, we must not fail to observe that Henry Cort devised new methods of rolling and puddling iron, which gave such an impetus to the industry that, by the close of the XVIIIth century, various districts of England saw the rise of great furnaces belching their volume of smoke and making the night glow with the lurid glare of their huge fires. When Henry Cort and Peter Onions in 1783 devised a process of puddling whereby carbon could be burned out of the pig iron, a malleable iron was produced and became adaptable to a variety of uses. But perfection in this industry had not yet been realized, so that iron was not available for the purposes to which the XIXth century was to put it. As Thorndike says, "The iron industry became the steel industry after the English inventor Bessemer, in trying to improve the metal employed in artillery, purified iron by forcing a blast of air through it while in a molten state and at an extreme heat."⁸ It was thus that the iron was cleansed of additional carbon and slag. While Bessemer announced his invention in 1856, it was not until some time later that his extraordinary process was generally accepted. In 1864, the Martin Brothers of Sireuil, France, developed the open-hearth process of making steel, but up to this time no process could eliminate from the iron or steel the ever-present phosphorus in iron ores. It was in 1878 that S. G. Thomas introduced a method which solved this troublesome problem.

STEEL

Steel! All these discoveries and the adoption of new methods have made possible the use of steel for rails, rolling stock of railroads, steamships, skyscraper edifices, bridges, subways, automobiles—an alarming list, a bewildering array of things that have come out of the steel age. There has been no Midas whose touch turned everything to gold, but the touch of the common man, represented by his scientific advocate, has turned almost everything to steel. How can one compress upon a page, compass in a chapter, or even express in a volume the well-known story of steel? It forms the skeleton of modern civilization and the sinews

⁸ *A Short History of Civilization*, p. 487.

of war; its ring is heard everywhere in the harsh music of the XXth century.

At the same time, we must not fail to make mention of the more tender development of industry in connection with the primitive art of pottery. Wedgwood was preëminent among all the potters of western Europe who were experimenting with clay and the colors and designs it could be made to assume. He succeeded in producing a ware which was white throughout in contrast to the red or buff clays which had formerly been used. This discovery made English ware the most popular in Europe. Although Wedgwood started with the small sum of twenty pounds, a legacy left to him, he did not hesitate to put back into his small concern every penny he could save and thus he extended his enterprise until he left it one of the largest of its kind in the world, with no diminished prestige even to this day of rapid advancement in industries.

But the Industrial Revolution looms up in our minds as something more spectacular than anything that agriculture and manufacture can suggest. It means transportation. How was the new age, the machine age, to arrange for exchange of goods and public travel? Canals, either invented by the Chinese or early adopted by them, seemed to hold out promises which to us seem ridiculous when we think of the improvised canals our airplanes make in the very air. But such artificial rivers were of value in the earlier stages of industry. They were introduced into England in 1759 and some of these, like that of the Duke of Bridgewater, enabled the householder to procure his coal at half its former price. By the close of the XVIIIth century, London and Bristol, Liverpool and Hull had each its canal system.

THE RAILROAD

During the early part of the XVIIIth century, roads in Great Britain, as in most other European countries, were in a deplorable condition. When a wet summer was added to a wet winter, the roads became impassable for wheeled traffic. At the close of the century, however, great improvements were introduced, the most notable being that of McAdam, who in 1811 reported to Parlia-

ment concerning his new method of road making. While the stage coach had been on the road as early as 1640, it was not until 1784 that mail coaches, later made romantic by Thomas De Quincey, were introduced by Palmer, the Pullman of those early days. In 1814 Stephenson invented his locomotive engine for transporting freight, especially coal—a “freighter” that made its trip from the coal mines to the cities at the rate of three miles per hour! The history of the English railway was almost as protracted as the journey of Ulysses.

In 1818, Parliament refused to sanction a plan for the extension of railroad lines, partly because the noise of the iron horse would scare the foxes in their coverts. Three years later, however, the Stockton and Darlington line was authorized for freight carriage. Yet the railroads did not take firm hold upon the public imagination until the Liverpool and Manchester Railroad was opened, shortly after Stephenson's *Rocket* had won the prize in competition with three other competing locomotives of different types. The proud winner in this test finished in a burst of speed of approximately thirty miles per hour. In 1830, the Duke of Wellington was present at the opening of the line and a new era began. But it was not until 1844 that a general railroad-construction movement was inaugurated, although by 1850 almost all the well-known railroad systems of England had been established.

The year 1845 has been called the year of the “railroad mania.” The new mode of transportation had conquered space and captured the popular imagination. For some time previous to this, people had enjoyed a considerable measure of commercial prosperity and the accumulated capital was seeking new outlets into the depths of investment. These new speculators had not far to look since the phenomenal success of the railroad seemed to conjure up visions of profits wider and brighter than anything the world had known before. Here was an Eldorado of steel inviting the eye and tempting the purse. Hence new railroad companies sprang up, their stocks were issued and soon began to soar. As Edward P. Cheney says, “All classes were caught in a wild speculation which reached to every other form of finance and industry. A frenzy seized the stock markets and thousands of men removed their savings from other places, but bound them-

selves to payments far beyond any funds in their actual control. Men grew rich over night by the rise of the price of shares they had not yet paid for in companies whose rights of way were not yet surveyed."⁴

A recent experience of a similar character in our own country gives us to understand how the British populace of nearly a century ago was drawn into the whirlpool of speculation. In the latter months of 1845, the flood subsided and left its victims stranded. Thousands of families were hopelessly ruined and such things as prosecutions, flights from justice, imprisonments, and suicides were quite the order of the day. Out of this chaos, as a voice crying from the depths, arose the demand for parliamentary control and regulation of railroads. But the natural disinclination of Englishmen for excess of government did not fail to assert itself, so that little by way of control was done. From that day to this, British railroad systems have felt little governmental influence in either development or management, for the government has done little more than emphasize the obvious: that the railroads should serve public interest and have an eye to its welfare.

THE STEAMBOAT

While steamship development was under way before railroad activity became so marked, the paddle wheel did not keep pace with the driving wheel. In 1787, John Fitch ran his steamboat on the Delaware but could not make the venture pay. But what Fitch failed to achieve on the Delaware, Fulton with his *Clermont* accomplished in 1807 on the Hudson. As we have observed, Bell's *Comet* had steamed down the river Clyde in 1812. The Atlantic Ocean was crossed in 1838 by the *Great Western*, which made the trip in fifteen days at an average speed of some eight knots. Within two years of this time, the Royal Mail Steam Packet, the Peninsula and Oriental, and the Cunard Company were off to a successful start. The improvements made in the facilities for transportation from the beginning of the XIXth century to the present time make it possible for us to reach practically any part of the globe with more ease and speed than were

⁴ *Industrial and Social History of England*, rev. ed., p. 213.

available to a European in his endeavor to reach the parts of his own little continent. At the time of the American Revolution, it required six weeks to reach our shores from England, while the same trip is now made in less than as many days. In 1804, the Duke of Wellington had to spend six months to return to England from India, while at the present time the same journey requires only thirteen days. One has only to recall the experience of his grandparents in making their tedious journey westward to realize what has been accomplished since the days of the covered wagon, for now the same journey can be made within a week by automobile. But it is unnecessary to multiply illustrations of this sort. We feel the speed of the age and accept the benefits of industrial civilization with the egoistic complacency of a youth who has fallen heir to the family fortune.

As far as we have gone into the history of modern industry, we have confined our attention to England, for it was there that the Industrial Revolution first indicated its character. It was in England, too, that the new movement assumed significant proportion before it began to repeat itself in other lands. But such a practical movement was bound to spread, for industry is not like art and does not require the special talent and taste which make one nation more aesthetic than another. England did attempt to enclose the industries it had brought forth, but the restrictions it employed were of little avail. The British government enacted legislation meant to keep the inventions, discoveries, and industries within its own borders, just as though such gigantic things were only trade secrets; but enterprising English workmen, who passed over to the Continent as also to America, refreshed their memories of the machines they had worked with at home and reproduced them in other places. This was hardly the cause of the new industrialism in extra-English countries, but it was one of the contributory factors.

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION ON THE CONTINENT

In France, the influence of the French Revolution and the reforms instituted under the Napoleonic regime tended to abolish the restrictions that the mediaeval guild system had imposed upon

industry. But more direct and significant was the new spirit abroad in the land, which encouraged initiative along various lines of industrial development. During the reigns of Louis Philippe and Napoleon III, fame if not fortune came to French industries, especially in the manufacture of women's wear, as silks, velvets, and other sorts of dress goods, to say nothing of perfumes and other accessories of milady's boudoir. Yet in comparison with the sturdy growth of English industry that of France was puny and slow. The reasons for this are not far to seek.

At the time of the Industrial Revolution, France was predominantly an agricultural country, where the majority of the population lived on the land in villages and small towns and where there were no general, large landholdings comparable to those in England. From the standpoint of foodstuffs, France was practically independent of imports and, being able to feed themselves, the French were not greatly concerned about commercial expansion. Then the slight increase in population whereby there were not so many new mouths to feed delivered France from the necessity of solving the food problem, which in other lands was more acute. In short, the French people were quite independent and reasonably contented. The soil was rich and fruitful, the climate congenial, so that the inhabitants of *la belle France* had no marked yearning after the life of the congested and smoke-swept cities of England.

In addition to such passive resistance to the Industrial Revolution, the mind of France was taken up with its political problems. The old order had been destroyed and a new form of government installed. And then—Napoleon! France had to expend its energies in conflict and had little strength left for commerce. There was also a scarcity of raw materials and labor supply, a limited market and an unwise tariff. France was more concerned with decking out its soldiers in color than in conducting a more useful form of clothing industry. The engines of war were more in evidence than the machinery of peace and, although France did have machinery before 1815, it is difficult to determine the number of these new contrivances or the extent of their use. Water power was plentiful, accessible, and easily adapted to the purposes of manufacture; hence there could be

no pressing demand for steam. France was addicted to the hand loom and, in certain types of textile manufacture, uses it even at the present time. However, the French did not fail to avail themselves of England's cotton-spinning machinery, introduced in 1786 and used quite elaborately at Creusot and Indre. Yet, even in 1914, almost half of the French looms for weaving linen were operated by hand.

French genius did not ignore French industry. By means of Berthollet's discovery (1786), chlorine was applied to bleaching, so that what formerly by a natural process had required some eight months to whiten was done in two days. Joseph Jacquard, to mention another industrial pioneer, revolutionized (1801) the draw loom so that it would weave intricate and delicate patterns. But the full force of the Industrial Revolution in France was not felt until after her railroad system was completed (1855-1860). Previous to that period, French factories were small and used a correspondingly small amount of steam power. Indeed, we are informed that as late as 1896 "the average number of workers in the 575,000 industrial establishments of France was 5.5 and only 151 factories employed more than 1,000 hands while 400,000 had one or two work people."⁵

Since the World War France has improved her position in respect to certain lines of exports, especially steel. Some of her industries have been thoroughly Americanized, a notable example being in the automobile works of André Citroën, the largest automobile manufacturer in Europe. Even more remarkable from the standpoint of rapidity was the transition from simple mediaeval existence to the industrial form of life experienced in Belgium. Just as in England, the farmers were the first to feel the ferment of new scientific ideas in agriculture. But with the rapid development of its resources and because of its strategic position on the map of Europe, its fine system of canals, its Antwerp harbor, and its coal mines, Belgium was quick to awaken to the modern day. It was not long before its factories were humming with the new music and the land itself became a veritable workshop.

⁵ Dietz, *The Industrial Revolution* (1927), p. 64.

Such countries as Italy, Austria, and Russia have been late-comers in the industrial field. Italy has suffered from the lack of coal and iron, things so necessary for industrial enterprise. On the political side, Italy found it difficult to exemplify the Roman ideal of unity, although this was achieved finally under Garibaldi, Mazzini, and Cavour. As for Austria as she was before the World War, the heterogeneous character of the peoples living under the Hapsburg rule made it impossible for this country to respond to the industrial power that was dominating almost all other countries in Europe. Russia was in a worse condition industrially, if not otherwise moving along sluggishly between the banks of East and West. She was mediaeval in her life, peasant-like in population, and absolutist in government. The story of Russian transformation must be left to the future, which may observe unity where we see only conflict and contradiction in the present period of storm and stress.

THE GERMAN AWAKENING

Many causes operated to delay the industrial development of Germany. Even in the early part of the XIXth century, industrial development west of the Rhine was behind that of even such an agricultural country as France. The mediaeval guild system remained intact after it had relinquished its hold upon other European countries. But new economic forces were at work and new industries, organized upon a more modern basis, were being introduced. These, together with the extension of the domestic system of manufacture, made the mediaeval form of association incompatible with the modern ideas of liberty and free competition.

During the European wars of 1793-1815, England was profiting by the benefits of her Industrial Revolution in that she was able to compete with German manufacturers in their own markets. This gave impetus to a movement for a protective tariff in Germany, perhaps the first immediate, political effect of the Industrial Revolution there. Each of the German states imposed tariff duties on manufactured articles with the aim of protecting domestic manufacture. But, as Hayes says, "There

were so many German states, however, that this multiplicity of customs duties seriously interfered with commerce.”⁶

Prussia was the first state to attempt a remedy. She established a uniform tariff over the whole of Prussia itself, imposing a 20 per cent duty on colonial products and a 10 per cent duty on manufactured goods. She proceeded then to invite other sovereign states in Germany to adopt the same regulations uniting the customs administrations with her own. These states hesitated, but on January 1, 1834 the Customs Union, or *Zollverein*, went into effect. It was not long before this *Zollverein* was found to rest on good economic foundations, since it enabled Germans to trade with one another in freedom from the former restrictions while it protected their manufacturing interests from inroads by French and English manufacturers.

Industry in Germany, or the Germanies, before the establishment of the *Zollverein* was in the hands of men who employed domestic cottage workers or was controlled by masters who labored side by side with the workers they employed. Almost everything was done in a small way. “Iron, for example, was smelted in hundreds of very tiny furnaces owned by artisans who found by-employment on the land.”⁷ Few in number were the large industries and these in the main were confined to the textile or allied trades, but there were large sugar refineries in Hamburg and Bremen. It was not until after 1845 that the industrial development of Germany felt any marked acceleration. Then the textile industries, coal and iron productions, and other industries increased their stride. Although Germany started late, she learned how to match the pace of her competitors, so that German industrial history is not wanting in romantic features. In 1914, Germany was about to dominate the industrial future of Europe.

AMERICAN INDUSTRIALISM

The Industrial Revolution in America was at first a repercussion of the movement in the Old World. Workmen from

⁶ *History of Modern Europe*, Vol. II, p. 96.

⁷ Dietz, *The Industrial Revolution*, p. 65.

England who had made their homes in the United States reproduced the kind of machines with which they were familiar and often improved upon the original patterns. But native Americans were not behind their English cousins in inventive genius. The fertility and versatility of the American intellect is shown by the number and variety of patents issued. The United States Patent Office was created in 1790 through the efforts of the American inventor John Stevens of Hoboken. In 1833, the head of this office resigned for the reason that, in his mind, every important invention had been made. By the year 1860, 36,000 patents had been granted and between that date and 1890 the number was extended to 640,000. The number of these patents is now close to a million, since the end of the first quarter of the present century extended the record up to 969,428. "Nothing more strikingly reveals the extent and implications of the economic revolution than the fact that the average number of inventions patented in any one year exceeds the total number patented in the entire history of the country before 1860."⁸

Yet it was not until the close of the Civil War that the intense business activity so characteristic of American life became obtrusive. Except for the South, prostrated by secession and reconstruction, the years between 1865 and 1873 were crowded with enterprises. East, North, and West were vibrating with new activities. Railroad extension was so wide that tracks ran from the Atlantic to the Pacific and 30,000 shorter lines were laid here and there over the land. Agriculture responded to the invitations of the soil and grew like Jonah's gourd. Capital increased proportionately and the public purse bulged with profits from domestic and foreign markets.

The parts of the "Machine," which now looks so formidable, were being put together. Inventions of importance to railroads were the Westinghouse air brake (1869), Jamey's automatic coupler (1871), and various other devices enhancing transportation. The Pullman car appeared in 1864 and sought to add refinement and comfort to the speed of travel. Meanwhile Stephen Field and Thomas A. Edison were making significant

⁸ Morison and Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic*, p. 689.

experiments in electric transportation. In connection with the principle of rapid communication between remote points, Samuel F. B. Morse, professor of art at New York University, perfected the recording telegraph (1837), while in 1866 Cyrus W. Field and Sir Charles Bright succeeded in laying the Atlantic cable. In 1876, Alexander Graham Bell made the toy telephone an economic and social necessity. Now these historical items do little more than call our attention to the vast and intricate system of mechanical arrangement enveloping us and invading our precious lives.

The industrial drive that started in the soil, turned itself into a machine, and then assumed the form of electricity, is no longer an Industrial Revolution. There can be no doubt that the movement was a revolution, but it is a question whether that term can be qualified by the adjective "industrial." In like manner, we may question whether we can come to an understanding with the time by speaking of it as the "Machine Age." As Beard says, "Indeed, effort to reduce the confusion of the modern age to principles of control, whether in matters of business, labor, health, family life, economy, the arts, government or international relations, is no mere excursion in mechanics, no mere question of arranging material objects."⁹ The Industrial Revolution which has transformed human life and reshaped the earth has done more than create business; it has brought us face to face with the business of living. Hence, we cannot solve the problem of life by inventing a machine or save our souls by passing a law.

In order to see where we stand, let us glance eastward. A swift glance at China and India serves to disclose the difference between the land where the sun rises and that where it sets. The older, eastern civilization is based on human labor as its source of power in pathetic contrast to a civilization conducted by the gigantic robots that the western man has made. But before the civilization of the West could effect the change from man to machine, it had to pass through some exacting experiences. While the transfer was going on, it tended to perpetuate old evils and add new ones to their store. The movement from field

⁹ *Whither Mankind*, pp. 405-406.

to factory, from kitchen to workshop and then to the huge plant wherein the worker became but a hand was not without the wrongs that Mammon can ever cause, and many have been the bitter fruits that have grown up and ripened from the root of all evil.

THE NEW HOUSE OF BONDAGE

The immediate effect of the Industrial Revolution was to improve the outer condition of the laboring classes as they moved out of the house of feudal bondage. There were high wages, to say nothing of improvement in economic conditions generally, and more improved ways of living. Hosts of farm laborers, glad to escape from the servile conditions of farm and estate, began to flock toward the industrial centers. And not these alone, for their number was augmented by a stream from another land, and the sons of Erin began to come over from the Green Isle seeking their share of the wealth in the English Eldorado. The result was unregulated or almost chaotic competition among the "hands," whose wages began to fall, and in the economic struggle in the factory; the children of the factory worker were forced into the labor market, for the pay of the householder was not sufficient unto the needs of the household.

Factory towns in England were the battlefields where the new war was waged and the homes of the toilers became the "barracks of industry." Not only did the workers have to meet the competition offered by rival workers and endure the consequent reduction of wages; they were forced to face periods of unemployment thrust upon industry and beyond the power of either employer or employée to control. New ideas and changing fashions outmoded old ones and left the new industrialists stranded. "Both the manufacturer and his hands were at the mercy of a change of fashions in Vienna, the failure of a banking house in Edinburgh, a revolt in India, too rapid expansion in the production of everything from pottery clay to tea and, above all, war in Europe."¹⁰ Until 1847 there was no limit set to the working day and the hours of labor in New England factories, for example, varied from 60 to 80 per week. Some classes

¹⁰ Dietz, *The Industrial Revolution*, pp. 37-38.

of workers, as the tailoresses, toiled as many as twelve hours a day seven days a week, with an average weekly wage of \$3.81, providing no time was lost. These facts and others like them were brought out by an investigating committee of the Senate.¹¹

Little or no thought was given to the question of sanitation or of safeguarding the worker from possible injuries from the machinery. In Europe, children who were scarcely more than infants marched in their wooden clogs over the cobblestones to their places in the factory, there to toil from sunrise to sunset. In the mines such children worked in water, in total darkness and foul air, “opening or shutting trap doors all day long or dragging, tied by girdle and chain and on hands and knees, loads of coal too heavy for them.”¹² By the early part of the XIXth century, the growth of the population effected by the Industrial Revolution was startling, and it has been estimated that between 1820 and 1870, the numbers increased 20 per cent in France, 55 per cent in Germany, and 83 per cent in England. This growth was chiefly in cities, so that for the first time in western Europe there was a type of civilization distinctly urban. The new industrialism developed fortunes of huge proportions. The lords on their estates enjoyed this increase, not only through investments, but by leasing lands for the new cities; in addition to this, they did not fail to exact royalties upon the coal and iron worked from their lands, as well as from the railroads that passed through their estates.

“PROGRESS AND POVERTY”

Alongside this great wealth was a form of poverty unlike anything hitherto seen and it seemed necessary for every Dives to have his Lazarus. In 1847, John Stuart Mill uttered memorable words when he said, “Hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day’s toil of any human being. They have enabled a great population to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment.” Carlyle

¹¹ *Report of the Committee of the Senate upon the Relations between Labor and Capital* (1885), pp. 284-287.

¹² Warner and Martin, *The Groundwork of British History* (1926), p. 596.

asserted that the question of all questions to which an answer must be found was the "condition of England," meaning by this the social and economic degradation of the workers. In like manner, politically minded workers, who met in taverns and obscure places, expressed the belief that their problems could be solved only by having Parliament pass suitable laws, while labor unionists began to advocate the principle of collective bargaining.

In France, men like Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Proudhon were profoundly stirred by the social situation engendered by the new industrial force. But it was in England and Germany that the boldest spirits were to be found. Other men besides Carlyle were seeking the answer to the great question. John Stuart Mill, to mention only one English economist, was getting down to the foundations of the new Political Economy. Robert Owen may have had less economic insight, yet he rejoiced in practical wisdom and simple faith in the possibilities of mankind; like Saint-Simon and Fourier, he sought to improve the actual conditions of the worker. In Owen's mind, misery was the result of the competition between men and machinery; the cure of it was to be found, he thought, in the coöperative use of the means of production and the subordination of them to the well-being of the masses. His various experiments in education, his theories regarding the influence of environment upon character, and his earnest effort to make the State a protective agency for the weak were instrumental in inaugurating social reforms and factory legislation as well as a new view of the State's responsibility toward its members.

LABOR LEGISLATION

Public attention having been called to the evils of the factory system, Parliament was forced to act and a series of Factory Acts, forty of them, were placed on the statute books. The first of such laws, passed in 1802 and 1833, dealt exclusively with conditions in the cotton factories. The act of 1833 forbade the employment of children under the age of nine, while those between the ages of nine and thirteen were to be given two hours a day in school. Later acts prohibited the employment of women and children in

the coal mines. The persistent humanitarianism of Lord Shaftesbury bore fruit in an act passed in 1847 in spite of the strenuous opposition of a large group in Parliament who apparently could not see why the period of labor in factories should be limited, in the case of women, boys, and girls, to ten hours per day. These laws were the precursors of a steadily increasing number of regulative and remedial acts passed in all industrial countries. Thus the modern State has been forced by the Industrial Revolution to participate in the social and economic welfare of the people.

While the influence of Owen and almost all other social reformers in England was practically limited to their own land, the influence of Karl Marx was to be felt in every land where the social problems of the Industrial Revolution emerged. Marx was a Hebrew and a Hegelian. His intellect, as Ramsay MacDonald has said, "was of the massive order which conceives big systems, which follows them through their ramifications and which at the same time is capable of taking instant action on the passing incidents of the day."¹³ The socialism of Marx presents the thesis that if the workers of the world are to be emancipated they must realize the fact that they are engaged in a titanic struggle against the master class that is exploiting their labors. The conception of life thus involved is industrial, the determining factor in history economic, and the conclusion a practical one. Marx brought socialism down to earth from the utopian clouds in which it had long languished. His merit lies in the fact that he called attention to the abuses of industrialism and the shortcomings of capitalism. At the same time, he is not just the sort of individual one would acclaim as dictator or vote for as President. And those who sympathize with the aspirations of such socialists are bound to realize that there is no short and easy way out of the industrial complications that have developed since the soil was thoroughly cultivated and modern machinery began to move.

Those who study civilization realize the importance of industry, but are not willing to let its machines throw dust into their eyes. Industry is not the whole of life and those who see everything in the machine are somewhat myopic in their vision. Life is more than meat and the body more than raiment. Industry was meant

¹³ *The Socialist Movement*, p. 206.

to emancipate man, not to enslave him; to save labor and create leisure. At the present rate of progress, the near future should see mankind doing the work of the world in a fraction of the time formerly devoted to it. The tendency to abridge the time of industry is appearing in the shorter labor-day and shorter labor-week. Then will arise the problem of leisure or the question, what to do with oneself. This will afford the opportunity for general culture or the improvement of one's own life. None the less will the new leisure provide room for civilization and it is in man himself rather than in any machine that he can make that civilization is to be found.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RELIGIOUS TREND OF MODERN LIFE



CONTEMPORARY RELIGION

THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF modern life have not prevented or prohibited the continuation or development of the religious trend in human life. However, the modern mind does not accept religion instinctively nor treat it dogmatically, but is inclined to question its philosophical basis, scientific validity, and social value. The religious ideals of the western world in the XXth century are still those of Asia Minor two or three thousand years ago, but these have undergone definite criticism as to their validity and value. The modern Christian is now more than ever conscious of nourishing his spiritual life and instructing his intellect with values and ideas that another race, to say nothing of another age and clime, once gave him. He seeks to atone for this by contributing his own critical ideas, the fruits of his logic and ethics. In dealing with the modern trend in religion, it will be most convenient to consider it historically in its theological and philosophical, its scientific and social forms. This treatment will involve a consideration of English Deism and German philosophy of religion, the Anglo-American conflict of science and religion, as also the American application of psychology and sociology to religion. Contemporary conclusions to the great religious question will be found in the Social Gospel and Humanism.

ENGLISH DEISM

The beginnings of modern philosophy of religion were made early in the XVIIth century by the English Deists. Usually the term "Deism" is taken to signify the idea of God outside of and transcending the universe in distinction from the notion of an immanent Deity. But in the historical sense, the term has a specific meaning. It signifies a system of religious thought which

asserts the rights of man in opposition to the authority of the Church, and reason rather than tradition as the guide to religious belief. In the case of the English Deists, a Deist was one who asserted the rights of free thought and who supported the contention that religion is based upon reason rather than revelation. The term "Deist" appeared as early as 1693 in a work by Thomas Blount entitled *The Oracles of Reason*, and may have been used even earlier, since the idea of Deism dates back to the beginning of that century. Deism itself was but a definite and forceful expression of Natural Religion, a rationalistic notion prevailing throughout the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries during the period called The Enlightenment, *die Aufklärung*, *L'Éclaircissement*.

In dealing with Deism, we must not fail to observe that it was more of a popular and even political movement than a philosophical school. It was based upon the general conception of the Law of Nature as this was developed in the form of Natural Religion and Natural Rights. The first of these movements was headed by Herbert of Cherbury in England, the second by Hugo Grotius in Holland. From one we received the idea of *religio naturalis*, from the other that of *jus naturale*. Between these two movements which aimed at universal religion and international law there is an association which is both logical and chronological. In 1624 Herbert produced his religious work *On Truth—De Veritate*; in 1625 appeared Grotius' juristic work *The Rights of War and Peace—De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. These exponents of the Law of Nature in both religion and rights were personally acquainted and seemed to share their ideas. The intimacy of their acquaintanceship is shown in Herbert's autobiography, wherein he says—"My book, *De Veritate*, having been begun by me in England and formed there in all its principal parts, was about this time finished. . . . I communicated it to Hugo Grotius, that great scholar who, having escaped his prison in the Low Countries, came into France and was much welcomed by me and Monsieur Tielenus also, one of the greatest scholars of his time, who after they had perused it and had given it more commendation than is fit for me to repeat, exhorted me earnestly to print and publish it."¹

¹ *Autobiography of Lord Herbert of Cherbury*, p. 247.

NATURAL RELIGION AND NATURAL RIGHTS

In addition to the personal association of these two pioneers, there was a certain logical likeness between their works. Herbert asserted the existence of a natural religion prior to the determination of definite creeds and established forms in religion. Grotius affirmed the existence of a natural right independent of definite codes and actual legislation. They seemed to have in mind a law written in the hearts of men. Both agreed in deducing their first principles *a priori* from the very nature of man; both proceeded from this *a posteriori* to the actual existence of this law in both creed and code. Their appeal was to an *instinctus naturalis* and a *consensus universalis*. The fusion of Natural Religion and Natural Rights is to be found in Charles Blount's *Religio Laici* (1682) wherein the author considered Herbert's principles of universal religion the best basis for religious toleration.

But the effectual fusion of Natural Religion and Natural Rights was brought about by two major thinkers of The Enlightenment, Locke (1632-1704) and Spinoza (1632-1677). These two men belong to the class of great thinkers and are not to be confused with the Deists, whose thought lacked depth and whose philosophy of religion was little more than a protest against dogmatism and the civil establishment of religion. In the case of Spinoza there was little likeness between the pantheistic philosophy he developed into a system and the deistic propaganda his writings seemed to serve. With Locke, the distance from Deism was even greater, since Locke elaborated a system of empirical philosophy quite antithetical to deistic rationalism. How, then, are the names of these two thinkers to be associated with the deistic movement? In a political, not a philosophical manner, for it was their practical conceptions of the State and not their theoretical views of nature that Deists used in advancing their cause.

Although Spinoza's speculative philosophy was dogmatic, his theory of politics was liberal. He proceeded from Hobbes' idea that right is might, but softened this severe doctrine by making it apply to what we might call the might of the brain. His argument was that, since one has the right to do whatever is in his power, he has the right to think freely, since his private thoughts

are things over which no outside power, like that of the magistrate, has any control.² The contention in favor of inward freedom is to be made in favor of spiritual worship over which the magistrate has no control, although he may enjoin the duties of justice and charity.³ These practical conclusions of Spinoza were based upon his distinction between the realms of reason and theology or, as we should say, between science and religion. "Reason is the realm of truth and knowledge, theology that of piety and obedience—*ratio regnum veritatis et sapientiae; theologia autem pietatis et obedientiae.*"⁴ To us such a distinction seems obvious and the mention of it trite. Not so, however, in the XVIIth century, when State and Church were one and where the control of the citizen was both political and ecclesiastical; hence the importance of Spinoza's *Theologico-political Tractate* of 1670.

FREE THOUGHT AND TOLERATION

Spinoza's relation to Deism was only indirect. His Latin language was hardly accessible to the average Deist and his thought too profound for any of them. His theory of free thought was calculated to enhance their idea of liberty, had they known his philosophy; but for the most part they did not. It is significant to observe in this connection that the Deist Anthony Collins, in his list of free thinkers from Socrates to Locke, fails to mention the magic name of this Spinoza! Yet Deism was not wholly unaware of Spinoza's name. A certain Kortholt considered him with Herbert and Hobbes as one of the "three impostors." The Deist Toland (1670-1722), whose ideas were somewhat pantheistic, was called by Warburton the "mimic of Spinoza,"⁵ and the name of Matthew Tindal, the arch-Deist, was associated with that of the great philosopher. This was in a bit of doggerel that went the rounds in the palmy days of Deism:

"Spinoza smiles and cries the work is done;
Tindal shall finish (Satan's darling son) —
Tindal shall finish what Spinoza first begun."

² *Theologico-political Tractate* (1670), Cap. XVII. ³ *Ib.*, Cap. XVIII.

⁴ *Ib.*, Cap. XV. ⁵ *Divine Legation of Moses*, 5th ed., Vol. IV, p. 273.

Locke's theory of toleration was more accessible to the Deists, although they were more inclined to a vigorous assertion of free thought than a rational plea for toleration. Locke's philosophy, as we have intimated, was far from being deistic. Indeed, when he assumed that the mind is by nature a blank tablet dependent upon sensation for its knowledge, he was asserting something the very opposite of Deism, which assumed the existence of a Law of Nature written in the heart of man. What Locke did was to insist upon the inner character of religious faith and its consequent independence of control by State and Church. How could a magistrate dictate one's private belief? "Although his opinion in religion be sound," said Locke, "and the way he appoints truly evangelical, if I be not thoroughly persuaded in my own mind, then there will be no safety for me in following it."⁶ It was on such a basis that Locke assumed the right to work out his own conception of religious faith.

The Deists themselves had no such philosophy as we have seen in Spinoza and Locke or even in Herbert and Grotius, but they did not introduce their religious ideas without preparing the way for them by political tracts calculated to advance the cause of free thought. For the sake of emphasizing the political character of this theological movement, we make mention of their contributions to the legalistic literature of the day. Tindal produced, in 1694, *An Essay Concerning the Laws of Nations and the Rights of Sovereigns*. This was followed in 1694 by *An Essay Concerning Obedience to the Supreme Powers*. In a more philosophical manner he wrote, in 1697, *An Essay on the Rights of Mankind* and added to this *A Discourse on the Liberty of the Press* (1698). We continue the list of juristic works produced by the Deists by mentioning John Toland's *Life of Milton* (1699) and his *Amyntor* (1699) in defense of it. Toland produced also *Paradoxes of State* (1707), *The Art of Governing by Parties* (1707), and *Anglia Libera* (1707). Even Thomas Chubb (1679-1747), the humble tallow-candle dipper but influential Deist, wrote *Some Short Reflections on the Ground and Extent of Authority and Liberty* (1728). But the classic work of this phase of Deism was that of Anthony Collins, *A Discourse of Free*

⁶ *Letters for Toleration* (1689), *Works*, 11th ed., Vol. VI, pp. 17-26.

Thinking (1713), a rather specious work in which the author contends that "the surest and best means of arriving at truth lies in free thinking."⁷ Without such liberty, argues this author, it will be difficult for one to decide between a true religion and a false one.

Why mention a series of works long since forgotten? It was by these that Deism was established and the development of Deism, although it was a wretched affair, was the beginning of modern religious thought. The effect of such a combination of the theological and political on the basis of what the Deists called reason was felt in this country in the case of Thomas Paine, if not in that of Thomas Jefferson also, in the popular "infidelity" of Robert G. Ingersoll as also in the gay theology of the late Elbert Hubbard. Indeed it might be possible to find survivors of the deistic movement among some of the free thinkers of the present day.

RATIONAL CHRISTIANITY

After Deism had contended for free thought, it proceeded to the rationalization of Christianity. This was undertaken first by an obscure writer named Arthur Bury in a work entitled *The Naked Gospel* (1690). Again appeared Locke in the rôle of a semi-Deist when he published his essay on *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695), a work which sought to reëstablish primitive Christianity pretty much as our Modernists are trying to do today. Locke's conception of Christianity was much like that of John the Baptist in that he saw in Christianity only a doctrine of repentance and faith; a belief in Jesus as the Messiah and a "good life" were the essentials of true religion. John Toland gave a deistic touch to such views when he produced his *Christianity not Mysterious* (1696). Anthony Collins continued the deistic interpretation of the Gospels in his *The Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion* (1724), a work in which he questioned the authenticity of the fulfillment of the prophecies recorded in the New Testament. To this, William Woolston added an attack on the miracles mentioned in the Gospels, while Thomas Chubb, relying upon the favorite notion of the Law of

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

Nature, produced a work entitled *The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted* (1728).

Out of such rationalized Christianity grew a system of Natural Religion based on the famous Law of Nature deduced by Herbert and Grotius. This was the work of Matthew Tindal in his impressive volume *Christianity as Old as the Creation; or the Gospel a Republication of the Law of Nature* (1730). This work was known as "the Bible of the Deists" and elicited more than a hundred replies, chief among which was Bishop Butler's famous *Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion* (1736). Butler was supposed to have answered Tindal and all the other Deists but, as a matter of fact, he was really assenting to their main idea, only his tone was more reverent and his emphasis upon revelation much greater than theirs.

THE DOWNFALL OF DEISM

The reply to Deism came from unexpected sources. A certain Henry Dodwell wrote, in 1742, a work called *Christianity not Founded on Argument* and began to cast doubt on a rationalized Christianity, saying, "A boasted rational faith is without the least foundation in either nature or revelation."⁸ In like manner Lord Bolingbroke, a kind of parlor-Deist, was just as skeptical about Deism's fundamental dogma. "It cannot be proved," said he, "without the help of the Old Testament, nor very well with it, that the unity of God was the primitive belief of mankind, but I think it evident that the first and great principle of natural theology could not fail to be discovered as soon as men began to contemplate themselves and all objects that surrounded them."⁹ But it was due to Hume that Deism was brought to an end as a philosophy of religion. Hume's skepticism would not permit one to dogmatize concerning the existence of God, which the Deists had taken for granted. Then, his historical sense led him to see the absurdity of the deistic notion that a perfect Natural Religion was the possession of primitive men, who, according to Hume, had "a low and grovelling sense of Deity." In France, which had borrowed Deism from England, Rousseau tended to

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁹ *Works* (1754), Vol. IV, p. 203.

offset the progress of the movement by making religion a matter of emotion. In Germany, where Reimarus had introduced the deistic idea, Lessing served to restore the importance of historical religion by regarding it, as it appears in the Bible, as "the education of the human race."

The direct results of Deism, which were felt until the close of the XVIIIth century, are now lost to view. After Hume and Kant had criticized reason and revealed its limitations, modern thought was no longer in a mood to dogmatize about the power of the human understanding to solve transcendental problems. With the Deists, reason was largely a word, a motto, or a sort of chronometer one could carry about with him and consult as the occasion might arise. However, the history of Natural Religion, or Deism, was of value in liberating the human mind for religious inquiry. In addition to this, it had the advantage of pointing out the fact that religion as such is the universal possession of the human spirit. The freedom of the subject and subject matter of religion made possible a philosophy of religion, a constructive rather than a purely contentious view. This was taken up in Germany in the latter part of the XVIIIth and early part of the XIXth centuries. It was the work of Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

These three German thinkers agreed tacitly that religion was some form of absolute life. They differed in their ways of regarding this. Kant stressed the moral value of religion, which he defined as "the recognition of all our duties as divine commands." Hegel proceeded to religion from his usual point of view, which was that of intellectualism. He defined religion as "the finite's spirit's recognition of itself as absolute Spirit." Schleiermacher, the theologian of German Romanticism, ignored both the ethical and the logical conception of religion and sought to place it upon an aesthetical basis. He defined religion as "a feeling of absolute dependence, and held that it lies at the basis of all thought and action." For convenience, we may suggest that Kant found religion in the will, Hegel in the intellect, and Schleiermacher in the feelings.

KANT

The depth of Kant's thought was such as to submerge his verbal description of religion and to discourage all who, like Matthew Arnold, try to regard religion as "morality touched with emotion." Kant's starting point was that of radical evil in the world. This he does not attribute to sense alone, which would make man simply bestial; or to reason only, for that would make the evil in man a diabolical thing. Human badness comes about when man, who is a creature of both sense and reason and who should elevate reason to the higher position, tends to lower reason for the sake of sensuous advantage. It is the office of religion to reverse this natural tendency by means of total repentance rather than by tentative reform on the part of the religious subject. This is the redemption of the individual, although it would seem from Kant's discussion of it that the highest religious act was the self-salvation of Buddhism rather than the Christian idea of vicarious redemption.

In the achievement of personal salvation, the subject of religion avails himself of the Son of God, although Kant assumes this to be the Ideal Man within the individual rather than the historic Christ. Kant deals just as freely with the New Testament idea of the Kingdom of God which, as we saw in the chapter on Christianity, he made the central teaching of Christianity. The idea is that those who have undergone this self-salvation through the ideal Son of God become members of an ethical or spiritual world-order whose end and aim is righteousness. In a general way, Kant tends to associate his idea of the Kingdom with that of the Church, but it is more the ideal Church Triumphant than the real and historical Church Militant. The theological effect of Kant's philosophy of religion, appreciable after Hegelian theology had declined, was seen in the ethical theology of Albrecht Ritschl.

HEGEL

Hegel's philosophy of religion seems more impressive but less penetrating than Kant's. It had a metaphysical basis in the

Hegelian idea of the Absolute, which became the God of religion, just as it had historical scope in the development of oriental religion, in which Hegel found the awakening of the finite spirit to its real nature as that of Absolute Spirit. The manner in which this religious program is carried out involves Hegel in a kind of higher psychology of history. With all of the oriental faiths in his hand as so many skeins of spiritual life, Hegel proceeded to weave them into the pattern of his absolute idealism, indifferent to the thought that the colors might not match nor the pattern be suitable. No religious faith except the culminating one, still less any individual adherent to any cult, could derive any more satisfaction than the vague feeling that he was perhaps a single thread or knot in the terrestrial tapestry.

The achievement of this colossal scheme of spiritual life is through the vast systems of oriental faith. Hegel takes these ancient beliefs, revivifies them through his system of Spirit, and then arranges them after the manner of his threefold plan: the Religion of Nature, the Religion of Spiritual Individuality, Absolute Religion. The organized forms of Natural Religion are exemplified in Confucianism, the religion of measure; Brahmanism, the religion of fantasy; and Buddhism, the religion of absorption. There must be a transition to the Religion of Spiritual Individuality and this is found in the threefold form of the Persian religion of dualism, the Syrian religion of pain, and the Egyptian religion of mystery. According to the magnificent plan conjured up by this Absolute idealist, it was necessary for the Absolute in its self-realization to break with nature in the form of dualism, suffer the pain of this diremption, and then brood over the mystery of the evil involved in it. Then the way for independent individuality on the part of the Absolute was prepared. Now, Hegel speaks as though this had actually taken place in history.

The Religions of Spiritual Individuality are three in number: the Hebrew religion of majesty, the Grecian religion of beauty, and the Roman religion of utility. In these ancient cults the Absolute is individualized, and thus realizes that it is not one with itself; hence it must return unto itself in the form of Absolute Religion or Christianity. When one considers such a

speculative system as Hegel's he is led to wonder whether the author of it means that the Absolute actually passes through these stages or whether it merely seems so to the mind of the speculative thinker. This doubt led to the division of Hegel's system into two schools, the right and the left. According to the Right School, the evolution of the Absolute was only an idealistic way of representing the relation of God to history. According to the Left School, the Hegelian idea is to be understood realistically, so that the historical course of things is to be understood as the actual development of spiritual life, in which the highest form of that life is to be esteemed God. This bold conception fitted in but none too well with the Christian idea of the incarnation of God in Christ.

The effect of Hegel's philosophy of religion, as indeed of his whole system of speculation, was to detach the intellect from both metaphysical objects and the facts of history and deliver it over to a flexible but indefinite realm of "Spirit." Apparently truth could be found apart from objective realities. David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874) took advantage of this in writing his famous *Life of Jesus* (1835). In this work, Strauss asserted that the Gospels were a collection of myths that had grown up in primitive Christian communities and further gave the impression that, in his mind, the person of Jesus himself was a mythical rather than a historical character. In a similar manner, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) made a spiritualistic or psychological application of Hegel's idea that the Absolute comes to consciousness in man so that man, or humanity, is the real object of religious thought and worship, or *homo homini deus*. Since God is the objectification of man's thought of the Absolute, there is no worship but that of humanity.¹⁰ Hence, as Max Stirner suggested in criticizing Feuerbach, no longer do we say, "God is love," but "Love is divine." Something not wholly unlike this is being attempted today in connection with social religion. In his own day, Feuerbach's ideas were readily taken up and spread by the political revolutionary leaders in Germany and by the radical socialist factions working toward the abolishing of capitalism.

¹⁰ *The Essence of Christianity* (1841).

SCHLEIERMACHER

Schleiermacher's *Discourses on Religion* (1788) appeared before Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, but it is most convenient to consider it last, since the logical position of Schleiermacher is between Kant and Hegel. In assuming the attitude that religion is a matter of feeling, Schleiermacher finds it necessary to show that religion is not a way of doing, as Kant had indicated, or a way of thinking, as Hegel was to point out. Schleiermacher begins by attacking the metaphysical ideal of religion, but can do little more than say that "quantity of knowledge is not quantity of piety." It was as though he were imitating St. Paul's statement: "Though I have all knowledge and understand all mysteries and have not charity it profiteth me nothing." In a parallel manner, he attacks the notion that religion is a matter of moral conduct by stating that morality comes upon the soul in a state of activity, religion in a state of passivity. From this, although it appeared in a later work, came the definition of religion as a feeling of absolute dependence.

But Schleiermacher really did more than distinguish religion from metaphysics and morality; he gave it a positive content. Thus he speaks of religion as "intuition and feeling," which makes it different from thought and action. In a manner somewhat more definite, he referred to religion as "sense and taste for the infinite."¹¹ His general conception of religion was that of pietism and romanticism. It was of value in identifying the inner spring of religious consciousness, but not so effective in indicating how this consciousness expresses itself in thought and deed. In like manner, it was of value in enhancing the content of religion but not calculated to produce any system of religious thought or a theology.

CONFLICT OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN AMERICA

After the death of Hegel in 1831, his philosophy declined and fell into disrepute because of the radical activities of the Left School of the system. The place of idealism was taken by mā-

¹¹ *Discourses on Religion*, tr. Oman, Discourse II.

terialism, and religious thought, which had been rationalistic and philosophical, changed into the conflict between science and religion. This was conducted on the scientific side by Comte, Spencer, Huxley, and Haeckel; its history was written by John William Draper (1811-1882) in his *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science* (1874), Andrew D. White (1832-1918) in his *Warfare of Science and Religion* (1896), and Émile Boutroux (1845-1921) in his *Science and Religion* (1909). The conflict was an unsatisfactory one since the scientific opponent of religion, especially in the case of Comte and Spencer, was not the master of any exact science, while the average defender of the faith, like Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Bryan, was a decided layman in both fields of the controversy. Moreover, in the XIXth century, both science and religion suffered from a dogmatism which is now quite foreign to them. At the beginning of the controversy nearly a century ago, it was a matter of religion *or* science, whereas now it is the problem of religion *and* science. Between these two contrasted phases of the movement there grew up, beginning with Spencer, the science of religion.

Is there a conflict between religion and science as such or is it merely a matter of conflicting opinions between those whom William James called "tender minded" and "tough minded" people? Apparently there is a real conflict akin to what Kant called an "antinomy," or an inevitable difference between an idealistic and a materialistic view of the world. How does this arise? It might seem to arise all along the line where the forces of religious belief and scientific measurement are drawn up against each other, but in reality it does not. For there is no conflict between religion and mathematics, no reason for choosing between God and gravity. The conflict in question concerns man and those sciences that bear upon him and his place in the universe. It has focused upon the sciences of astronomy and biology; it has assumed a humanistic if not an egotistic character. In the controversy, we observe man attempting to preserve his dignity after the planet earth had been placed in an inconspicuous position and man's origin on the earth connected with the origin of terrestrial life generally. The enemies of religion have

been Copernicus and Darwin, or more accurately Galileo and Huxley, who made their vast views accessible to the popular mind.

ASTRONOMY

Modern astronomy was calculated to degrade the value of man rather than to destroy the idea of God. Copernicus, the founder of it, was a religious man, held the office of a secular canon in the Church, and dedicated his *De Revolutionibus Orbium* to none other than Pope Paul III. Two generations later, the new astronomy was taken up by two men who were much better scientists than Copernicus; one was Kepler, who by discovering the laws of planetary motion placed the system upon a mathematical basis. This supreme act caused no religious controversy, still less did it result in persecution for its author. The other exponent of the new system was Galileo, who popularized what was really a question for mathematical experts. Worse than that, Galileo treated with scorn and subjected to satire any one who persisted in the more conservative view. It was this literary touch more than any scientific theory that got Galileo into difficulty. For Pope Urban, who as Cardinal Barberini had formerly been a friend and admirer of the brilliant physicist, assumed that Galileo had satirized him in the character of *Simplicio*, in the *Dialogue* between the Copernican, Ptolemaic, and Aristotelian astronomers. The result was as unfortunate for Galileo as his attack had been undignified. His "imprisonment," however, amounted to little more than retirement, first at Siena, then at Florence. Thus what was really a conflict between two conceptions of the universe amounted to little more than a quarrel between two men. At the present time, we have grown accustomed to the new celestial order and, marvelous to relate, the new physics of Relativity makes it possible to resume the old geocentric point of view provided we will assume that it is only the relative viewpoint of the observer.

It was the geology and the biology of the XIXth rather than the astronomy of the XVIth century that brought about the conflict between science and religion. The new view of the earth with its gradual evolutions seemed more fatal to faith than

the new theory of the heavens with the eternal revolutions of the stars. There was more than one reason for this. In the first place, it was more difficult to deny the mathematics of Copernicus and Kepler than the geological and biological theories of Lyell and Darwin. Then, the Copernican astronomy appeared at a time when the range of popular education did not compare with that of three centuries later, so that in comparison with the many who appreciated the significance of evolution there were few who realized the meaning of the new astronomy. Besides these considerations, it may be added that, even with the earth as an insignificant dwelling place, man could still preserve his dignity and dream of his destiny. Moreover, the proponents of the new astronomy, Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, were religious men who looked upon the new system of the heavens in a theistic manner. Hence the original conflict between science and religion was little more than a private quarrel between such scientists as Galileo and Bruno and the Church. Not so, however, in the case of evolution.

BIOLOGY AND EVOLUTION

The significance of this theory was at once appreciated as something disastrous to man's belief in his divine destiny; it was just as destructive of the religious idea of a divine design in the universe. Man himself was involved in the new theory, which attempted to account for his origin far back in the history of nature and in connection with the existence of the lower animals. To this day, especially after the revival of the controversy in connection with the famous Dayton trial and what led up to it, there is repugnance to a scientific theory on the ground that it implies an ape-ancestry for mankind. Of course it can be pointed out that the idea of human evolution with its notion of a lowly ancestry for man is, as it were, a democratic view of humanity; it can be suggested that, with evolution going on in both nature and society, there is the prospect of a better future for the human race; but such vast conceptions of past and future have never been stimulating to the faith of those who live in the present.

Since we are inclined to scoff at "tender minded" people, it may be well to recall that such tender mindedness was peculiar to Darwin himself. Apparently he regretted the consequences of his own theory of natural selection since, as he said, it "placed man in the same predicament with the other animals." Darwin wished to view man in detachment from the animal world generally and said: "If I saw an angel come down to teach us good, and I was convinced from others seeing him that I was not mad, I should believe in design. If man was made of brass or iron and in no way connected with any other organism which had ever lived, I should perhaps be convinced."¹² Darwin did not appreciate the fact that man is not in the same predicament with the other animals. In the life of man, as we noted in Chapter II, there are certain significant factors which tend to make us forget his animalistic origin. Man's superior and adaptable brain, his faculty of spoken language, his industry and art, his social life and religion differentiate him so fully from his nearest of animal kin that we may view him about as he was viewed in ancient, mediaeval, and early modern times.

There is, however, this difference between the man of the past and the man of the present in the way he views himself today: at the present time, after the controversy over evolution and the place of man in nature, we realize that the place man occupies is one that in large measure he has made for himself by taking natural selection into his own hands. Man has come to realize that the human race, far from falling heir to a terrestrial estate, has purchased this at the price of human effort in connection with civilization. Hence the reply to the challenge of evolution, if we may put it that way, is not merely the intellectual elaboration of a theory of evolution whereby man has attempted to draw a circle around the question of his own origin; it is a reply in terms of effort, the effort of the will in the humanizing and civilizing of the world. We cannot prove man's moral dignity by speculating about it; we can, however, promote his moral nature by the exercise of ethical effort.

From the foregoing it will be seen that modern religious thought

¹² *Life and Letters of Darwin*, ed. by Francis Darwin (1887).

in the last three hundred years has passed through the stages of theology, philosophy, and science. These periods we have observed in the history of English Deism, the development of the German philosophy of religion, and the Anglo-American conflict between religion and science. But there have been other and less conceptual forms of religious thought; we observe these in the higher criticism of Biblical literature, the historical life of Christ, the essence of Christianity, the study of comparative religion, the psychology of religion, and religious education. These may be less impressive forms of religious thinking, but they are no less important. We will begin with the development of higher criticism.¹³

HIGHER CRITICISM

The term "higher criticism" is not used to indicate anything superior on the part of the literary critic; it is called "higher" to distinguish it from "lower criticism," which deals with the texts involved and the most probable use, arrangement, and spelling of the words. The higher criticism concerns itself with the date, authorship, composition, and editing of a religious document. Before the beginning of the modern period, there were suggestions that some of the books of the Old Testament were later than was commonly supposed, but the authorship of the Pentateuch was not taken up until the middle of the XVIIIth century. Before that time Luther, in the true spirit of German radicalism, had suggested that it did not make any difference whether Moses was the author of the books that bore his name or not; in 1670, Spinoza had pointed out that the Pentateuch could not have been written by Moses.

But no other authorship was suggested until 1753, when Jean Astruc in his book called *Conjectures*¹⁴ introduced the names of the "Elohists" and "Jahvists," to which we referred in Chapter V in dealing with the subject of Hebrew religion. This Astruc discovered the two different ways of designating the divine name

¹³ Article "Criticism," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

¹⁴ *Conjectures sur les mémoires originaux dont il paroît que Moyse s'est servi composer le livre de la Genèse*.

and concluded that, in the book of *Genesis*, Moses had made use of the writings of men who had referred to the Deity as Elohim, or God; Jahweh, or Lord; and Jahweh-Elohim, or Lord God. This was indeed only a conjecture, but out of it grew up the modern system of Biblical criticism. In 1783 Eichorn, professor at Jena, took the hint given by Astruc, introduced other documentary criteria, and thus carried the idea of plural authorship throughout the entire Pentateuch. Like Astruc, Eichorn clung to the idea that Moses was at least the editor of the famous five books.

Criticism then went to extremes. Alexander Geddes, in Scotland, abandoned the Mosaic idea altogether and, what was far worse, saw in the Pentateuch nothing but a rough collection of literary fragments, thirty-nine of which he claimed to discover in the book of *Genesis* alone. An important step in the direction of sound criticism was taken in 1798, at Jena, when Ilgen discovered two writers who used the term Elohim to describe the Divine Being; an early Elohist whose ideals were of prophetic character and akin to the writings of the Jahvist, and a later Elohist who was so Levitical in tone as to be known henceforth as the Priestly Writer. Another document was identified in Jena when, in 1805, DeWette detached the author of *Deuteronomy* and identified it as a law-book which figured in the reform during the days of King Josiah, 621 B.C. When DeWette observed that the style and spirit of *Joshua* were the same as that of the Pentateuch, he added it to the collection and made the Hexateuch the first literary unit of the Old Testament.

Just one hundred years after the pioneer effort of Astruc, Hupfeld reasserted the presence of two Elohist writers, the prophetic and the priestly, and surmised that their documents along with that of the Jahvist's had been combined by an editor, or redactor known to criticism as R. It was in this way that literature of the Hexateuch came to be recognized as the work of certain anonymous writers known as J, E, P, D. Just as in the case of English Deism, which was a purely dogmatic movement, the work of Biblical criticism met opposition from the conservatives. This appeared in the attack upon Bishop Colenso in England and Dr. Briggs in America. Superior critical work

was done by Cheyne and Driver there, by Harper and Toy here. As a result, the study of the Old Testament is now an intelligible pursuit of the student.

NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM

In dealing with the literature of the New Testament, our procedure must follow the general plan used with the Old. That is, as we placed the Prophets before the Law, we must put the Epistles before the Gospels. In so doing, we make a beginning about the year 50 and catalogue the documents in the order of the Thessalonian epistles, the Galatian one, the Corinthians, and the Roman epistle. In the case of the epistles to the Philippians, Colossians, Ephesians, and the little letter to Philemon, the Apostle Paul was in prison at Rome and styles himself the "prisoner of the Lord." The epistles to Timothy seem to be Pauline in tone, but some of the subject matter taken up, as the qualifications for bishops and deacons, indicates ecclesiastical developments that took place after the Apostle's death. The epistles bearing the name of John bring up the question whether the author of these letters was the disciple John, which itself carries us on to the deeper question whether he was the author of the fourth Gospel. In order to see that question aright, we must look into the literary history of all four Gospels.

So much critical literature has been lavished upon the Gospels and so great the amount of controversy thereby engendered that we hesitate to make what must be a brief statement of the situation in this part of New Testament criticism. This, however, we may follow to the extent of observing that the original Gospel was that of Mark, containing a brief and somewhat irregular account of the doings of Christ and the leading events in his career. It is a valuable book of narratives. The Gospel according to Matthew is characterized by the well-known discourses (the *logia*) of Christ, but does not fail to contain most of the narratives recorded in the previous Gospel. According to Renan, "Papias mentions two writings on the acts and words of Christ: first, a writing of Mark, the interpreter of the Apostle Peter, written briefly, incomplete and not arranged in chronological

order, including narratives and discourses composed from the information and recollections of the Apostle Peter; second, a collection of sentences written in Hebrew by Matthew, 'and which each one has translated as he could.'"¹⁵

The Gospel of Luke is a much more personal document, has the distinction of being the only book in the Bible written by a Gentile, and states in its first verse that it was made up of records made by "many" who were "eyewitnesses and ministers of the word." The author himself is known as the companion of Paul, as also the author of *The Acts of the Apostles*. The book contains considerable material found in the earlier Gospels besides accounts of some seventeen parables not mentioned elsewhere. It is of unusual value in showing, as it does in the prologue, how a typical Gospel, like those of the synoptic writers, was composed. The problem arising in dealing with these documents of the New Testament is not to take a composite literary work apart, as was the case with the Pentateuch, but to fit them together in a harmonious history. This becomes unusually difficult with the fourth Gospel.

THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The Gospel according to John is thought usually to differ from the three synoptic ones in the way that it transcends them in mysticism. But none the less does this Gospel excel them in realism in that it gives details supplied by an eyewitness. In the cleansing of the temple, this author says that Jesus "made a scourge of small cords;" Judas Iscariot is referred to as "Simon's son;" the name of the high priest's servant whose ear Peter cut off is given as "Malchus;" the other Judas is spoken of as "not Iscariot;" the time of the final examination in the trial before Pilate is given as "about the sixth hour;" and in place of the objective statement that there was a superscription placed upon the cross, this author says, "And Pilate wrote a title and put it on the cross, and the writing was, Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews," and later added, "What I have written, I have written."

In sharp contrast with these details noted by an eyewitness, we

¹⁵ *Life of Jesus*, Introduction.

find accounts of mystical discourses absent from the synoptic Gospels, which do not represent Christ as talking metaphysically about "life," "truth," "light," and "the world." What shall we do with this conflict between the first three Gospels and the fourth, with the internal contrast between the realistic and the mystical in the fourth Gospel itself? We can do as several like Renan have done; that is, apply the analogy of the life and death of Socrates as reported by such widely divergent types of mind as the practical Xenophon and the dialectical Plato. If we attribute historical accuracy to the author of the *Memorabilia of Socrates*, none the less can we ascribe authenticity to the idealized account of the master as presented in the *Dialogues of Plato*. "The Author of this Gospel," says Renan, "is in fact the better biographer; as if Plato who, whilst attributing to his master fictitious discourses, had known important matters about his life which Xenophon ignored entirely."¹⁶ If the Gospels had been biographies instead of sketches made for those who understood and appreciated them, they would give the unfortunate impression of being able to contain the transcendent life. In their brevity and crudeness is found their chief glory. If a "Life of Christ" were attempted, "I suppose," said the writer of the fourth Gospel, "that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written."

COMPARATIVE RELIGION

The religious thought of the present has been broadened and perhaps deepened by the rise and development of Comparative Religion, which took place in the last quarter of the XIXth century. The European development of Christianity over a period of seventeen hundred years, or after the death of the Apostles, had caused the Christian to lose sight of the fact that his was originally an oriental faith. The Semitic form of his theology had further obscured the fact that, by historical right, he might well have inherited the faith and intellectual life of his own Indo-Germanic race. It has come about that the religion of the western world is Hebrew, not Hindu, in character. The result

¹⁶ *Ib.*, Introduction.

of this historical fact has been to make the study of oriental religions nothing but an academic exercise. Hence, when a Swami representing Brahmanism appeals to the Christian on the basis of similarity of race and language, the effect is to excite intellectual curiosity rather than to arouse spiritual interest. In the instance of the doctrines of theosophy, Hindu thought has made some impression upon the western mind.

The systematic study of Comparative Religion is associated with the name of F. Max Müller (1823-1900). He owed his training in Sanskrit to his German education, but his work in Comparative Religion was guided originally by Eugène Burnouf (1801-1852), who deciphered the text of the *Zend Avesta*, which Anquetil du Perron had brought to Paris. The importance of Max Müller is found in the way he placed the materials of the study before those who desired to make a historical study of religion. In 1875 he began editing the *Sacred Books of the East*, which work he continued until his death. As the result of this effort, the student of Comparative Religion has access to some fifty-one volumes of Sanskrit, Pali, Zend, and Chinese religious literature. Among others who advanced the study were Cornelis P. Tiele, whose *Outlines of the History of Religion* were translated into English in 1877, and P. D. C. de la Saussaye, whose *Manual of the Science of Religion* was translated in 1891. The study of oriental faith was made popular by James Freeman Clark's *Ten Great Religions* (1871). Interest in the study, which is less acute than in the XIXth century, was aroused by the World's Congress of Religions at Chicago in 1893.

The historical method followed in the study of Comparative Religion has not been such as to yield the greatest amount of religious value. That method has been an external and historical rather than an internal and spiritual one. This has resulted in the separation of the world's faiths in both space and time in such a way as to give sections of human history instead of the historical flux of spiritual life. Instead of trying to discover the common spirit that engendered Judaism, Brahmanism, Confucianism, and the like, the student of Comparative Religion has contrasted the forms of developed religion. He has compared the different plants, as it were, without seeking their common life, their single

soil. This has resulted in identifying the various species of religion rather than their common genus. The condition of Comparative Religion is thus one of spiritual dilettantism in the different dreams experienced by various races and has produced confusion. What has been its method?

Its method has been static rather than dynamic, and when religion is surveyed in the form of the "comparative," history becomes a set of sections, not a process of various movements. This has yielded an archaeology instead of a psychology of religion; it has given us the intellectual meaning of various oriental cults rather than the motifs operative within them. Then, likewise, in ranging these religions side by side for the sake of comparison, it has assumed that each existed in its own right as a separate form of spiritual life. This has produced what Bergson in his *Creative Evolution* calls the "cinematographical illusion," or artificial practice of making a series of snapshots serve in place of the continuous moving picture. A similar condemnation of this practice, applied in particular to human history, is to be found in Spengler's *Decline of the West*. It is in connection with Comparative Religion, where we find a detached Confucianism, Brahmanism, or Judaism, that this mechanistic method is misleading. The spirit of religion can be appreciated when we observe the distinctive qualities of different faiths—the domestic character of Chinese worship, the renunciatory form of Hindu faith, and the pietistic character of Biblical belief.¹⁷ It is this vital view of human history that has been lacking in the static science of Comparative Religion. It has given us cross sections of human belief instead of the linear development and historical trend.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

The psychology of religion has not been more successful and, like the science of Comparative Religion, it has proved more academic than constructive. Apart from the quasi-psychology of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, there was no analysis of religious consciousness until the days of Tylor's *Primitive Culture* (1871), Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* (1876-1896), and

¹⁷ Hoyland, *History as Direction* (1930), p. 74.

Frazer's *The Golden Bough* (1890). These works, which were more anthropological than psychological, dealt with man's primitive belief. The psychology of religion as such has been pursued chiefly in America and in France. In this country, the most thorough work on the subject is James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). Others that may be mentioned are E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (1910); J. H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion* (1912); and G. A. Coe, *The Psychology of Religion* (1916).

Even at its best, when its accepted subject matter was that of consciousness, modern psychology was in none too good a position to grasp the subtle complexities of religious experience in the race. Now that this science is making use of mechanisms, as the unconscious of Freud and the behavior of Watson's psychology, it is less likely to give a good account of the content of religion, or indeed of anything else peculiar to the human spirit, as the aesthetical and ethical. The subject of religion, which has had a long and serious history in the life of mankind, is not to be analyzed as though it were a matter of sensation and feeling. Such a content of experience as religion affords is to be apprehended in some other way, perhaps that which the Germans refer to as *Geisteswissenschaft*, or science of the spirit.

THE SOCIAL GOSPEL

The present century is witnessing an attempt to Christianize the world in a secular and social manner. This movement is recognized generally in the form of "The Social Gospel." The conception of Christianity that it entertains is that of the Kingdom of God. This great concept of Christ's, analogous to the Ideal Republic of Plato and the Ethical Commonwealth of Kant, is the constitution or program of the new religious movement. The advocate of the Social Gospel, however, is more interested in Christian propaganda than philosophy of religion, hence he does not take pains to determine whether the Kingdom is supposed to be visible or invisible, social or spiritual, a remote moral influence or an immediate social incentive. In certain instances, where the Social Gospel has bred Christian Socialism, the im-

pression is created that the purpose of Christ was to reconstruct the social order at such time as seemed most propitious. Now, according to the impromptu philosophy of history sketched by the social evangelist, that time was the period of our industrial democracy. "For the first time in religious history, we have the possibility of so directing religious energy by scientific knowledge that a comprehensive and continuous reconstruction of social life in the name of God is within the bounds of human possibility."¹⁸ In the pre-social period, Christianity was so preoccupied with pietism, dogmatism, ecclesiasticism, and the like that there was little or no room for democratic doctrine and social service. Furthermore, the earlier religious leader was not in possession of our natural and social sciences, our politics and pedagogy.

In considering the Biblical interpretation, the ethics, and the philosophy of religion so zealously employed by those who are anxious to inaugurate the new Social Gospel, one finds it difficult to avoid certain disagreeable impressions. The close connection between Christ and the prophets, which the new Gospel attempts to establish, tends to make both original Christianity and the revival of it appear Jewish in form, gregarious in its conception of humanity, and materialistic in its application. The ethics is such as to identify the moral with the social without any attempt to justify this doubtful conception. The practical effect of such loose thinking is to minimize the importance of the individual subject of ethics and the ethical world-order to which, in distinction from actual society, he belongs. The social philosophy of religion, while not to be criticized for ignoring the theological dogmas of orthodoxy, may well be judged adversely for its failure to supply reason and faith with objects of belief other than those of "society." It is not sufficient to state that the Social Gospel is one of *doing*, not of *thinking*. The will stands in need of the intellect, and the doer of the word must first be a hearer of it.

THE SOCIAL CREED

Just what the Social Gospel has in mind as its program is not always clear; it has not yet called a Nicaean Council. However, it

¹⁸ Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis* (1911), p. 209.

has not failed to produce some sort of religio-social manifesto; we find it in a statement drawn up under the head of *Social Ideals of the Churches*. These ideals were adopted by the First Quadrennial Meeting of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America in 1908 and are still in force, while additional resolutions are contemplated for the meeting in the fall of 1932. The social creed of Protestantism, which is worth quoting in full, is as follows:

- I. Equal rights and justice for all men in all stations of life.
- II. Protection of the family by the single standard of purity, uniform divorce laws, proper regulation of marriage, proper housing.
- III. The fullest possible development of every child, especially by the provision of education and recreation.
- IV. Abolition of child labor.
- V. Such regulation of the conditions of toil for women as shall safeguard the physical and moral health of the community.
- VI. Abatement and prevention of poverty.
- VII. Protection of the individual and society from the social, economic, and moral waste of the liquor traffic.
- VIII. Conservation of health.
- IX. Protection of the worker from dangerous machinery.
- X. The right of all men to the opportunity for self-maintenance, for safeguarding this right against encroachments of every kind, for the protection of workers from the hardships of enforced unemployment.
- XI. Suitable provision for the old age of the workers, and for those incapacitated by injury.
- XII. The right of employees and employers alike to organize; and for adequate means of conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes.
- XIII. Release from employment one day in seven.
- XIV. Gradual and reasonable reduction of hours of labor to the lowest practicable point, and for that degree of leisure for all which is a condition of the highest possible human life.
- XV. A living wage as a minimum in every industry, and for the highest wage that each industry can afford.

XVI. A new emphasis upon the application of Christian principles to the acquisition and use of property, and for the most equitable division of the product of industry that can ultimately be devised.

There can be no doubt that since Christianity was not intended to be a monastic religion, the Christian Church should lay due stress upon the idea of the immediate welfare of mankind in connection with morality, health, economic existence, and the like. The only question is whether the Church can promote these causes directly by means of a social program or indirectly as the result of its original spiritual enterprise. One who looks philosophically at the nature of religion may be quite certain that it is not the calling of the Church to advocate such a proposal as that of birth control. Indeed, one who takes such an objective point of view may question whether the Church, considering itself a body of voters as well as a body of believers, should insist upon such a political measure as the XVIIIth Amendment to the Constitution. It is possible to combine the spiritual with the social in the form of cause and effect, or to look upon it as a tree and its fruits, without making the spiritual merely a means to a social end.

HUMANISM

The most remote repercussion of the Deistic controversy and the conflict between science and religion appears in the religion of Humanism. Its general tendency seems to be that of Ethical Culture; it bears some resemblance to the humanistic ideals of Ludwig Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity* (1841) if not those of ancient Epicureanism. The creed that it affects might be summed up in "I believe in Man." According to the statement issued by The First Humanist Society of New York, this faith embodies the following articles:

"Humanism is a new faith for the new age.

It is an affirmative, creative, inspiring religion.

It keeps step with science.

It frees the human spirit from superstition and servility.

It releases man from fear of the supernatural.
 It transcends materialism.
 It is neither theistic nor atheistic.
 It approaches immortality scientifically.
 It opens the doors for progress in religion."

The characteristic thing about this project is its attitude toward history. Humanism assumes that it is possible to break with the past and begin *de novo*, presenting "a new faith for a new age." No great amount of reflection is necessary to reveal the idea that religion, like law and art and unlike sciences and the practice of medicine, is involved in history and pushes forward into the future as it is impelled by the force of the past. The past is not something that we have left behind us with its centuries like a series of landmarks along a road that has been traveled; it is something that moves along with us. The historical view of life tends to make us intellectually sympathetic toward humanity as a whole and keeps us from being intrigued about our own day and generation. It is under the influence of the religious consciousness that we enter into history and let history enter into us. Now, it is this historical conception which is pathetically wanting in such a well-intentioned movement as Humanism.

In addition to its complacent conception of the present, Humanism indulges the idea that man is adequate to his own needs. Science can answer all man's questions, and industry supply all his needs. The issue involved in Humanism and similar movements can be presented by quoting a rather rhetorical sentence from Emerson's essay *The Oversoul*: "What is the universal sense of want and of ignorance but the fine innuendo by which the soul makes its enormous claim?" The "enormous claim" of religion is the existence of God and the soul. The bases of these beliefs is the "universal sense of want and of ignorance." The "fine innuendo" is human faith. According to the reasoning, or the impression of Humanism, the sense of want and ignorance has been dispelled by the theoretical and practical advance of science, whereby man has become sufficient unto himself. According to a more sober, more historical view of

humanity, science has not and cannot answer all questions or supply all needs. The field which science has chosen for its investigations and inventions, since it is that of immediate experience, is not coterminous or of equal depth with the domain of spiritual life wherein religion appears and operates.

CHAPTER XIX

THE PLACE OF ART IN CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION



THE ART OF ARCHITECTURE

THE PLACE OF ART IN CIVILIZATION HAS ALREADY BEEN RECOGNIZED. When we were considering *The Evolution of Man*, we observed that art was one of the various ways in which man sought to humanize his animal existence. Art in the aesthetic sense we found to be the primary quality of *Greek Culture* and we noted how, in the case of Gothic architecture and the poetry of Dante, art tempered the rationalistic spirit of *Scholastic Culture*. In still other situations has the aesthetic spirit revealed itself. Now we are called upon to consider whether this aesthetic trend, so discernible in the past, persists into our own age to make it possible for us to participate in the spirit of the past and enjoy an aesthetic consciousness in the present. In making this artistic inventory, we shall direct our view along the lines of history with an eye to the situation in the present century and shall do what we can to identify the artistic ideal in America. The three spatial arts of architecture, sculpture, and painting, the two temporal ones of poetry and music still persist. With all our modern ingenuity, we have been able to invent no extra one.

The art of architecture exemplifies the spirit of civilization in the adaptation of man to nature and the adjustment of men to one another. It concerns itself with the physical principle of gravity and the arrangement of men in groups, domestic, religious, political. Architecture is the expression of an age's culture. We see in typical structures the inherent difference between Orient and Occident, Greek and Roman, mediaeval and modern, Europe and America. The Great Pyramid, the Parthenon, the Roman Pantheon, the Gothic cathedrals, St. Peter's at Rome, St. Paul's in London, and the Empire State Building in New York — the differences among these are not those of time and place,

style and material only; they are differences in civilization, in spiritual life. How are these divergent tendencies to be identified?

The ponderous Pyramid, so laboriously constructed, reveals a sense of life, a form of culture entirely different from the spirit that built the American skyscraper. According to Hegel, the Pyramid was a monument to faith in the immortality of the soul and a belief in salvation by works. The skyscraper is testimony to scientific skill, economic enterprise, and belief in business. The Parthenon had its specific application to Greek religion. It was expressive of belief in form, in beauty and proportion, and might be taken to mean that "beauty will save the world." The Roman arch and dome are suggestive of political enterprise. The arch so often used for the roads that led to Rome and the dome that rounded over the building indicate a belief in centralized imperial power. The Gothic cathedrals, so amiable in form, and so like modern engineering in their structure, portray the aspiration of the soul and the power of communal activity. In a structure like St. Peter's, we observe the revival of paganism or the desire for a classic rather than a scholastic conception of life. The touch of the classic that one sees in colonial architecture with its useless pillars and the French style with its mansard roof, both still conspicuous in the development of American architecture, may be attributed to imitation rather than to anything inventive or individual.

AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE

The tone of American architecture, betrayed by the skyscraper, has nothing mystical, aesthetical, or religious about it. The typical office building rejoices in the spirit of brutal optimism. Even the World War and unsettled conditions of peace have not been able to check the confident, self-assertive spirit of the modern American builder. All architecture signifies the conflict of forces—the downward drive of gravity and the upward thrust of the building material. This conflict between gravity and rigidity has been met with the column and the arch, hence the Grecian and Gothic styles. In the case of modern America, the structural

problem has been solved and the style determined by the girder. The tall building is erected in the form of a steel frame enclosed by comparatively light building material. The artistic justification for this style may be found partly by an analogy to the human form, where the tissue of the body is supported by a skeletal structure on which it seems to be hung. It is more adequately atoned for by the physical fact that nature herself in the case of an ore encloses a certain amount of metal in a stony covering. But, to speak more definitely, it has been the possibilities of engineering and the exigencies of commercial existence that have brought the skyscraper into existence. Now, we cannot fail to observe the presence of the tower-like building but we are not so observant of its characteristics. What are the leading features of contemporary architecture in America?

The general impression of size appears to be the most salient feature of modernist architecture; this shows specifically in the vertical dimension, or height. The Great Pyramid involved at least as much building material and the Cologne Cathedral suggests as much floor area; but the tallness of the modern building is its own characteristic. The ideal of altitude was attained originally by the Eiffel Tower, nearly a thousand feet in height; but the modern tower of America is still taller, as we observe in the Empire State Building, something less than a quarter of a mile high. Moreover, the American steel tower is enclosed and made into the form of a building serving a commercial purpose. Now, the specific factors that characterize a modernist American skyscraper are physical and social; they are concerned with the building material primarily and the practical purpose, which is mostly mercantile. If one is at all cynical, he can refer to such a structure as a temple to the god Mammon.

If one is disposed to moralize upon modernist architecture, he may observe that there is a certain structural sincerity about a skyscraper in that it must abide by the law of gravitation and the nature of the materials whose rigidity seeks to satisfy or overcome that law. For the most part, the building is inwardly about as it appears to be outwardly; the floors correspond to the height of the girders and the architectural spaces are in harmony with the structural divisions. In the Woolworth Building in New York,

wherein Gothic motifs are combined with Gotham aims, this correspondence of the structural with the spectacular is noteworthy. The modernist building as such is no imitation of the Gothic or any other style; although it is not without style, it is independent of stylistic tradition. Its most obvious impressions are those of the vertical line, the set-back form of exterior elevation, and the necessary lack of cornices. But it is natural and civil law that have produced these effects, for only as the structure conforms to the law of gravitation and the building code can it be erected. Decorations, instead of being something added by sculptor and painter, are integral parts of the building and depend for their effect upon the inherently decorative character of the materials, metal, stone, and plaster, involved. The total effect of the modern building is that of the gigantic and comely.

There can be no doubt that modern architecture in America represents national ambition just as it reveals the trend of the times. It expresses industrial democracy. But when we compare the American skyscrapers of the XXth century with the Gothic cathedrals of the XIIIth, we are bound to wonder at the comparison. Both represent technical skill in engineering; both alike reflect the social and coöperative spirit of the respective centuries. In both we observe the organization of labor; there in the form of guilds, here in the form of unions. The main difference appears in the purposes of the two structures. The Gothic sought the expression of religious aspiration which, however, had little that was sanctimonious about it, for the Gothic movement was as much social as spiritual. The spirit of Gotham is of another sort. It is that of faith and the future; faith in man and a future which extends into the next generation rather than into eternity.

SCULPTURE AND CIVILIZATION

The art of sculpture is significant of civilization but does not appear to lend itself with ease to cultural changes. This is largely because of the usual materials employed—wood, stone, and metal. In like manner, there is a limit set by the ordinary subject matter, which is that of the human form. The work of the plastic artist is beset with difficulty since his material is inflexible, and

even when the sculptor attains to fullness of expression, as he did in the days of the classic Greeks, there are always the limits prescribed by the human form. Hence we cannot expect such freedom as we observe in the other spatial art, that of painting, still less the free play allowed by such fluid arts as poetry and music. Sculpture is bound to maintain a certain standard in size and form; it requires the touch of the heroic, as this is found in its development from the *Panathenaic Procession* that Pheidias depicted upon the frieze of the Parthenon to the heroic figures designed in our day by Gutzon Borglum. However, the sculptor's art has not failed to lend itself to the expression of cultural periods in their characteristic forms.

The grotesque idea of life with an accompanying sense of mystery makes its appearance in the monstrous figure of the Egyptian Sphinx. In such a figure is a confession that man has not yet arrived at the idea of humanity but intuits its being in relation to animal existence. In clear and most pleasing contrast to the art of the Nile is the perfect humanism of Greek sculpture. It was nobly crude in the case of Myron's *Discus Thrower*, classically perfect with Pheidias, beautiful with the *Hermes* of Praxiteles, and still human and beautiful in the decadence which produced the *Laocoön* and *Venus of Milo*. Roman sculpture could not improve upon the Greek but it could and did add dignity and gave the art a patriotic touch.

Gothic sculpture suffers from comparison with the Greek as also from the cathedrals it adorned. However, there was a robust realism about this type of plastic that might be supposed to devote itself to a more sacred form of sculpture. In French Gothic it became independent art. But it was not until the classic tradition was revived, as it was in the Italian Renaissance, that sculpture became a fine art again. This it was made in the XIIIth century by Niccola Pisano with his pulpit of the *Baptistery* at Pisa. The bronze gates of the *Baptistery* at Florence, the "gates of Paradise," by Ghiberti (1378-1455), the *David* and *John the Baptist* of Donatello (c. 1386-1466), and the *Singing Boys* of Luca della Robbia (1399-1482) may be compared generally with classic sculpture, certainly with the Roman. The climax of Renaissance plastic appeared in Michelangelo. In the case of this supreme

artist, we find the inner genius of the Greeks but not the outer form, for the creative power of the Italian master drove him into designing forms which have nothing classic about them. This we observe in his commanding figure of *Moses*, which is in no wise comparable to the *Zeus* of Pheidias; in like manner, his statues of the Medici, with the accompanying figures of *Day* and *Night*, *Dawn* and *Evening* lack Grecian placidity and are saturated with the romantic and pessimistic. The psychology of these shapes is that of striving and suffering; it betokens the Christian rather than the classic conception of life.

MODERN SCULPTURE

Sculpture since the death of Michelangelo has not been impressive as an art but has conveyed the significance of succeeding cultural periods. Lorenzo Bernini (1598-1680), the last of the great school of the Renaissance, became Baroque and rendered sculpture rather theatrical. The early half of the XVIIIth century, an unaesthetic period, witnessed a continuance of the flamboyant spirit but underwent a happy change in Houdon (1741-1828) and Canova (1757-1822), who tended to restore the classic ideal of form. A certain amount of vigor was driven into the art by Thorwaldsen (1770-1844), whose *Lion of Lucerne* rejoices in realism. In England, Alfred Stevens (1818-1875) gave the sculpture of the XIXth century a suggestion of Michelangelo in the XVIth, as one observes in his monument to Wellington in St. Paul's Cathedral. The culmination of the art founded by the Greeks appears in Rodin (1840-1917), who seems to have strained his material for the sake of giving it unusual expression and symbolic meaning. The psychological touch applied by Rodin appears in *The Kiss* and *The Thinker*, statues which carry the mind away from the subject matter and the form of the figure to a story it is supposed to relate.

American sculpture, realizing the patriotic phase of the art, has revealed itself in statues of military and naval heroes and statesmen, as these are found in Washington and many municipal centers. In the classic style, Hiram Powers (1805-1873) carved the *Greek Slave*, a figure which tended to popularize the art.

Saint-Gaudens (1848-1907) enjoys a great reputation as a plastic artist, yet his only nude figure was the bronze statue of *Diana*, famous for its position at the top of the tower of the old Madison Square Garden. The robust and colossal in sculpture was the extensive relief which Gutzon Borglum (1876-) began to carve in the face of Stone Mountain, Georgia. Lorado Taft (1860-) has gone at the art with chisel and pen and in addition to patriotic pieces and symbolic forms, like *The Blind*, has written an authoritative work, *The History of American Sculpture*. Among the women sculptors of America are Janet Scudder (1873-), famous for her fountains, as also Gertrude Vanderbilt Whitney with her *Aztec Fountain* and *Fountain of El Dorado*.

Turning points in sculpture were reached after the death of Praxiteles in the fourth century B.C., Michelangelo in 1564, Houdon in 1828, and Rodin in 1917. The tendency of the art is to yield the ideal of massiveness for the impressionism and expressionism peculiar to modern painting, as also to return to the primitive. "Just now," says Lorado Taft, "the archaistic fever is well-nigh universal; buttonhole eyes, macaroni hair, washboard drapery — all are *de rigueur* in up-to-date galleries of sculpture. But in spite of all this wave of childish imitation there has been in some respects a notable advance. . . . Mass is once more considered and despite an affectation of naïveté, there is a return to the fundamental principles of good sculpture."¹ It is a question, however, whether the modern conception of matter, so wanting in the idea of solidity, and the prevailing temper of the day, as fully devoid of stability, can offer much to the classic art of sculpture.

HOW PAINTING PICTURES CIVILIZATION

The place of the painter in history may seem to be that of an illustrator in a book; the story unfolds and the artist simply pictures it. But the function of painting is something more energetic, for the artist feels life as it is being lived and then expresses it. The Italian primitive painters did more than paint pictures

¹ *The Appreciation of Sculpture*, p. 41.



"WOLF AND FOX HUNT." RUBENS



"CHRIST ON LAKE GENNESARET." DELACROIX

(facing page 489)

of the Madonna who was being worshiped; they also were among the devotees; their belief they expressed by means of the brush. The painters of the Renaissance did more than copy ancient models; far more than that they felt the creative spirit that had animated ancient Greece. The romantic artists did not apply color just because Romanticism was a roseate view of life, but they themselves felt the glow of warmth that the early XIXth century was experiencing. The painter of today does not confine his efforts to illustrating the confusion in civilization; he feels this confusion himself, suffers from or glories in it, and then paints his inchoate canvases as forms of hectic self-expression. Modern painting in the sense of that which has taken the place of classic tradition is thus an expression of modern life — romantic, naturalistic, impressionistic, expressive. Our civilization and our studios are in something like concord.

When we approach modern art in the strict sense of that term, we can make a helpful distinction by saying, in the Renaissance there were "artists" but now we have "painters." This contrast may be heightened by observing that the artist-painter must consider both subject matter and technical treatment; the matter and the manner, the way the picture will look in a gallery compared with the way it is painted in the studio. In addition to these aesthetical comparisons, the ethical one of altruism and egoism may be mentioned. What is the difference in results? The older artist paid careful attention to his subject matter and considered how his painting would look upon exhibition. The newer painter-artist flouts the subject for the sake of treatment and seems to be painting for himself in his studio. The difference is that of "illustration" and a "canvas." We might go so far as to venture the suggestion that one can tell the difference between the two types of painting by noting the amount of pigment laid upon the canvas. The old artist was a "thin" painter, the modern is inclined to be "thick." Certainly we feel the differences when we pass from the section of the gallery devoted to the old masters to the one set aside for the moderns. Botticelli and Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo and Titian, Raphael and Correggio, to mention only a precious few, present one appearance. Turner and Delacroix, Courbet and Daumier, Cézanne and Picasso, to men-

tion only the best, have produced works that bear but faint resemblance to these.

STUDIO TECHNIQUE

There is, however, a common technique shared by these two schools; let us analyze it briefly and with the primary aim of pointing out that it was not wanting in the Renaissance. First of all, there was draftsmanship and painting by means of line. Now, linear fidelity is something we are bound to mark in the exquisite touch of Botticelli, in the line of strength in Michelangelo, of dignity in Raphael, of living power in Rubens. Color became manifest with the Venetian school of Titian, Giorgione, and Palma Vecchio; yet we would not refer to these artists as colorists. We find some significant lighting, although of an artificial sort, in Leonardo and Correggio, while there was adequate perspective and composition when the high Renaissance was reached after the year 1500. Yet these obvious forms of technique were used as means to an end, to make a good picture, a good illustration, as it were.

What we find when we come to the modern art of the XIXth and XXth centuries is the retreat of the subject and the rapid advance of technique. Indeed, we find more than that; or, to reverse the mode of expression, what we lose is the impression that something outside the canvas is being represented. What we behold is not a picture of something, as Madonna, prince, historical scene, but a painting. The subject is only an excuse for the display of the painter's art and often it is difficult to determine. Thus the motto of the modern painter is, "No representation of the recognizable." If we may venture the analogy, we will suggest that post-classic aesthetics resembles post-classic physics in that the conceptions of nature entertained by artist and scientist are not all obvious. We cannot extend our common-sense notions of space, time, and matter and thus approximate to the scientific truth about them or the artistic treatment of them. Physics, as we observe it in the case of Relativity, and art, as we see it in modernist painting, require elucidation. The physicist, the painter must explain his novel methods to us and after that we

must exert ourselves to interpret his formulas, his figures. This elucidation on his part and sophistication on ours is something new; it was not required by Newton or Michelangelo. Their science, their art was not simple nor did it fail to take us out of our everyday world; but to this we returned with the feeling that the things of science and of art looked strangely natural.

MODERN PAINTING AND PHYSICS

Perhaps we can do no better than pursue still further this parallel between the science and the art of today. Art is quite different from science and yet, like science, it may attempt to press on beyond the familiar world of facts into some unusual order of existence. This seems to be the case with both physicist and painter, in whose ideas we find something unearthly. Relativity proceeds by fusing space and time in a continuum marked by the interweaving of space-points and time-intervals, so that we cannot answer the question "Where?" without involving the question "When?" In the art of painting, this fusion of space and time appears when music assumes an objective or pictorial form and when painting becomes so dynamic as to convey the effect of movement. Common sense may object to all this and hold out for separate forms of space and time. In defense of the new view, however, it may be pointed out that, in observing the position and formation of a stratum in the earth's surface, we must take cognizance of the time when the stratum was thus placed. Art is no less insistent upon the space-time fusion, the blending of form and movement; as a meteor or rocket draws a bright path behind it in the sky, the futurist painter seeks to impart the same sense of movement in the object he places upon his canvas.

In a more definite manner, it may be stated that modern art is best exemplified in Impressionism, Cubism, and Futurism. These three tendencies are widely divergent; they agree in departing from the classic conception of a painting as a picture of something. Their exponents would make of painting a creative art of which the picture will assume the form of a thing-in-itself. In a certain sense, the modern painter uses colors the way the composer

employs tones; that is, the painter would construct something of them. The Impressionist seeks to present the appearance of an object at a given time under the changing conditions of light and to observe that nature, far from using black and white, is devoted to color. Hence the dark shadow cast by an object is rendered purple. The Cubist goes to the other extreme. Instead of presenting an object in some ephemeral situation, he prefers to represent its inherent and abiding nature, or the plan on which it is constructed. His painting presents a solid rather than a superficial aspect of the object. When this block-method of painting is employed, it gives us the impression that the work of the painter has just begun and that the Cubist should proceed with it and form a human figure capable of organic existence. Such is our impression when we look upon *A Nude Descending a Staircase*. Yet such a painting does not fail to convey at least an architectural conception of the human form. The Futurist, as we have indicated, develops a kind of energetic art calculated to give the impression of things in motion or objects at work. In a certain sense, Futurism is cinematographical. It suggests movement in the way that a picture of wreckage gives some idea of the railway collision that caused it.

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TENDENCY

In our endeavor to penetrate the mask of modern art, we are bound to observe the studied crudeness of the painter's work, if not that of the composer or the poet. In the forms of painting just mentioned, in free verse and jazz music, there seems to be a reversion to type, as though the artist would turn evolution back upon itself to reinstate the primitive. The anthropological factor in modern arts is unmistakable. We may jest about this and speak of the "futurist" as really a "pastist," yet we must come to an understanding with the tendency. In one significant case, that of Gauguin (1848-1903), we observe a painter who abandons civilization and goes to the South Sea Islands, where he lives like a native and paints and carves in primitive style. The portraits of *Maori Women* and the *Maori Venus* reveal a certain amount of technique and sophistication, yet the spirit of these canvases

is aboriginal. The tendency thus revealed by Gauguin might be called ancestral, or atavistic.

When we are confronted by this tendency, which is not confined to Gauguin only, certain questions arise in our minds and these have a direct bearing upon our whole problem of civilization and culture. Is the modern artist so satiated with the life of the present that he seeks primitive existence as a relief? Or does primitive art, which has not been worn smooth by the refinements of the classic school, reveal a technical merit which the modern may well imitate? Or, finally, is the unity of the race so complete and the continuity of its development so marked that present and past have much in common? Undoubtedly an individual artist like Gauguin may have recourse to the primitive in order to refresh his jaded spirit, but the anthropological spirit, so to style it, must have some deeper source. Everywhere there is a perceptible tendency to depart from the norms of culture and the standards of civilization, as these latter are expressed in statutes. The art of painting reveals this in the distortions peculiar to Postimpressionism; music accompanies it with its savage sense of rhythm; poetry responds with its crudeness, and architecture forms a background of primitive power.

The effect of modern painting with its change from subject matter to technical treatment has been to educate the layman in the meaning of the painter's art. Perhaps the painter goes too far in his departure from the pictorial when he aims to give "no representation of the recognizable," but this extreme tends to draw our eyes and minds away from the trite conception of painting as the accurate reproduction of the obvious. That is more the work of the photographer. In a similar manner, the result of the new painting has been ethical in the sense that it reveals a disinterested regard for its objects, whether high or low in the social scale, impressive or commonplace in the natural order, and good or bad in the traditional sense of those terms. Modern art lets its light fall upon just and unjust, proud and humble alike. In figure painting, it does not aim at a "beauty show" but attempts to present an average degree of fairness in the average person. In *genre* painting, it has the effect of calling our attention to the stern realities of life and the way they affect the race

in the form of humble surroundings, the bowed form, and wrinkled face.

TWO EFFECTS OF PAINTING

In a more definite manner, it may be pointed out that the new painting has had two results. It has enlarged the field of the subject matter by revealing the effect of light and air upon objects viewed at different times during the day. This has been the work of Impressionism. It has analyzed its objects in such ways as to penetrate beneath the surface into their very structure and thus show how they exist at all times, under all conditions. The Cubist has achieved that. Then, in the case of dynamic Futurism, the new painting has impressed us with the feeling that it is only in a conventional way that bodies may be thought of as at rest. In truth, every physical object is an exhibition of energy and it is this that the Futurist has striven to bring out. By means of art, our vision of the world today is different from what it was because of the way the modern artist has represented it to us.

On the subjective side, the painter who has enlarged our world of percepts has not failed to liberalize our tastes. We are now able to admire what at first seemed only a caricature of objects. If the painter in the instances of Impressionism, Cubism, and Futurism has indulged in exaggeration bordering on distortion, his excesses have had the effect of drawing us away, as if by force, from aesthetic conventionalism. Our layman's attitude might be expressed by saying that our new appreciation of the art is, as it were, a mean between the extremes of old and new, of illustrative pictures and independent paintings. Hence we are now in a position to appreciate such a work as *Rain, Steam and Speed* by Turner, *Apples on a Table* by Cézanne, the brilliance of Signac, the solids of Picasso, and the bold brushwork of Van Gogh. The new canvas has given us a new consciousness. In all art, the beholder must participate by contributing appreciation to the artist's effort. At the present time, when so much of art is left unsaid or unpainted, the amount that the beholder must contribute is excessive. The painting taxes his brain to

discover its intention or calculated effect. Let us see, then, where we stand in the art of painting.

Those who look upon art just as they look upon anything else in civilization — religion, science, industry — find it difficult to account for the new movements, or the art that has abounded since 1870 when Impressionism came to the front. It is not difficult to realize that the painter, who had been a kind of picture-maker, was disconcerted by the new art of photography, which was making it possible to procure accurate views of objects and scenes. The camera had become the rival of the canvas. Thus there came a breach in creative art and the world which it had been imitating. But in addition to the fact of photography, there were more positive factors in the development of Impressionism. There was, for example, the interest in scientific inventions. In speaking of the difference between two types of painters, Clive Bell says, "Instead of painting women and flowers as that back-number Renoir continued to do, up-to-date M. Besnard would represent *Electricity* or *The Wonders of Science* or just *Death*."² Now, the value of Besnard's work is that it marks the end of Impressionism.

THE PROGRESS OF PAINTING TO THE PRESENT

If we desire to restate the art of painting historically and thus indulge in dates, we may observe the beginning of the authentic movement which rose as early as 1300 with Cimabue and Giotto. Such academic art, as we might call it, persisted until the death of Rubens in 1640 or that of Poussin in 1665. Of these two, it was Rubens who expressed more of the modernist tendency. The influence, or wake, of the academic tradition continued until the death of David in 1825, although the Romantic School may be said to have had its beginning in 1822 when Delacroix exhibited his first painting, *The Barque of Dante*. The leading lines of contrast between the termini of the old classical and new romantic schools, represented most effectively by David and Delacroix, may be stated in the form of artistic preferences. The classical stressed draftsmanship, the line as outline or con-

² *Nineteenth Century Painting*, p. 213.

tour; an analytical study of the human form in the classical manner inclining toward the typical; the subject matter chiefly historical or otherwise impressive in character. The romantic changed abruptly to color which blurred the outline, turned to nature, and interpreted art upon the basis of full emotion rather than thin intellectuality. The transition from Romanticism to Impressionism was effected generally by the landscape painters of the XIXth century, primarily Corot and Théodore Rousseau, Turner and Constable.

The aspiration of the older artist was to see nature steadily and see it whole. The Impressionist has sought to view nature swiftly in the form of fleeting instants of the passing light. If we may venture to suggest chronological confines of the movement, we can date Impressionism from the exhibition of Manet's works in Paris, 1867, to the death of Cézanne in 1907. Within this forty-year period, we can include also Monet, Degas, Renoir, and Pissarro. The most typical development of Impressionism is afforded by the work of Monet, who, in such a picture as *The Haystacks* provided himself with a score of canvases upon which he painted in progression the successive sunlight effects of his object. This, however, yielded more of a Luminism in particular than a general Impressionism. The lightness of impressionistic principles of painting was such as to discontent a great artist like Cézanne, hence we observe the emergence of a Postimpression School comprised of what we might call little Cézannes. In the group, however, were such independent artists as Van Gogh and Gauguin.

Cézanne in particular requires notice; his superior art has had the effect of making the modern movement at least semiofficial or half orthodox. "The germinal ideas of Cézanne may be formulated as follows," says Mather, "creative distortion: this means the departure from actual appearance that the artist makes either to express his emotion or to emphasize as against what the eye sees in the object what the mind knows to be there. We may call these distortions Expressive and Factual."⁸ Such "expressive distortion" may be understood by comparing the painter's manner to the author's style, in the sense that

⁸ *Modern Painting*, p. 344.



"A WHEELWRIGHT'S YARD ON THE BANKS OF THE SEINE." COROT



"THE FOREST OF FONTAINEBLEAU." CÉZANNE
(facing page 496)

Nor is our spirit today that of those great composers Bach and Handel, or of their followers in the Classical School of the XVIIIth century, Haydn, Gluck, and Mozart. But the Romantic School of the XIXth century, the school of Schumann, Chopin, Berlioz, Liszt, and Wagner, broke down many of the classical restrictions and opened the way to a freer use of harmony and a development of a new type of melody. Composers of today may, it is true, go back to Bach in their adoption of his contrapuntal writing, that is, the combination of several musical melodies and harmonies moving along at the same time; but the modern counterpoint is extremely dissonant, so much so that it is difficult to discover the different melodies running through the work.

It is to the romantic composers that we are particularly indebted. In certain technical ways musicians of today follow that outstanding operatic composer Wagner (1813-1883). Wagner's use of the chromatic scale, which progresses by half steps instead of by the more usual diatonic combination of whole and half steps, is a forerunner of the similar though more advanced type used by Debussy (1862-1918) and the impressionistic composers. However, there is one important distinction to be noted. In spite of his use of the chromatic scale, in Wagner's works one is ordinarily conscious of the original key in which the composition was written, whereas César Franck (1822-1890), though he progressed from one key to another by the chromatic scale in much the same way as did Wagner, occasionally made the central key of his work somewhat more obscure. Debussy, in our own century, carrying Impressionism still further in his search after unusual color effects in his music, finally evolved harmonic patterns which are in no key. Just as the French painters of the school of Impressionism, Manet, Monet, Renoir, and others, employed color, so does Debussy treat each musical chord as a bit of color, ignoring the structure of his composition. This fragmentary music is similar to the poetry of the Impressionistic School. Maeterlinck in his "*Pelléas et Mélisande*" allowed one or two colorful words to express an entire thought. When Debussy wrote the musical setting for the poem, he too reflected the element of sound for its own sake. The older idea of a melody

with harmonic accompaniment is largely abandoned by the impressionistic writers. If a certain chord expresses, let us say, light or water or mist, it is repeated in sequence in an endless variety of pianistic figures to intensify the initial impression. In this way the usual harmonic progressions sanctified by tradition are entirely absent and we get what one critic has called "merely movement, sound, and color." Such impressionistic music is naturally largely sensuous, and the intellectual element plays a minor part.

FRENCH AND GERMAN COMPOSERS

In spite of the utter lack of structure in the compositions of certain modern composers today, there are other composers who fail to consider the emotional element of music at all, and approach composition with an intellectual attitude resembling that of the Classical School. To be sure, their dissonant chords and progressions from one key to another would never be mistaken for classic, but in their utter subduing of feeling and their unswerving regard for the structure and architecture of their compositions they are classic. Such a one was Reger (1873-1916), in Germany, who wrote involved counterpoint of an extremely dissonant order. The intricate weaving of the tone lines in counterpoint involves an intellectual capacity far more than any other type of composition. Another writer of this intellectual music is Schönberg, who was at first a Romanticist in the Wagnerian manner. He writes in a scale made up of twelve tones instead of the more usual eight tones, and employs the devices of counterpoint in a most intricate manner. His music lacks emotional warmth, but has great architectural value. Hindemith, another German composer, writes in the most advanced manner as far as dissonance is concerned. His works are sometimes spirited and usually hard in tone. He employs many of the classic forms and hence is particularly concerned with design rather than with color effect. Along with these Germans, the French composers still preserve their traditional elegance, precision, and clarity of design, which has been part of their national heritage. Ravel, not one of the most ultra composers, still writes music of great

technical brilliance and, though not an extremist, is a modern in tone.

The treatment of the old contrapuntal principles in this dissonant way has resulted in a type of music known as polytonal. In such music several keys are heard simultaneously, as the different voices are written in different keys. However, the technique of counterpoint has merely been expanded to include lines of chords and keys instead of single melodies. Richard Strauss has employed polytonal progressions in his orchestral works. The different tonal streams each running its own way and yet combining in a unified effect are most arresting when employed to express conflict. Honegger has used the polytonal apparatus with wonderful effect in his *Le Roi David*, notably when he pictures the various camps of the armies and different groups marching. Both architecture and dissonance are combined in such music, resulting in an effect which is pleasing to some and entirely cacophonous to others.

NEW CHORDS

In constructing this dissonant music, it is natural that new chords should be invented to meet the demands of the sound and color effects. Even in the Romantic School one finds chords which include non-harmonic tones; that is, tones not found on the chord-structure built up from intervals of thirds and fourths, the ordinary chords which make up the music of hymns. Such familiar chords have lost their appeal, and startling combinations of intervals have been constructed, entirely apart from ordinary rule. Yet many people of no musical training like such progressions.

The piano, used by Chopin (1810-1849) and Debussy, both of whom appreciated its genius, has undergone a change in the manner of technical manipulation. Now it is played with not only the fingers, but the palm of the hand, the fist, the entire forearm, and the elbow. It is struck with hammers, the strings are plucked, etc. To many this seems a sacrilege, but new sonority has developed. These percussive effects are sometimes legitimate. In general the orchestra could do much better, how-

ever. There is a limit to the capacity of the piano and it can scarcely be forced beyond its limitations. The inclusion of many tones lying adjacent to each other is technically called the use of tone clusters. These often include all the tones of the scale, heard at the same time, and the tones of the black keys which form the pentatonic scale. Unusually brilliant passages are found with tone clusters alternating with scale runs and with the over-worked *glissando*, or glide. Some of the effects are cheap and have little to do with the real development of musical thought. There is a place for them, however.

In the orchestra there is more attention paid to the individual instruments than ever before. Again we find evidence of innovation in the Romantic School. Berlioz (1803-1869), who has been called the greatest of French musicians, experimented very definitely in the groupings of the orchestra, dividing the strings into eight or twelve parts and developing special effects in the percussions. It is for such innovations as these that he is regarded as the real founder of modern French music. Modern composers have tried to achieve effects similar to those produced by Berlioz, but more economically. The instrumental body of the orchestra has been reduced by certain German composers, and the solo instruments are heard to greater advantage. There is almost a fad for the smaller orchestra. The piano is introduced as a full-time member of the group, instead of performing only as a solo instrument. Rimsky-Korsakoff (1844-1908), Richard Strauss, Stravinsky, and many others have written passages that tax the individual instruments to their full capacity. The infinite range of instrumental capacity is amazing. The amount of sonority has increased to such an extent that one is often inclined to call it noise. It is Respighi who uses the orchestral apparatus to the limit.

It is difficult to classify moderns in the field of music because each composer is a law unto himself. However, there are certain composers who should be mentioned, since they represent specific tendencies. Scriabin (1871-1915) enlarged the harmonic vocabulary by writing arbitrary scales which give a peculiar and individual quality to his work, and also used involved rhythms. Stravinsky is also rhythmic to a degree which nearly obscures

other elements of his art. His rhythms are sometimes primitive in effect, often of a complexity which is amazing, and again very sophisticated. Stravinsky has passed through several harmonic phases, from a neo-Russian folk strain to a pale and non-individual, neo-classic style. Many consider Sibelius the greatest living composer. He is comparatively uninfluenced by the trends of other countries. He reflects the quality of his own native Finland. There is a strength and rugged quality quite individual to him, and his harmonic scheme is different from that of any other composer. He seems less a member of a school than a lone personality of peculiar force. His music is folklike, yet dissonant, and abounds in original effects.

' AMERICAN COMPOSERS

Most of the younger American composers write in the modern idiom, speaking technically. Aesthetically they are not all of one mind. In general they use all the resources of dissonant counterpoint, employ the most advanced type of chord structures, and treat the orchestra in the newer manner. There are many and varied influences which cause the works of different composers to possess distinct styles. Howard Hanson is known for the rugged character of his harmonic style. Aaron Copland has made jazz a part of his idiom. John Alden Carpenter, although older than some of these newer composers, has mirrored American life in its urban aspects in *Skyscrapers*, while Arthur Shephard has written music with a touch of the western prairies running through it. Henry Cowell experiments with new instruments and new ways of securing novel tonal effects on the piano. He has delved into the physics of music more than has the average musician. Roy Harris writes with vigor and a certain freedom from convention. Although these composers are not always self-avowed nationalists, there is a strong tendency to seek an expression truly American. Charles Ives, an older composer than those mentioned, is nevertheless very modern in spirit. He has, in the *Concord Sonata* (1920), given a tonal recreation of the great personalities of Concord: Emerson, the Alcotts, Hawthorne, and Thoreau. The wild

young man of a few years back, Leo Ornstein, has reverted to a more conservative idiom in the past few years. His adventures among the tone clusters were startling when they first resounded on an astounded public's ears.

The influence of the Negro spiritual and Negro music in general has been felt. John Powell has written a *Negro Rhapsody*, and Harold Morris a concerto (piano) based on Negro themes. The latter was one of the most praised works of recent seasons. The modern Americans talk a great deal about the "long melodic line," the necessity of abandoning the strict chord sequence, and the effect of "polyrhythms." In many cases there is a radical tendency, with the negation of all that has gone before. Yet Chasins, one of the talented younger men, recently argued in favor of the evolutionary principle rather than the revolutionary. One is impressed by the intellectual quality of the aesthetic creed of the moderns; there is less talk about feeling. In fact, it seems to be considered in bad taste in many quarters to exhibit any emotion. Whether this can continue is an open question. Music has always been an expression of the emotions, and one can scarcely leave that phase out of the composition process. Recently people have asked how far the dissonant element in modern music can go without degenerating into mere noise. Radical composers have replied that noise is a legitimate part of music. They approve of imitating our peculiar and often distracting noises. This opens the question of whether wholesale imitation of everyday affairs, even in the realm of sound, is a good aesthetic position. The selection of sounds to make an artistic pattern is probably a far better way of creating lasting music. Just as the mind refuses to accept all the overtones in any fundamental tone, this being a biological protection, so will it refuse to accept as beautiful all sounds, regardless of their source or combination.

UP-TO-DATE POETRY

The art of poetry is quite in line, and in a rather jagged line, with its sister arts of painting and music. All three give the impression of being intoxicated. Of course, it is not fair to

measure a modern canvas, a flash of free verse, or a bit of syncope with the frescoes of Michelangelo, the blank verse of Milton, or the symphonies of Beethoven. There is no question about the authenticity of such classics, and in comparison with them these modern productions are bound to fall short. But do they need to plunge down? We would be sympathetic toward the aesthetic strivings of the *nouveau*, but we cannot help wishing he would be more respectful in his attitude toward the past, if not more amenable to its instruction. Is modern verse to be called poetry in any acceptable sense of that term? Perhaps, but those who have felt the undulations of great poetic seas—*The Iliad*, *Faery Queen*, *Divine Comedy*, and *Faust*—must fail to feel any tidal drift in the modern poem, which seems to do no more than trickle, splash, and spatter. Under what circumstances did this American art arise?

THE POETIC RENAISSANCE OF 1912

Twenty years ago, Harriet Monroe, herself a poet, began the publication of *Poetry, a Magazine of Verse*. It was a sign of the times. Poets were springing up everywhere and so great was the output of verse that, six years later, John Masefield was led to remark that America seemed to be making ready for a great poetic revival comparable to the eras preceding Chaucer and Shakespeare.⁵ The historical analogy breaks down at the point where the poetic genius is supposed to appear, since no semblance of a colossal figure is discernible, but it is not to be denied that the new republic of verse includes many talented minds which have given adequate expression to poetic art as they understand it. These pioneers of poetry resemble their forefathers in that they also regard America as the land of opportunity, opportunity for the ideal as well as the real. The Columbus of the American adventure seems to have been Walt Whitman, whose "barbaric yawp," as he himself called it, was to awaken the land to its poetic task. This impromptu bard may not have found "tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in stones, and good in everything," but he saw miracles

⁵ Marguerite Wilkinson, *New Voices, An Introduction to Contemporary Poets*.

in leaves of grass, an ant and grain of sand, the tree-toad, cow and mouse.⁶ Moreover, it was not only his own voice that caught his ear, for he heard America singing in the voice of the mechanic, carpenter, mason, shoemaker, seamstress, and the like, "each singing what belongs to him or her and to none else."⁷ Then there was Emily Dickinson, also, another pioneer of the new verse, and what a strange companion for the rugged Whitman!

The *Who's Who* in American poetry would form quite a substantial volume, since the list of names is long and the range of poems wide; hence it becomes difficult to select the names that will prove permanent in literature or to cite the poems that will endure the test of time and prove to be of abiding merit. We might reach back and restore the names of Riley and Field, make mention of Edwin Markham and Bliss Carman, and pay some attention to Edwin Arlington Robinson and Edgar Lee Masters. But the style of verse we are seeking as typical of the *nouveau* poetry is findable chiefly in Carl Sandburg and Vachel Lindsay. The usual reader of poetry looks to the poem to take him out of the commonplace world by invitations to its own realm of remote delights, hence he is not inclined toward the poetry of the steel mill, the slaughter house, and the crowded city. But it was in such a *milieu* that Sandburg produced his *Chicago Poems*. Paris, Venice, Vienna seem promising places for poetry, but can any verse come out of a bustling American city? Yet Sandburg produced poetry that is one hundred per cent American.

The democratic if not banal element appears no less obtrusively in Vachel Lindsay's three R's, "Rhyme, Religion and Ragtime."⁸ *The Congo* is an Africo-American poem inspired by the poet-pedestrian's long tramps through certain of the southern states. In it we hear the tones of the primitive medicine man and the modern evangelist, the deep bass and the shrill falsetto of colored singers in their spirituals, and both the pomposity and fear of the primitive mind represented by the American Negro. The evangelistic tone which hums through much

⁶ *Song of Myself*.

⁷ *I Hear America Singing*.

⁸ Louis Untermeyer, *Modern American and British Poetry*, p. 159.

of Lindsay's verse comes forth most distinctly in his *General Booth Enters into Heaven*, which adopts the rhythm and borrows the lilt and language of a well-known Salvation Army street hymn.

THE RANGE OF AMERICAN VERSE

Although the artistically judicious may grieve over the quality of verse being put forth and the ears of the groundlings not be tickled by its music, we dare not deny that poetry puts forth its voice and gains at least some hearing. More people than ever before are writing verse and if the art is not so popular as it was in Elizabethan times when almost every man was a verse-maker, rhythm has become contagious and with a certain set rivals the fad of dancing. The symptoms of this noble mania cannot be mistaken; they appear in the form of a light rash upon the pages of newspaper, magazine, and bound volume, however slender and wide with extent of white space these last may be.

The taste of the newspaper reader is such that the "daily poem" is printed with the news, advertisements, and comic strips. A page or so of the "best verse" is printed in some of the weekly magazines and a sonnet for which the editor has paid a modest sum appears here and there in the monthly magazine. The book reviews in the Sunday papers include criticisms of the latest poetic offerings. In a more constructive manner, such a periodical as *Poetry, a Magazine of Verse*, devotes space to poems that otherwise might not find their way into print. Speaking of such magazines, Carl and Mark Van Doren's *American and British Literature since 1890* says, "They have given a hearing to poets who might otherwise have been neglected, they have stimulated critical discussion of poetry, they have helped to fix public attention upon the art."⁹ If the young poet is not privileged to assemble his verses in a bound volume, some of his poems may appear in company with those of his fellow bards in an annual anthology like *The Best Poems of 19—*, a rather authentic publication which began to appear in 1923.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

TENDER BARDS

Going farther back into the mind of the modern Muse, we find that schools and colleges are encouraging the youthful mind to express itself in the form of the new verse, which is not quite so severe as the classic poem. Indeed, curricula in some secondary schools are now devoting less time to the classics for the sake of presenting contemporary literature in the form of drama and poem, essay and novel, or the type of reading matter the student is most likely to continue reading after graduation. On the constructive side, school poetry, as we might call it, has been furthered by the publication of such a magazine as *The Scholastic*, a magazine designed primarily for the writings of scholars in the secondary schools. Then there is the student anthology *Saplings*, made up entirely of the literary work of high-school students. This "Children's Crusade" has advanced so far that an ancient publishing house in New York brought out in 1927 a work entitled *Singing Youth*, an anthology of poems by children, edited by Mabel Mountsier. Four years earlier, Louis Untermeyer, himself a poet, had edited an anthology called *This Singing World*, a book designed to appeal primarily to children.

Modern poetry, as far as one can discern its method, seems to be more interested in expressing immediate actualities than in groping after clouds of idealities. It seems to take life "as is," or in the *caveat emptor* sense, and makes no distinction between poetic and non-poetic subjects. The poems are free in expression but not without some sort of pattern which is designed to fit the mood. As to technique, it may be observed that the all-important factor of rhythm is founded on cadence rather than on metrical feet, for the poem is supposed to read better than it scans. The diction, too, is quite informal, being the speech of everyday life rather than the traditional language of the Muse whose use of "thee" and "ye," "yclept" and "ere" has been supplanted by the colloquial. Imagery is present, but it is not so much the analogy between the poet's impression and some object in nature, as cloud or stream or hill; rather is it the expression of his mood.

THE WOMEN POETS

Those who read modern American poems in moods as sympathetic as they can command are bound to observe that the new American art has enlisted the endeavors of women. Poetry had known its Sappho and Elizabeth Barrett Browning, but was not disposed to admit that the art which Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Goethe, and others not quite so superior had glorified would ever "go feminine." This it seems to be doing at the present time to such an extent that the woman poet is not at all exceptional. Apparently feminism has extended beyond the ballot box and has adopted modes other than those of costume and coiffure. Poetry is one of these feminine fashions. It shows itself in connection with the rise of the new lyricism and is somewhat emphatic in its stress upon love. In *The Answering Voice* (1917), for example, Sara Teasdale has assembled one hundred love lyrics by women, and apparently is not going to meet much competition in the form of as many sentimental sonnets by men.

One cannot forget the success which Petrarch and Shakespeare enjoyed in their attempts to express amorous adoration in sonnet form and may wonder why the American Renaissance has not witnessed anything of the kind among its vigorous bards. Can it be that the feminist movement, which placed women in many of the positions formerly occupied by men, has ousted these women from the tender places they once enjoyed in masculine hearts? And is it that woman writes, and that somewhat dispassionately, about her love for man because man refuses to write about his love for woman? "One could chart the progress of unsentimental love-poems from the intensities of Emily Dickinson and the simplicities of Lizette Woodworth Reese to the varied resonances of Edna St. Vincent Millay, Sara Teasdale, Elinor Wylie, Elizabeth J. Coatsworth, Léonie Adams, Virginia Moore, and a score of others," says Louis Untermeyer.¹⁰ "Such a course would be endless and unprofitable." If endless, why "unprofitable?" the reader might ask. For between the ranges of Edna St. Vincent Millay's *The Fatal Interview* and *The Janitor's Boy* by Nathalia Crane, there must be room for much psychological and

¹⁰ *Modern American and British Poetry*, p. 47.

sociological matter well worth analyzing in the spirit of the times.

The masculine bards appear to be leaving the feminine heart to its own devices, for the "nymphs" that intrigue their way into their poems are more likely to be the Brooklyn Bridge, Subway Builders, Steel, Science, New York, Abraham Lincoln, Trees, A Crowded Trolley Car, Lincoln again, Turbines, and that most remarkable Burial of a Dead Cat. It is the city rather than the *milieu* of meadow, grove, and dale that seems to make appeal to the sophisticated poet.¹¹ Practically all of these determined bards take their art most seriously, although here and there, as in the case of Ogden Nash and Wilfred Funk, there seems to be the feeling that it is all very good fun. In the instance of James J. Montague, who produces a poem for the newspapers every week day, a very clever bit of verse is turned out as though it were all in the day's work. If only these other versifiers would take themselves less seriously we could have more sympathy for their efforts. However, it cannot be denied that American poetry of the last twenty years is a fairly authentic expression of American life during that period, and if the poet does not write worthy verses it is because we do not live worthy lives.

¹¹ Edna Lou Walton, *The City Day*, pp. 3-42.

CHAPTER XX

THE VALUES OF CIVILIZATION



MAN A VALUING ANIMAL

MAN," SAID NIETZSCHE, "IS THE VALUING ANIMAL AS SUCH." Now, this is quite different from calling man a "good animal" or a "happy animal"; goodness may develop in man and happiness occur in his life, but in the meantime man must express his nature and carry on in human enterprise. He does this, as we realize today, by a constant process of valuing whereby he sets the seal of approval upon men, enterprises, ideas, and the like. Man may never discover the *summum bonum* in his life or develop utopia in his civilization, but he appreciates the values of things and tries to decide upon the worth of life. Civilization and culture are sets of human values—outer values that have taken the form of cities and institutions; inner ones appearing in the arts and sciences. The result of what man has done is findable in just these works of the valuing animal as such.

All of us use the standard of value without knowing it. When we look at anything sharply, we are inclined to ask, "What is the good of it?" If we sum up the results of feudalism or the French Revolution or the World War, we may inquire, "What good did it do?" Likewise, when we observe the intensive mechanization of labor and watch the robots at work, we are tempted to put the question, "What will it amount to?" We vary the expression but maintain the same attitude of the valuing animal when we keep asking, "What's the use" of this or that? Values know no national boundaries but are coterminous with human existence, yet there seem to be such things as German values and English values, the more explicit sense of values expressed by Russia and Italy. At the present time, when the world everywhere is adopting a critical attitude toward civilization, we are inclined to inquire concerning our own national values. Are these still just life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness or are we in quest of new values?

When we apply our value-judgment, or what the Germans and Austrians call a *Werturtheil*, we are likely to apply some specific standard rather than a general norm. We are like geometers who apply their axioms and deduce their propositions, determine points and positions, and draw lines and figures, but who do not attempt to analyze the nature or compute the size of the space with which they deal. Thus we do not raise the question whether life has any worth or civilization any value; we assume, as we are bound to do, that the civilized existence of man has some value, then we try to discover what that is. We cannot step off the earth, survey our planet critically, and decide whether it is a good place to dwell or not. We cannot detach ourselves from life and give a disinterested opinion of human existence. For we are on earth and in life, not in empty space or paradise, and it is here on earth that we must elaborate our system of value-judgments or the things worth while. Hence our view of the values that civilization has given us is an immanent not a transcendental one and we measure our existence from an interior point of view just as we compute the size of the universe from the way it shapes itself around us. Now, what is the principle of value whereby we pass practical judgment upon the character of things?

VALUE AND ENERGY

In taking up the difficult question concerning the nature of value, we may observe that, as a happy coincidence, it came into existence as an idea about the time that science discovered the principle of energy, if we may put it that way. Value and energy were discoveries of the first half of the XIXth century. Men had always found worth in things and the universe had forever expressed energy, but the idea that value was a desire to be realized and energy a work to be performed were new to the human mind. For the sake of definiteness, we might apply the physical idea to the human ideal and thus say, "Value is the energy of the soul or the inherent capacity for work." It has operated in the various phases of western civilization that we have examined — political, social, industrial, economic, artistic,

and religious. It has a psychology of its own and a history as long as that of civilization in the western world. We will survey the idea as it arose in history.

The source of the value-principle is to be found in Christianity, not as a theological system or an ecclesiastical organization, but as an inner system of spiritual life. Christianity began by departing from the idea of the Good and ignoring the cardinal virtues. There was none good but God and as for the virtues, where could one find the human being who thoroughly exemplified the virtue of temperance or courage, of wisdom or justice? The Christian conscience did not lower the tone of morality but rather raised it; at the same time, it changed the standpoint of life from the idea of the Good in itself to that of the value of the soul. "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" This was the original value-judgment of the western world. It involved a change from outer to inner, from the physical to the psychological.

As a spiritual potential, the principle of value was called the faith that removes mountains and overcomes the world. It is true that the Founder of Christianity did say that it was of no value to gain the whole world and lose one's own soul, but thereby he implied that it was within man's power both to win the world and save his soul. There could be no sense in renouncing the world unless one had it in his power to possess it. Theology has been taken up with the idea of saving the soul, not that of winning the world. Both are forms of Christian energy; of the energy that makes for values. The result of this energy has been to establish a spiritual order expressed by the Christian Church and an order of civilization appearing in the State. For Christianity, as a religion of values, worked for the intensification of man's inner life and the extension of his outer existence. It was both Asiatic and European; ancient and modern.

The essence of humanity consists in the adaptation of inner life to outer existence; something that has quality to something that has quantity, or the small to the large. The old Asiatic world conducted this adjustment by reducing the conditions of adaptation to a minimum; that is, by wishing and thinking and doing less and less. The motive was to set up no ideal that could not

be realized. Since man cannot have or achieve everything, he attains peace by renouncing the desire thus to have or to achieve; he escapes the "divine discontent" peculiar to the Christian consciousness. This reduction of one's own world to a minimum appeared in China in the form of Tâoism, in India as Buddhism, in late Greek thought as Stoicism. All are foreign to the Christian conception of value.

ORIENTAL VALUES

From the *Texts of Tâoism*,¹ we extract the following significant sentences:

"I consider doing nothing to be the great enjoyment, while ordinary people consider it to be a great evil. Hence it is said, Perfect enjoyment is to be without enjoyment; the highest praise is to be without praise. . . . Heaven does nothing, and thence comes its serenity; earth does nothing and thence comes its rest. By the union of these two inactivities, all things are produced. All things in their variety grow from this inaction. Hence it is said, Heaven and earth do nothing, and yet there is nothing that they do not do. But what man is there who can attain to this inaction? . . . To exercise no thought and anxious consideration is the first step toward knowing the Tao; to dwell nowhere and to do nothing is the first step toward resting in the Tao; to start from nowhere and pursue no path is the first step toward making the Tao your own. He who practices the Tao daily diminishes his doing. The perfect man is said to do nothing and the greatest sage to originate nothing, such language showing that they look to heaven and earth as their model."

The Hindu mind, just as fully despairing of its inability to cope with the world, indulged similar views and was equally glad to praise inactivity. This appeared in the philosophical system of Yoga and the Buddhistic religion. In the *Bhagavad Gita*, which has sometimes been compared to the New Testament, the god Krishna asserts, "Casting off works and the rule of works both lead to bliss; but of these the rule of works is higher than casting off works. . . . He who in doing works

¹ Books XVIII, XXII.

lays his works on Brahma and puts away attachment is not defiled, as the lotus leaf is unsullied by the water. . . . Without undertaking works, no man can come to worklessness. . . . But for the man whose delight is in Self, who is contented with Self and is glad of Self, there is nought for which he should work. . . . He who beholds in work no-work and in no-work work is the man of understanding among mortals." Buddhism goes deeper than this in that Buddhism penetrates to the core of human existence in desire. Since, according to the Buddhistic conception of things, the world is not destined to grant man his desires, the only thing to do is to reduce and ultimately eradicate them. Then one will come to an understanding with his world; if he gains nothing, he loses nothing, since he really asked nothing.

A faint repercussion of such noble despair appears in the writings of the late Stoics. The founder of this movement, Zeno, was supposed to have had an Asiatic origin, which may account for the tendency of the stoical mind to relinquish the world. Before the appearance of Stoicism, at the end of the classic period, the Greeks had entertained the ideal of world supremacy by means of art and philosophy with their dominant ideals of Form. What the Greeks lacked was the idea of Force, the energy of the soul that makes for value. The late Stoics seek to adjust the will to the world by making the intellect distinguish between the things that are in one's power and the things that are not. If the Christian had drawn that line there would have been no modern period in our sense of the term, no discovery, invention, or enterprise. There is much that is noble in the writings of these men, as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, but at heart their ideas are paralyzing and fatal. They are often read by youths who, on the threshold of life, despair of their powers and seek temporary comfort in the anaemic idea of the things beyond one's power. In the Christian consciousness and according to the Christian will, there is nothing conceivable that is beyond man's power. "All power is given unto me," said Christ. "All things are yours," said St. Paul. The modern Christian is quite aware of this, although he may understand "all things" in a rather practical way.

THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF WORTH

The Christian religion came into the world in the form of enterprise. It generated belief in mankind and engendered value as energy. Tinged somewhat with the oriental ideal of renunciation, Christianity put this principle to good use. Let one lose his life in the world, behold! he saves it. Let him hate his little existence and he will begin to love his larger life. The result was refreshing, regenerating. "Ask and ye shall receive; seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto you." Unlike oriental systems of thought and worship, Christianity did not attempt to decrease man's desires but sought to increase his power to achieve them, hence the desire for things and the energy that wins them began to be adjusted. The special method was that of religion—faith in the individual, salvation of the world, and the establishment of the Church. But the general nature was broader, deeper; it tended to release the inherent powers of the soul, raise all men to a higher level, and unite them in a great world-movement. This is the reason why we find in Christianity the origin of the value-principle; it was inherent in Christ's thought and the basis of his Kingdom.

As the Kingdom of God came without observation, so the principle of value was slow in receiving recognition. Indeed, it was not until modern science released the forces of nature and powers of the mind that, as though it were doing a miraculous work, the idea of human value in the world was clearly seen. It had dawned in the idea of the Church, flashed out in the crusades, and brightened into chivalry; but the value idea implicit in these movements was not clear or well founded. Christian values were felt as emotions and employed practically in the development of institutions; these contained the Christian sense of life's worth, but did not express it as a philosophical idea. But the values of life which the ancients had sought in the formal virtues exhibited by the perfect State were incorporated in religion and became an overwhelming spiritual force. The realm of values had been unearthed, a new continent of life discovered.

MODERN THEORIES OF VALUE

The recognition of this value did not appear until the end of the XVIIIth century when it was given by Kant. Before that time, modern ethics had revived Epicureanism and Stoicism in the form of Hedonism and Intuitionism, or so much old wine in new bottles. It was Kant who discovered the new world of values although, like Columbus, he did not realize what he had done. So intent was he upon enforcing his supreme law of duty in the Categorical Imperative that he did not appreciate the spiritual content within this rationalistic form. However, he did make direct reference to the principle in question when he said, "Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all value and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity."² Kant made a more personal approach to the idea of value when he added a second imperative: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in every case as an end and never as a means only."³ The resulting idea is—man has worth and the world of humanity is a kingdom of values. A generation later, Schopenhauer gave more solidity to the idea of value by raising the total question whether life itself has any worth. His conclusion was negative, unfavorable. Life for him meant the blind expression of the Will-to-Live and the misery that follows from it. Nevertheless we are indebted to this pessimist for presenting the question of the life-value, which we can consider as seems best to us.

After the general principle of value had been established by Kant and Schopenhauer, other German thinkers proceeded to a more definite analysis of the idea. F. E. Beneke (1798-1854), the German psychologist, placed the idea of value upon the basis of experience, making it comprehensible in terms of pleasure. The German philosopher Lotze, returning to the ideas of Kant, endeavored to superimpose upon the world of intellectual forms the world of ethical values, thereby making the distinction between the What-is and the What-ought-to-be. At the close of

² *Metaphysics of Ethics*, p. 64.

³ *Ib.*, p. 57.

the XIXth century, the principle of value was formulated more definitely by the Austrian thinkers Meinong and Ehrenfels, one defining the value of a thing in terms of its pleurability, the other using desirability as the basis of the value-judgment. In addition to this direct and practical conception of what has worth for mankind, there have been derivative and theoretical developments of the principle which have sought to bring about an approach between the validity of an idea in itself and its value for the mind that entertains it.

Then there has been the brilliant but unreliable treatment of the question by Nietzsche, who, following Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will, introduced the idea of the Will-to-power and urged a "Transvaluation of all Values" whereby the modern man might repudiate Christianity and reinstate paganism or its equivalent. From Nietzsche we can appropriate the idea that values, like energies, can be changed, whereby we who feel no such bitterness toward the existing order of things may still regard it as in need of revaluation. That will yield us the futurism that Nietzsche so madly sought. Suppose, then, we adopt Nietzsche's definition and look upon ourselves as valuing animals; all things old will begin to assume new forms.

FORM, PIETY, AND FORCE

Before we can evaluate the present and the future, we must view the past. What values has mankind been pursuing in the last three thousand years? Historical generalizations are bound to be faulty since nations do not assemble themselves in groups like animals that organize the life of the species upon the basis of instinct. But we must run the risk and excuse ourselves on the ground that we are seeking illustrations. Accordingly we may assume that the ancient ideal was that of Form. The Greeks sought this in art, the Romans in law. Both nations sought to perfect something and render it permanent. There were many things about their ways of thinking and doing that were not formal, but the idea of a pattern ever prevailed. The mediaeval conception of life was that of Piety; the pattern was a divine one. Ancient forms persisted but they were invested

with a spiritual content that overflowed the banks of the canals the ancients had cut for them. The Fathers of the Church and the Schoolmen were Greek, but only outwardly. And with all their deviations from their central purpose they pursued the value of Piety. With moderns, who are nearer to us, the prevailing ideal has been that of Force. The dynamic value could hardly escape attention when nature was revealing its supreme system of natural force. Hence, if we dare sum up the history of the western world in terms of that which has had worth, we may speak of the values of Form, Piety, and Force.

Before we can stipulate the special values of our century, or indicate the characteristic values of individual nations, we must come to an understanding with the general principle of value. This we can do without much trouble if we will turn away from the idea that reality is something substantial and fixed. Of course we still incline to the ancient notion that reality is a substance and the modern but now classic conception of matter as a material thing. But we are learning that physical reality is something much more like energy. It is capacity for work, a tendency, or work still to be performed. Energy is not a reality in the ordinary sense of the term; it is a kind of realizing, or at best a realization. Its stability is assured by its tendency to conserve itself without loss or gain rather than to be itself as a thing.

Value is the energy of the soul; it is inherent capacity for work, work that is being performed but has still to reach anything like realization. Now, that realizing principle of life, observable in individuals like Shakespeare and Goethe, in nations like England and France, is value. It is difficult to lay hold of it, as in the case of energy, but not difficult to appreciate it. The ancient life-ideal was that of the Good, a kind of moral thing-in-itself. It seemed like a rare metal that one could find, a new continent he might discover. Its actual presence became even more definite in the virtues that sprang from it—courage and temperance, wisdom and justice. The modern conception of value is not so solid. It is a force within humanity which, like the struggle for existence, tends to make humanity realize itself. The principle of value instead of merely existing in the world like the Good, is rolling through the world like a snowball, which picks

up its immediate past, incorporates this into itself, and crushes its way on into the immediate future. Indeed, there is no ethical ideal comparable to that of value in the expression of progress.

VALUE AND HUMAN LIFE

Just as there is energy inherent in the universe, so is there inherent value in human life. Such human value assumes the energetic form of strength. For the most part, this strength does not exist as a thing that might be compared with the human body; it is promissory and potential, or something that can come into existence through exercise. Dropping these physical and physiological analogies and resorting to psychology, we may speak of man as the creature who, in part, emerges from the animal order and exerts himself in order to become human. It is, perhaps, as Ibsen expressed it in *The Emperor Julian*:⁴

“So shall it be when the Right Man comes.

And who is the Right Man?

He comes into being in the man who wills himself.”

The same is true in some degree of man as such; he also comes into being as a self-willed creature. The Right Man or the Right Nation is that one which sees the value of its personal, national existence and brings its real self into being.

The individual does this or has it done to him through education. Society effects it or produces it within by means of culture. The State arrives at national selfhood by its civilization. The aim of individual life is not always clear since the issues of life are many, but it is reasonable to assume that both in ideals and actuality the individual aspires to get value out of life. In a community with its complexity of interests, the social aim is not always apparent, but it is clear that a community is tending toward the values that seem within its reach. In a political State, where manufacture, trade, war, and the like stand out most eminently, the undercurrent of energy is valuational. The State is trying to get value out of the world. This tendency is recognized under different names — “balance of power,” “a place in

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Act III.

the sun," "irredentism," "making the world safe for democracy," and the like.

At the present time, the western world and to some extent the Orient also, is debating the respective values of war and peace. As we shall see when we come to *The Present Outlook*, wherein the supposed and actual values of the World War are discussed, the idea of war probably because of the extraordinary activities that it involves creates the delusion that there are positive values in war by means of which a nation hopes to secure the foreign possession or foreign trade of the nation against which it contends. On the other hand, peace tends to create the impression of stagnation through inactivity, since it does not enlist the value-energy of the soul in anything definite or different from the routine of industry and trade. In the XIXth century it was supposed that industrial activity would inhibit militaristic activity, but the recent war revealed the fallacy of the economic argument. Nations sacrificed a large volume of trade with one another for the sake of a smaller volume of possible trade with their rivals' dependencies. But although the war-value of nations has been discounted if not deprived of all its appeal, the western world is still under the impression that there is worth in warfare. The difficulty with the peace-value is found in its negative character, since it means the absence of war rather than the presence of something positive. But the creation of peace-values is perhaps the greatest of all problems of present civilization.

WHAT IS VALUE?

Now we cannot probe very deeply into the lives of present civilizations unless we sharpen our instrument. We must have a keen idea of what we mean by value, and this will require a certain degree of psychological analysis. The widest range of the subject may be measured by the concept of "Interest." The values of men are the things that interest them or may be said to be of interest to them. It is no paradox to say that many men are not interested in the interesting, but are absorbed by what is not interesting at all. Health, for example, is of interest to

mankind; but it does not follow from this indisputable proposition that every individual is thinking about hygiene and watching his diet. Wealth, on the contrary, may not be as much a matter of interest as it would appear to be by the way it looms up in human life today, but this idea does not prevent people everywhere from being excessively interested in money and what it will buy. What, then, is this mysterious principle called "Interest?"

If we let the idea of interest serve as the general tone of mind in the completeness of its feelings, volitions, and ideas, we shall be in a position to appreciate it more keenly. That which interests the intellect catches the attention and directs the mind along definite lines. These lines may be marked by the desire to work out a puzzle, solve a mathematical problem, or map out various constellations in the sky. When appeal is made to the will, one's powers are so engaged that one goes about some definite task like building a house or setting up a business. All that an individual accomplishes in his life might be called the objectification of his interests, although it may be more convenient to refer to the fortune he has made, the position he achieved, or the reputation gained. With nations, the kinds of civilization they have wrought out might be called their national interests, although it seems simpler to speak of Babylon and Assyria, Greece and Rome, England and France. However, we are not thus prevented from referring to Babylonian or Grecian or British values—the things they willed and wrought.

The emotional side of interest needs more complete description, fuller discussion. Interest itself is of an emotional character; it is something that we feel. Hence, instead of applying the idea of interest in general, we shall penetrate our subject more deeply if we sharpen the instrument down to feeling. Here, likewise, we have something we know by experience. Feeling identifies itself at once in the form of pleasure and pain, which assume a passive, receptive form. Feeling appears again in a dynamic and aggressive way as desire and aversion. These are pleasure and pain in action. These factors in our problem give us no trouble since we know what they mean and how they work. Some trouble may arise, however, when we find it necessary to

distinguish between pleasure and the pleasurable, desire and the desirable. Then we shall have to apply reason to emotion and begin to rationalize our simple feelings.

VALUE AS PLEASURE

Until we discover that our views are inadequate, we will make this simple assertion: "Value is pleasure." This means that we shall take a simple, agreeable experience and look at it. That which pleases the tongue or stomach registers itself as an agreeable feeling. But that is not the total experience; the mind reacts upon the immediate feeling and pronounces it worth while. The feeling has value. On the other hand, one may eat what is pleasant to the taste and for the time satisfactory to the stomach, but because of subsequent indigestion conclude that the gastro-nomic experience was not worth while. The preliminary feeling of pleasure did not have value. Apparently our feelings are too superficial to make valuing animals of us.

In addition to superficiality, there is another phase of feeling that makes it a poor candidate for the position of value in human life. The feeling of pleasure is for the time being only, which fact we recognize when we say, "You cannot eat your cake and have it." The pleasure of eating cake or anything else pleasant comes at the time of eating plus a moment before and a moment after. The feeling is fixed in time. The same is true of every pleasure; it belongs to the class of things attached to special, privileged moments. Now, value is a condition of consciousness that has no such discontinuity about it; value is a frame of mind, a constant tendency or habit. We might imagine that the mind could stretch its feeling of pleasure backwards and forwards to make it fill up the gap between pleasures, but the mind does not do that. If there are six hours between meals, we do not devote the first three of these recalling the past pleasure of eating and the last three to the anticipation of the next meal. Pleasures are experiences that we do not recall in the past or anticipate in the future.

In order to escape from the predicament produced by the temporal fixation of a feeling in its special "now," we seek to

make it more flexible by calling pleasure the "pleasurable." By this we mean that an experience is calculated to give pleasure. We are not having the feeling at the time, for we are not eating or reading or traveling as we would like to do; but we judge that food or a book or a trip could give us pleasure and conclude that it must have value for us. Furthermore, one can render his idea of pleurability still more flexible by concluding that certain experiences, while not actually pleasurable to one's self, are likely to be satisfactory to others. In this spirit one says, "I do not happen to like caviar, but I can see how others may be fond of it. German opera does not appeal to me, but doubtless it is of interest to a certain class of people. I am not fond of science, but I recognize its importance." In this manner, one leaps from his private sense of pleasure as though from a springboard to plunge into human experience as a whole. But even the more adaptable idea of the pleasure is not sufficient as a determinant of value. It lacks the dynamic quality which life demands.

VALUE AND DESIRE

The dynamic quality of feeling is found in desire. This is feeling plus volition. When we desire an object, we set our sense of pleasure in motion and proceed toward it. When we feel aversion, we make our implicit sense of pain draw us away from what we do not desire. In its dynamic quality, then, the principle of desire seems more effective than the passive sense of pleasure. But desire is more than a dynamic feeling; it is more than feeling but less than will. The result is that we can desire just as we do desire; it may be the pleasurable, the indifferent, or even the painful. The volitional, the willful factor in desire makes it relatively independent of mere feeling. There is no question about our desiring pleasurable experiences. But we can desire and later find satisfaction in things that are matters of emotional indifference. "Yes, I read the book, saw the play, took the trip to Montreal. I can't say that I enjoyed them, but still I'm glad I know the book, witnessed the play, and saw the city." We can desire the painful also. This may amount to playing the hard game, climbing the steep, craggy mountain,

or mastering a difficult subject, such as calculus. There was no promise of pleasure at the outset, no feeling of pleasure at the outcome of these rugged experiences, but the tough nature of the valuing animal made him desire to do the unpleasant thing. Finally he finds satisfaction in his performance.

But desire, like pleasure, is subject to chronological limitations. Pleasure is always in the present, desire in the future. Now, the principle of value is not temporal; it abides, carries on, and spans the whole range of man's life. For this reason, the exponent of the value-theory of life is forced to shift from desire to the "desirable" just as he was impelled to change from pleasure to the "pleasurable." Now, the desirable is that which we believe to be in harmony with man's nature as such, even if no human being actually desires it. Value is that which is "to be desired." "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. More are they to be desired than gold and much fine gold. Sweeter also are they than honey and the honeycomb." Thus spake the Psalmist. But he did not assert that man in his finite capacity actually desires the principles of righteousness to the extreme of preferring them to the sweet taste of honey and the obvious advantage of gold. He exercised value-judgment and declares upon the basis of good reason that man realizes the desirability of what he does not actually desire.

VALUES AND DESIDERATA

There are certain examples of human preference that tend to reveal this cardinal distinction between the desired and the desirable; between the finite nature of man and his infinite ability to reason; between man and Man, the valuing animal as such. The exemplification of the desired-undesirable is found in war and wealth. In the minds of modern people, if we except professional militarists and munition-makers, war is judged to be undesirable. We see now, after the greatest but least satisfactory of wars, that human conflict is irrational. Yet we desire war to the extent that a slight pretext will promote patriotism, urge us to arms, and engender bloodshed. The case of wealth is analogous but not so convincing. The best of men are convinced that

the pursuit of wealth for its own sake, especially in the modern manner, is irrational, yet all of us actually desire such irrational wealth. In the instances of both war and wealth, we feel and act contrary to ideas and values, yet the rational idea of value as that which is to be desired persists.

On the other hand, we have at least two parallel cases of the desirable-undesired: in piety and death. Practically everybody believes in and praises that degree of moral perfection we have called piety; practically everybody wishes to see it exemplified in the lives of others. But scarcely anybody wishes such a paralyzing ideal for himself. "The judgments of the Lord" are merely "to be desired." The same is true of death, and all the more so. Everybody believes in death, for it would be infinitely worse to live on instead of dying. Nevertheless, no one, if we except the aged person, the chronic invalid, or the suicide, actually desires the desirable termination of life in death. Here, again, reason saves us; reason tells us that our emotional appreciation of life-experiences — of war and wealth, piety and death — is at fault and will remain fallacious until rationalized in the form of the judgmental desire, the value-judgment.

If values are the genuine desiderata of the human soul, what can be said of the various national values that have appeared in the course of history? It is by no means easy to determine the desires of the nations except as this is done in a broad and cursory manner. We feel that the desires of the East are different from those of the West and that the things sought for in antiquity have been supplanted by the new desires of the modern man. In the empires of the Babylonians and Assyrians, one observes a desire for splendor and luxury. The Chinese mind exhibits a decided inclination for regularity and a staid condition of existence. The ancient Hebrews manifested a wish for earthly righteousness and a national prosperity extending into the far future. In the history of the Greeks, we observe a noble passion for wisdom and a longing for form, while the records of Rome reveal tendencies toward dignity in the Roman citizens and power in the world at large. Such were the values of the ancient order. What things have come to be esteemed valuable in the new world?

THE DESIRES OF THE NATIONS

The desires, or values, of modern nations are not so clear; they have not passed on into perspective and our conception of them is likely to be colored by our own desires as citizens. Since the discovery of America, the values of European nations have been influenced by their desire to colonize in the western hemisphere, Spain in South America, France and England in North. In the case of England, the effect of insular position has been toward an expansion which has resulted in world-wide empire. Such national ambitions betray themselves in various expressions of pride, or "such boastings as the Gentiles use." Thus we have such slogans as "Britannia rules the waves"; "*Deutschland über Alles*"; "*France d'abord*"; "The Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave." Inwardly viewed, England sets value upon aristocracy not only in the official nobility but also in the type of man recognized as a gentleman. Germany is expressive of thoroughness, or *deutsche Gründlichkeit*; this shows itself in German system, German efficiency in war and peace. France still rejoices in national homogeneity and that sense of form which has created the expression *la belle France*. The United States is still trying to rejoice in its pioneer sense of freedom from authority but is somewhat disconcerted by the way in which irresponsible immigrants, delivered from the control of their native lands, have developed what might be styled a system of lawlessness. Russia and Italy are persuaded that there is national value in made-to-order forms of government of Communism and Fascism.

What is the American norm of value and what the seven deadly values of the day? From the discovery of this continent until within immediate memory, "America" has been synonymous with "opportunity." It was opportunity for the discoverer, the settler, and the immigrant, but now the rest of the world is leaving it to itself. The era of opportunity has closed, the frontiers have disappeared, and conservation has taken the place of exploitation. The tone of national life changed during the Civil War from the political to the industrial, and the period that Lincoln marked when he spoke of the founding of the nation "four score and seven years ago" bears only a faint resemblance to the period

of three score and ten years since. The first period was marked by the founding of the Republic, the principle of states' rights, the rise of national parties, and deductive legislation growing out of the Constitution. In the second period, we find the more brilliant minds preferring private enterprise to public life, the development of business organizations rather than political parties, industrial inventions in place of political programs, and legislation based chiefly on expediency. Business has surmounted politics and labor movements taken the place of political developments. These are transvaluations which have come about in the natural course of human events.

OUR SEVEN DEADLY VALUES

In addition to these general values that concern the nation as much as the people, there are certain popular values which are so marked as to demand special notice. The American mind, if not the minds of other nations, has become keenly conscious of its desires and has let these crystallize in the form of values. Most of them are by-products of American technics, for the machine has both affected the appearance of the world and changed the desires of those who live in it. No longer is the average citizen contented to dwell under his own vine and fig tree; he desires to get out of life at least all that there is in it for him. These seven deadly values, as we may call them, are Communication, Speed, Entertainment, Health, Psychology, Sex, and Youth. Mankind may ever have desired such benefits as these, but the proportion in which they are esteemed today makes them new values.

COMMUNICATION

The desire for immediate Communication with distant points and the consequent annihilation of space arose in connection with steam and electricity. Another age might have hesitated to break down the apparently natural barriers of space and time lest it incur the wrath of the gods, but the American of the last one hundred years has rejoiced in the machinery that grinds more rapidly

than the mills of the gods. These space-time destroyers are easily recognized in the locomotive, the steamboat, automobile, and airplane. These provide the advantage of rapid transportation of the individual himself, his body. Communication of a different sort appears in the telegraph, telephone, radio, and television, whereby one's mind is placed in immediate communication with that of another at some distant point. In such victories over the old space-time barrier we find an intrinsic value.

When we seek to evaluate the value of communication, we must bear in mind that it concerns the form of an operation, not its content. It is a question of the physical manner of the communication, not the spiritual matter. In a poetic manner, we may speak of the Revolutionary fathers as having "fired the shot heard round the world," but it was a long time before report of American freedom was heard in the Old World. Compared with the broadcast of an advertisement spoken or sung or crooned from a radio station the time involved seems distressingly long. Yet nothing worth while is taken from Lincoln's Gettysburg Address because it went forth with only the speed of sound to be heard by a few hundreds; nothing is added to a commonplace address because it proceeds with the speed of light to as many millions. And yet we are bound to find a value, if only a potential one, in the facilities of instantaneous communication.

SPEED

In close connection with the value of communication is that of Speed. There is a saying that he that believeth shall make no haste, but for all that we have faith in rapid movement. In most cases, such rapid transportation by means of steam engine or motor is based upon the principle of necessity, since the exigencies of modern life require one to cover greater reaches of space in correspondingly short stretches of time. Yet in other instances by no means exceptional, the idea in mind appears to be movement for its own sake, as in motoring, with the added zest of speeding. We crave the kinaesthetic sensation that comes from swift transportation through space especially when the means of locomotion are under our own control, and just as gladly

do we observe and recount to others the time we made on such and such a trip. The nation may be no better off for those who in their swift cars have taken the place of the forefathers who journeyed in the covered wagon, yet we cannot disabuse our minds of the idea that the increase in speed is a gain in capability and character.

The value of speed contributed to life by means of the motor means increase in the quantity of life without improvement in its quality. At the end of a day's motor trip in which one's senses have recorded thousands of impressions where formerly these were merely in the hundreds, one is no wiser than at the start of the journey. Or is there any appreciable difference between those who have their cars and drive them and the less restless persons whose motor experiences consist of no more than an occasional ride in bus or taxicab? But since motoring is so universal and has come to the point where we average about a car to a family, the time is coming when rapid transportation will be so taken for granted that its value will not be appreciated. There is still the air, but even there it is possible that before the end of the century aeronautics, which is now so exceptional, will become the rule and the airplane will repeat the history of the automobile.

ENTERTAINMENT

The value of Entertainment is another desideratum which has been both created and satisfied by the machine. This might be called our "show value." The stage is by no means new, since it dates back as far as the theater of Dionysus in the middle or perhaps earlier period of Greek life and has since existed the world over. But mechanical entertainment peculiar to the movie-play and also the radio-play, which is coming into existence, is something new. The remarkable feature of the moving picture show is not that it exists or that it commands attention now and then after the manner of the theater, but that it is accepted as an essential of everyday life in America. As we shall see when we come to the details of *The Present Outlook*, the statistics of attendance at the movies is such as to show that, on the average, every member of the population sees a picture every week. When

the number of infants, of the very aged, the blind, and those who are not impressed by the technique of the movie stage is considered, it will appear that the "movie population" is unusually devoted to the art and science of the mechanized drama and assiduous in attendance.

For the most part, it may be assumed that the moving picture show, except where it depicts crime and sensuality, is a negligible factor in American life. It might be regarded as having a broadening effect upon and an educational influence over the mind, but the flying images of instantaneous photographs even when they are synchronized with some sort of spoken text are not likely to have a Shakespearean effect upon the mind of the habitual movie audience. On the other hand, it might be suggested that the movies are of ill effect mentally in the way that they take one's mind away from the realities of life and create the impression that, after all, all the world's a film. At best, it may be said that the moving picture, whether it has a value or not, is such a factor in contemporary life as to express a "frivolity rendered august by its persistence," to borrow an expression from Anatole France.

HEALTH

The present age is interested in the Health of mind and body, so that we find a sort of hygienic value asserting itself among these more spectacular desiderata. The range of this value is such as to include more than the organic welfare of the body; the hygienic value includes concern for the nerves, glands, teeth, the skin, and the like. The importance of health in the American mind is indicated in striking manner by the *Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research*, founded in 1901, and the *Rockefeller Foundation*, 1913, with its International Health Division. The millions or hundreds of millions set aside for this work suggest the price that is set upon this value.

There can be no doubt that the hygienic value is a genuine one, yet it can have the ill effect of making the average person over-conscious of his body and mind so that, instead of accepting hints from nature or warnings from the family physician, he may be inclined to attribute to himself some of the ills that are referred

to in the "health column" of the daily paper. This is most likely to be the case when, in the guise of psychology, the eccentricities, dreams, and occasional black thoughts of the human mind are made to appear unusually serious and to suggest that one is suffering from the mental ills on which the enthusiastic psychologist is expatiating. The health value, especially when it concerns our mental health, may be understood as a consideration naturally arising in a civilization whose excitement and speed stimulate the nerves to the point of irritation. If there were not the constant tendency to disorder in mind and body, there would not be such an effort put forth toward preventive medicine. Fortunately for the American population, the methods being adopted for the prevention and cure of disease have to do more with diet, air, exercise, rest, and a common-sense plan of living than with the patent medication which sprang up and flourished all too well in the XIXth century. The ideal of a sound mind in a sound body is being pursued more and more with regard for the principles of rational living, less and less with blind faith in the magic of medicine.

PSYCHOLOGY

Psychology is a popular value which has arisen in the XXth century. When this science, if it was a science, was studied in the form of "mental philosophy," the principles involved in it were too metaphysical and the interests which it aroused were too theological to make any popular appeal and constitute a value. In like manner, although to a less degree, when the advance of such study to the introspective study of consciousness was still along the academic line, the populace had no access to the psychological laboratory and hence people lived their lives and did their work in rather charming innocence of psychophysics. The popular mind made some general reference to the brain and spoke of the successful person as one who was "brainy," but did not have any desire or ability to look into these important matters. But in time the science of psychology became something other than the study of mind or mind-body. It began to refer to glands, complexes, reactions, psychoses, and the like and the very in-

definiteness of these terms, along with the constant appeal to the sex-factor in life, made psychology a popular value or something worth thinking about. An array of popular psychologies appeared duly flanked by magazine and newspaper articles. At least one newspaper syndicate put forth a feature conducted by an emeritus professor of psychology, who sought to enlighten the public on the subject of mind normal and abnormal. At the present time, psychology is not as appealing as astrology, but it has become such a popular desideratum as to afford a distinct value.

Attention was called to psychology by the various efficiency methods and intelligence tests that appeared with the new century, and psychological interest was enhanced by the special intelligence tests of the army. Unfortunately this wholesale psychology had the effect of showing that the male and militant portion of the population was better fitted to fight than to comprehend the purpose of the conflict, but the general idea of a mental test on paper seized the popular imagination, and thus there arose a variety of impromptu tests in the form of cross-word puzzles, "Do you know that's?" and the like. This press psychology had the effect of enhancing the psychological value and tended also to popularize the clinical term "moron," often if not habitually employed by those who, under examination, would have been unable to state the psychological significance of the opprobrious epithet. In addition to such psychology of cognition, there has been an unusual interest in the mind viewed from the emotional and elemental point of view.

This has associated itself with the vague use of the terms "glands" and "complexes." The glands, both ductless and otherwise, had been in operation from time immemorial, cases of goiter were by no means new, but the psychological effect of the ductless glands and their influence upon personality soon became popular. The gland became a kind of fad and the inimitable "Hermione" of Don Marquis, having first referred to them as though they were all the rage, added that, in her opinion, they would soon become outmoded like the leather coats worn by autoists. The complexes have made still greater appeal — that of sex. This function, like the glandular one, is by no means new.

As far back as the days of Sophocles, from whom Freud adapted the terms "Oedipus Complex" and "Electra Complex," the morbid range of dreams had been divined.

SEX

The idea of Sex, not the only but still the predominant one in psychoanalysis, has been raised from the biological to the psychological level and made a conscious value in the life of the present age. The antiquity of sex needs no comment; the obvious importance of it in both animal and plant may suggest, however, that sex is hardly a discovery of the XXth century, as though it were an element rare as radium. No, it is merely the historical fact that people at large are thinking and talking and writing about the obvious and making a special value out of a general function; this is what calls for comment. The advantages of this tendency, or the value of the sex-value, may be expressed under the general head of popular enlightenment, although in our age this assumes the superficial form of sophistication. Thus it can easily be demonstrated that a certain amount of elemental information coming in a sober, semi-scientific way is better than a vague impression often associated with vulgarity. In like manner, the sex-value may be upheld on hygienic grounds. Furthermore, it might be pointed out that the "short and ugly word" is capable of being lengthened and perhaps adorned by the psychological fact that sex plays an aesthetic as well as an erotic part, having at least something to do with both the appreciation and production of the beautiful in art.

However, it requires but a moment's reflection to convince one that this single function of the organism is not supposed to assume responsibility for every form of human thinking and action, still less for all manner of civilized institutions. The economic, industrial, political, religious, and even the social institutions in general are in no special debt to the peculiar economy of all faunal and floral existence. In the life of the individual, the disadvantage of the sex-value appears in the way that it tends to discount the delightful experience and romantic theme of love. The older generation managed to live, love, and bring the younger, smarter

generation into existence without the self-conscious and sex-conscious sentiments so much in evidence in the popular mind. The ignorance of sex was the bliss of love, but the present generation seems to be willing to forego romance for the sake of sophistication. If the primordial principle seems like such a new idea that one is supposed to believe that sex has just been discovered, it might be borne in mind that Eros was both the oldest and the youngest of the gods, so that the erotic tendency may be viewed as the most primitive and elemental or as the most advanced and psychological. There are many living today who can recall the time when there was no such word as sex in the bright lexicon of youth, just as there are some of the present generation who doubtless will live long enough to observe the passing of the same word from common speech.

YOUTH

The seventh of the deadly values that may be cited is that of Youth. At a time in the history of civilization when the inhabitants of the West might well have thought of oriental old age and death, so deadly was the effect of the World War, their aspirations took a decided turn in the direction of youthfulness. The amazement of and deference to youth was by no means a new idea when it was reproduced in the present century. A sort of Ponce de Leonism rose soon after the discovery of America; history was familiar with the expression *jeunesse dorée*, and older generations had accustomed themselves to saying, "Youth must be served." But the contemporary youth-value assumed the novel form of youthfulness triumphant in the trim figure of the "Flapper." She was apparently the product of the economic regime in connection with which the great god Mammon found it expedient to employ whole regiments of young girls who could do the work of men without unduly burdening the payroll. These daughters of Dives promptly met the situation by organizing themselves, as it were, into a corps of sweetly militant maids who changed the symbol of the young woman from that of the clinging vine to the proud sapling. They were characterized by independent spirits but recognized by their short hair and

short skirts — fashions demanded by the kind of life they had begun to live.

Not to be outdone by these authentic examples of youthfulness, no longer sweet but strenuous sixteen, their mothers imitated them. As the child of the older generation found it interesting at times to don the mother's garments, the mothers of the present generation have reversed this process. The result is that the women of this generation, young and old, give or attempt to give the impression of youthfulness. Bobbed hair and docked skirt for both mother and daughter are or have been symptoms of this. The feminine symbol for the genuinely young is Joan of Arc; for the apparently young, that same Cleopatra whom age could not wither and whose infinite variety custom could not stale. Other indications of the youth-value feminine are findable in what might be called major cosmetics, or face-lifting, to say nothing of the rejuvenation process instituted by Dr. Steinach. A literary example of this phase of new womanhood was given by Gertrude Atherton in her novel entitled *Black Oxen*.

Although the youth-value of the XXth century will be associated with the life of woman, man has not been indifferent to the idea of a Fountain of Youth. The men of the XXth century have gone at the problem in a tonsorial, sartorial manner just as the women made use of coiffure and costume in the outer quest of youthfulness. Thus the men of the age are usually smooth-shaven and to that extent boyish in appearance, comfortably and perhaps jauntily attired. The short skirt has been matched by the knickerbockers of golf players and non-participants in the sport, and such athletic attire has been quite generally adopted even when the wearers of it are often quite wanting in the accompanying athletic figure. In more serious ways men have matched Steinach with Vornoff; that is, they also have expressed the hope of actual rejuvenation. But for the most part men have taken the youth-value to mean the prolongation of their existence on earth and thus have gone in for life-extension. Their literary guide is none other than that forever-young senior, Bernard Shaw, who, in his *Back to Methuselah*, has tried to create the illusion that the allotted span of life can be stretched, if only in imagination.

NEW VALUES NEEDED

The time is coming when these seven deadly values will have to give place to new ones and it has been suggested that a handsome prize should be offered to the genius who will invent a new value for the human race. If evolution proceeds by emergence, it is possible that such a novel value will appear in the form of a new purpose in life, a more remote goal than is now in sight.

CHAPTER XXI

TYPES OF NATIONAL CULTURE



CULTURE PERSONAL AND NATIONAL

IN CONTRAST WITH SCIENCE, WHICH IS IMPERSONAL AND SOCIAL, culture is individual and national. This is because it relates to man rather than nature and moves along in history instead of taking its place in the world. Culture is something creative and only remotely related to the intellect's faculty of comprehension. It deals with the sciences, but with the arts also, and consists of intellectual life rather than any process of reasoning. There can be no national culture without the culture of individuals who make up the political group and there can hardly be intellectual culture without the aesthetic background that a nation affords. We are bound to associate Homer with Greece, Cicero with Rome, Leonardo da Vinci with Italy; Goethe is ever German, Rousseau French, and Emerson American. In a certain sense, culture is a European ideal and may be said to consist of the Europeanization of the intellect; but none the less is it so national that the cultured individual can hardly detach himself from his group or uproot himself from his native soil. The very fact of language, which the man of culture uses in expressing himself, is testimony to his racial and political connection.

As a result of the patriotico-personal character of culture, separate nations have expressed massive forms of intellectual life, which have then been exemplified by private individuals who have both borrowed from and contributed to the national culture-spirit. Here and there an individual may be a branch broken off and grafted upon the olive to partake of the root and fatness of the tree. This we observe with Heine in France, Stendhal-Beyle in Italy, Henry James and Joseph Conrad in England; but such transplantings seldom result in genuine culture or true art with the mind that is to the manner born. The sincere artist may transcend the level of his national existence, as did Goethe,

exceed the limits of his locality as in the case of Emerson, or like Ibsen wander from his native land; but Goethe was forever German, Emerson American, and Ibsen Norwegian. Native tongues take care that native sons shall speak their proper language and testify to the nationalism of their culture. How may these national cultures be identified?

GREEK CULTURE OF BEAUTY

Already, as a matter of history, we have spoken of Greek culture in its connection with our civilization. In so doing, we sought to pursue historical method and thus were forced to refer to the Greeks in a realistic way, perhaps as they may have thought of themselves, all unmindful of the sublime fact that they were to become models of Classicism. Having paid our tribute to pragmatic history, it is now our privilege to indulge the idealistic interpretation which the study of Greek life has made traditional. We place their intellectuals, the *kaloi kagathoi*, at the head of the column, to be followed in turn by artists who made other nations famous for the Greek spirit of culture. Greece was responsible for its national culture, for there was nothing overpowering in the geographical situation in which it found itself. There were no towering mountain ranges or majestic rivers, no vast reaches of either land or sea, but only hill-like elevations and slender streams, while the coast line on the Mediterranean was well fortified with many a charming isle. The absence of natural grandeur prevented the Greek intellect from being embarrassed by the thought of its natural limitations, while the character of the land kept them from becoming too gregarious. They beheld nature in miniature and developed their art in the spirit of proportion rather than size. They viewed human life socially, entered by free choice into their own political relations, and developed the *polis* in the tiny form of the city-state.

The psychology of the Greek mind was that of perfect humanism; it reveals its subjects as men who sought to rationalize all impressions, emotions, and impulses. We have recognized this already when in speaking of Greek culture we referred to

their ideals of self-knowledge and restraint, or nothing in excess. But above all they were to exhibit what Aristotle came to call the "energy of contemplation" or activity of an intellect that beheld interesting problems everywhere. It began to reveal itself in extravagant dreams about the universe, man, and the course of things celestial. In time it appeared again, when metaphysics had taken the place of myth in naïve speculations about the nature of things, whether of water or air, whether one thing at rest or many things in motion. None the less did this intellectual avidity lead the Greeks to lay hold of the intimate nature of particular things, as when Archimedes sought the true weight of gold and Pythagoras considered the relation of the hypotenuse to the other two sides of the triangle. These and many other things noted in the chapter on Greek culture indicate the cognitive character of Greek psychology.

The reflective culture that the Greeks superimposed upon their discoveries and inventions assumed the form of official philosophy, or idealism. The Greeks were drawn to this type of speculation by their desire to have a standardized way of thinking in place of the sophistical opinions of Protagoras. It was their desire to discover what all men must think, not what one man may think. Then, they were drawn to the idealism of forms as a way of escape from the flux of particular things that the heedless philosophy of Heraclitus had proposed. Hence they welcomed the teaching of Socrates, who established knowledge on the basis of definitions in much the same manner that Pheidias described the human body in a typical and anatomical way. These Socratic ideas assumed the form of a set framework in the absolute idealism of Plato, which provided the intellect with knowable objects distinct from the imperfect and changing objects of sense. Just as much was there among these Greeks the desire to discover the channels of life and paths of action, so that to their metaphysics they added a system of morality based upon the contemplation of the Good.

THE GREEK LANGUAGE

The immediate expression of this intellectualism came to the Greeks as a gift in the form of language, for in the beginning was

the word. The *logos* was the gift of the gods. It meant more than "word"; it included the idea the word expressed, if not the thing behind the idea. Their language itself was euphonic and in comparison with Latin came forth with fullness in sentences complete in meaning and remarkable for smoothness of sequence. Greek rejoices in a wealth of forms indicative of a mind whose perceptions are acute and whose thought has considered its subject with care. The noun with its definite article is declined with less modification than the Latin substantive, but its four cases are adequate. The verb exhibits rich conjugations capable of expressing all possible variety of relations, which themselves are made more definite by the use of significant prepositions, while the various shades of meaning are made apparent by a profusion of particles. With the *logos* as his guide, the Greek could say what he wished in the way he wished it understood, since his flexible language made his thought articulate.

Classic consciousness and its mode of self-expression engendered style in art, the Apollonian form of culture; this style consisted in loyalty to the media in which the artist worked. Greek architecture seems to stride majestically from the simple Doric to the symmetrical Ionic, to the ornate Corinthian. Greek sculpture advanced from the massiveness of Myron to the perfect formalism of Pheidias and thence to the beauty of Praxiteles. In keeping with this implicit plan or pattern, the Grecian drama began by unfolding the sturdy stanzas of Aeschylus, proceeded to the Classicism of Sophocles, and culminated in the more conscious and human art of Euripides. The art of the Greeks seems to have advanced according to a preconceived plan and to have filled in a framework devised in advance. It was in this spirit that Plato referred to ideas as preëxistent patterns which the mortal mind of man recalled as its experiences in a previous state of existence.

CLASSICISM

The Greek spirit reasserted itself directly in the Italian Renaissance, when Apollo resumed his creative work. The Greek

idea appeared in France and Germany where it was first a pattern for imitation and then a principle for analysis. The classic sense of form reveals itself in the development of French poetry from Malherbe onward; tightly unified drama appeared on the stage of Corneille. Moreover, the clarity of French style and the constant reference to the intellect may be taken as further examples of Grecian influence. In the German mind, the Classic became a concept to be submitted to reflection rather than a model to be followed by creative art, so that it was the aesthetical more than the artistic that the Germans acquired from the Greeks.

Among the Germans we observe this in the archaeologist Winckelmann, who likened classic beauty to rare wine drunk from a simple, transparent goblet or a spirit drawn from the material order by fire. "Beauty," he went on to say in dilating upon the Greek ideal of art, "is like the purest water, which is more highly prized the less taste it has because it is free from foreign elements."¹ Lessing, who felt that the neo-Classicism of the French was not authentic, exhibited what he esteemed the Greek ideal by drawing sharp lines of distinction between poetic and plastic art and with the rigor of the metaphysician relegated one to the perception of time, the other to the domain of space. Schiller was more sunny in his method. He distinguished between ancient and modern poetry when he spoke of the former as "naïve," the latter as "sentimental," thereby setting the Greek ideal in a relief it had never enjoyed before. For the most part, the popular effect of classic culture has shown itself in the Greek motif in conventional architecture and the pursuit of Greek and Latin in the schools.

The Greek conception of culture, as this is now fixed in our minds, may seem too good to be true, hence there are those who feel that Grecian idealism and aestheticism are somewhat mythical. Surely we cannot think of original Greeks as devoting all their precious energies to the True and Good and Beautiful any more than we can imagine the ancient Hebrews so surrendered to righteousness that the Ten Tribes were found instantly serving God day and night. In the case of Grecian idealism as it was

¹ *Werke*, Lib. 4, Cap. 2, § 23.

entertained by the Greeks themselves, it must be observed that Apollo, god of beauty and enlightenment, was not the only deity, for there was Dionysus, god of sense and debauchery. Thus it was that Nietzsche,² having felt that the Apollonian had been too highly praised, strove to rehabilitate the Dionysian ideal of robust culture. His contention was that the Greeks went too far when, especially in the drama, they allowed the rationalism of the Apollonian forces to subject the barbaric and titanic powers of the Dionysian cult whereby the Greek stage became a rigid form instead of a living body. To this philosophical criticism he added a bit of propaganda by insisting that it was the original mission of Richard Wagner by his naturalistic operas of the *Nibelungen Ring* to restore the barbaric vigor symbolized by the worship of Dionysus. This, however, was not to be done, not even by the Germans, who are guided by Faust rather than by the ancient god.

But after we have duly discounted the traditional idealism of the Greeks and made as much allowance for the realism of life, we cannot consent to the idea that there was anything like a balance between the ideal and the real, or genuine competition between Apollo and Dionysus. The faunal deity with his troupe of satyrs was looked upon by the Greeks as a sort of interloper whose mischievous presence was tolerated by only a base minority. In the *Bacchae*³ of Euripides, we observe Greek hostility to the orgiastic rites of this impromptu god. The stand taken, which is the losing one in both history and drama, is represented by the Theban king Pentheus, who tries to discredit the new rites being introduced into his little dynasty by styling them as unseemly and as better suited to barbarians than to Greeks. It may have been that it was the Dionysian motif in Greek life that gave the national culture its genius, yet without the ethical restraint and intellectual guidance of the Apollonian, Greek culture might have amounted to nothing but so much mental fermentation or a protracted period of storm and stress. The impression left by the ancient Greeks is forever the Apollonian ideal of idea and form; to us they bequeathed their world of ideas.

² *The Birth of Tragedy*.

³ *Bacchae*, tr. Way, 482-483.

ROMAN CULTURE OF DIGNITY

Roman culture was far less volatile than that of the Greeks; it tended to harden into the practical forms of civilization. Instead of regarding the intellectual and aesthetical life of the Romans as competing with Greek culture, it is wiser to consider it as something complementary, or as the addition of the practical to the theoretical. The Roman mind saw this clearly and thus indicated, as it were, a division of labor whereby the Greeks should be thought of as perfecting the arts and sciences while the Romans excelled in law and politics. It was with this in mind that Virgil referred to others who cut out breathing bronzes and drew living countenances from marble, traced out the plan of the heavens and predicted the rising of stars, only to conclude that Romans were meant to rule peoples, beat down the haughty in war, and impose the practice of peace.⁴ Such was the imperialistic standard which Rome set up in contrast with the intellectualistic ideal of Greece. The comparison was implicit in all the Romans did, but did not fail to receive explicit statement, as in the above case of Virgil. In a similar spirit, Cicero, himself a man much after the Greek pattern, expressed himself in his oration on the impeachment of Verres, the corrupt governor of Sicily who had plundered the Grecian cities of all their masterpieces of art. "I realize that it is hard for you, gentlemen of the jury, to understand how the Greeks feel about spoliations of this particular sort. Indeed, in a manner that seems strange (to us), the Greeks take delight in those things that we despise."⁵ There was this sharp contrast between two ancient peoples; how are we to account for it?

The deep cultural contrast between Rome and Greece is not to be accounted for outwardly on the basis of physical causality as though there were a radical difference in the geographical settings of the two lands. Both were peninsulas thrusting their way down into what we might call the basin of civilization and culture — the Mediterranean Sea. But the Roman mind, or will, accepted its position in the physical world in a spirit somewhat different from what Greece had done, certainly before Greece

⁴ *Aeneid*, 847-853.

⁵ *In Verrem*, II, iv, 134.

came under Macedonian rule. The original aim of the Greeks had been to enjoy and cultivate something given in the joy of a beautiful present, in a mood which made them forget the past and entertain only vague presentiments of the future. With the Roman it was otherwise. The Italian peninsula seemed to point significantly in the direction of Carthage to the south while to the north it spread out in such a way as to suggest a Europe that might be conquered. To follow out these geographical suggestions would be to review the well-known topic, the rise and fall of Rome; not so clearly, however, would it supply us with a psychology of Roman culture.

ROMAN CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

Among the Romans, the tendency to fixate ideas in the forms of civilization was such that the idea of a Roman culture in a free and flowing form is all but lost to view. The Romans did not luxuriate in the intellectual and artistic life that had meant so much to Grecian enjoyment. And there was in Roman culture little of that aesthetic delight in form or mental avidity to understand that had made the Greeks seem like students more than men of the world. The Romans did not lack taste or curiosity, but their pursuit of the Beautiful and True was not so disinterested, so enthusiastic; it was subordinated to the Good as they understood it; the Good of power and utility. If the essence of the Greek mind had inclined it to some sort of logic, Roman culture gravitated toward law. Apparently the Roman mind was content to let the things of this world take care of themselves, but not so the affairs of the human order, for there was a world which was to be governed by suitable laws which, later, were interpreted as the dictates of nature in the form of *lex naturalis*.

The psychology of the Roman mind appears altogether staid when compared with the spontaneity of Greek intellect. The Romans had their own humanism, but it was ethical rather than intellectual; it lacked the warmth, versatility, and color that the Greeks had infused into human consciousness. The difference between Greeks and Romans may be indicated by calling one

a people of intellect, the other a people of will. It might be expressed by the suggestion that the Greeks were more cultured than civilized, the Romans more civilized than cultured. How did this appear in their respective arts? Greek art exemplifies beauty and grace, that of Rome a feeling for elegance and dignity. The Greek was artistic where the Roman was more artificial, and between the two artistic efforts there is the difference between creating and making. The Greeks pursued art for its own sake and ended by laying down, as they did with Aristotle, the laws of aesthetics. The Romans began with the rule and sought to exemplify it.

THE LATIN LANGUAGE

The mental difference between these two model nations of antiquity was bound to appear in the languages they used to express their characteristic spirits. Attention has already been called to the flexibility and richness of the Greek language; it remains only to observe the opposite qualities of laconic Latin. Greek in the hands of those who used it was as wax to be molded according to the ideas and feelings of the mind; Latin was a bronze to be beaten into acceptable, permanent form. The language that the Romans employed to express their prevailing mood rejoiced in none of the fluency which the voluble Greeks demanded of their speech; it exhibits a discontinuity in which much must be made of the independent word and a taciturnity inescapable in the well-known *veni, vidi, vici*. A large portion of the utterance is thus left to the imagination of hearer or reader. The noun lacks the article which, in the case of Greek, is so impressive that the omission of it is of special significance. There is no such copious use of particles or even of prepositions, for the main parts of speech are supposed to bear their own burden of argument. The Latin verb is there to express relations, but not with the versatility of the Greek paradigm.

When contrasted psychologically, Greek might be styled a subjective language in the sense of verbal expression going forth from a mind desirous of expressing itself fully, while Latin subordinates the mood of the speaker to the object he is con-

sidering as something apart from himself. Yet in spite of this apparent lack of human warmth in the Latin language, it has been able to permeate modern tongues to such a degree that today we use one dares hardly say how many more Latinized than Hellenized modes of speech. Long ago Latin gained a foothold in the vernacular of law and politics; in modern times Greek forms have been revived to enrich the terminology of science.

Such were the deep-grown roots of Indo-Germanic culture, such the direct growth of intellectual life in Athens and Rome. But the Graeco-Roman spirit did not pass away with the death of the body, for the culture of the ancient world, being dead, yet speaketh. That which at first was the Hellenizing of mankind in the western world was destined to become the Europeanizing of the western man. When Greek culture and Roman civilization had ceased to exist, the people who were destined to revive them were still in a raw condition bent more upon destroying the old world than building upon it. These Germanic tribes were to be converted to Christianity, cultured according to the Greek plan, and civilized in a Roman manner. They were destined in time to develop their own national cultures partly by revivals of the ancient European culture and in part through something indigenous within them. We must now analyze the cultures of various modern nations with the hope of discovering the typical within them.

ITALIAN CULTURE AND THE RENAISSANCE

The character of Italian culture invites admiration more than it provokes analysis; it yields more enjoyment than enlightenment. For the most part, the culture of Italy may be regarded as one vast picture gallery. It has its poetry from Dante to Petrarch, and after the Renaissance was to give the world modern science in the person of Galileo. During the Renaissance, it rejoiced in the arts of sculpture and architecture. Then there was Palestrina, who may not be related to modern music the way Bach is, but who was not wanting in modern technique. But still it is the canvas that must remain the symbol of Italian culture, or paint-

ing from the birth of Cimabue (*c.* 1240) to the death of Titian (1576). In dealing with the question of Italian culture, we must consider whether it was a Renaissance movement and, if we decide that it was not, whether it was really helped by the revival of the ancient method. We are in the habit of regarding Italian culture as though it were a wistful tendency which emerged from the gloom of the Gothic era and made furtive gestures in the direction of an art which could not come to any culmination until the Renaissance appeared in all its glory, just as we are inclined to believe that the decline of the neo-classical style with its simplicity and formalism was followed by the fantasies of the Baroque. A superficial view of the XVth century renders such a conception of Italian culture plausible. Yet it is more profound to think of the course of culture in Italy as a spiritual movement which proceeded from the XIIth to the XVIth century, from Gothic to Baroque, in a vital and creative manner, to be interrupted for the time by XVth-century imitations of the pagan manner. Such a conception of Italian culture places us in a position where we must regard the classical Renaissance as a hindrance to the free development of the Italian spirit.

After the lapse of a thousand years and more, it was impossible to resuscitate the spirit of antiquity with whose body Italy was quite familiar. In the interim, Christianity had appeared and developed into a world-religion, the Gothic spirit had spread over Europe and given its art a distinct style, music had arisen and was soon to be systematized by Palestrina (*c.* 1524-1594), and genius had come forth in the person of the Italian painter, the Italian poet. The characteristic art was to be painting, as formerly it had been sculpture. The relation between ancient and modern art was chiefly in plastic art as represented by Michelangelo, and to some extent in architecture. The great Tuscan sculptor had been deeply affected by the discovery of the *Laocoön* group in 1506, itself more of an example of the Baroque or Romantic than of Classicism. But this and other examples of classical form had no power to overcome the genius of Michelangelo and render his art pagan. His attitude toward his art was radically different from what that of Pheidias had been. "For Pheidias marble is the cosmic stuff that is crying out for


form. The story of Pygmalion and Galatea expresses the very essence of that art. But for Michelangelo marble was the foe to be subdued, the prison out of which he was to deliver his idea as Siegfried delivered Brunhilde."⁶

REALISM OF ITALIAN CULTURE


Not Greece and Rome, but nature and Christianity are to be taken as the true foci of Italian culture, for it was not what artist and scientist might have inherited from the past but what they felt and perceived around them that was to engender the spirit of Italian culture. As far as tradition was concerned, this was originally Byzantine, but it was abandoned as early as Cimabue. One sees this in his *Madonna Rucellai* in the church of Santa Maria Novella at Florence. The art of Giotto (1276-1336), his pupil, is even more intuitive and vital; it reveals expression and action, excels in certain points of technique, as the representation of drapery, and is nearer nature herself than to any school of art. The same independence of Classicism appears in Fra Angelico (1387-1455), whose name can hardly be attached to that of any school save the Gothic. In choice of subject matter, there was a touch of paganism in the art of Botticelli (c. 1444-1510), who painted both the Venus and the Virgin, but the manner of execution in its flowing line was not at all classical.

The course of Italian culture, unlike that of France or England, where continuity has prevailed, was comparatively brief. None the less was it a compact movement which has given the world culture in a condensed form. We have seen that Italian culture cannot be called Renaissance culture in the classic sense; it was itself a Renaissance which, unable to triumph over the impressive forms of ancient art, came to an untimely end. Since the official close of the Renaissance, Italian culture has not been able to compete with the intellectual and aesthetic work put forth elsewhere in Europe. It made a magnificent beginning a century later when the new science of physics was practically established by Galileo and flashed forth a century later when

⁶ Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, tr. Atkinson, Vol. I, p. 276.



THE DOGE'S PALACE, VENICE



SENATE CHAMBER IN THE DOGE'S PALACE

The interior of the palace was decorated by famous Venetian painters of the sixteenth century.

(facing page 548)

Vico's *Scienza Nuova* (1725) suggested the possibility of social science. But for the most part, the poetry and painting, the architecture and sculpture of Italy are a precious memory. This must be said even when, in addition to these arts of the Renaissance, Italy gave opera to the modern world, as it did in the XVIth century through Emilio del Cavaliere, Vecchio, and Peri. But here, again, it was a Renaissance beginning rather than a continuous development.

THE DILETTANTISM OF FRENCH CULTURE

It is a precarious undertaking to attempt in a few pages the characterization of a national culture extending over several centuries and ramifying among the various arts. We can do little better than indulge in significant adjectives. In this spirit we would refer to French culture as being dilettant. Unlike the national culture of Italy, that of France was not dependent upon the classical Renaissance and did not develop any school of XVth- or XVIth-century painting. The culture of France, rejoicing in the continuity lacking in Italy, grew up steadily out of the mediaeval period and has continued without interruption to the present century. The absence of Renaissance painting, itself so conspicuous not in Italy alone but in Germany, Holland, Belgium, and Spain, is atoned for by the presence of a culture-spirit whose continuity and steadfastness is the most characteristic feature of Gallic culture. This, however, aside from its Gothic architecture of the Scholastic era, has been the culture of the word — of poetry, drama, or literature generally.

The tone of French culture is that of dilettantism. This is an unhappy term, but the offense that it might cause may be avoided by considering just what it means. By national dilettantism such as one finds in French culture, we do not mean any such intellectual superficiality as an individual displays when dabbling in art or science. There is no such superficiality in the Gallic mind, but still there is a certain lightness of touch and versatility of action that justifies the use of the term employed. Compare the culture of France with that of Italy and you behold no such religious faith as the Italian mind exhibited in a practically per-

manent mood from the Gothic period to the Baroque, when its culture flourished. France, likewise, enjoys none of the empiricism which has made the English mind stolid and practical in even its most artistic periods. Nor is there discernible in the French mind that rationalism which, with the German, deepened into dogmatism. On the contrary, there is about the Gallic genius a noble skepticism in the sense of a mind that refuses to commit itself to anything.

GALLIC SKEPTICISM

The character of Gallic dilettantism appears in the way that the French mind plays with its ideas. Montaigne played with knowledge when he asked, "What do I know? — *Que sais-je?*" This was a question put in a spirit far different from the tremendous interrogative of Kant, when at the end of *The Critique of Pure Reason* he asked, "What can I know? — *Was kann ich wissen?*" Descartes' academic skepticism which led ultimately to belief in nothing but his own existence is not really an example of a man doubting, but of a mind that wishes to see what can be accomplished by doubt. The same sort of dialectical dilettantism appears in Pascal's *Pensées*, in which the weakness of reason, ugliness of nature, and hatefulness of self are ideas indulged in for the sake of discovering the innermost recesses of the heart. Rousseau is the most extreme example of the dilettant. He played with the ideas of culture and civilization as a child might play with toys and in his childishness disclaimed all mental and moral responsibility. In like manner, Voltaire's *Candide* is a form of play in which the earth itself is the toy. One cannot fail to find dilettantism in the *Positive Philosophy* of Auguste Comte, which, for all its show of science, conveys the impression that the author is amusing himself, although in a serious way. The culmination of Comte's idea, the Religion of Humanity, which for him was the worship of humanity incarnate in his sweetheart, is convincing of its semi-serious or dilettant spirit.

Evidently the dilettant tone of French culture is something persistent. Ernest Renan betrayed it theologically in his *Vie de*

Jésus (1863) and it was he who said, "Man sees clearly at the hour which is now striking that he will never know anything of the supreme cause of the universe or his own destiny. Nevertheless he wishes to be talked to about all that." And is there not the same distrust of logic accompanied by a free play of fancy in Bergson's idea that the intellect must surrender to the intuitive faculty, which alone is able to comprehend life? Further touches of dilettantism appear in the arts. Cubism, although of Spanish origin, has been furthered by the French as by no other people. The same may be said of Futurism and Dadaism; if they arose outside France, it has been within its borders that these movements have been developed. However, since there is so much thickness in English empiricism, so much heaviness in German dogmatism, to say nothing of the nihilism of Russian culture and the commercialism of the American mind, the noble dilettantism of the French mind is to be welcomed and prized for the freshness of its tone and brightness of its ideas.

THE CONTINUITY OF ENGLISH CULTURE

English culture resembles French in being indigenous and continuous. It is somewhat akin to the culture of Italy in that it has devoted itself to art instead of developing tendencies or aesthetical theories; then, it is devoted to practically a single art—that of poetry. There was English Gothic and there has been English painting, as that of Turner and Constable. But beside French architecture and Italian painting English efforts in those directions can only suffer by comparison. English poetry, however, is without parallel in the modern world; and, then, there is always Shakespeare.

Although we must regard English culture in the direct form of literature, we must not overlook the fact that in the Elizabethan and Victorian periods it produced its culture-philosophers—Bacon and Matthew Arnold. Yet in both instances, the culture-ideal, far from being a creative one calculated to engender development in the fine arts generally, was associated with the literary. Both Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* (1605) and Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) are concerned with books.

In like manner, both these exponents of culture consider art, which for them is only literary art, from the appreciative or critical standpoint, not the creative. They appeal to reader rather than writer, and tend to think of culture as information. A more comprehensive conception of the cultural was afforded in Arnold's day by Ruskin, who was aware of the fact that beauty can express itself in the less articulate forms of architecture and painting.

If for a moment we return to the theoretical principle of culture laid down in Chapter IV, we may be able to appraise the value of culture in the English mind. Culture, we recall, concerns itself with the contrast between animality and humanity. In England's case, even with its Darwinism, we may not say that the mind has remained upon the plane of animality, but as surely may we observe that it has not wholly surrendered itself to the competitive ideal of humanity. Then, has England with its ever-pronounced empiricism seen fit to cultivate the ideal of the Remote as in a moment we shall find this in German transcendentalism? Or has the English nation as a culture-people been so impressed with the inward possibilities of Contemplation that it has minimized the ideal of Conquest? It is true that the English mind has long felt the importance of the inner life, as one observes in its religious belief and reverence for conscience, but apart from its spiritual and ethical earnestness it has not surrendered the ideal of outer existence in either individual or nation. But these are largely theoretical considerations.

ENGLISH POETRY

The development of British culture does not reveal any restless ramification into all the forms of art, but an almost uninterrupted growth along the single line of poetry. It is as though the English intellect in forsaking the immediate realms of the empirical, practical, and political had resolved to indulge in only an articulate form of art and through the beauty of language develop the aesthetical in the most sensible manner possible. The silent and implied beauty of painting, still less the mystical beauty of music, have made no such appeal as is found in the rational

medium of language. Architecture? Yes, this solid and useful art has made its appeal to the British brain, but not in such ways as to open architectural avenues comparable with those of ancient Greece and modern France. The English people have followed more of a Roman model. Painting, also, in the form of landscape and portrait — Constable and Gainsborough — but no development of the color-art such as one finds in the Renaissance lands. As for the art of tone apart from the indirect development of this in English poetry, the land of Shakespeare is practically without music.

But in the articulate art of poetry, which reveals the power of the word, England is easily able to take its place in the select line of peoples with their national cultures. When one considers British verse, which has made supreme use of a language rich in both Anglo-Saxon and Latin words as German and French are not, one is inclined to refer to great names — Spenser and Shakespeare in the Great Queen's day, Milton, and then Browning and Tennyson in the era of the other great woman monarch. But there was poetry before Shakespeare transcended his land and age, and a continuous stream of verse between Elizabeth and Victoria. As for Shakespeare, to whose genius the Germans lay some claim, it might be observed that when he was intent upon dramatic effect he staged his play outside England — Italy, Denmark, Egypt.

PERSISTENCE OF THE POETIC PRINCIPLE

Now, it is the continuity of English poetry-culture that should attract notice and receive emphasis, for its insular aesthetics reveals no likeness to the condensed culture of Italy or the sporadic efforts of Germany; rather is England like France in the strength and smoothness of its intellectual energy. The Anglo-Saxon period had its *Beowulf* and *Cynewulf* and a stream of melody however slender from the year 700 to the Norman conquest some four centuries later. The middle period of English literature is well filled by Chaucer, whose greatness, as we appreciate it now, had power to carry the poetic spirit over the period made barren by the Hundred Years' War and the Wars of the Roses. But

even here a foreign war and domestic turmoil did not prohibit the appearance of Sir Thomas Malory's *Morte d'Arthur*. To mention the Elizabethan period is to pronounce the magic name of Shakespeare and raise British culture to a special, sudden height. Nor should we ignore the fact that, in addition to the Elizabethan court there was a kind of Elizabethan underworld, and if the official stage was absorbed by the genius of Shakespeare, there were commercial theaters whose dramatic wants were supplied by such playwrights as Thomas Dekker, Thomas Heywood, and Thomas Middleton. Indeed, some two thousand plays were produced between the middle of the XVIth and the middle of the XVIIth centuries, yet the world has decided to let Shakespeare stand as the symbol of this great dramatic movement in which all the world was indeed a stage.

The persistence of the poetic principle was threatened by the Puritan regime in which the play was prohibited, but it failed to nip in the bud the genius of Milton, who himself emerged as a world figure when the period of Restoration appeared. Here were also such technical poets as Dryden and Pope, to say nothing of the poetically minded Bunyan. What the drab XVIIIth century lacked in poetic fervor it made up, in part, by the creation of the modern novel, the development of the essay, a touch of genuine drama in Goldsmith, and the romantic reaction against Classicism. The XIXth century saw England caught up a second time in a cloud of poetry or literature generally, in the Victorian period. The present century, while somewhat too sophisticated for the naïve spirit of art, has made room for scientific-social writers easily recognized in the persons of Thomas Hardy, Bernard Shaw, and John Galsworthy. English culture in the sense of enlightenment has not been wanting in scientific contributions of unusual importance, as one realizes the moment he mentions the names of Newton and Dalton, Darwin and, in our century, Sir Ernest Rutherford. English culture has been much more stolid than that of France and might be called the culture of naturalism. What it lacks in beauty it makes up in power. It is a type of culture so well supported as to insure itself for a long period.

THE SPORADIC NATURE OF GERMAN CULTURE

The course of culture in Germany has been the opposite of smooth. The American mind which studies European cultures for the sake of instruction and nourishment observes in Teutonic culture something akin to the political geography of the land; this is broken up into kingdoms and principalities as its culture is scattered about in periods, as Storm and Stress, *Romantik*, and the like. Like other European cultures, that of Germany had its background, which was that of *Lied* and *Saga*, but from these unto modern times to say nothing of the present there was no continuous development. What in other nations was the Renaissance was to Germany the Reformation, whose literature was bound to sacrifice style to doctrine and religious propaganda. Then while other nations were developing their special types of culture, Germany was in the throes of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). The result was that German literature enjoyed scarcely more than a century of existence, or from the birth of Goethe in 1749 to the death of Heine in 1856, a period bounded by religion at the beginning and science at the end.

In the art of painting Germany made a genuine beginning in the Renaissance painting of Dürer (1471-1528) and Holbein (1497-1543), but this movement was interrupted by the Reformation and when the artistic spirit reasserted itself it was through the art of music. However, it must be said in behalf of German culture that its music, exemplified so superbly by Bach, Haydn, and Mozart, tends to redeem the ugliness of such an unaesthetic period as the XVIIIth century. This music persisted with Beethoven as its transitional figure between century and century, classic and romantic schools, and became an unusual force in the case of Wagner (1813-1883), but when we think of German culture since that time, we think of *Kultur*, of politics.

The German mind is characterized by its tendency to promote an inner unity of thought and feeling without the added ability to realize this in an objective form. It entertained nationalistic ideals as far back as the days of Luther, but these were not realized in the form of a unified government until the days of Bismarck. It enjoyed a religious and mystical spirit, but this it has

not been able to use in the form of a unified church, since it is partly Protestant and partly Catholic in theology and politics. It has indulged fine aesthetic ideals, but it is only in the art of music, so akin to its own national spirit, that Germany has been able to compete with the culture of other nations. From the beginning of modern times, something has held this people back, something has operated to divide the national spirit. At the present time, it is the aim of the Hitler party to bestow the long-sought nationalism upon the German people.

GOETHE AS CULTURE PATTERN

Germany had its architectural development in both the Romanesque and Gothic periods. The Rhine reveals this in the Romanesque structures at Mainz, Speier, and Worms; in the Gothic cathedrals or minsters in Cologne, Strassburg, and Freiburg. The Danube also saw its Gothic in cathedrals at Regensburg, Ulm, and St. Stephens at Vienna. We have mentioned the Renaissance painting of Holbein and Dürer, but these were not the only artists of the period, for there were also the Cranachs, Lucas the elder and Lucas the younger. The poetry that we have seen fit to crowd into the century between 1750 and 1850 was glorified by the grand name of Goethe. In a certain sense, Germany is Goethe and Goethe Germany. The importance of Goethe is not likely to be overestimated, not even when one, like Spengler, identifies western culture with the name of Goethe's hero and thus styles it "Faustian." At the same time, one cannot fail to observe in Goethe a certain noble weakness characteristic of the German people.

This is the pathetic inability to unify the inner life of the soul with the outer existence of the body, the eternal with the temporal. Extreme subjectivity appears in *The Sorrows of Werther*, a kind of balance between subjective and objective in *Torquato Tasso*, and finally, an acquired, studied objectivity in the complete *Faust*. Goethe was aroused to creative activity by reading Shakespeare and has been spoken of as "the German Shakespeare," but there is an enormous difference between a type of genius that, like nature herself, puts forth its products

unconsciously, with limitless richness and no trace of egoism, and another which labors splendidly with itself until at last it achieves genuine greatness. Nevertheless, the poetry of Goethe while self-conscious and often pedantic is of more value to the conscious culture of a nation than anything and everything in Shakespeare. Hence one turns to Shakespeare for endless entertainment, but to Goethe for enlightenment. It is only in *Hamlet* that one can find anything to brood over for any protracted period, while the poetry of Goethe seems labored because it is burdened with thought.

DOGMATIC CHARACTER OF GERMAN CULTURE

There can be no doubt about the authenticity of German culture in the past; the only question is one that concerns its future. Those who know their Goethe and Schiller have not been inclined to marvel at the clever novels and plays of Hauptmann and Sudermann, which are far from being distinctly German things. Moreover, the student of national cultures is bound to regret the militaristic tone of Bernhardi in his pre-war work, *Germany and the Next War* (1912), in which the question of German national culture is discussed, and the violent polemics of Kaiser Wilhelm, in which the more general term *Kultur* was given and taken to mean intellectual and aesthetical culture in the form of *Bildung*. It was around this strange standard of *deutsche Kultur* that the intellectuals of Germany rallied or were rallied in 1914. But the Germans in their lust after nationalism had had this in their blood for a century. Fichte expressed the ideal of German unity on the basis of national culture in the sad days of the Napoleonic campaigns. "Nothing in the world of sense, nothing which concerns our acts or affections has value except as it makes for culture."⁷ It was unfortunate that he should have given a militaristic touch to this as he did when he added, "War makes for culture."⁸ Culture is indeed a nationalizing principle which this country has still to develop, but in its spiritual breadth it is even more international in character.

German culture may be characterized as dogmatic, although

⁷ *Werke*, VI, p. 86.

⁸ *Ib.*, p. 101.

not in a bad sense. It is stamped by ideas and proceeds from the principles of aesthetics to the practices of art. The aesthetics of Baumgarten and the criticism of Lessing preceded the poetry of Goethe and Schiller, and the transcendental philosophy of Kant and Fichte seem to have been necessary as the theoretical basis of the Romantic School. German culture is Grecian culture reversed. Faust is the very opposite of Apollo. However, the culture-doctrine of Germany, even when it is dogmatic, is most useful for purposes of study. One does not feel in German culture what he experiences in the suave intellectual life of France or England, but he learns from Germany more than France and England together can teach him.

THE TWO EPOCHS OF SPANISH CULTURE

The culture of a nation is the spiritual gift which the world cannot refuse or whose bestowal forget. In the case of Spain, at the western end of the enchanted Mediterranean, there was the gift of the western hemisphere or the disclosure of a new world. In its long history, Spain has undergone two experiences which have marked its national character and placed an impress upon its culture. The first of these experiences was the so-called "Reconquest," or the long series of wars between Christians and Mohammedans continuing intermittently from the VIIIth to the XVth century and ending at last in the surrender of the famous fortress of the Alhambra in Granada to the armies of the Catholic sovereigns Ferdinand and Isabella. This was in January, 1492. In the following August, Christopher Columbus, under the patronage of Queen Isabella, sailed westward to discover a new route to the Indies and returned "to give a new world to Castile and Leon," as an old Spanish rhyme puts it. For the next century and a half, Spain was the richest and most powerful nation in Europe, the head of a world-empire, the center of a cultural domain whose only rival was the England of Elizabeth.

Out of the turmoil of the Reconquest the first masterpiece of Spanish literature was born. This was the great epic *Poem of the Cid*, or *Cantar de mio Cid*, which recounts the adventures of Rodrigo Diaz, the Cid Campeador. This Lord Champion, exiled

from Castile because of the displeasure of King Alfonso VI, fights against the Mohammedans and captures the city of Valencia. The Cid in character is the perfect warrior, the first Spanish national hero and the incarnation of his country's ideals. To understand these ideals one must appreciate his character. The Cid was so human in character as to have been of the earth earthly. Although the epic that bears his name glorifies him, it does not lose sight of the fact that he was a historical character nor does it endow him with excessive virtues, still less with supernatural powers. Compared with the hero of the *Chanson de Roland* or the Siegfried of the *Nibelungenlied*, the Cid is a decidedly realistic character, brave, loyal, and courteous enough, but sufficiently human to display resentment and stoop to trickery. We are prone to think of Spanish culture as something romantic, but it is just as thoroughly realistic.

DON QUIXOTE

Out of the abundance of life in the Golden Age of Spain which followed upon the discovery of America and the world-wide expansion of the Spanish Empire, there issued a wealth of literary and artistic material which the world now accepts as something more lasting than the establishment of the empire itself. During this classic age, the XVIth and XVIIth centuries, Lope de Vega wrote dramas literally by the thousands and Calderon composed his religious and allegorical dramas in which Shelley and others were to take delight. But the greatest gift of the Golden Age was Don Quixote, *The Adventures of the Ingenious Gentleman, Don Quixote of La Mancha*. Almost everybody is familiar with the story of the poor, crazed knight who, with rusty spear and patched helmet, set out to right the wrongs of a perverse world. His very name is the symbol of impractical idealism and to be quixotic is to be nobly thoughtless of self. But it must not be overlooked that the true greatness of this great work by Cervantes lies more in the serene sense of reality that pervades the story than in the fanaticism of the hero. The adventures of Don Quixote are distinguished from those of a hundred other knights-errant by the fact that he rides through a real world while these others

are found in some far-off fairy land. Then, likewise, Don Quixote is ever accompanied by one of the most realistic characters in imaginative literature—the peasant Sancho Panza, his squire. Each character of Cervantes' work is a distinct creation; the realist is as authentic as the idealist.

THE PICARESQUE NOVEL

But Cervantes was not the first to turn his attention to the humble character or *genre* figure. Half a century before *Don Quixote* was published, there appeared an anonymous booklet entitled, *The Life of Lazarillo of Tormes and his Fortunes and Adversities*. This marked the beginning of the "picaresque novel." This type of fiction assumed the form of satirical writing purporting to be the autobiography of a *pícaro*, or rogue who respects no precepts nor conventions but makes his way by his wits. The effrontery of such a character makes it possible for him to penetrate the sham and conceit of society, while his astuteness enables him to capitalize such social traits. Lazarillo was the first of these rascals, but his brethren soon became numerous. Like him, these picaresque characters are shrewd and hard-hearted opportunists living a real and utterly unsentimental existence in a sordid and selfish world. The type of novel which develops such human characters affords the last word in realistic fiction.

There is realism in Spanish painting as well as in Spanish literature, or a mingling of idealism and realism. The superb canvases of Velasquez are as objective as nature herself in their adjustment of beauty to ugliness. This "painter's painter" and master of technique is as ready to depict drunken peasants and dwarfs as the members of the royal family of Philip IV. For Velasquez beauty is the expression of reality, hence he paints the ugly chin of his royal patron with the same fidelity with which he renders the humped back of the jester. To a certain extent, this realism may be attributed to Murillo, whose canvases reveal Madonnas or peasant girls, saints or street urchins. Among other noble realists of Spanish studios are Zurbarán, Ribera, and de Goya.

RUSSIAN CULTURE AND NIHILISM

When we attempt to come to an understanding with the culture of old Russia, we are made to feel that, as its Dostoevsky said, "Russia is a freak of nature" and "the Russian soul is a dark place." The types of national culture we have examined in the intellectual development of Europe from Greece to Germany, have revealed fairly small and homogeneous nations occupied with native ideas. In the case of Russia, however, we find a land overwhelming in size and dominated by the "black-earth force." In addition to this geographical factor, there is a sociological one also, for Russia is a mixture of East and West. "Scratch the Russian," said Dostoevsky, "and you'll find the Tatar." The Russian's sense of national destiny, voiced by Gogol in 1842, is of special interest at the present time. "And you, Russia of mine, are you not speeding like a troika which nought can overtake? Is not the road smoking beneath your wheels and the bridges thundering as you cross them? . . . Whither are you speeding, O Russia of mine? Whither? Answer me! But no answer comes, only the weird sound of your collar bells. Rent into a thousand shreds, the air roars past you, for you are overtaking the whole world and shall one day force all nations, all empires to stand aside to give you way."⁹

The outer culture of Russia, in distinction from its strange culture-spirit, can be identified generally by a glance at its architecture and literature. After a long preliminary period marked by insignificant wooden structures, Russia inaugurated its history of architecture by imitating the Byzantine style made characteristic and spectacular by weird cupolas and metal decorations. During the great Gothic period of Europe, Russian architecture was halted by the Tatar invasion (1238) and the weight of the Tatar yoke, which was not thrown off until the time of Ivan the Great, in 1480. From the Byzantine style, Russia passed to the Baroque, as it may best be styled although it retained some of its oriental forms and indulged in certain excesses of the Rococo. A striking example of the Byzantine appears in the Ostankino

⁹ *Dead Souls*, end of Part I.

Church at Moscow; of the Baroque, in the Winter Palace at St. Petersburg.

Russian literature, to which we shall turn in a moment for enlightenment on the subject of Russian culture, fails to follow the analogy of European writing generally. It dates back hardly earlier than the XVIIIth century when, especially in the reign of Peter the Great (1672-1725), the Russian mind came under the influence of French and German authors. A beginning in the Russian poetry of the cultural period was made by Antiokh Kantemir (1708-1744), but the most brilliant representative of the school was the romantic poet Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837). Yet the most significant factor in Russian culture is the Russian novel. Sometimes the Russian novel is in line with the usual work of fiction, as in Dostoievsky's *Brothers Karamazov* and Tolstoi's *Anna Karénina*, but for the most part the Russian work is a species of propaganda or what might be called thesis-novel. We will look into it for the sake of discovering how the typical Russian writer of the XIXth century regarded his land and the state of its national culture.

THE RUSSIAN NOVEL

Gogol, as we have observed, prophesied the rise of Russia and its descent upon Europe, but later writers tend to despair of Russia's destiny and to depreciate its state of culture. "There is no one, as yet, among us; there are no men, look where you will," says a character in one of Turgenev's stories. "All are either small fry or squabblers, petty Hamlets, cannibals, either underground gloom and thicket, or bullies, empty triflers and drum sticks." Yet in a spirit somewhat akin to that of Gogol, Turgenev proceeds to predict the coming of Russian men. "They will come? O, thou soil! Thou black-earth force! Thou hast said, 'They will come?' Behold I put thy words on record."¹⁰ However, while he was inditing such sentiments he could not refrain from speaking of his land as "anonymous Russia," which seemed to lack originality and the power to give anything to the world. "Our dear mother, Orthodox Russia, might sink down to the

¹⁰ *On the Eve*, tr. Hapgood, pp. 232-233.

nethermost Hell, and not a single tack, not a single pin would be disturbed. Everything would remain quite calmly in its place, because even the samovar and linden bast slippers, the shaft arch and the knout, those renowned products of ours, were not invented by us.”¹¹

At the close of the XIXth century, Maxim Gorky, a lineal, literary descendant of Gogol, resumed anew the question of Russia's place in the world. This he discusses on the basis of “a foreign word called ‘culture.’” Just as Dostoievsky had referred to what he called “the Russian's longing for seemliness,” so does Gorky indicate that Russia's great need is order. “That means,” says a significant character in *Foma Gordyéeff*, “that a cultured man is he who loves business and order, who in general loves to arrange life, loves to live, knows the value of himself and life.”¹² Man was appointed to organize life, but the Russian has not heeded his divine vocation. “You have not made life, but a prison,” says Foma in the story just mentioned. “You have not constructed life; you have made a cesspool.”

THE VALUES OF RUSSIAN CULTURE

In spite of such derogatory criticism on the part of Russia's own spokesmen, the land of the “black-earth force” has not been wanting in genius-culture. It has developed a characteristic form of architecture based upon the Byzantine, but developed in its own national manner, especially in its gorgeous minarets. Russian music is still more expressive of the Slavic spirit. The characteristic Russian composition is divided into phrases of five or seven measures instead of the even-measured ones of the Nordic. Its modal basis is found in the melodies that have come down from the primitive period through the Greek Orthodox Church. The mood of such music is not simply somber; it is made up of sharp contrasts between the melancholy deepening into despair to the gay bordering on the riotous. Outside Russia, it was influenced by Tschaikowsky and Rubinstein; its nationalist representatives are Moussorgsky, Borodin, Cui, and Rimsky-Korsakoff.

¹¹ *Smoke*, tr. Hapgood, p. 151.

¹² *Foma Gordyéeff*, tr. Hapgood, p. 423.

Within the field of the natural sciences, the world is indebted to Lobatchevsky for a system of non-Euclidean mathematics which, with that of Riemann, has enabled the modern man to take a macroscopic instead of a purely mundane view of the universe. Mendelieff organized and rationalized the science of chemistry when he proposed the Periodic Law adjusting the then-known chemical elements to one another and making possible the successful prediction of the existence of others. Pavlov has given psychology the "conditioned reflex" which has made the psychology of Behaviorism possible. The Russian soul may have been a "dark place," but it has not been wholly wanting in light.

Of all modern nations, Russia has been significant in setting the culture-problem in a vivid light, although often an unfavorable one. The question whether a nation should devote itself to remote interests and inner ideals when there are immediate needs and urgent tasks before it was taken up by these authors of novels with ideas. Turgenev had had a taste of European life and was loyal to the idea of Russia rather than to Russia itself. He is fond of depicting Russia as Hamlet, the ineffective dreamer, when it should be Don Quixote, the unselfish idealist. On the other hand, Dostoevsky, without really questioning the possibility of national culture, was in doubt about its desirability. Instead of making man effective, culture may so sharpen his faculties as to render him vicious and in opposition to the moral purpose of life. The reader of Dostoevsky, an extraordinary but disordered mind, finds it difficult to form a clear idea of his intention, but can gather the idea that culture inclines man toward crime and should be controlled by compassion. Let the reader of the Russian novel compare Raskolnikow, in *Crime and Punishment*, with Myshkin in *The Idiot*, and he will observe the striking contrast between the intellectual and the moral. This appears in opposed maxims. "A cultured man has the right to commit crime, even murder." Such is the motif of one work, while the imperative ideal of the other is "Compassion is the only law of human existence." Now, this is in a way a conflict between the Tatar and Buddhist ideals of the ambiguous Russian mind, of "anonymous Russia."

The culture-issue, or the conflict between the individual's ideals and society's needs, was voiced by Dostoevsky when he said, through one of his characters, "The whole question lies in the question, which is more beautiful, Shakespeare or boots, Raphael or petroleum?"¹³ Elsewhere in this same work, Raphael's masterpiece is contrasted in value with simple and useful objects and the opinion is expressed that "the Sistine Madonna is inferior to a glass or a pencil." In like manner, one of the characters in *The Possessed* speaks of "the rumble of the carts carrying bread to humanity being more important than the Sistine Madonna." This is, of course, the Buddhist ideal of compassion, which affected both Dostoevsky and Tolstoi. As for the Hellenic ideal, it is "the idiot" in the work so entitled who lisps the idea that "beauty will save the world." At the present time with Russia under Soviet rule and busy with its Five Year Plan, it is difficult to forecast the future of national culture there.

AMERICAN CULTURE AN ASPIRATION

American culture is at least an aspiration and may be spoken of as something that is yet to come. In some ways, it bears analogy to Russian culture in that it was hardly thought of until the XVIIIth century and made no real beginning until the next century had come. Without any peasantry at the bottom or an official aristocracy at the top, America has led an average life in which political adjustment, industrial development, and commercial organization have been uppermost in the national mind. The separation of Church and State, which allowed the individual to worship according to the dictates of his own conscience, has been followed, although unofficially, by a similar separation of Academy and State, which has left the individual to follow the dictates of his own tastes. The result is that we have no national religion, but hosts of religious individuals; no national culture, but a goodly group of individuals interested in the intellectual life. Thus far American culture has been something in excess of national mentality, a kind of dessert one might or might not take after a hearty meal of substantial things.

¹³ *The Possessed*, tr. Garnett, p. 454.

Certain features of national culture are discernible in American life, if only in outline. In a remote manner, the American resembles the Athenian in his restless desire for enlightenment and the conviction that a good life, especially that of the citizen, depends upon knowledge. The public-school system might perhaps be regarded as reflecting the spirit of Socrates, although the way in which this is exemplified is just as suggestive of Protagoras, who sought to make the individual the measure of all things. This we do in the name of liberty and thus do we assert that the private citizen has a perfect right to poor taste, for American aesthetics ever tends to take this juristic point of view. In another sense, there is an analogy between American culture and that of Rome in the common practicality of these two people, ancient and modern. Then, in a manner not unlike that of France, American culture is dilettant in the way that it plays with ideas without assuming any philosophical responsibility for them. Americans find ideas interesting, but are not inclined to mull over them. For the most part, the culture-life of America is Anglican by inheritance and imitation. The only art it has is the literary one, although its commercial architecture is a sign of creative aesthetics.

THE MENTAL MELTING POT

The minor dilettantism of the American mind, which compares none too favorably with the major dilettantism of Gallic genius, has arisen apparently from the excess of information over the power of invention. Americans desire to know things, hence their thousands of newspapers, hundreds of magazines, and annual output of books on all subjects. They are given to encyclopedias, digests, and works of condensed information. In addition to this, they have a certain acquaintance with the ideas of other nations as these have been brought over by the more intellectual immigrants. The condition of the American mind is not unlike that indicated by Paul Bourget when he described the psychology of dilettantism as the mind's participation in "an infinite fecundity of things" whence arises a *mélange* of ideas and the "conflict among the dreams of the universe

elaborated by diverse races." There was a time in the progress of American culture when some were inclined to look to immigration as an intellectual influence and to feel that America might be able to synthesize a rich variety of ideals in a "melting pot." But not only has immigration ceased, but the effects of the influx of foreigners in the past has fashioned more of a witch's cauldron than a melting pot. A nation's intellect can endure and make good use of the ideas that come from some other nation, as Rome was nourished by Greek culture, but when a heedless variety of ideas is brought together the result is only confusion.

American culture so far as it has proceeded has been an experiment. It has attempted to develop culture on a democratic basis and pursue it in connection with a life of activity. Now, orthodox culture has always been founded on aristocracy and a life of leisure. The American ideal, instead of being the Athenian one, according to which the gods of intellect quietly surveyed the world from the heights of Olympus, tends to exemplify the prophecy of Daniel: "Many shall run to and fro and knowledge shall be increased." There can be no doubt that the American is attempting its national culture on this popular and activistic basis. The only possible doubt is whether such a new type of culture can so succeed as to place America among the cultured nations.

EMERSON AS CULTURE PROPHET

America had its culture prophet in the figure of Emerson, whose address *The American Scholar* was a sort of intellectual declaration of independence. He thought of the incipient American scholar as a native genius educated by Nature, by books, and by action, chiefly the first and the last, and implied that the American mind, while wanting in its own history of culture, could draw as minds in other nations had done from the original sources of spiritual life. Then, he prophesied, American scholars and not merely pedants and dilettants will appear. "We will walk on our own feet, we will work with our own hands, we will speak our own minds. The study of letters shall be no longer a name for pity, for doubt and for sensual indulgence. The dread

of man and the love of man shall be a wall of defense and a wreath of joy around all. A nation of men will for the first time exist, because each believes himself inspired by the Divine Soul which also inspires all men."

The intense Americanism of this noble document was quite in keeping with the juvenile sense of national pride peculiar to what we might call the first period of American culture. Herein we find artless tales of pioneer life—the backwoodsmen of Cooper, the early settlers of Irving, and the whalers of Melville. Such is the conception of poetry at the present time that one hesitates to introduce into its blatant music the flute-like tones of Longfellow's verse or make any mention of Poe's perfect technique in versification. In like manner, it seems out of place to say anything about the complacency enjoyed by the conventional novels of Howells. For we have turned away abruptly from the naïve and demure aesthetics our fathers were wont to enjoy. The present century has witnessed the rise of the discontented writer and disorganized artist. America, it seems, has no right to be self-satisfied, still less to indulge in the youthful braggadocio of writers like Bret Harte and Mark Twain. Ours is the era of disenchantment in which we find no more charms along "Main Street" and no particular merits in our "Babbitts." In place of the early literature, which was really "the American comedy," we have now something that Dreiser calls "the American tragedy." It remains to be seen whether this new pessimism in American culture will be as productive as the old optimism. It may turn out later that this era of our discontent will prove to have been but the transition to a higher level of intellectual life in America.

CHAPTER XXII

THE EASTERN QUESTION



THE ORIENT AWAKENS

WHEN, TOWARD THE CLOSE OF A WORK ON CIVILIZATION AND culture, we refer to The Eastern Question, we may appear to be dismissing a great problem with a shrug of the shoulders or a wave of the hand. Why, one may ask, was not the Orient mentioned if not fully elaborated at the beginning, and how can such a vast continent with its antique history and diversified races be compressed into a single chapter? The answer to this question has been given already if only by implication—that it was not until late modern times that western civilization felt the impact of the East in any form save that of the Hebrews and such other oriental peoples as were associated with them. Hence our western civilization betrays a Hebraic strain, while the Mongolian, Hindu, Persian, Siamese, and the like are not indicated. However, we do not intend to affect disdain for or disclaim responsibility toward the gigantic East. If it did not influence Christian civilization while it was in the making, it is beginning to bear upon it now with a force which is likely to intensify itself during the course of the century. “The sun also rises” and the East has at last arrived.

In taking up the oriental problem, if we may so call it, we are conscious of the fact that our method is rather indiscriminate. What we call the East includes more than its share of the earth's population and this great mass is divided into vast groups which, like the Chinese and Hindu, are decidedly characteristic. We have been careful to distinguish the Greek from the Roman, the Anglican from the Continental, and the American from the European, when these folks have definite likenesses. How, then, can we place the mask of the Orient over the features of Asiatics who among themselves are so sharply divided and widely diversified? Narrow little valleys separate our western peoples; tremendous canyons of space and time, language and custom yawn

between the Asiatic nations. Hence we feel somewhat conscience stricken when we take a whole continent of people with different religions, languages, civilizations, and the like and call it "The East." Yet in most ways we are justified.

EAST AND WEST

We will not proceed to our justification by employing what has become a kind of geographical "bromide" and thus say "East is East and West is West." Rather will we say that, for all their inherent differences, the nations of the Orient are all alike in being systematically different from those of the western world. These differences may be indicated sharply by stating that we of the West have indulged the principle of progress, which they of the East have seen fit to neglect, just as we have promoted the idea of historical movement and historical record, which seem to have meant so little in the oriental world. The trends of civilization that we have followed — science and philosophy, politics and social thought, industry and economics, have been traced out in the West since there was little indication of them in the East. And then, sad to relate, we have made our progress in civilization and culture by means of something by no means so well known or so eagerly accepted — war!

The Near East is no stranger to western thought, for it has been represented quite definitely by the Turk, with whom, it is to be hoped, we have learned how to deal. But at the present time the Far East, as also India, is looming up; hence it is well to look as far as we can in that direction, observe what has been going on in China, and try to adjust our vision to the future. Japan, like Turkey, is no such stranger to us, and the Japanese may become a practical problem for America as the Turk has been for Europe.

OLD CHINA

The history of China has been incomparably longer than was that of Rome, but how unimportant seems time when divided into such historical periods. The Chinese records give a confused

account of the beginning of things, but Creation is not a subject which warrants clarity. The first human being was Pan-ku and this Chinese Adam, who was likewise a Methuselah, was supposed to have lived millions of years before the opening of the historic period. After the passing of this ageless character there appeared the Heavenly Emperors in the form of a succession of thirteen brothers, each of whom is said to have ruled 18,000 years. The next in the royal order were the Earthly Emperors, eleven brothers, who are credited with some sort of astronomical observation and the development of a calendar. The Human Emperors, who came next in order, consisted of nine brothers who divided the world into nine countries and established towns and cities. Before anything like a historical character was placed on record, there was a period of five dragons and a number of fabulous emperors. At last came Fu Hsi, who reigned in the province of Honan from 2852 to 2738 B.C. and who is credited with having originated the law of marriage, the domestication of animals, the Chinese system of writing, the lute and the lyre, as also the fish net. Shen-nung (2738-2705 B.C.) appeared next and added to Chinese civilization the art of husbandry and the use of medicinal herbs. Huang-Ti (2705-2595 B.C.) invented the calendar and is reputed to have taught handicraft in connection with wood, clay, and metal.¹

This practical era was followed by four other rulers, who led up to the glorious reign of Yao (c. 2426 B.C.), the democratic king during the golden age of Chinese history. The Hsia period (2205-1766 B.C.) was marked by certain contributions to civilization in the form of astronomical study, the establishment of schools for nobles, and the invention of wine. The Shang period (1766-1122 B.C.) was significant for the beginning of lyric poetry, but it was the Chow dynasty (1122-255 B.C.) which began to reveal rational civilization and culture. This significant span of years includes the time of Lao Tze and Confucius, as also Mo Tze, "the Christ of China." In 536 B.C., the first written law code was effected. The Chin dynasty (221-206 B.C.) lasted only fifteen years but it was significant for having given its name "Chin" to

¹ *Les mémoires historiques de Se Ma Tsien traduits et annotés par Edouard Chavannes* (1905).

the country thenceforth known to the West as China. It was a period of centralized power, gold and copper coins came into use as the medium of exchange, the brush pen was invented, and the art of calligraphy came into being.

THE SONS OF HAN

The Han dynasty (200 B.C.-200 A.D.), which has given rise to the expression "Sons of Han" to describe the Chinese, was marked by the appearance of a Chinese history written by Sze-ma-chien, a Chinese dictionary by Hsu Shen, and the opening of the Imperial Library. The period of the Three Kingdoms (220-589 A.D.) was one of incessant war but did not prevent the appearance of poets and savants such as the Seven Scholars of Chang-an. In the succeeding period (589-618) the knowledge of the world was made under seven heads: 1) Classics; 2) History; 3) Philosophy and Military Tactics; 4) Poetry; 5) Arts and Sciences; 6) Buddhism; 7) Tâoism. The Tang dynasty (618-907) covered a period of Chinese culture. For the first time in China's history, the *intelligentsia* of north and south cooperated in the cultural movement, making it possible for the Chinese to claim that in the VIIIth century theirs was the most cultured land under the sun. The Sung period (960-1280) was an age of refinement which produced some famous poets and painters, while the Yuan period (1280-1368) was the age of Kublai Khan, the Mongol leader. Other periods followed, but it is the Ching dynasty (1644-1911) which interests us by reason of its relation to the West.

CONTACTS OF EAST AND WEST

The earliest contact between East and West is not on record, but doubtless it antedates the Christian era. There are annals of Chinese emperors wherein the doings of the Romans are mentioned. On the other side of Asia, the Hebrew prophet Isaiah cast Messianic glances in more than one direction and appears to have scanned China, "the land of Sinim." "Behold, these shall come from far; and, lo, these from the north and from the

west; and these from the land of Sinim.”² Horace, certain poets of the Augustan period, Pliny, and Ptolemy refer to China and its people under the names of “Sin,” “Chin,” “Sinae,” and “Seres.” In the IInd century A.D., Marinus, the Tyrian geographer, knew China under the name of “Chin.” In the VIth century, the Greek monk Cosmos Indicopleutes referred to the land as though his reader knew just where China was; in the VIIth century, the Byzantine Theophylactus Simocatta refers to the Chinese as Taugas.

The interest in the East was an economic one and might be symbolized by the term “silk,” or *ser* as the Mongolians called it. The name came into Greece and Rome along with the product itself and thus we observe that Virgil, Horace, Strabo, and others made mention of the *Seres* or *Sericae*. But silk was not all that the Westerners procured from China, for there were other desirable things, such as furs and iron, and it was Chinese iron rather than the more luxurious product which appealed to Pliny. The silk industry in China dates as far back as the Empress Huang-ti (c. 2640 B.C.), who encouraged the cultivation of the mulberry tree and the rearing of silkworms. It is said that the eggs of the silkworm and seeds of the mulberry tree were carried into India by a Chinese princess (419 A.D.), who secreted them in the lining of her headdress. From the Ganges valley, the silkworm seems to have moved into Khotam, Persia, and Central Asia, finally to arrive at Rome, where its precious product was worth its weight in gold. But the silkworm in China was one thing, in the West another, and it was a long time before the manufacture of silk was achieved. However, there were two Persian monks who had lived in China, where they had learned the art of silk-making. These monks came to Constantinople and told the emperor of their talent but confessed to their lack of raw material for the art, whereupon they repaired to China and in 550 returned to the Byzantine capital with a supply of silkworm’s eggs duly concealed in a bamboo cane. It was thus that the West learned this valuable form of manufacture.

Chinese salesmanship two thousand years ago was nothing in comparison with this business art at the present time, yet business

trips were not unknown. According to the Chinese records, the Emperor Wu Ti of the Han dynasty sent a certain envoy named Chang Chien to Bactria, Parthia, and Mesopotamia. Leaving China in 138 B.C., this agent returned twelve years later with tales to relate about the regions round the Oxus and Jaxartes rivers. He reported that he had seen Chinese goods in Bactrian markets—clothing and bamboo sticks, imported from Szechwan and Yunan through India and Afghanistan. This trip marks the beginning of China's trade with the West. It is said further of this Chang Chien that upon his return from his long trip he brought back with him the grapevine and alfalfa and had such seeds as those of the walnut, hemp, and grape hidden upon his person.

The wandering of this Chinese "salesman" bears certain but yet remote resemblances to the more classical journey of Ulysses. Chang Chien and his hundred companions were captured by the Huns. In vain he tried to escape; he therefore settled down to the extent of taking a Hun wife and begetting a son, yet with an eye ever cast eastward. When the Huns were busy fighting another tribe, he escaped without his family and with only one of his hundred followers. Before reaching home, Chang Chien had to endure capture by a Tatar tribe, but at last he did effect his long-delayed return and in quite the modern spirit wrote an account of his perilous journey. Not only did this business trip enrich the experience of this Chinese *entrepreneur*, but it won him the title of "Road Opener." In 104 B.C., the Chinese general Li Kuang-li fared forth with a larger force on a different mission, since his purpose was to avenge the murder of the Chinese envoys at Ferghana. Before he returned, this Mongolian militarist had entered into diplomatic relations with Parthia and even sent an envoy, Kan Ying, as far west as the Syrian border of the Roman Empire.

WESTERNERS GO EAST

The overtures of the West to the East were not quite so theatrical. Chinese records of 196 A.D. make mention of an envoy from the Emperor Marcus Aurelius and there is an astronomical

treatise said to have been brought to China from somewhere in the Roman Empire. In 166 A.D., the records are to the effect that King An Tun, said to be the Emperor Antoninus, sent a mission to the Chinese. Some contemporary Orientals are of the opinion that the emissary in question may have been none other than his nephew, none other than Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, who may have wished to acquire eastern wisdom and substitute it for Greek philosophy, but it is doubtful whether this Roman Stoic would extend his investigations to such length. After a lapse of some three centuries in a period of history when centuries did not mean much, China had the advantage of entertaining emissaries from Fu-lin, or Constantinople. Nestorian missionaries followed during the reign of Tang Tai Tsung (627-650) and were established under imperial patronage. But the exchange of cultures was not confined to the silk industry and diplomacy. It assumed the more prosaic form of paper and block type.

The art of making paper came westward in a rather circumstantial manner. There were Arabian merchants who had entered in business relations with the Chinese and during a battle between squads of the two nations the Arabs managed to take some Chinese prisoners. Now certain of these soldiers were none the less printers, or were familiar with the art of paper-making, and communicated the same to their Arabian conquerors. Paper-making reached Europe through Spain, where Arabs and Europeans were thinking of something other than this useful art-industry. Block printing on paper dates back to 593 A.D. in China. The development of the art was so slow, however, that it was not until the Xth century that a certain Feng Tao struck off the first book in modern form. The oldest printed book now in existence, one of the many precious things in the British Museum, is in the Korean language. In the year 932, or exactly one thousand years ago, all the Confucian classics were printed in book form by order of the Chinese government.

In addition to these more material exchanges of civilization there was the religious relationship promoted by the Nestorian missionaries already mentioned. Their arrival in China, dated at 635, was made manifest by a tablet or monument erected in

781 and discovered in 1625 at Sian in Shensi province. According to this source, a certain A-lo-peu (Raban or Ruben) as well as others reached China and translated the Bible into Chinese. Those were the days of toleration, and the Emperor Tai Tsung received representatives of all religious faiths, including Buddhists, Parsees, Manicheans, as well as these Nestorians. Likewise were there guests from various nations, including the Japanese, Koreans, Tibetans, Tatars, and Annamese. The Chinese court was a veritable culture center and hither came envoys from the caliphs of Omar and Othman and the Byzantine emperor Theodosius.

The rise of the Mongols shows us what the Chinese Empire was and suggests what it might become again in the future if it could produce another Jenghiz Khan (c.1155-1227). Under the leadership of this Tatar leader, China extended its already large borders and spread its sway from the Pacific Ocean to central Europe, so that northern, central, and western Asia, to say nothing of southern Russia and the lower Danube land, was under Mongol sway. The sons of Jenghiz were no less aggressive, for they advanced their regime in Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Dalmatia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. To be sure, they were beaten back by western force and retained only Russia, which paid tribute to the house of Khan until 1480. This is just so much history and has been written numerous times, but it is worth while reflecting upon what China might do if it were to resume its one-time militarism under the auspices of modern warfare. The West, especially Europe, still persists in the assumption that all civilization and culture, not to mention industry and warfare, are its own prerogatives. But the West is not what it was, so that in time it may have to come to an understanding with the East.


THE RISE OF ORIENTALISM

From the XIIIth century to the present time, the East has been a source of fascination for the West, which has lingered over the travel tales of Friar John Plano Carpini, Friar Odoric the Bohemian, William of Rubruquis, Ibn Batuta the Moor, and Marco



Ewing Galloway, N. Y.

THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA, BUILT ABOUT 214 B.C.
Every hundred yards the wall is fortified with a tower.



TEMPLE OF CONFUCIUS, PEKING, CHINA

Polo of Venice.³ Still another and later popular Orientalist was Sir John de Mandeville. Shakespeare had heard of Salamis and in *Othello* we hear an echo from its streets. Coleridge, after reading Marco Polo's account of the summer palace, had a vision of the "stately pleasure dome where Alph the sacred river ran, through caverns measureless to man." After Marco Polo, the first information in written words appears in the reports of the Jesuit missionaries after they had gained access to China. A sample of a French missionary's letter, printed in 1589, is found in the following: "From the most glorious and right royal isle of Japan and then straight from the uttermost end of the earth, to wit: from the most mighty empire of the Chinas." Between 1596 and 1598 the first Chinese portraits were brought to Holland, and French engravers in the time of Louis XIVth printed from the Dutch plates and found no little market for their pictures. Treatises about China soon followed. In 1655 *Novus Atlas Sinensis de Martino Martini* appeared in Vienna and had a wide circulation. This geographical work exercised a considerable influence over Athanasius Kircher, who published a copiously illustrated work on China.

But pictures or books of illustrations were not the only reflections of the East upon the mind of the West. In 1662 Père Ignatius da Costa translated the *Ta Hsio* or *Great Doctrine* and published it in China under the title of *Sapientia Sinica*, with woodcuts in the Chinese style. The work, by the way, was a discussion of Chinese philosophy generally, with special reference to Confucius and his social system of morals. In 1673 came Intorcetta's translation of *Chung Yung*, which contained a life of Lao Tze done in both Latin and French. In addition to this, the work expatiated on the *Táo*, or *logos* or *ratio* or way of this same Lao Tze. The first translation of the *Analects* of Confucius was made by Père Philippe in 1687. The *Analects* consists of twenty chapters of Confucian philosophy wherein the *Jen*, or human relationship, receives much stress. The religious feature of this staid work appears in the idea that as institutions depend upon morals, so morals depend upon beliefs. At the same time,

³ *The Book of Sir Marco Polo*, tr. Yule (1903); Jordanus, *The Wonders of the East*, tr. Yule (1863).

the Chinese sage did not fail to stress the domestic ideal for which China is famous, saying, "When all families are in proper order, all will be right with the world."⁴ Further appreciation of the Chinese on the part of the French is observable in the work of Père Lecomte, *Das heutige Sina* (1686). "When Heaven distributed the gifts of nature, it gave to the French valor and the science of war, to the Dutch shrewdness in trade, to the English the art of navigation, to the Chinese skill in government, but to themselves, the Siamese, wisdom and understanding."⁵

FRENCH INTEREST IN CHINA

French interest in China was so marked in the XVIIIth century that New Year's Day, 1801, was celebrated in the French court with festivities of a Chinese character. Under Chinese influence, the stateliness of the Gothic and the formalism of the classic Renaissance were forgotten and French architecture assumed the Rococo form. This style, itself implicit in the Baroque, invited a relaxation of forms, the introduction of subtle lines, and a fondness for pale tones. The lighter arts likewise betrayed the oriental influence in the enthusiasm over porcelain and shimmering Chinese silk — *peau de chine*. The Chinese garden became popular; Louis La Comte, who in 1696 wrote on the subject, was widely read. During the period 1750-1759, Chambers, architect to the king of England, produced the first Chinese garden in the West. In order to study the subject, he made two journeys to China, and in addition to his new departure in landscape gardening wrote his *Essay on Oriental Gardening*. The Chinese garden which Chambers developed in Kew Garden for the Duke of Kent became the model for others, and, when taken up in France, became known as "Chinese-English." Replicas of the pagoda in this garden were built in Het Loo, Holland, at Chanteloup on the Loire, and in the *Englischer Garten* in Munich.

But the thoughts as well as the things of China made some appeal to Europe, as can be seen in the political philosophy

⁴ Cf. Reichwein, *China and Europe* (1925).

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 309.

of François Quesnay. Quesnay happened to meet in Paris a Chinaman named Ko, from whom he learned something about the man's homeland. The Chinese conception of State and citizenship appealed to Quesnay and his political economy seems to indicate some intellectual importations from the East. He commented upon the *Analects* of Confucius, saying, "They all deal with good government, virtue, and good works; this collection is full of principles and moral sentences which surpass those of the Seven Sages of Greece." This Quesnay goes on to add, in *Despotisme de la Chine*, "It is only the method of the Chinese doctrine which should serve as the model for all States." His pupil Mirabeau shared his enthusiasm for Confucius and, speaking at the funeral of Quesnay, he said, "The whole teaching of Confucius aimed at restoring to human nature that first radiance which it had received from Heaven and which had become obscured by ignorance and passion. He therefore exhorted his countrymen to obey the Lord of Heaven, to honor and fear him, to love their neighbors as themselves, to overcome their inclinations, never to make passion the measure of action but to subject it to reason, and not to do or think or say anything contrary to reason."

The XVIIIth century, especially in France, seemed susceptible to oriental influence; the age was weary of its own civilization and sought something. In this case it was really the old, yet the East served as a novelty and provided a step back toward nature. We observe this in Voltaire's oft-quoted maxim that wisdom and happiness come from a cultivation of the garden, but we feel the force of it more fully in Rousseau's excessive enthusiasm for what he called nature. This has already received notice and needs no repetition. However, we may observe that the Chinese who have become acquainted with this Gallic genius are inclined to find his historical prototype in their ancient culture.

EASTERN AND WESTERN THOUGHT

His sentiments sound somewhat like an echo from the writings of Lao Tze, although there is no indication that Rousseau was influenced by the Chinese sage whose writings had yet to see

the light of western translation. There is, however, some resemblance between the intellectual nihilism of the early oriental writer and the more hectic naturalism of the late western one, so much so that Chinese students who have adopted European culture are inclined to press the analogy. The *Táo Teh King*, written by Lao Tze, advocated a retreat from the civilization of his day, the sixth century B.C. But that was not all, since this Chinese Rousseau, as we might call him, seems to have favored a flight from all reality for the sake of finding peace in a kind of mystical nothingness. He shows the endless attraction of nonexistence by calling our attention to sweet nothings with which we are already familiar. The *Táo* is like the emptiness of a jug, like the empty space in a wheel where the axle turns; it is the charming hollowness of a door or window in a house. The jug serves as a container, the wheel turns, and both door and window perform their functions of ventilation and illumination simply because they are not, because of their sublime emptiness.⁶ This, however, is not romanticism and is not likely to appeal to the Rousseauian; rather is it a nihilism in which all western cultures would be swallowed up.

The intellectual *entente* of East and West was strengthened by the influence of Goethe, for he also appears to have felt the appeal of the Chinese mind. Certain European scholars, primarily Von Biedermann,⁷ are of the opinion that the oriental influence was sufficiently direct to have contributed to the sources of Goethe's play *Elenor*. What had Goethe to say about the question? In his diary, January 10, 1781, there is a note to the effect that he was reading *A Detailed Description of the Chinese Empire* by Du Halde and had come across a play and a story which interested him. This play was *The Little Orphan of the House of Chao*. On September 4, 1817, according to the diary, Goethe read another Chinese play, *An Heir in His Old Age*, and described it as a remarkable piece of work. In his old age he confessed to being impressed by certain Chinese poems which had been translated into French; and toward the close of his life, as we observe from his conversations with Eckermann, January 31, 1827, he said: "I see more and more that poetry is

⁶ *Táo Teh King*, tr. Legge, Ch. 4, p. 11.

⁷ *Goethe-Forschungen* (1879).

a common possession of mankind. The expression 'national literature' does not mean much now. The age of 'world literature' is at hand and every one should endeavor to hasten its coming." But all such literary enthusiasm for the East was little more than so much exoticism; we may liken it to Europe's interest in China's silk. The more direct contact through literature, commerce, and politics was yet to come.

THE STUDY OF CHINESE LITERATURE

The exact knowledge of Chinese literature dates from the days of James Legge (1815-1897), whose thirty years as a missionary in China, whatever it may have meant to the Chinese, resulted in the translation of the Chinese classic nine volumes (1861-1886). Legge appeals to the Chinese as a man with missionary prejudices but they feel indebted to him for the way he gave publicity to their esteemed literature. The volumes in question consist of the Five Classics, or the *King*, and the Four Books, or the *Shu*, containing the *Analects* of Confucius, *The Great Learning*, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, and *The Book of Mencius*. In addition to these authoritative works, Legge translated the teachings of Mo Tze, which are supposed to draw a spiritual line parallel to that of Christianity before the latter was in existence, selected parts of *Yang Chu*, and various prose poems. The classics mentioned are embodied in *The Sacred Books of the East*, edited by F. Max Müller.

Since we are seeking to indicate the intellectual lines extended between West and East, we may note that America as well as Europe came to feel the fascination of the Orient and to feel that the cradle of the human race might still be of interest to the mature men of the West. Emerson, who so often indulged his sense of intellectual irresponsibility, was in possession of certain translations which Legge had made. He read *The Book of Poetry* and dabbled in certain secondary sources of Chinese wisdom. In 1868, when the Chinese minister visited Boston, Emerson made a speech characterized by a graceful gesture toward the East: "China interests us at this moment in a point of politics. I am sure that the gentlemen around me bear in

mind the bill . . . requiring that candidates for public offices shall first pass examinations on their literary qualifications for the same. Well, China has preceded us as well as England and France in this essential correction of a reckless usage, and the like high esteem of education appears in China in social life to whose distinctions it is made an indispensable passport." The Confucian realism with all its staid talk about education, family life, and politics was far from intriguing the genius of the Concord sage, who preferred ideas that were incapable of exact statement and direct application. Hence it was Lao Tze with his dumb-founding doctrine of the T'ao rather than the homely Confucius who appealed to Emerson.

Emerson maintained his role of "Greek Yankee" and descended just far enough into the vasty deeps of the Spirit to look like an American Buddhist, but he was not so adept in the part of a mandarin. His oriental thought seems to have passed through Athens and undergone a change of attire. "As we go back before the light of tradition comes in, the veil drops. . . . All tends toward the mysterious East. . . . From the time of the first dispersion of the human family to the rise of the Greeks, everything in the history of man is obscure and we think ourselves fortunate if we can write in broad lines the fate of a dynasty."⁸ Now, that which drew the intellectual emotions of Emerson toward the East, which he did not for a moment understand, was his own doctrine of the "Oversoul." The conception of spiritual emanation to which we human beings owe our existence and enlightenment made an original appeal to Emerson, since it delivered him from logic and action. It is not to be wondered at that he was inclined to see the exemplification of this sentiment in the original gropings of the oriental mind represented so strangely by both Buddhism and T'aoism.

ORIENTAL PESSIMISM

The oriental idea in Buddhistic and other forms has made appeal to some of the more delicious minds in Europe and America. In 1879 Edwin Arnold sought to popularize Buddhism

⁸ Cf. Carpenter, *Emerson and Asia* (1930).

through his work *The Light of Asia*. In the present century, the appeal of the East has been felt by H. A. Giles, Witter Bynner, Amy Lowell, Ezra Pound, Arthur Waley, Eugene O'Neill, John Hall Wheelock, and others. Among students of Chinese literature we find I. R. Richards, Irving Babbitt, and Arthur Hummel. A much more profound sympathy for the East was felt in the XIXth century, when popular Orientalism was not so fashionable. We have mentioned Goethe as a modern who found a *motif* in some bit of Chinese literature but we should not harbor the impression that there was anything oriental in the sense of suffering expressed in *The Sorrows of Werther* and *Torquato Tasso*. Goethean grief was far from being a borrowed emotion and the subject of it did not have to look abroad for sorrow. Hence we may understand that he spoke for himself when he said, "Some god gave me power to tell how I suffer — *Gab mir ein Gott zu sagen wie ich leide.*"

In the case of Schopenhauer, whose pessimism competed with the worst forms of Asiatic despair, the case is not so clear. In his major work, *The World as Will and Idea*, Schopenhauer refers sympathetically to the *Bhagavad Gita*,⁹ makes a rather unconvincing comment on the doctrine of the "Gunas" in the *Brahmanas*,¹⁰ and specializes, we might say, in the objective idealism of the *Upanishads*.¹¹ This is in connection with the principle of Vedanta, whereby the disciple of that philosophical faith is led to identify himself with the world and the world with himself according to the maxim "That thou art — *tat tvam asi.*" Schopenhauer's notion was that each little fretful will is but an expression of the one Will-to-Live, which is hardly what the Vedanta itself teaches.

The East made a more sincere appeal to the Russian mind, which both physically and psychologically is closer to the Orient. Tolstoi seems to avail himself of both Christian and Buddhistic sentiments in his criticism of modern civilization, as one may observe from reading his spiritual autobiography, *My Religion*. Dostoievsky, who to his sorrow knew the Siberian section of Asia, falls quite naturally into Buddhistic moods. "Compassion is the only law of human existence," he wrote; is not this Bud-

⁹ *Op. cit.*, § 54.

¹⁰ *Ib.*, § 59.

¹¹ *Ib.*, § 63.

dhistic? Or, as a more palpable example of the Buddhistic, take the case of the hero in *The Idiot*. A mental affliction had so operated in the brain of "the idiot" that it had removed all desire for life and tendency toward evil, so that he was placed almost automatically in the condition of Nirvana or something akin to it. Now, it was the idea of human life reduced to a minimum that made appeal to Dostoevsky, who was bound to prefer Buddhistic quietism to the Tatar sense of vicious self-affirmation which he observed in Russia. But concerning all these furtive attempts to express western feeling in eastern forms, we might suggest that in most cases they seem affected. In addition to this it might be pointed out that the Christian feeling of seriousness and the Shakespearean sense of sorrow, as expressed in Hamlet, are adequate unto most of our emotional needs, so that we need not borrow any feelings from the Far East.

POLITICAL APPROACHES TO THE EAST

There have been political as well as literary approaches to the East. The Portuguese made expeditions to China in 1517 and 1522, but upon both occasions were expelled. In 1553, however, they succeeded in establishing themselves in Macao but not without political conflict. It seems that the king of Portugal, having already assumed the title "Lord of the Indies," wanted something of the same sort of lordship in China. Blood was shed, as might be expected, and the political ambition of the Portuguese frustrated; but they did succeed in acquiring the privilege of trading along the coastline with Macao as a base.

In 1543 the Spaniards seized the Philippines, where quite a Chinese colony had been established. Competition set in and as a result the Spaniards massacred the whole Chinese population, some 20,000 in number. When more Chinese came to the Philippines, the method of massacre was repeated; and then the Spaniards decided to permit a colony limited to 6,000 to remain and carry on trade. The reaction of the Chinese government represented by the officials at Canton was such, among other things, as to create what they called a Co-hong, or group of thirteen Chinese merchants appointed to arrange

trade relations with foreigners and it was through the members of the Co-hong that the new western business men had to deal. In their business relations, it may be remarked, the Chinese merchants used no contracts but still kept faithfully to their word.

The West was represented again in the East when Dutch traders reached the East Indies in 1599. They came to Canton to trade, but the jealous Portuguese persuaded the Chinese officials to oppose them. In retaliation, the Dutch sent fifteen ships to attack Macao but were repulsed, whereupon they went to the Pescadores, only to be driven out thence. For a while they established themselves in Formosa, but the Chinese took this from them, so that their trade expedition came to naught and for a century they accomplished nothing but what could be done by smuggling. With the beginning of the Manchu reign in China certain western nations, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and Russian, approached the land more diplomatically in the form of embassies which came to China in search of commercial privileges.¹²

EASTERN TRADE

The English came to China in 1620 and seventeen years later employed the cannon to force commercial relations with their host. But apparently little came of this militant method of mercantilism, since the British were busy at home, and it was not until the XVIIIth century that they repeated their vigorous attempts at salesmanship. It was in the XIXth century, however, that the Chinese were made to realize how seriously the western world takes the question of business. Most of the British trade with China was in the hands of the East India Company, an organization comparable to the Co-hong already mentioned. The British business organization was responsible for the Opium War of 1840; it began to open the slanting eyes of the Chinese to some of our western ways. The opium habit was spreading and the Chinese officials were concerned about it; they wanted less of the drug rather than more. When the Chinese government forbade the importation of opium and destroyed 20,000

¹² *Histoire du Commerce du Monde* (1894).

chests of the drug, the English government went to war. The conflict came to an end with the unjust treaty of 1842, whereby China was forced to pay the cost of the war, indemnify Britain for the destruction of the opium, and cede the city of Hongkong to her. Thus arose the extra-territorial jurisdiction of foreigners in China.¹³

The relation of France with China began by being politico-religious, for the French were interested in the activities of the Roman Catholic Church in China. But the French, like the English, showed themselves somewhat predatory and the conflicting aims of western missionaries and merchants were somewhat bewildering to the naïve Orientals. France joined England in fighting China in 1857, when Peking was captured and the imperial palace burned. In 1884 France again came into conflict with China over Tonkin, which had been a vassal state of the Chinese.

Although an American ship landed in China the year the United States gained its independence from England, it was not until 1844 that a treaty between the two nations was signed. The American treaty was the same in content as the British document as far as extra-territorial stipulations were concerned, so that America did not appear much more friendly to the Chinese than Europe had been. But there was at least one bright spot in the dark firmament of diplomacy. It was found in the diplomatic career of Anson Burlingame, whom President Lincoln sent as Minister to China. After six years of service, Burlingame resigned and became an envoy in the Chinese service. This Burlingame became the head of the Chinese political mission to various nations; he advocated a more just international policy concerning China and insisted upon the full recognition of her sovereign rights. One example of this diplomacy appears in a treaty signed by Secretary Seward for the United States in 1868.

The age-old isolation of China ended before the Opium War of 1840, for at that time China was no longer left to herself. Disputes with France and England gave her some idea of western civilization, opened her seaports, and started foreign

¹³ Soothill, *China and the West* (1925).

trade. China began to realize the importance of knowing foreign languages other than the famous "pigeon English," as the Mongolian tongue pronounced "business English." A school for the study of western languages, called the Tung Wen Kuan, was founded, political reforms inaugurated, and a navy established. Books on modern science were published and with the reform of 1898 there appeared Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, to be followed by Mill's *Logic* and essay *On Liberty*, Spencer's *Sociology*, and Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*.

HOW CHINA AWOKE

China was on the way toward Europeanization when its slumbering nationalism awoke in the form of the Boxer Rebellion. She has yet to recover financially from the heavy drain upon her resources, sadly reduced by payments for indemnity. The outside world had never looked attractive to the self-contained nation, but the anti-foreign feeling reached a climax at the end of the century. Japan made war upon the defeated China in 1895 and took Formosa as a trophy. The western powers saw similar opportunities and began to take advantage of them. Germany got Kiaochow, England Weiheiwei and Kowloon, and France Kwang Chow-wan, while Russia leased Port Arthur and Dalny. These powers became rivals in the matter of mines, railways, and the like, and serenely availed themselves of the special privileges that China had accorded foreigners. At last China showed resentment and a society called "The Righteous Harmony Fists," or "Boxers," spurred on by the empress dowager, attempted to kill the "foreign devils." The result of the revolt was defeat for China, which had to pay heavy indemnity for the death and destruction wrought by the Boxers. Although China was humiliated by this experience, she took heart again after observing the victory of a sister oriental land, when Japan defeated Russia in 1904. Chinese students flocked to Japan to learn the art of war and the Chinese government began to assume a more modern form.

The Chinese revolution of 1911 has become a great landmark in the rather eventless history of that country. Its leader,

Sun Yat-sen, respected the old culture in a way but was not at all averse to western methods. His one ambition was to break down the Manchu rule and establish a republic upon the noble ruins. Sun Yat-sen was not himself successful but he engendered a political spirit which has become symbolic of unity and progress in China. The revolution gave the Chinese a sense of self-confidence, which, except in the case of Japan or Turkey, had ever been lacking in the oriental world. During the World War, China had a chance to breathe and go about developing her industries. Socially and economically, China was better off for the war in the West, although politically she was not prepared to meet international competition, to say nothing of the special aggression of Japan.

In order to understand the recent conflict between China and Japan, we must bear in mind the sociological differences between the two types of mind. The Japanese rejoices in a spirit of all-for-one and aims at the tight unity of the nation. China, made up of various tribes who have always agreed to disagree rather than to work their way to compactness and unity, stands for sectional units rather than national unification. The Japanese are a small, progressive, and aggressive people, proud of themselves but the subject of disdain on the part of China. Their 60,000,000 inhabitants, who strain the imperial islands, represent a population which has doubled in the last sixty years. The Japanese mind appeals to the Chinese as being rather self-styled or *sui generis*, as though it were neither an orientalized nor occidentalized but a native consciousness. Japan rejoices in modernized mills and factories, a well-trained and completely equipped army, and the third largest navy in the world. Since the time that Commodore Perry opened her gates by force in 1853, Japan has progressed by learning western lessons and following western examples and the last seventy-five years have seen her emerge from semibarbarism to a condition of intensive civilization and authentic political power. In her wars, Japan has known nothing but success and she is proud of the way she has played the part of David with such a Goliath as Russia and China. In order to carry on as a world power, Japan must have foreign trade and foreign territory much

after the manner of the great island empire of the West — Great Britain.

CHINA AND JAPAN

The recent Chino-Japanese clash in Manchuria was due to a pair of fundamental factors. There was, first, a series of treaties and agreements forced upon China whereby Japan established her interest and influence in Manchuria and, second, Chinese nationalism. Japan intends to extend her power on the mainland, while China is just as determined to deliver herself from foreign aggression. The relations between China and Japan, never any too friendly, have been strained since 1925. In the first place, there is the mutual hatred between two oriental nations dwelling side by side; and, further, the more modern clash in the economic field. China has resolved to build railways to compete with the lines controlled by the Japanese. The Mukden-Hailungcheng railway, built by the Chinese, runs parallel with the Kirin-Changchun line managed by the Japanese. Then there is the Mukden-Kirin road constructed by China. The Japanese state of mind is such that she finds it intolerable to have China conduct her own ways of transportation.

China regards Japan with suspicion and believes that the island empire is indulging in imperialistic plans. China believes that her little Asiatic relative is planning the conquest of the southwestern Pacific, including Formosa, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and certain islands below the equator. But not bits of land in the sea only, for China is under the painful impression that Japanese ambition extends to the mainland also, where Japan seems to desire dominion over eastern Asia, including Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia, if not China itself. The western powers have been able to check the southern sweep over the sea; but various things, internal strife in China, Russia's preoccupation with her Five Year Plan, and the economic depression in the West, seem to be making Japan's Asiatic ambition more likely.

As for China, it may be said that she is the one country which rejoices in a civilization wherein adjustment by compromise

rather than domination by war has been the rule. She entered the League of Nations whole-heartedly, but her membership in that body has not been of quite so much value to her as her own troops. China, however, has yet to become a militaristic nation; but a great destructive power reposes within her walls. With her incomparable numbers and vast natural resources, she is a potential military power. In addition to this implicit aggressiveness, China is in a position to unite with Russia and confront the whole world with a vigorous communism. In the past, China has fascinated the imagination; before long she may attract the attention of the world in a more serious way.

OUR ASIATIC RELATIVES

Our gesture toward the "Orient," as we call it, appears unusually broad when we turn from the Chinese to the Hindus. From the historical point of view we are more like the people of India than they are like the Chinese. Our very language shows that, for we and our Hindu relatives speak the Indo-European tongue, which has no sort of linguistic connection with the speech of the Semites or that of the various Mongolian tribes. The ancient Aryan tongue, divided as it was into Sanskrit and Zend and still extant in the modern languages of India and Persia, has not been lost in Greek, Latin, the Romance languages, German, English, Slavic, and Celtic. But it was centuries after the separation of Asia and Europe that the Westerners realized that they were talking upon a more or less Asiatic basis. There is also a kind of psychological affinity between Europe and India in that the West follows mental processes of analysis, definition, logical reasoning, and the like, by no means so striking outside the Indo-European group of peoples. The Hindus have their Vedanta philosophy and we have our rationalism. Then why is it we do not come to an understanding with India and embrace Brahmanism?

The answer to that impromptu question is quite simple when considered in historical terms. We, the people of the western world, having lost sight of our Hindu connections, were induced to adopt a Hebrew form of religion, so that we who are of Aryan stock and Aryan tone rejoice in a form of spiritual life peculiar

to the Semites, the Hebrews. If Christianity had remained a Jewish sect such as it was at the outset of its career, our position in religion would be extremely paradoxical, but the passage of the Church to the Gentiles and the expansion of Christianity into a world religion make it possible for us with good grace to be Christians. The apostle of Hindu faith, as a persuasive Swami, may point out that we are so constituted mentally and so related historically that we should be Vedantists, but long ago the famous Apostle to the Gentiles gave us good reasons why we should become Christians.

A study of civilization in taking up The Eastern Question, as we are calling it, is bound to interest itself in India and the present situation in that overpopulous peninsula. We realize the historical fact that the British put in an appearance there more than three centuries ago, after which the inevitable happened. England established herself and for two centuries has been in practical control of the land. But what is the XXth-century situation in India? There was unrest at the beginning of the epoch, but the coming of the World War found India throwing her forces on the side of her English emperor to the extent of supplying England with a million and a quarter soldiers. But it has been different since the armistice, for in 1918 certain difficulties arose.

INDIA TODAY

The British government passed into the hands of the "Die-hards" and instead of rewarding India for her help in the World War it began to impose laws and ordinances to suppress the nationalistic spirit in India. The Indians, like the Irish, wanted home rule or at least dominion status like that of Canada. It was at this juncture that Gandhi came to the front. At heart he was a Loyalist and in political procedure a Moderate. He had served England in both the Boer War and the World War, so that his allegiance to the crown was hardly to be questioned. But after 1918 Gandhi became disaffected toward England because of her repudiation of India's claims for herself and political partnership with England. Then there arose certain political activities

in India as well as outbursts of the nationalistic spirit. These were due to three major causes:


1. The enactment of the Rowlatt Acts, which led to rule by martial law in several of India's provinces.

2. The massacre of Amritsar, in 1919, of unarmed Hindus gathered in a peaceful meeting to pass political resolutions.


3. The breach of promise to Indian Moslems, who had been promised that the Turkish Empire would not be dismembered if they fought on the side of the Allies, even when they had to take up arms against their fellow-religionists. Gandhi himself launched the non-coöperation movement against England and as a result Moslems, Sikhas, and Parsees, to say nothing of Hindus, flocked to his standard. Gandhi was an apostle of non-violence, but in spite of him riots and assassinations of British officials did occur. Gandhi was imprisoned in 1922 and thousands of Hindus working under the Indian National Congress were jailed and severely penalized. Due to his ill health, Gandhi was released, whereupon he ordered the Congress to desist in their work of non-coöperation but to contest seats in the Provincial and Federal Assemblies. The Nationalists had no difficulty in winning the elections and, having done so, attempted to bring the government to a standstill by obstructionist tactics.

HINDU INDUSTRY

Gandhi is by no means as poetical as Tagore, but he does not fail to project romantic ideals in industrialism. This he does in his little book entitled *The Wheel of Fortune*; by this he means what we more frankly call "the machine." But does Gandhi want this "Wheel of Fortune" to move forwards or backwards? Does he want to play a quixotic part and fight the power mill with the hand loom and have the enterprise of Manchester or any other factory town in England imitate the spinning methods in little Hindu villages? Apparently not, yet his industrial ideal is not clearly stated. "Do I want to destroy machinery altogether? . . . My answer is: I would not weep over the disappearance of machinery or consider it a calamity. But I have no design upon machinery as such. What I want to do at



JAPANESE PRINT, FROM AN OLD WOODCUT



DILWARRA TEMPLE, MT. ABU, INDIA

(facing page 592)

the present moment is to supplement the production of yarn and cloth through our mills, save the millions we send out of India, and distribute them in our cottages. This I cannot do until the nation is prepared to devote its leisure hours to spinning.”¹⁴

The idea of having the Hindu population use its leisure hours for spinning and thus supplement the work of the machine by light hand-labor is perhaps more artistic than economic, although in the spirit of the economist Gandhi does not fail to note that “even at the present time the weavers weave more cloth than the mills.”¹⁵ He makes us think of William Morris rather than John Stuart Mill. His argument proceeds primarily by analogy: “Why should not each home manufacture its own cloth even as it cooks its own food?”¹⁶ Now it is the cloth industry, which in such a climate as India’s might seem unimportant, and no other form of manufacture for which Gandhi contends, and that upon the ground that India should cleave to the home loom and family stove rather than resort to the gigantic mill and huge bakery.

Is Gandhi an Indian industrialist? Apparently not, from his rather tepid enthusiasm for the machine. When he exalts the loom, his “Wheel of Fortune,” he does not mean something pro-Hindu and economic but something anti-British and political. He will fight England with the hand loom and inspire his people with the patriotism of taste. “Will the nation revise its taste for Japanese silk, the Manchester calico or the French lace and find all its decoration out of hand-spun and hand-woven cloth?”¹⁷ If it will do that, it can carry out its program of non-coöperation; it can conduct its boycott of British goods. Hindu industry will thus lead to Hindu independence. For, as Gandhi claims, “there are enough weavers and enough looms in India to replace the whole of the foreign import of cloth.”¹⁸ Unlike German children, those of India will not be taught to fight but to spin, and the barricade against British aggression will be that of homespun cloth rather than barbed wire. Now there is no question that British policy toward India has been one of complete selfishness, yet it is a question whether this encroachment upon Hindu rights

¹⁴ *The Wheel of Fortune*, pp. 14-15.

¹⁵ *Ib.*, p. 9.

¹⁶ *Ib.*, p. 24.

¹⁷ *Ib.*, p. 6.

¹⁸ *Ib.*, p. 89.

can be met by the naïve methods of industry which Gandhi plans for his people.

WHAT DOES INDIA WANT?

Just what does India want? The Hindus answer that question with rather uncertain sounds. Apart from a minimum who want the British *status quo* to remain intact, there are groups which appear to desire this, that, and the other sort of independence. The most moderate desire less and less British rule, more and more Indian independence; but this is only a general sentiment, not a political program. The more ardent Nationalists in India desire the status of dominion government such as England accords to Canada. More radical Hindus seem bent upon an independent form of government on the basis of which they can develop a sort of "United States of India." There are still more radical minds that look toward some sort of affiliation with Russia and the establishment of a communistic regime.

What is India's political ambition? She appears to want nationalism, and yet her interests seem to be social and spiritual. These disincline her toward western civilization as such, as well as the development of the western type of State represented by Japan. Just as India desires industry without industrialism, so she appears to wish some sort of national independence and unity without political nationalism. "Nationalism," says Tagore, "is a great menace. It is the particular thing which for years has been at the bottom of India's troubles. And inasmuch as we have been ruled and dominated by a nation that is strictly political in its attitude, we have tried to develop within ourselves, despite our inheritance from the past, a belief in our eventual political destiny."¹⁹

CAN INDIA GOVERN HERSELF?

Is India prepared for self-government? The American Colonies were in 1776; Ireland was when it set up the Irish Free State; but the case of India seems different. Its vast, mixed population

¹⁹ *Nationalism*, p. 133.

is not united in any political program, although the Nationalist sentiment is the most popular idea in the land. This is evinced by the Round Table Conferences held at London. At the first conference (November, 1930), the representatives consisted of seventy-six Loyalists nominated by the Viceroy and thirteen British members. The Nationalists refused to participate unless all political prisoners, including Gandhi and 40,000 of his followers, were released from prison. Even at such a conservative conference the spirit of nationalism prevailed. The Hindu delegates demanded it and succeeded in having the conference close with a pledge of Indian autonomy. Furthermore, the political prisoners were released. At the second conference, Gandhi was made the sole representative of the Nationalists and put forth India's claims for equal partnership in the British Commonwealth of Nations and a dominion status like that of Canada. Gandhi was given audience by the king and appeared in his simple Hindu garb instead of formal court dress. This was the subject of both amusement and admiration on the part of the world generally, which may not have understood that Gandhi's loin cloth was worn by him as a symbol of the poverty endured by the millions whom he represented.

Apparently India has no real desire for a nationalism like that of England in the West and Japan in the East. Her problem is to produce a people, not a State. "In my country," says Tagore, "we have been seeking to find out something common to all races, which will prove their real unity. No nation looking for a merely political or commercial basis of unity will find such a solution sufficient. Men of thought and power will discover spiritual unity, will realize it, and preach it."²⁰ Is the West to continue its practical leadership in the world or will the East surpass it with a different form of civilization? As we have seen, civilization means something industrial and political, scientific and social; it means citizen and machine. The oriental idea in China and India is something different, a less strict and strenuous conception of civilized life. Should not the West study the East and, as it learned of old its original lessons there, try to learn some newer ones?

²⁰ *Ib.*, p. 127.

CHAPTER XXIII


THE PRESENT OUTLOOK



THE SO-CALLED PRESENT

WHAT WE CALL THE "PRESENT" IS NOT DETERMINED BY the calendar, but by custom. Everything that is the object of perception and does not incline us to indulge in memory may be called "contemporary;" a "thing of the past" is not merely that which is old, but that which is no longer in use. In the larger sense, then, the present is the era of modern improvements dating back nearly a century and might be moved back to 1837, when the electric telegraph of Morse came into vogue. The dates that indicate the beginnings of centuries are unimportant in themselves; the year 1801 does not compare in significance with 1815, when Napoleon met his Waterloo, nor the year 1901 have any meaning when contrasted with the year 1914. What we may call our present dates from the beginning of the World War or, more accurately perhaps, in the subsequent period of ambiguous peace, whose problems of recovery are now perplexing us. At any rate, we can partly identify our present with the part of the XXth century that we have lived.

The first decade of the XXth century was hardly different from the last ten years of the XIXth. It was still dominated by the ideals of the Victorian period, which ended officially, one might say, with the death of the queen in 1901. The former ways of conducting business and the comfortable ways of living were still in force. People generally did not pride themselves upon sophistication, but were more interested in preserving the graces of life and the ideals of respectability. The style of the new century was still that of the old; the literature was still Victorian. People of culture were more inclined to form Browning clubs than to attend Ibsen plays. The ancient institution of marriage was not subjected to attack, divorce was not taken for granted, and references to sex were made with reluctance, as also with delicacy. The population was made up of men and



AIRPLANES MANEUVERING



Fairchild Aerial Surveys, Inc.

THE LINER *Manhattan*, IN THE HUDSON RIVER

(facing page 597)

women in whom mental health was the rule; people were either sane or insane, for there was no twilight zone of semi-unbalanced minds.

FROM CENTURY TO CENTURY

The passage from the XIXth to the XXth century saw little change in the outer mode of living. It was still the era of the home, private homes for the middle class, city and country houses for the more wealthy. In America, apartment houses were comparatively few in number even in the larger cities and when they were built did not rise above three or four stories and thus were able to preserve the general tone of domesticity. In the matter of conveyance, which was deemed of secondary importance, it was still the era of the horse, and the ideal of motion for its own sake, or the flux of the present, had not been developed. There was an approach to this, however, in the bicycle, but its radius of activity was about equal to that of the carriage. The automobile appeared, but was a decided luxury; and when the Ford put in its appearance it was more of an object of ridicule than a desired possession. In 1896 Langley's airplane made its first flight, one of three thousand feet, and in 1903 the more practical plane of the Wright brothers enabled them in their original flights to remain in the air about a minute and travel 852 feet. Two years later, a span of twenty-four and a half miles was made, which hardly anticipated the transatlantic flight that is now (1932) coming into vogue. Radio in the sense of telephonic communication from a broadcasting station to a loud speaker is a matter of the 1920's.

At the beginning of the century, business corporations were small in comparison with the gigantic concerns of the present and did not fail to arouse opposition among both literary men and legislators. Thus a considerable amount of anti-trust literature inspired by the Sherman anti-trust law of 1890 flourished; in 1906, suit was brought against the Standard Oil Company, which was ordered to dissolve, the dissolution taking place five years later. As far as the mass of the population was concerned, America was still the land of opportunity, for there was still

plenty of free land left for the disposal of those who desired to go west and develop homesteads. The Spanish War had given the nation a new faith in its ability to contend with a European power, so that faith in America and the future of its people was unbounded. There was an unquestioned belief in democracy and just as much confidence in the ability and opportunity of each individual within it. It was this pioneer spirit that America expected to perpetuate during and after its participation in the World War. Europe was still under the domination of the ancient idea that a victorious war is a successful one. In considering the present outlook, therefore, it will be necessary to observe the most significant feature of contemporary existence—the World War.

THE WORLD WAR

A dire prophecy of the futility of war had been made and as serious a warning given four years before the conflict began. This, to mention just one work, was brought out by Norman Angell in *The Great Illusion* (1910), a book wherein he attempted to show "that the commerce and industry of a people no longer depend upon the expansion of its political frontiers; that a nation's political and economic frontiers do not necessarily coincide; that military power is socially and economically futile and can have no relation to the prosperity of the people exercising it; that it is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another—to enrich itself by subjugating or imposing its will by force on another; that is, in short, war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which people strive."¹ Before we turn to economic losses, we must not fail to observe the ghastly destruction in the living domain of human existence. The losses of the European belligerents in those who were killed immediately or died of their wounds amounted to about 7,300,000, while the total of the wounded ran up to something less than 20 million. These figures do not include those of Japan, which were comparatively small, or those of the United States, where the figures are about 300 thousand

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. x.

dead from all causes connected with the war, more than 75 thousand wounded, of whom some 85 per cent returned to duty, to say nothing of a large number unaccounted for. These data apply to the military forces; the casualties in the Marine Corps were comparatively small. All told, some 50 million men were engaged in fighting or in some other form of military activity.² Later estimates have placed the total number of dead at about 10 million, of wounded well over 20 million.

In continuing this tragic inventory, we might include later losses resulting from revolutions following upon the war. If warfare had not begun in 1914, there would be no way of accounting for the three attempts to restore the monarchies in Russia, two similar attempts in Hungary, with their attendant losses, or the sacrifices that resulted from the creation of the so-called "succession states" around the Baltic and in central Europe. Of these later losses there is no accurate account, since Denikin and others who attempted to restore the Romanoffs to the throne kept no records, while the Bolsheviki minimized their own casualties and magnified those of their royalist opponents. Then the famine following the devastations in Russia was responsible for additional thousands of deaths, some accounts of the same running into several millions. Thus, making every reasonable allowance for exaggeration, it is fairly safe to state that the war was responsible for more than 10 million deaths. Those that came about as the result of undernourishment and neglect of children in countries other than Russia in the decade following the war cannot be ascertained, but the misery of the masses from 1915 to 1925 was only another sickle in the hands of the grim reaper Death.

ECONOMIC LOSSES

The loss in economic resources was colossal; the figures we shall give are so large that imagination cannot visualize the real amount of the account. Since the war was fought essentially in the interests of commercial rivalry, the losses in commerce may be observed first. The industrial nations of Europe, primarily

² Binder, *Major Social Problems* (1920), p. 268.

Great Britain and Germany, had been trying constantly to extend their exports; therefore it was natural for them to seek more colonies as outlets for their surplus products. The procedure was based upon false economic logic; then the facts of international commerce were against it. In citing these facts, we can do no better than quote at length from the valuable pages of Charles A. Beard's work, *Cross Currents in Europe Today* (1922).

"Now strange as it may seem — and this is one of the paradoxes of the situation — the most important branch of the trade of all European countries was not with the backward races of the earth which they were eagerly struggling to conquer and hold, but with their powerful and enlightened neighbors. In 1911, for example, Great Britain sold to Germany 57 million pounds worth of goods. That was more than the value of her exports to her immense Indian Empire with its 200 million subjects. In the same year, England sold to Russia goods to the value of 22 million pounds. That was more than she sold to all the dusky natives of her African and distant insular possessions. In 1913, England's business with Germany, counting exports and imports, was equal to more than one third her entire business with all her colonies, dominions and dependencies. In other words, on the eve of the War, Great Britain's business with Germany — her bitterest rival — was a vital part of her economic life. There is another fact worth remembering; namely, that Great Britain, in 1913, did 500 million pounds worth of business with her imperial possessions and a billion pounds worth of business with the lands she did not rule: namely, the free nations of the earth. When we recall that the World War cost Great Britain about 10 billion pounds and that the annual interest and other charges on her debt in 1921 amounted to 350 million pounds, we may be permitted to raise a question as to whether commercial warfare by arms 'pays' in any sense of the word." ³

FIGURES WRITTEN IN RED

Germany was by no means the only country that was linked in the chains of trade with Great Britain. There was Austro-

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 85, *et seq.*

Hungary and a considerable territory of middle Europe under the commercial domination of Vienna which, while themselves prosperous and in a position to offer competition to Great Britain, offered her most profitable business opportunities. Russia, likewise, was no mean market. In 1910, her export trade amounted to 1,383,000,000 rubles; her imports totaled 953,000,000 rubles. Europe was thus a golden network of economic bands. Her swift express trains carried merchants and capitalists from Paris to St. Petersburg, from London to Constantinople. Not only did the war destroy these golden lines of a vast commercial system, but, by means of strife and bitterness, has prevented the laying down of new lines in the old places. Today European commerce is confined to bare necessities, while each country tries to erect trade-barriers against its neighbors. Then there is with this commercial antagonism a political one, the two so interwoven that it is difficult to determine which is cause, which effect.

Again we must return to the money question and by means of gigantic sums exemplify the finances of the belligerents before and after the war. "The aggregate debt of the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Germany and Austro-Hungary increased from August 1st, 1914 to January 1st, 1919 by \$166,700,000,000. This total does not include the increase in the national debt of Greece, Serbia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania and Japan nor the losses sustained by municipalities, villages, hamlets and farms in the destruction of buildings, machinery and means of transportation. These figures are staggering but have probably been increased by twenty per cent during 1919. What the burden of the future will be may be inferred from the interest which has to be paid. The difference between 1920 and 1913 was, for the United States \$1,100,000,000 against \$23,000,000; Great Britain, \$2,300,000,000 against \$122,500,000; France, \$2,000,000,000 against \$257,300,000; Russia, \$1,600,000,000 against \$212,200,000; Italy, \$600,000,000 against \$93,000,000; Germany, \$2,500,000,000 against \$200,000,000; Austro-Hungary, \$1,500,000,000 against \$161,700,000 — a total difference for the seven countries of \$11,600,000,000 against \$1,070,000,000. This interest must be raised annually and will decrease only very gradually as pay-

ments on the principal are made. The increase is due not only to the growth of the debts, but also to the rise in the rate of interest from an average of 3.9 per cent to one of 5.5 per cent. Here is an increase for payment of interest of 1,000 per cent. For each the interest charge on indebtedness exceeds or at least equals the total yearly public revenue in 1913 and imposes correspondingly heavy responsibilities on the taxpayers."⁴

The total economic losses have been variously estimated from 250 to 300 billions. The total direct and indirect costs of the war, including as nearly as possible every item, such as the capitalization of the lives and properties lost on land and sea to neutrals as well as belligerents, have been estimated at the sum of \$337,946,179,657.⁵ The United States went into the war with a national debt of \$971,562,590 as of 1916 and came out with a net cost for the war of \$22,625,252,843, having in addition loaned the Allies the sum of \$9,455,014,125 — a gross expenditure of \$32,080,266,968.⁶ A small part of the loan to the Allies has been paid back but the chances are that most of the remainder will have to be canceled. Meanwhile other expenditures connected with the war have to be added to its cost. Federal expenditures alone in behalf of World War veterans, including all expenses for pensions, medical and educational care, administration and bonuses, etc., have amounted to \$5,475,505,520 between 1917 and February 29, 1932.⁷ Then the expenditures of different states add to this sum paid by the Federal government.

IDEAL LOSSES

Suppose we turn from these figures that only a Croesus could comprehend and consider individuals with small amounts of money in their pockets. Prior to the avalanche of 1914, the average Parisian workingman paid about 18 francs for a month's rent as reckoned in gold and 30 centimes for a kilo of bread. After the victory, the same French citizen was compelled to pay

⁴ Binder, *Major Social Problems*, p. 269.

⁵ Bogert, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publications, p. 299.

⁶ *Ib.*, p. 267.

⁷ Charles Merz, *New York Times* (April 10, 1932).

four times as much for rent and bread. Every other European like him has been compelled to pay for the cost of his war. Then, money-inflation added to the general distress and produced confusion worse confounded. Who knew the value of the official paper he carried about with him? Its purchasing power could change with the winds or one wake up in the morning to find that the money of yesterday had shrunk in size like the hide in Balzac's story *The Wild Asses' Skin*. The tendency engendered was not that of thrift but of spendthrift. How worthless was paper money may be inferred from the specific case of certain printers in Russia's official money mill who stole some 15 billion rubles but thereby managed to profit to the extent of only \$70. But such monetary losses were not the only ones.

There were imponderable, incalculable ideal losses. The international good will which the peoples of Europe had required decades to develop was destroyed when the first shot was fired. The pale light of love was overwhelmed by a black cloud. Who can tell how many homes were broken up, how many widows and orphans made? How many died of starvation, disease, and the spiritual maladies of sorrow and the broken heart? Confidence in civilization was destroyed and the spiritual outlook upon life shattered more thoroughly than the walls of a cathedral like Rheims. Civilization may be returning, but its moral standards have been ruptured and its ideals obscured. Perhaps the war, while it lasted, did produce a flash of patriotism, an outburst of self-sacrifice and a broadening of the intellectual horizon, but such moral assets are so small in comparison with the necessary liabilities that one may well ask, "What price victory?" It is only as the western world, which according to Spengler faces its downfall, resolves to outmode and outlaw war that one can be optimistic about the present century "up to now."

EUROPE SINCE THE ARMISTICE

What about Europe since the signing of the Armistice? In what ways have the leading civilized nations established any sort of *modus vivendi*? As is ever the case with intense emo-

tions, the feelings inflamed by the war have altered and in most cases disappeared. The human heart cannot forever indulge the hatreds that spring up in special, sudden ways; these tend to burn themselves out. Since the close of the war, which is our real present, a series of readjustments may be taken to mean as many efforts to rehabilitate civilization. The history of Europe in this period may be divided into three parts, in which have been found as many attempts to reconcile various bitter antagonisms.⁸ The first period may be said to extend from the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to the occupation of the Ruhr, beginning in January, 1923. The period was marked by political confusion and economic chaos among the Central Powers, especially Germany, where in the summer of 1923 the old mark, which had been terribly inflated, collapsed. The Central Powers were shorn of their colonies by their conquerors who seem to have been animated by self-interest, a spirit of revenge, and a desire to render their one-time enemies powerless in the future. Since the Treaty of Versailles had claimed that Germany and her allies were responsible for the war, the procedure took on the form of punishment.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

In the matter of liabilities, the amount of reparation based largely upon theoretical computations was placed at the sum of 120 billion dollars, although later this was reduced to the relatively small figure of 9 billion. The Treaty of St. Germain with Austria severed that country from Hungary. Thus Austria, which had been the immediate occasion of the war, was not only defeated but disrupted. When the country became impoverished, its people were fed by the American Relief Administration at the cost of 72 million dollars. In 1922 the remnant of a nation secured from Great Britain and France, Italy and Czechoslovakia about 35 million dollars, which saved it from complete collapse. The Treaty of Trianon with Hungary had the ultimate effect of reducing the former dual monarchy to a fraction of its former self. Their territory was reduced to about one

⁸ Article "Europe," *New Standard Encyclopedia*.

third of its former extent; the remaining two thirds were given to the newly created succession states of Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia, as also to the old country of Rumania, which with the addition of Bessarabia from Russia and the Dobrudja from Bulgaria increased its territory and population two hundred per cent. Italy fell heir to Trieste and Fiume with the adjoining territory. Turkey was reduced to a narrow strip of land around Constantinople, from whence it had to transfer its seat of government to Angora in Anatolia. Its other European lands fell into the hands of Greece and the newly created state of Albania.

In the meanwhile, Mussolini had taken control of Italy in the name of Fascism. In the rôle of Caesarean dictator, Mussolini acquired the free city of Fiume and the island of Rhodes. An expedition into Corfu was checked by the intervention of the League of Nations. Such an increase in the power of Italy irritated France, which felt that the system of the balance of power was being threatened by Mussolini, who by means of treaties was making overtures to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany, Spain, Rumania, and even Great Britain. In order to offset these advances, France approached the members of The Little Entente, composed of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania, and by means of loans forced Austria and Hungary to submit to this alliance. The object of France in these acts of diplomacy was to cripple Germany by isolating her and by extracting the utmost in reparations. To this end France established an *entente cordiale* with Poland, which had been rehabilitated from former Russian, Prussian, and Austrian territory. France encouraged the formation of succession states along the Baltic at the expense of Russia. These states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland—are small, but with Poland they formed a bulwark against Bolshevist Russia. There communism had succeeded, had been able to gain some foothold in Germany and Italy, and established a short-lived regime in Hungary under Béla Kun. The first post-war period of European history may be called the political one. Its climax was reached in the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in the fall of 1924.

ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES

The second period might be styled the economic one; it was begun in 1924 in connection with the Dawes plan of reparations and continued until the close of 1927. Its work was resumed, however, in 1929 in connection with the Young reparations plan. Both of these plans were developed by the realization that Germany, the chief debtor nation, was approaching economic disaster; they led to a more rational view of the reparations problem and prepared the way for the creation of the Bank for International Settlements, 1930. An additional step toward genuine peace with Germany was her admission to the League of Nations and the award of a permanent seat in 1927. The important Treaty of Locarno in 1925, signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, pledged these powers to the recognition of the then-existing *status quo* and left them free to direct their attention to the improvement of the economic situation, especially in the defeated countries. The attempt of Germany to seek an *Anschluss* with Austria and Hungary by means of a customs union aroused violent protest from the Entente Powers in 1931 on the ground that it threatened the policy of the balance of power.

During the years 1923-1929, the United States made a number of debt settlements with various European States and extended numerous large loans to foreign governments in both Europe and South America. This government took part both in the inauguration and endorsement of various peace pacts. Great Britain has played a comparatively moderate part in Continental politics, since her energy has been absorbed chiefly in the adjustment of internal problems, the establishment of the Irish Free State and the questions arising in connection with her rule in India. There is no little significance in the change of terms from "British Dominions" to "British Commonwealth of Nations."

RUSSIA'S FIVE YEAR PLAN

The third period of European post-war history, or that from 1928, may be thought of most clearly in connection with Soviet

Russia. It may be dated from the tentative operation of the Five Year Plan, taken up in October, 1928 and adopted in May, 1929. The plan calls for the socialization of agriculture and industrial expansion with the increase of output of 55 per cent in the one and 133 per cent in the other. In the technicalization of Russia, assistance has been loaned by American engineers. In this period, which is the present one, it has come to be recognized that the Soviet is quite a permanent factor in international matters. Russia has all but proved its ability to maintain a stable government and organize its internal affairs. In recognition of the new Russian system of industry and the modern American system of production, Europe has responded in the form of an economic bloc or Pan-Europa or what might be called the United States of Europe. It is the program sponsored by Aristide Briand.

The three periods mentioned may be taken to signify as many attempts to solve the problems that have dogged our steps since the end of the World War. The best that we can say of them is that they have not been failures. At this point, in our attempt to come to an understanding with the present, we might observe the practically bloodless revolution in which Spain, on April 15, 1931, deposed its monarch and established a republic. And we might add the moratorium of June 19 of the same year, when the United States established a temporary suspension of reparation payments. These separate events are symptoms of a desire to effect radical changes peacefully and to promote economic coöperation. The German ballot which reëlected President von Hindenburg is not without its meanings. First, it was an indication that the German people wish to continue a stable form of government and are disinclined to make any approach toward Fascism, as this was represented by Adolf Hitler, the opponent of von Hindenburg. The defeat of Hitler was a defeat for militaristic nationalism. As a side issue of this political event, it might be observed that the Hitler campaign was made on the basis of no further payment of reparations. This was accepted by the Germans as a vigorous gesture, but, in addition to that, it was taken to mean that the victors in the World War are resigned to the idea that reparation payments are bound to come to an end without the full payment of the war debt.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The present, or post-war, situation sees a rainbow of promise in the League of Nations, which has been in existence and operation for a dozen years. The League was formally established January 10, 1920. It is an association of States which, by signing the covenant, pledge themselves to refrain from war until they have submitted their disputes with one another or with States not members of the League to the consideration of the League. Any State violating the pledge is automatically in a condition of outlawry as to the other States, which are bound to sever all political and economic relations with the defaulting member. Not only this, but the nation-members of the League have pledged themselves to coöperate in social and economic, humanitarian and labor questions. By its timely intervention, the League has been able to prevent several smaller wars and has been responsible further for several agencies of great international importance. It supplies information concerning topics of interest to nations and endeavors to mold public opinion in the interests of peace. The most important of the particular agencies for peace have been the Disarmament Conference, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Bank for International Settlements.

In October, 1924, a number of European powers met in Geneva in order to clear still further the tense atmosphere produced by the war. The discussions resulted in The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Few nations signed the document and thus this attempt on the part of the League of Nations to build up a permanent agency of arbitration died abortively in 1925. However, the policy thus inaugurated proved more permanent and resulted in a number of disarmament conferences, which have been of increasing importance in the troubled affairs of the nations. The conference held in the early part of 1932 at Geneva has aroused greater interest than any of its predecessors because of the larger number of nations represented. It will not bring peace to earth but it does afford an example of what could be done by men of good will.

OTHER PACIFIC MOVEMENTS

The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 for the renunciation of war is a multilateral treaty aimed generally at the outlawry of war; it may be considered the logical outcome of the last of the Fourteen Points indicated during the war by President Wilson. The United States itself has declined to become a member of the League but has given ever-increasing evidence of its interest in the League's activities, especially in that of the World Court, or the Permanent Court of International Justice. It was officially represented at the Disarmament Conference of 1932.

The Bank of International Settlements, located at Basel, Switzerland, was opened May 20, 1930 with a fixed capital of 500 million Swiss francs. The purpose of this organization is to avoid friction that might be occasioned by the payment of war debts and reparations.⁹ All such payments are made to this bank, which disburses the moneys to the various creditors and seeks, further, to adjust all differences in the matter of claims between the parties concerned. From the beginning, the operations of the bank proved most beneficial; the first year's business showed a turnover of more than 300 million dollars.

These activities of the League are to some extent the cause but to a greater degree the effect of that general aversion to war which is growing up among civilized peoples. A number of books depicting the horrors of war have found ready and numerous readers and the feeling that war must be abolished has grown in volume and intensity. The ideas of philosophers, like Immanuel Kant, on the subject of perpetual peace are studied more eagerly today than ever before, and a greater number of people are joining the ranks of the Pacifists. In general, the feeling that war is an abomination is shared by peoples and governments alike; it has become a kind of international force.

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR

A certain touch of internationalism is indicated by the various European tours that have become so popular since the war.

⁹ Article "Reparations," *New International Yearbook* (1930).

Such tours were in operation before 1914, but were not such popular movements as we observe today. Travel was a matter of business or luxury. The war aroused curiosity on the part of Americans, who desired to visit the battlefields, see the lands about which they had heard so much, and breathe the atmosphere of the Old World. Hence we have observed numerous student tours and sometimes the so-called "floating universities," which have taken their classes on tours around the world, stopping at important places, investigating the customs of different peoples, and studying. Such intelligent travel is a manifestation on the part of one half of the world to learn how the other half lives.

The war, which still colors our present outlook, cast a certain reflection upon science. It was more a matter of machines than of men. The only reason the Germans could achieve so many victories against numerically superior foes is found in their superior use of the scientific means of warfare. Their submarines, "Big Berthas," and lethal gases were tragically effective. Their application of science to food-economy and in finding synthetic substitutes for war-materials enabled them to hold out much longer than otherwise would have been possible. It was only when their raw materials were exhausted and the Allies themselves applied similar scientific methods, as in the case of the British "tank," that the Germans were forced to yield.

AERONAUTICS

The war was fought on land and sea, beneath the surface of the earth and water, and in the air. One result of these belligerent operations has been to make us "air-minded." Aeronautics is the science that has profited by the war. The risks of flying are much greater than those of motoring, but the absence of physical obstacles and the possibility of choosing one's own path as well as the speed attainable have loaned a lure to aviation. Only the future can tell what will come of a mode of transportation that still is unusual. The record solo flight of Charles A. Lindbergh, who in 1927 flew from New York to Paris, a distance of 3,610 miles, in thirty-three hours and twenty-nine minutes, is not likely to be equaled by the average aviator,

although an approximation to it was made in May, 1932 by the famous woman-flyer Amelia Earhart. Although aviation, in comparison with motoring, is still in the hands of isolated experts, it is becoming safer every year and correspondingly more popular. There are actually fewer accidents in the air than on the auto highway, although the proportion of accidents to total trips is much greater, but catastrophes in the air are of such spectacular character as to cause much comment in the press. The figures to which we must resort in speaking of anything in this age of statistics are impressive.

In the year 1931, all aircraft under the American flag, civilian, commercial, governmental, flew a grand total of 218,890,503 miles. This was six and a half million miles less than in 1930, but twenty million more than in the boom year, 1929. Civilian and commercial planes flew 144,978,228 miles in 1931, compared with 164,793,612 in 1930 and 144,579,451 miles in 1929. The number of passengers carried in 1931 was 1,875,992 compared with 2,621,992 in 1930.¹⁰

THE AMERICAN SKYLINE

In a certain sense, the background of the present outlook in America is afforded by the skyline of the great city. In dealing with *The Place of Art in Civilization*, we made some comment on American architecture in connection with the general history of building. This topic we must resume in order to comprehend the trend of contemporary life. The increased value of land forced modern enterprise to extend the height of the building rather than to extend the area of the foundation. The result has been the skyscraper. Although the first of this architectural type is usually associated with the city of Chicago, the New Yorker can point to the fact that in 1880 George B. Post built for Darius O. Mills a building 120 feet in height and commodious enough to house 1,200 tenants. By the beginning of the XXth century, the mastery of steel construction and the elevator made more ambitious projects possible. In 1902, the Flatiron Building in New York rose to the height of twenty stories, or 286 feet. In

¹⁰ *Aircraft Yearbook* (1932), p. 12, *et seq.*

1913, the Woolworth Building ascended sixty stories or 796 feet. A few years ago, to say nothing of the numerous commercial towers erected in the interval, the Chrysler Building extended its sixty-eight stories to a height of 1,046 feet, only to be displaced in the air by New York's and the world's tallest structure—the Empire State Building, with its altitude of 1,248 feet above the street.


What shall we say of these structures which are so characteristic of contemporary America? They seem indeed to ignore the mythological message which might come to them from the Tower of Babel with its heaven-defying height and its confusion of tongues. Are we in our architecture challenging the law of gravity? Are we also, with our mixture of races, running the risk of confused tongues and conflicting race-ideals? Prof. Charles A. Beard in his monumental, half-million-word work, *The Rise of American Civilization*, has a significant word on this subject. "For good or evil, perhaps beyond both, in any case inexorably, the spirit of American business enterprise was not reverent, shrinking or benign; it was the spirit of power, crude and ruthless, rash to the point of peril, defiant of all petty material limitations, given to action too swift for meters. When called upon to serve this spirit, architects for a long time came hobbling in the restraints of the academies; they deprecated it, scorned it or if they took commissions tried to crush it."¹¹ To what extent, in what way shall we moralize upon American architecture? In itself it is an obvious form of building; society demands it, nature allows it. If we may moralize at all, we may observe that those who entered the Parthenon were infused with the classic spirit in all its superiority, while they who in all reverence crossed the portals of Chartres and Rheims were filled with the Gothic spirit in all its solemnity. Are we of this age inspired with feelings equally appropriate or must we come under the condemnation of the poet who, in another connection, said of our peace palaces, "Ye build, ye build but do not enter in"? It would require giants or supermen properly to inhabit such gigantic structures, hence one is tempted to make the comment—such people in such buildings.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, Part Two, pp. 786-787.



Keystone View Co.

THE EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, NEW YORK CITY



BROOKLYN BRIDGE AND THE NEW YORK SKYLINE

(facing page 612)

MOVING PICTURES

A totally different manifestation of man's power over nature is found in the moving picture, an indication of national entertainment on a huge scale. The next century may look back upon this one amazed to learn that today a considerable portion of the population spend part of the day or night looking at long strips of photographs. "In the United States there are over 22,000 motion-picture theaters having a weekly average attendance of 120 million people."¹² This amounts to saying that one seventh of the population are in attendance daily. From an inconspicuous beginning at about the opening of the century, the industry, as we may call it, has shown marked improvement in technique and extraordinary increase in popularity. The "nickelodeons" that sprang up in the first decade of the century were crude affairs attended by people whose social standing is indicated by the price of admission charged. Today we find magnificent buildings often superior to theaters and opera houses wherein are exhibited films whose production has cost millions. Such daily shows are taken for granted and attendance upon the "movies" is parallel to reading the news. The pictures are sometimes elevating and instructive, but usually commonplace in dramatic construction and tawdry in appearance. At the present time, the leading aim of the motion picture is to project drama. The effect of such an adaptation is often that of the substitution of coincidence for motivated action, so that a good picture is often a bad play. The motion picture, however, is an industry rather than an art. The total capital invested in the enterprise throughout the world is about two and a half billion dollars. The addition of equipment for the sound picture cost approximately half a billion.

POPULAR SCIENCE

The effect of the technicalism involved in modern inventions has been direct and physical, indirect and psychological. We are utilizing what the machine produces; we are trying to un-

¹² Article "Motion Pictures," *New Standard Encyclopedia*.

derstand how the product is manufactured. This has given rise to popular science. This movement may not have enhanced the dignity of physics and other sciences but it has served to enlighten the modern mind, especially in the case of youth. The typical American boy plays with mechanical toys or miniature reproductions of machines and thus grows up in the atmosphere of the scientific. In addition to this, he and his elders also find in electrical appliances, to say nothing of "the car," an incentive to observe and perhaps think about scientific matters. A number of popular magazines, such as *Science News Letter*, *Popular Science*, *Popular Mechanics*, *Science and Invention*, cater to the mild appetite for scientific information. This semiscientific state of mind at large is made more intensive by science courses in the schools, if not by popular discussions in books and magazine articles devoted to the new physics. Hence a young lady who might be expected to comment upon the latest novel may be heard discussing the Quantum Theory. It is doubtful whether the mass of those who speak glibly of science have any inkling of the theories recently put forth by Planck, Bohr, and others, but the hero-worship for Einstein is at least an indication of interest in the mysterious ways of the universe.

The present outlook is marked further and more deeply by a change from the humanities of the older education to the technics of the new. In colleges, the halls of languages are by no means so popular as the chemical and physical laboratories. In society, a gentleman is no longer a man familiar with the classics but one who is adept at machinery, while a lady of today instead of speaking French drives her own car. In addition to science in the form of application, the present view of the world is marked by science as a sentiment. The popularization of science has had the effect of diminishing fear and superstition. Even the average person of the present is inclined to regard disease in a scientific rather than an animistic manner, as the logical result of improper living or imperfect sanitation. The conquest of nature, which marked the beginning of civilization, has reached a point where man has learned how to live and what to think about the natural order that produced him.

The expansion of the popular mind into a world-outlook may

be attributed to the World War. This has been largely emotional and has engendered a desire for a fuller life and greater freedom of self-expression. In the case of the more intelligent and capable portion of the American population, such a desire for *largesse* and liberty revealed itself practically in the attempt to extend enterprise and make more money. The pause in industry, as for example that of building, called for extra effort in the field of work; the inflation of prices due to the war market as also payments on loans to foreign countries promised and realized the bull market that obtained until the close of the year 1929. In all this, there was no industrial philosophy at work, for the thoughts that were entertained were the effects of happy circumstances, not the cause of them. With the populace at large, the fullness and freedom of life, as life recoiled from the tension of war, assumed various forms in which the sense of responsibility was not always present.

LAXITY IN MORALS

The sudden passage from war to peace caused a relaxation of the ethical earnestness that, in the form of courage, self-sacrifice, and devotion to a cause, had gripped the western world. The moral quality of life during the war had been largely that of a morale consisting chiefly of courage. When such Spartan vigor was relaxed, the result was of the Epicurean sort. The uncertainty of life had shown itself on the battlefields of Europe and the futility of human existence insinuated itself into the mind of the masses, who seemed inclined to adopt the ancient maxim, "Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die." In the minds of the older generation, the ethics seemed to be, "The great crime of war has rendered petty all possible vices of peace." Those who were too young to have participated in the conflict appeared to reason, "You committed your great sin, we will now indulge in minor ones." The proprieties of the past, especially as these had crystallized in the Victorian age, were at once outmoded and a new morality compounded of Cynical and Cyrenaic factors began to prevail.

This laxity in morals found direct expression in connection

with sex, a short and significant word now as much in vogue as it was formerly taken for granted and passed over in silence. The idea involved assumed the form of both the artistic and scientific, if we may style them such, for sex became the subject of novels and plays, where it ousted the more refined sentiment of love. The change has been such as to suggest eroticism in literature. On the scientific side of the question, this biological factor known to medical science and assumed in practical life has become the subject of conversation and the theme of books on sexology, some of them written by women. The plea advanced in the case of such scientific "best sellers" is that of truthfulness, or the idea that the significant facts in life should be fully known by as many as possible. No such plea, however, has been put forth in connection with any other biological function, where it is still assumed that nature will take her own course and attend to the welfare of the human organism.

THE STATUS OF WOMAN

The status of woman, which is usually significant of a civilization's temper, has undergone quite a radical change. This can hardly be attributed to the political significance of the XIXth Amendment, which gave woman the ballot, still less to any attempt on the part of the politically "new woman" to be an aggressive force in politics. The ballots cast appear to be about as they were before women went to the polls, except that more of them are cast. The change in the status of woman is more decidedly social. It reveals itself in costume and coiffure; the short skirt almost necessitated short hair and vice versa in order to preserve the appearance of balance in woman's form. The development of the cigarette habit is another sign that woman wishes to live pretty much after the manner of man. This has come to the point where to see women smoking while walking through the street and frequenting smoking cars is by no means unusual. Perhaps the whole situation where women are concerned may be expressed by saying that the lines once drawn between the sexes and between women of social position and those of doubtful reputation have been at least blurred. The re-

sult has been confusion. It would be fallacious to connect woman's new freedom with the Flapper movement, itself by no means to be regretted; it is not flaming youth but flaming middle age that may be criticized.

The public press responded to the new outlook on life by providing an appropriate sheet: the tabloid press. The first of these diminutive newspapers made its appearance at the close of the war, to be followed by others which now have their regular place on the news-stand. The tabloids have outdone the yellow journals in sensationalism and appeal to emotion and human curiosity. The press generally had been able to supply the demand for criminal news; the tabloid press added to this bits of piquant gossip duly set off by the illustrations that comprised most of the space. The great success of these little sheets has revealed the existence of multitudes who make up mentally the lower strata of society. These appear to read with satisfaction the pseudo-papers with the feeling that in scanning large, lurid headlines and gazing upon photographs they are keeping up with the news of the day. Tabloid readers seem to take a personal interest in their papers, thus giving the impression that those who absorb the hectic matter enjoy it empathically, or by proxy.

PROHIBITION

The question of Prohibition is so vast and complicated that a volume instead of a paragraph is really demanded by it. We may observe, however, that although anticipated by state-wide Prohibition in many parts of the country, that is, in twenty-four states, the proposal of the XVIIIth Amendment at the close of 1917 and its ratification by the states early in 1919 was comparatively sudden and may be considered a war-measure.

The popular attitude toward this gigantic social movement has been the subject of straw ballots in which the "wets" have preponderated. On the other hand, tentative measures in the direction of "wet" legislation by Congress have failed. If one is disposed to analyze the present situation in Prohibition on the basis of national history and sociology, he is likely to observe a baffling combination of the Puritan spirit that brought the law into exist-

ence and a pioneer spirit of lawlessness. Those who settled the land originally were of Puritan stock, but as they extended their frontiers far and farther west, as they did in the days of the pioneers, the distance from any seat of authority tended to make them heedless of law. The passage of time has not removed the Puritan desire to make laws and the pioneer tendency to ignore them. In the language of President Hoover, when he was Secretary of Commerce, Prohibition is "an experiment nobly planned," not a "noble experiment," as his words are commonly quoted. Apparently the "experiment" has engendered tendencies wholly unlooked for, as in the development of the "gangsterism" and the social and political corruption that has followed in its wake. To a certain definite extent, we have exchanged the saloon for the "speakeasy" and the licensed liquor traffic for "bootlegging." The better minds of the land, who are in the vast majority, are agreed that there must be adequate liquor legislation, but are not agreed upon the idea that this is to be found in national Prohibition.

URBAN LIFE

Another feature of the present situation is findable in the surge or drift of the population from country to city. This may be attributed to the economic factor in contemporary life. The introduction of labor-saving machinery on the farm has rendered many former agrarian workers technically unemployed, while the lack of proportion between agrarian and industrial labor has made the farm unattractive. But the social factor has been in operation also. The city offers better opportunities for work, less drudgery, more leisure and entertainment, and more of that thrill which we have come to believe a necessary ingredient in human life. These are quite obvious factors put in an informal manner. A few lines of statistics will reveal their operation more definitely.

Census of Population

	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930
Urban	22,298,000	30,380,000	42,166,000	54,304,000	68,955,000
Rural	40,649,000	46,614,000	49,806,000	51,406,000	53,820,000

Thus the urban population, which forty years ago was little more than half of the rural figure, caught up with it in about twenty years and is now considerably in excess.

The ascendancy of the city over the country in such obvious things as finance, business, politics, newspapers, and the like appears also in manners and morals, customs and costumes. In our own country, these differences were never so marked as they were abroad. One who knew the different sections of a foreign land could tell from a glance at the costume from what section a person had come. These differences in dress loaned color to the great international fairs at Leipzig and Nizhni Novgorod; the costumes displayed were loved and adhered to because they expressed the tribal consciousness of the wearers and, in many cases, embodied tribal history. But with the ever-increasing facilities for transportation on the removal of political restrictions on free migration, such costumes are rapidly passing away. Public gatherings in Madrid and Moscow exhibit their countrymen in the same factory-made garments as one finds in Paris or London — the same drab uniform of the Machine Age in which none of the love and pride of the possessor is evident.

In the United States, where outer uniformity has long prevailed, there was still a certain psychological difference. The rural person was supposed to have a better heart and superior morals, while his city cousin presumed to have a better brain and keener intelligence. But now the denizen of the rural regions either reads city papers or has the national news gathered by press associations and newspaper syndicates printed in his local paper. His radio-outfit keeps him constantly in touch with urban centers and makes him feel as though he were a part of the nation's pulsating life. In this manner, the one-time provincialism has given way to a kind of cosmopolitanism. In addition to this national expansion which has made the country more homogeneous, there is a tendency to Europeanize American life. This has come about from reading news of the war, foreign travel, and the translation of foreign books into English.

On the other hand, the present situation in the western world reveals the fact that an Americanization of Europe is taking place in the matter of industry. American factory products were

formerly imported by different European countries, but now Americans have exported the factories themselves. At first such industrial exportation was at the rate of 2,000 per annum and although it has slackened since 1929, it is still proceeding in such a way that goods made by American machines are threatening the old handicrafts. We have already commented upon the fact that the industrial Five Year Plan in Russia is involving American technics.

CAPITALISM AND COMMUNISM

In addition and in sometimes superficial trends, the present outlook is rendered significant by the appearance and persistence of the Russian Soviet. There is nothing in Europe, still less in America, that runs parallel with it. On the surface, the philosophy of this Bolshevism is an economic one made popular theoretically by Karl Marx. But the underlying and animating psychology of this politico-economic movement involves a breadth and depth of life formerly unknown in Czarist Russia. That which would prove impossible here seems to be at least tolerable there. The Bolsheviki claim that there communism, by liberating men from the perpetual anxiety over their livelihood, is able thus to arouse their higher motives. The claim of the Russian communist is that, once their collectivist State has passed through its present period of adolescence with its accompanying storm and stress, the mature government will be able to provide amply for its citizens, who will then enjoy greater leisure and more opportunity for self-development and the elaboration of a higher type of mankind. Thus runs the utopian argument from Plato's *Republic* to More's *Utopia*, from Marx's *Capital* to Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, and thence to Lenin and Stalin.

The retort of the capitalist is based upon an entirely different philosophy of life. According to capitalistic ethics, the best in man is developed through struggle which supplies incentive to work and initiative in developing enterprise. Communism, so argues the capitalistic thinker, is possible but only upon the basis of slavery such as Plato advocated and the Incas practiced. Further, it is asserted that small tribes that have lived

for ages under a communistic regime are still on the lowest level of civilization. Capitalism may be guilty of some iniquities, but these fade into insignificance when compared with the fundamental iniquity of communism in its attempt to reduce all men to the same level, since the leveling process will not be upward but downward. If the present injustices of capitalism can be removed, this system of producing and distributing wealth will still offer the highest opportunities for the type of life all men are supposed to seek.

THE END OF IMMIGRATION

The present outlook in the matter of American population reveals the fact that America is no longer the land of golden opportunity for European immigrants. For more than a century this land was a haven of refuge for all who in their distress sought to improve their economic, social, and cultural condition. The largest number of immigrants admitted to this country in any decade was from 1901 to 1910, when 8,795,000 aliens who intended to make their homes here entered our various ports. The following decade showed a sharp decline; the third, marked as it was by stricter immigration laws, showed a decided recession; while the fourth one seems likely to prove the end of immigration, unless some decided and unexpected change takes place. In 1931, the number of immigrants admitted was only 97,000, the deportations amounted to 2,000, while the number of emigrant departures totalled 61,882. For 1932, the number of new arrivals is estimated at only 45,000 and with the return of older immigrants to their native lands there will be no increase of population from that source. Greater opportunities are now being offered by several South American republics and immigrants from overcrowded Europe are headed southward, especially toward Brazil and Argentina.

PRESENT SERIOUSNESS

The outlook for the second decade since the war is such as to reveal a greater degree of seriousness on the part of the popu-

lace. Law is regarded as something to be changed, not merely defied. The gangster, who was originally a "rum runner" but has now become a kidnaper and murderer, is no longer viewed in the guise of a Robin Hood. There was a time when the life story of a gangster was on sale alongside the autobiographies of an ex-President and a candidate for the Presidency, but with that gangster in prison the glamour of the outlaw has passed away. The present seriousness may be due to the depression which set in during 1929 or perhaps it dates back to an earlier period, when post-war frivolity began to decline. The attitude of flaming youth has been indicated by the manifest desire for higher education. The number of college students nearly trebled between 1919 and 1930, notwithstanding the increased severity in enrollment requirements. Some of these new aspirants for academic honors may be purely "collegiate," but reports from the authorities in the institutions of higher learning are to the effect that students are more industrious and give less trouble than those of a decade ago.

At the present time, we are living in something like an age of ideas although herd behavior, standardization, and technicalism are in evidence and in force. The political and economic changes that have come about since the war tend to make us reflective and in such a mood we are given to inquire concerning the true bases of civilization. Democracy, we believe, must render an account and give a reason for its existence, since it can no longer be taken for granted. The social consciousness has become keener and more intelligent. A decade ago, in such a depression as was experienced in 1921, very little was done to relieve unemployment, but at the present time, when all classes of society are suffering from deflation, numerous agencies to relieve distress and provide work are in operation. This serious endeavor to assist the unemployed may be due to the dread of a possible communism in place of democracy, but, if that be the case, it is only an example of national intelligence in America. For the most part, it seems as though relief agencies were prompted by common sense and common humanity. Our plight is common; the gap between rich and poor, Dives and Lazarus, is no longer a great, fixed gulf.

The present outlook cannot be called a dark as much as a serious one. The character of the times is usually expressed by calling the present the Machine Age. In the minds of most people, this means the mechanization of life and the overproduction of commodities. Others choose to see in the machine a more serious idea. These make a broad application of the principle that work is accomplished only by the degradation of energy, as though heat, like water, ran down hill. This bit of steam-engine logic has provoked and to some extent popularized the idea that the universe is running down and although its ultimate decline into a universal condition of energy no longer available is dated forward into the remote future, the spirit of decline is in the air. The extent to which this merits serious consideration will be discussed in the final chapter of this work: *The Resultant View of History*.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE RESULTANT VIEW OF HISTORY



THE MEANING OF HISTORY

THE FOREGOING CHAPTERS, WHICH BEGAN WITH THE CELESTIAL origin of the earth and ended with the problems of contemporary life in America, may be looked upon as so much history. To be sure, they have not followed the traditional lines of political history with its periods, reigns, wars, movements, and the like, but still the only possible classification for what has been said is the historical one. The first ten chapters, which ended with the close of the mediaeval period, may be considered to belong to the past. The second ten, which considered the various phases of life as we have come to know it, are of the modern spirit. The last four, including this one, are so many attempts to come to an understanding with contemporary life and thought. In all these, a certain conception of history has been implied; this must now be stated more explicitly. From what we have seen, we have learned that the historical process means more than bodies in motion and organisms under development; we have seen that history means progress of mankind in action and thought, in industry and science, in economics and politics, in social and religious life. How is such human history to be understood?

The first step to take in understanding history is to realize that it is not confined to the past. History is a temporal process which, instead of tracing a line back of it, rolls up its past behind and proceeds much after the manner of a snowball as it rolls forward. A historical period like that of the Hebrews and early Christians, Greeks and Romans, lived its own life while it was in force, but does not fail to live on in us, if only by way of memory. What we found in history was not the passage of time over spaces where different people were located, but a series of trends which have thrust their way forward into our lives. This is because the things that we found in history were

not merely events that took place in some "then and there" in distinction from our "here and now," but trends or tendencies that keep on affecting our own lives. We recall these now as industries and institutions, arts and religions, systems of economics and politics, to say nothing of languages and social organizations. These are still with us. Archaeology may explore a prehistoric cave and discover primitive tools, unearth an ancient temple and find an altar, decipher an old cylinder and read the record of a realm; we also work and worship and write history. We are in natural sympathy with these men of the past, even the fossil men of some geological age.

PERIODS AND TRENDS

If we are to enter into the spirit of history, we must abandon the idea that history can be represented space-wise as so many sections of human existence and consider it time-wise as so many trends of human life. This will prevent us from saying that in the past man had art and religion just as now we have science and industry; it will lead us to see that in our own way we have the same desires and aims that men had in the past. Thus, instead of taking an external view of history and asking the questions of "When?" and "Where?" we must take an internal view and meet the questions "Why?" and "How?" Indeed, it is just as near the truth of history to say that it is a phase of the present as to consider it a part of the past. In fact, we must regard past and present, if not also the discernible future, as phases of the perpetual present, the grand contemporaneity of the world.

History is twofold: it deals with both events that take place in the space-time continuum and our intellectual view of them. The direction of history is both forward and backward; like Wagner's *Ring of the Niebelungs*, as he composed it, the music proceeds from beginning to end, the story from end to beginning. The actual course of history is forward according to the directional character of time, but the study of it is backward from the present to the remote period under observation. The fact is that a decisive battle was fought *at Cr cy in 1346, at Water-*

loo *in* 1815, at the Marne *in* 1914. These are the physical facts but the "at's" and "in's" do not tell the whole story. These spaces and times belong to the past where they have inscribed their own record, but the meaning of these military operations, which is not fully realized in our present, is a psychological process. It moves backward in memory to the point when and where the event took place, but does not fail to carry a XXth-century consciousness with it. History as fact keeps recoiling in the form of history as truth.

But how are we to understand the truth of history when the present assimilates the past? If history is a flux carrying even its deposits along with it, a true conception of what has taken place in the past would seem to be impossible; "has taken place," we say, since the perfect tense seems more appropriate than the past. Now, this view, which we are finding unavoidable, may seem to give us the course of history but not the truth of it. Even the channels of history appear to keep changing. But with the physico-historical fact, this is not the case; the monument set up on the spot, if nothing else, shows us that. Historical appreciation, however, in distinction from historical chronicle is in the same process of change as civilization itself. When we raise the question of truth, we have two forms of verity before us: truths of fact and truths of thought. Hence we must keep asking, "Have we the correct fact?" and "Have we the right idea?"

HISTORICAL COHERENCE

In taking up these parallel questions, we are called upon to apply two different criteria of truth: the criterion of correspondence and that of coherence. In the case of history as a chronicle, we obtain a truth when our present idea corresponds with the past fact, as whether George IV was or was not at the battle of Waterloo. When history means more than a succession of events and the study of it involves more than a chronicle, we arrive at a truth of history when we decide whether the Reformation was a purely ecclesiastical movement, whether slavery was the cause of the Civil War, or whether Germany was responsible

for the World War. In American history, we are observing a change from the patriotic to the more philosophical presentation of the subject. Now, that which guides us in such historical study is the criterion of coherence, the coherence of idea with idea. We wish to have the historical fact fit into the general scheme of things which we have worked out in independent ways. It is as though we changed the form of a figure without, however, altering its area. Its area remains the same no matter in what form we may change its outline. The present with its accumulated wisdom is bound to dominate the past. It was in this sense that Bruno and Bacon referred to the moderns as the true "ancients."

The same importance of the present in history appears in the way history as a record is written. When we deal with the past, we are inclined to believe that it sheds light upon the present. Thus we study primitive forms of civilization and culture, ancient arts and religions for the sake of interpreting our own efforts toward outer and inner perfection. But, as a matter of fact, the past does not reveal the present as much as the present reveals the past. "Why," asks Sidney Hook, "do we re-write the history of the past so often even when no new 'facts' have been discovered? What are the sources of our new insight into past events and personalities? If we had a complete motion picture of the trial and death of Socrates, would we once and for all time understand these events?" He answers these questions by pointing out that we interpret the less-known past by the better-known present and says, "The present is the basis from which we determine the kind of interpretation we must apply to the past."¹ We may not know a stone hatchet better than the cave man did, but we have a more perfect comprehension of instruments generally. We may not comprehend all that a primitive worshiper found in his rude temple, but we have a deeper insight into the meaning of worship. We may not be certain that we understand the hieroglyphic, but we appreciate the value of the written record. The present is our historical guide.

¹ "A Pragmatic Critique of the Historico-Genetic Method," *Essays in Honor of John Dewey*, Vol. XII, pp. 161-162.

PAST AND PRESENT

In considering this perpetual present, we are confronted by what the science of the day calls "the time-space continuum" rather than absolute time and space each existing in its own right. In this continuum, what we used to call "things" are more like "events"; they are made up of both location and date. From this point of view, all reality is history, while the science of it is historical investigation. Our own course of discussion, while not that of science, began with certain considerations drawn from astronomy, geology, and biology. Therefore, it may be well to observe how these sciences in their historical character view the remote past in the light of the present. In the case of astronomy, the selection of the tidal theory in preference to the nebular hypothesis is due to observations made at the present time. The astronomer studies events in the skies of the present, as these are observed on earth, and further experiments with starlike masses of rotating gases in order to discover the most likely form of stellar behavior. In geology, the age-old work of natural forces is interpreted in the light of similar agencies at work today, so that "the method of geological research may be defined as an inquiry into the past in the light of the present, of the solving of the unknown in the light of the known."² Evolution is hardly the subject of experiment, yet the mechanism at work within it is a subject of research in the laboratory. Thus does the present seek to assimilate the past; thus do we proceed from what the race has learned about the past to that past itself.

The knowledge of nature and man that we have today gives us insight into the less developed psychology and physics of the past. Our psychology, dealing with the life of the mind as we know it, throws light upon anthropology, or the life of the primitive mind. Our astronomical observations and measurements give us insight into the less perfect view of the heavens enjoyed by Copernicus and Ptolemy, just as our advanced views of geometry and mechanics increase our knowledge of classic mathematics and physics. The course of actual history is in the forward direction, but the comprehension of it is the reverse of this; we go from

² Pirsson and Schuchert, *Introductory Geology* (1924), pp. 6-7.

the present to the past. There can be no doubt that the genetic or historical method of viewing institutions like the Roman Empire or systems like Platonic philosophy or forms of government like monarchy is able to throw a light on present problems, but it is a reflected light; it is the light of our own contemporary thought. What we require in order to comprehend history is something more than the movement of mankind in time and space; we require the meaning of these movements—the conquests of Alexander, the wars of Caesar, or the campaigns of Napoleon. In our own day, half a generation since the World War, we are trying to gain a presentiment of how this catastrophe will appear in the eyes of the next generation and the future generally. Already we have begun to change our former views as to Germany's war-guilt.

When we review some classic work of history, we realize that it was more than a faithful chronicle of events set in a successive order. We see that the monumental work on history was colored by the time in which it was written. In the exemplary instance of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–1788) we have a work whose accuracy and completeness are beyond reproach, but this did not render it unnecessary for Mommsen to write his *Römische Geschichte* eighty years later. Moreover, Gibbon's work, besides being a history of Rome, is a kind of history of rationalistic England in the XVIIIth century. In the case of H. G. Wells' great *Outline of History* (1920), we seem to have a complete and objective picture of the world as we know it today, but in the course of time this work will come to be regarded as a great essay on the subject of social reform in the XXth century.

THE INADEQUACY OF FACTS

The historical method that came into vogue during the XIXth century consisted in factuality and the principle of natural development. It was based upon Positivism and Darwinism, and assumed to be dispassionate and objective. What it attempted to do was to present the course of history in the form of actual development pretty much after the scientific manner of evolu-

tionary procedure. But it is a question whether such a disinterested view of historical facts in regular succession can give us the truth of history as this unfolds. "A visitor from a distant star, descending upon the earth," says Hook, "might know the chronicle of events down to the slightest detail, might on his way down, since nothing is lost in the ether, discover how everything came to be what it is, but unless his mind-set were similar to ours, unless he had experienced directly or vicariously the chief forms of human interest, he would never understand that history."³ In the case of those who seek to apply the factual and evolutionary principles, it should be realized that they, far from being disinterested in their point of view or objective in their procedure, are making use of XIXth-century principles: namely, the Positivism and Evolutionism referred to. These were not in vogue during the XVIIIth century, they may not continue to the end of the present one.

But this is not to say that the production and pursuit of history as these have ever been carried on are in vain; still less is it to suggest the absurd idea that history in the common sense of that term should not be written and read. The idea that is seeking expression may be indicated by saying that an adequate conception of history makes certain demands upon us. These demands may be indicated somewhat as follows: that we should seek truths and not merely facts;⁴ should enter into sympathetic relations with the historical situation; and should understand that past events have contemporary significance. This does not mean that we are so to ignore time as to blot out the difference between past and present, a thing we are not likely to do. Indeed, the absurdity of such temporal confusion, whereby we think of Caesar as speaking a modern language and using such a modern device as a telephone, is a common source of the comic. We leave the events of the past just where they took place; it is their values in the light of the trends they exemplified and the institutions they illustrated that we would bring up to the present. In this manner, we appreciate the Hebrew character of our religion,

³ "A Pragmatic Critique of the Historico-Genetic Method," *Essays in Honor of John Dewey*, Vol. XII, pp. 163-164.

⁴ Hoyland, *History as Direction*, Ch. III.

the Greek form of our science, the Roman essence of our law, and the Christian atmosphere of our life. It is in this sense that we are able to intuit the history of the past.

FACTS AND TRUTHS

So dominant is the idea that history is the accumulation of facts, that it is worth while indulging a more vital conception of the past. History is not a road which the race has traveled, its various periods so many milestones; it is more like a stream in which we ourselves bathe. Aristotle observed something like this when in comparing history with poetry he said, "The one speaks of things which have happened, the other of such as might have happened. Hence, poetry is more deserving of attention than history. For poetry speaks of universals, but history of particulars."⁵ Goethe had this fluid and symbolic sense of history in mind when he uttered that significant line in *Faust*, "All the past is but a parable—*Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichniss*." Emerson sensed it when he said, "All the facts of history preëxist in the mind as laws. Each law in its turn is made by circumstances predominant, and the limits of nature give power to but one at a time. A man is the whole encyclopedia of facts. The Creation of a thousand forests is in one acorn and Egypt, Greece, Rome, Gaul, Britain, America lie folded already in the first man."⁶ All this, or the significance of it, we have sought to express by saying that the present is the interpreter of the past, so that it is only as one lives fully in his own day that one is able to feel the trends that have ever been engendering.

Since history deals with truths to which facts are subordinate, it can become the object of reflective thought as well as factual investigation. The trends that we discover in civilization can just as fully be turned into ideas about which we can reason or at least speculate. This might appear to indicate that we are able to perfect a philosophy of history—a most ambitious undertaking; but with the leading ideas of civilization and culture before us, have we not a right to consider their general meaning? In

⁵ *Poetics*, tr. Buckley, Ch. IX.

⁶ *Essay on History*.

taking up such a task, we receive preliminary encouragement from the fact that history exists in Time. We may not be able to understand the complete nature of the temporal process, but we know that it moves onward like a stream and exerts a force capable of changing all that is in that stream. We may imagine that we are able to draw certain things out of the time-stream and place them on some sort of *terra firma*. We attempt this when we date and locate a historical period like that of the Roman Empire or lay down the fixed principle of a science such as geometry or divide the history of culture into periods of ancient and modern. Yet, after we have considered the nature of both the historical process and the events that take place in it, we are inclined to feel that empires, sciences, and historical periods as we have formulated them are like rafts floating along on the stream of history. They maintain their form, their integrity, but still do not fail to move onward in the flux.

HISTORICAL METHODS

How can we smooth out the irregular course of a human history which exhibits such a multitude of facts and variety of forms? The task might seem hopeless, but the usual procedure in philosophy of history makes the matter suspiciously simple. This procedure consists in something that looks like drawing imaginary lines of latitude and longitude over the revolving, moving globe of history whereon are actually found, not only the sharp distinction between sea and land, but the endless variety of geographical forms. The lines of latitude and longitude enable us to keep our bearings, but do not so thoroughly aid us in determining what actually exists and happens within such a mathematical framework. But, of course, the philosophy of history does not attempt anything really analogous to what we have just indicated in connection with theoretical geography; it navigates, if we may so say, by other means than those of imaginary lines. Nevertheless, the linear method is the one that the philosophy of history uses, whence comes its unusual simplicity.

The lines of history are drawn in four forms—straight, cir-

cular, pendular, and spiral. When the linear method is followed, it does not require us to believe that the course of history is in a straight line, but only that its general direction is a forward one. A road will have to follow the configurations of the land and thus move in and out, up and down, but still it progresses to some remote point. The circular method does not necessitate history to exemplify the form of a geometrical figure; all that is requisite to fulfill the demands of the theory is that the object, which is civilization, shall return to its source. A planet does not move in a circular orbit or even in a perfectly elliptical one, but it does resume its original position. The pendular method is the linear one doubling upon itself. Its movement is that of forward-backward. Yet this oscillation is not an exact reproduction of the pendulum's behavior, which follows the law of equal time, or isochronism. The significant idea is that of retreat, or return. In the case of the spiral method, which is partly circular and partly pendular, the idea involved is that of a return to the original position, but upon a higher level. Each of these four views must be analyzed and, as far as possible, adjusted to actual history.

THE LINEAR METHOD

The linear method is the most attractive and most obvious. Time seems like a stream which moves forward carrying individuals, nations, and events along with it. If we consider a certain portion of time, for example one's own generation, or a larger but still limited period like that of American history, it does seem as though the course of things were progressive; from small to large, from simple to complex, from ignorance to knowledge. The life of an individual or a nation as lived is thought of as something progressing along a relatively straight line. But if in maturity that individual looks both backward and forward, he will observe that the next generation is repeating the general plan of his own life. Likewise with a nation; a Greek like Polybius will see Rome repeating certain features of Greek life; a modern historian like Mommsen will observe the Roman trend in German life. Yet the linear method will always impress one

as containing a part, at least, of the general plan of history. But this method involves something more than a forward movement.

It involves the idea of progress in the sense of something cumulative. The present inherits the past, adds its own contribution, and passes the whole amount on to the approaching future. In this sense, the linear method is optimistic. It has appealed to widely divergent types of mind—the extremely religious and the scientific. Accordingly, we find this historical method upheld by such different pairs of thinkers as St. Augustine and Bossuet, Comte and Spencer. Their respective ideas are those of revelation and evolution, the unfolding of a divine plan or the development of a natural program. In both phases of this linear method, we find the principle of gradual accumulation, but not that alone; we find the idea of consummation. There is a remote goal toward which all historical movement is tending. With St. Augustine, this was a divine realm, or the City of God; with Spencer, it was a human order in the form of a perfect Social State.

When, now, we take this view out of its theoretical setting and use it as a guide in the interpretation of history, what do we find? Generally that it is the historical view of the western world. The Hebrews, although of oriental origin, have adapted themselves to the Occident and in the Hebrew consciousness we find a distinct futurism dating as far back as the days of Abraham. He and his seed were to inherit the Promised Land, and the scepter was not to depart from Judah or a lawgiver from between its feet until Shiloh had come. The kingdom that was established later on was to be a perpetual one moving onward until the time of the New Jerusalem. The Christian conception was hardly different in plan from this, except that it was less earthly and turned human gaze forward toward the coming of the Kingdom of God or to the Last Judgment. The Latin mind may not have thought of the Empire in just this manner, but it did not proceed with the idea that its development was to be followed by decline. The Latin mind acted rather than thought, and in so doing made plans for an indefinite future.

THE CIRCULAR METHOD

The circular method of history is more after the manner of the Orient than the Occident; it is exemplified best by the Sanskrit mind in connection with Brahmanism. Nevertheless, the circular method is involved at times in the linear. For it is hardly possible to think of a line of progress as continuing to infinity or even *ad indefinitum*, and since progress, or movement, must persist, the course of things tends to return to its starting-point and thus round out a circle of movement. In both Biblical and pagan conceptions of history, this roundabout regressus appears in the form of a return to something like the original Eden or the Golden Age. In this manner, history completes a cycle of all possibilities and unites the Alpha with the Omega.

India furnishes the most complete example of the circular method of history if the cycle in question can be called history. In its own national history from about 2000 B.C. to 1000 A.D., the history of India yields almost no dates, although Buddha was reputed to have been born 557 B.C. and in 244 B.C. King Asoka convened the third Buddhist council and adopted the "Asoka Canon" of Buddhistic writings. However, there is a suggestion of historical movement in the activities of the Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva—creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world, although the Brahman does not indicate by what cosmic and historical processes this circular course of things comes about. Buddhism afforded a somewhat closer approach to the historical, although not in our sense of that term, when it introduced the principle of Transmigration, whereby the human soul in making its earthly passage to Nirvana was compelled to pass through various forms of earthly existence until it had extinguished desire and achieved the wisdom of life.

The Greek mind did not rejoice in a deep historical sense but tended to live in a beautiful present forgetful of the past and as oblivious of the future. Its art and philosophy seem to have been timeless things deliberately made rather than slowly evolved. Yet in Heraclitus and Empedocles we find the principles of historical thought—the Flux of the one and the principle of Recurrence in the other. The Flux of Heraclitus was not a

smooth evolution but something characterized by contradiction and strife, as also by the union of opposites; moreover, it promised no culminations. Empedocles had a more definite plan in his principle of constructive Love and destructive Hate among the elements of the world, whereby the Many become One only to be broken up again into the inchoate Many. "Thus inasmuch as One has been wont to arise out of Many and again with the separation of the One the Many arise, so things are continually coming into being and there is no fixed age for them; and further inasmuch as the elements never cease changing places continually, so they always exist within an immovable circle."⁷ Yet this was pure philosophy rather than philosophy of history.

The cyclical conception of actual history occurred to Polybius (c. 204-122 B.C.) in connection with the study that he as a Greek made of the Roman Empire. It was his immediate aim to show how all the civilized nations of the world had fallen under the domination of Rome, but the result was to delineate a universal idea of history. According to Polybius, mankind began its history in a pre-political condition not unlike that indicated by the modern idea of the State of Nature; to this primitive condition, by reason of calamity, man tends to return. The inhabitants of the primitive social order submitted to the rule of the strongest and formed a political monarchy based upon force. When the ideals of justice and political responsibility developed, the monarchy assumed a more ethical form and the natural monarch was esteemed king. But when the king became despotic, he was supplanted by wise and virtuous leaders who formed an aristocracy which, upon its degradation, sank into an oligarchy and then degraded itself into the low democracy of mob-rule. This brought the nation back to its original condition of nature, prepared the way for a new despot, and inaugurated another cycle of the same sort.⁸ Such a view of history is popular with pessimists. We observe it in such a mysterious poem as William Blake's *The Mental Traveller* as interpreted by William M. Rossetti, as also in *The Isle of Penguins* by the late Anatole France. The circular method of history is likely to

⁷ Fairbanks, *First Philosophers of Greece*, p. 167.

⁸ Cf. Dunning, *History of Political Theories*, Vol. I, Ch. IV, § 4.

become popular at the present time with peace following war and suggesting further warfare.

THE PENDULAR METHOD

The pendular method of history follows upon the circular about as the latter was found in a certain turn of the linear. But the notion that history moves around in a vast circle or that it swings back and forth monotonously is distinctly oriental. Nevertheless, most of us tend to apply the pendular method at times, as we observe how, like the ebb and flow of the tide, depression, defeat, and the like are wont to follow prosperity and victory. It is as though a certain balance were maintained or as though a principle of compensation so worked as to prevent a perpetual rise in the tide of human affairs, as also to promise a pessimistic people something better in the future. During the XXth century and more poignantly at the present time, we are witnessing what appears to be a demonstration of the pendular principle. Meanwhile, we are waiting for the same pendulum, which has gone to the extreme of depression, to swing back to a more prosperous condition of things.

The classic expression of this method is to be found in the *Yi-King*, or *Book of Changes*, among the Chinese classics. The plan of the *Yi-King* is presented in a form apt to bewilder the mind by its combination of simplicity and complexity. The work consists of sixty-four hexagrams or series of six lines half of them broken to indicate weakness and failure, the other half unbroken to signify the very opposite quality and state of affairs. Suppose we imagine six unbroken lines read, or viewed, from the bottom up. They indicate so many stages of progress which, having been completed, must revert to failure. The interpretation given by the ancient Chinese editor is symbolized by a dragon reposing in the deep, whence he arises, turns to the field, roams abroad, leaps up, and then attempts to fly only to fall again into the deep. The lesson is one of the certainty of changes with the moral of conservatism and modesty.

Or suppose we turn from this first hexagram to the second, made up as this is of six broken lines of weakness. The same

certainty of changes is then supposed to operate in such a happy way that, having patiently endured failure and affliction, the subject of the changes, individual or nation, is allowed to realize that the next change will be in his favor. The eleventh hexagram is of interest in that it is composed of three strong lines followed by as many weak ones. The implication is that, as there has been good fortune at the beginning, there may be disorder and defeat at the end. The reading of these strong-weak lines as given by the editor is illuminating: "The third line, undivided, shows that while there is no state of peace that is not liable to be disturbed, and no departure of evil men so that they shall not return, yet when one is firm and correct, as he realizes the distresses that may arise, he will commit no error. There is no occasion for sadness at the certainty of such recurrent changes, and in this mood of happiness the present may be enjoyed."⁹ Such a method of reasoning upon the arrangement of lines seems absurd to us, but is it not as near rationality as the present practice of astrology? Should we not be wiser and thus consider the lesson of this ancient Chinese system? In the inflation that came about during and following upon the World War, we might have realized that just as much deflation was bound to come; during the long period of depression, we might have taken courage from the thought that, after the manner of the hexagrams, a succession of weak lines would have to be followed by as many strong ones.

THE SPIRAL METHOD

The spiral method of history tends to embrace all the others. It is linear in that it indicates progress, circular in the way it provides for a return to the original source of the movement, pendular in the negative principles involved in a zig-zag movement. These lines are recast in the form of a spiral staircase. The most commanding exponent of this method is Hegel, whose whole philosophy may be said to be patterned upon the spiral notion. The particular method is the dialectical one whereby Being passes through the stages of the affirmative and negative

⁹ *The Yi-King*, tr. Legge, *in loc.*

to arrive at a higher synthesis of these in Being-for-self. We may clarify this paradoxical philosophy by suggesting the simple mathematical analogy of plus, minus, and plus-or-minus signs. Or we may state it in theological form by thinking of God as merely existing, then as creating a world as something whose imperfection is the contradictory of the divine nature and, finally, as "reconciling the world unto Himself," thereby realizing his own nature.

How does this profound conception of the world apply to human history? In religion, the threefold method of Becoming is exemplified in oriental religion where God is all; in pagan religion where, with Greek mythology and Roman politics, Man is all; and, finally, in Christianity where these contradictions are synthesized in the God-Man of the Incarnation. In art, the triad of development proceeds from Asiatic symbolism, wherein all art is sensuous, to Greek classicism, which reveals a happy combination of the sensuous and spiritual, and thence, finally, to Christian romanticism, which liberates art from the sensuous and places it upon the higher level of spirituality. In political history, the threefold development of the Absolute Idea concerns itself with the principle of freedom. In the oriental world, only one individual is free—the despot; and even his freedom is hampered by the despotic rule he must ever exercise. In the Graeco-Roman world, which delivered itself from despotism, some are free, but alongside these aristocrats we find a slave population. In the modern Christian world, not one or some, but all are free or destined to become so with the final abolition of slavery. The aim of political history is to establish permanent freedom by reconciling monarch to subject, or State to citizen. This is achieved by constitutional government, brought to a certain degree of perfection in England, where, as Hegel says, "The parliament governs, although Englishmen are unwilling to allow that such is the case."¹⁰ The critics of constitutional government claim that even this form does not establish freedom for the individual, in that abuses in the way of special "privileges" creep in, so that the individual is free only in theory, not in actuality.

¹⁰ *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, tr. Sibree, p. 474.

"THE DECLINE OF THE WEST"

The most spectacular of all philosophies of history is the most recent; it is found in *The Decline of the West* — *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, which appeared toward the close of the World War, or in July, 1918. According to the author, the work was ready when the war broke out, was worked over again by the spring of 1917, but had to appear later. It was translated in 1926 by Charles Francis Atkinson. The most significant factor in Spengler's conception of history is found in his idea of time, which bears striking resemblance to the real duration of Bergson, although Bergson's name is not mentioned in Spengler's work. Time is thought of as a stream, or series of streams, which flow to their respective outlets without any of the stoppages peculiar to the centuries or periods by which history is usually known. The result of such a method is to produce a new idea of contemporaneity. This is based upon analogies in civilization rather than identities in dates; it is cultural, not chronological. It is as though an ancient Roman at the age of twenty-one were "contemporary" with a modern Englishman who had just attained his majority. On the other hand, it is as though a babe born in Peking on January 1, 1931, were three thousand years older than a babe born in New York on the same date. "There is no history in itself," says Spengler;¹¹ there are as many histories as there are nations or even as many as there are individuals. There is certainly no genuine world-history in the form of a study which makes western Europe the basis of a chronicle divided into the triad of ancient-mediaeval-modern. This is only the "Ptolemaic system of history" into whose place Spengler would introduce the Copernican.¹² Now, as a matter of fact, what Spengler does amounts to more than a change in the point of reference; he places history on something like the principle of Relativity, wherein all calculations depend upon the position of the observer, who can make all the necessary corrections.¹³

The Decline of the West is a massive, 900-page, erudite work full of fantasy, penetrated with insight and abounding in the most

¹¹ *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, p. 26.

¹³ *Ib.*, Vol. I, p. 93.

¹² *Ib.*, Vol. I, p. 18.

varied of historical phenomena. In every serious work, the reader must raise two questions: what does he mean? what does it mean? — the author and what he says? When a work is well written, it is only the latter question which needs be asked. In the case of *The Decline of the West*, we are continually in doubt concerning the author's meaning and the significance of the historical process he analyzes so incessantly. However, we can gain some insight into his serious message by comparing his historical method with those just reviewed.

SPENGLER'S METHOD

Spengler does not follow the linear method of history in presenting his impressive program of spiritual, cultural, and political epochs. He is far too sensitive to the multilinear directions of history to be so obvious in his method. Likewise, he observes that the variety of the historical process permits of new beginnings, that many rich forms of culture have sunk into the stream of time, and that new casts of possible cultures may appear in the future. Nor does Spengler show any inclination to adopt the circular method, according to which world-history is an eternal repetition of the same cycle. Although Spengler has learned much from Nietzsche, he is unwilling to employ the latter's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, derived as this was from the notion that, since there is a finite number of elements in the world, there must be a finite number of arrangements of these, and that, in time, history would repeat itself. There are repetitions in the Spenglerian scheme in that each separate culture passes through a certain period like that of Rationalism; but world-history as a whole knows no such reversals in time.

The pendular method of history, the oscillation between the poles of revolution and reaction, prosperity and depression, is accepted by Spengler but only in an adapted form. In every separate culture, as the Chinese or the classical, there is the pendular swing from an initial period of rich, expansive feeling to the opposite phase of restrictive and critical thought. But there is no pendular swing between different cultures as in the Hegelian system, where the sweep of history moves from the

oriental to the pagan and from the pagan back to something like the oriental in the form of Christianity. Separate cultures can appear at any time or place in any order without reference to one another, as we observe in the special case of Asiatic and Aztec civilizations.

Although Spengler borrowed the principles of his idealism from Hegel, he does not follow the spiral method which this great Transcendentalist glorified in the form of the dialectical triad of Being, Negation, Becoming. The point at which they differ is that Hegel found a new culture born in the travail of an older one, whose image it bore or to whose pattern it returned. Hegel insisted on making particular civilizations parts of an organic whole in world-history or Objective Mind, while Spengler finds this organic principle limited to the development of each particular culture developing apart from the others. Spengler's is a Goethean or poetical conception of history, not a Hegelian and rationalistic one. The motto that might be printed above almost every page of *The Decline of the West* is the oracular line from *Faust*, "All the past is but a parable—*Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichniss*." As we shall see presently, Spengler does not attempt to interpret history upon the basis of causal connection but by means of a frontal force, a *vis à fronte* which he calls "Destiny."

✓ THE TWO KEYS TO HISTORY

The door of history has two keys, causality and destiny; man has tried to unlock it by using the key he has been holding in his right hand, the key of causality which fits so well into the lock of nature. Spengler's historical method consists in applying the key that man has held in his left hand, but has not used: the key of destiny. "In the Destiny-idea," says he, "the soul reveals its world-longing, its desire to rise into the light, to accomplish and actualize its vocation. To no man is it entirely alien and not before one has become the unanchored 'late' man of the megapolis is original vision quite overpowered by matter-of-fact feeling and mechanizing thought. Even then, in some intense hour, the lost vision comes back to one with terrible clearness

shattering in a moment all the causality of the world's surface."¹⁴ It is only by intuiting the destiny or vocation of nations that one can interpret their history, which is hidden from those who persist in reasoning about it on the basis of causality. When we analyze nature, we find causality a necessary principle of calculation; when we consider life, we become aware of a different idea — destiny or vocation. Destiny is bound up with time in the same way that causality is attached to space. The difference in Spengler's mind is that between Goethe and Kant, yet after all it has been Bergson who has made such temporal thinking possible for the XXth century.

When we apply the general principle of time-destiny and ignore the opposite notion of space-causality, we observe that every culture, or the being of a nation, is organic. But what determines its specific form? Why was ancient culture so sensitive to space, quality, and order, whereas the culture of the modern is alive to time, quantity, and power? In the Asiatic world, why is the world-feeling of Arabian or Semitic culture so different from Chinese, and both so alien to western consciousness? These differences are due to the soul or spirit which inhabits races and informs them of its existence. As in the case of Hegel's philosophy of history, so with Spengler; the development of a culture is the expression of something spiritual; *the Spirit* with Hegel, *a spirit* with Spengler. This spirit is a process which hardens into "style," the style of the soul as this is observed in the Doric and Gothic. Style is apparently something sclerotic; it reveals itself, as Spengler indicates at the beginning of his vast work, in mathematics, in the very meaning of numbers. Accordingly, the ancients needed only Euclidean or visible geometry, whereas the moderns found need of an analytical and rational method of dealing with space. "The classical soul in the person of Pythagoras discovered its own proper Apollonian number, the measurable magnitude; the western soul in the person of Descartes and his generation (Pascal, Fermat, Desargues) discovered a notion of number that was the child of a passionate, Faustian tendency toward the Infinite."¹⁵

¹⁴ *The Decline of the West*, Vol. I, p. 118.

¹⁵ *Ib.*, p. 75.

The Spenglerian idea of "style" is so unusual and yet so illuminating that it may receive the stress of an additional paragraph. "Style," says he, "is not what the shallow Semper, worthy contemporary of Darwin and materialism, supposed it to be, the product of material, technique and purpose. It is the very opposite of this, something inaccessible to art-reason, a revelation of the metaphysical order, a mysterious 'must,' a Destiny."¹⁶ It is this destiny which pursues and overtakes man, making it useless for him to contend with it. Nothing significant in the history of the world could have happened differently and, as Hegel had suggested, all the evil and tragic serve a necessary purpose. These ring out like counterpoint in a divine symphony whose ultimate harmony we catch in naught but vague and fleeting snatches. Old-fashioned theology expressed this idea as the "ways of Providence;" Hegel referred to it as "the cunning of Reason—*die List der Vernunft*." With Spengler, there is a kind of symbolic necessity in every sequence of events no matter how trivial those happenings may appear. All events are ways of the spirit which, however mysterious, do not fail to reveal characteristic forms.

THREE TYPES OF CULTURE

The ways the spirit takes are such as to engender three types of soul: the Apollonian, Faustian, and Magian, classifications which Spengler borrows from Nietzsche. These are spiritual styles, or types, to be found in every form of culture, although only one of them can be dominant at any one time. These three "souls," as Spengler calls them, appear as eddies in the current of history; they come and go at his call in philosophy of history. In Chapter VI of Volume I, they receive independent and fairly full treatment. The Apollonian soul is Grecian, it identifies the ego with the body, which it glorifies in the nude statue. The Faustian soul is western, expresses itself in the fugue, rejoices in a dynamic form, and promotes introspection. The Magian soul of Arabian culture is mystical. It appeared originally in algebra, astrology, and alchemy, reveals itself in

¹⁶ *The Decline of the West*, Vol. I, p. 221.

the mosque, mosaics, and arabesques, as also in Persian, Jewish, and Christian scriptures.

The Apollonian soul represents the spirit of natural, rhythmic, and proportionate expression. It is the glorification of bodily phenomena. It is anatomical and mechanical, works and thinks in straight lines and circles, has a Euclidean geometry and a monistic philosophy. Its deities are creatures of sun and light; its heroes men of simple motives and obvious qualities. Finitude and purity are the principles that dominate its world-feeling; the city-state is its form of political expression, the small temple its ideal edifice, and the doom of Oedipus its conception of destiny. Its spirit is that of an Attic forever, quite in opposition to the Christian conception of the world.

The Faustian soul breathes the spirit of infinitude. Fulfillment is only a pause in a life of perpetual longing, rest a shifting boundary-line in an endless Becoming. Maternity is its symbol of life and time its ideal of destiny. Suffering and sacrifice are the price of its serenity. Its space is infinite and non-Euclidean; its physical science is concerned with mathematical relations rather than with qualities. Its art-ideal is the draped body, not the nude; its architecture is the ascending Gothic, not the horizontal Doric; in the art of painting, it uses light-and-shade instead of contour-outline. Cabinet diplomacy is its politics, Beatrice and Gretchen its romantic ideals, and King Lear the symbol of its destiny. In its moods, the Faustian soul is marked by brooding introspection, the tendency to think about thought and create an idealistic picture of the world. In its practical philosophy, it is thirst for power and gain; it is the very soul of western Europe after the fall of Rome.

The Magian soul is not made so vivid, since it lacks the clarity of the Apollonian and Faustian. In its weirdness, the Magian mind is bizarre and may be represented by the arabesque. It seeks to command by secret wish and brute force, not by classical reason or Christian love. Alchemy and astrology are its sciences; its architecture is marked by the mosque and the horse-shoe arch. Its religion is Manichean and its theology a hierarchy of supernatural powers. Its central idea is neither the Apollonian finite or the Faustian infinite, but that of the incomplete. Its politics

assumes the form of the absolute State; it appropriates alien elements without assimilating them. It is the soul of Arabian-Jewish culture in Europe. But what about the great "Decline" or Downfall?

CIVILIZATION AND MACHINERY

Spengler contends that of the three cultures the Apollonian and Magian are dead and the Faustian is dying. This he tries to show by an examination of all the contemporary manifestations of this surviving but expiring culture. The occasion but not the cause of the mortal illness now being experienced by the Faustian soul is an intoxication, a disease produced by the creation of modern technics. The Faustian is being killed by the machine! "Faustian man has become the slave of his creation. His number and the arrangement of his life as he lives it have been driven by the machine on to a path where there is no standing still and no turning back."¹⁷ Spengler, however, does not make it clear whether the end of Faustian western culture means the end of all civilization. He himself accepts the fate of the Faustian and feels that western man can best fulfill his destiny and meet his doom by going down fighting. This final battle, whose outcome is uncertain, will be fought in the name of Caesarism.

The general plan of *The Decline of the West* is summed up at the end of Volume I, in three tables of "contemporary" epochs: the spiritual, cultural, and political; these date as far forward as the year 2200 and after. The spiritual epochs are analogous to the seasons. Thus we find Spring with its rural, intuitive, and myth-making forms; Summer with a ripening consciousness, reform, urban life, and rationalism; Autumn of enlightenment, city sophistication, and science; and Winter with its materialistic world-outlook, megapolitan civilization, utility, and prosperity. The cultural epochs include an early period of elementary expression to a later one when art passes into the hands of the great masters. The notion of the "decline of the west" is expressed in Spengler's table as follows:—"1800-2000. XIXth century. From Napoleon to the World War. 'System of the Great

¹⁷ *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, p. 504.

Powers,' standing armies, constitutions, XXth-century transition from constitutional to informal sway of individuals. Annihilation wars. Imperialism." This period which we call the "present" had its historical parallel in the Hyksos period of the Egyptians, in the period of political Hellenism from Alexander to Hannibal and Scipio, as also in the history of China between 480 and 230 B.C. That which may guide us in forecasting the future is a consideration of what Egypt was under Rameses II, the condition of Rome from Trajan to Septimius Severus, and the state of Eastern Han Dynasty from 25 to 220 A.D.

This general plan, which construes history as a year with its four seasons, becomes more plausible when applied to the lifetimes of individual nations. Their historical lives pass in review before the vision of those who behold history as process rather than as periods. Some cultures, like the Babylonian and Egyptian, have passed on, reached their culmination, and are now dead from old age. One of these extinct cultures, the Aztec, ended by violent death. "It was not starved, suppressed or thwarted but murdered in the full glory of its unfolding, destroyed like a sunflower whose head is struck off by one in passing."¹⁸ The Chinese, Hindu, Classical, and Arabian cultures are well advanced toward senility, and western culture, having passed the prime of life, is preparing to follow them. Far behind these other cultures is the Russian, which is still in its infancy. "Tolstoi," says Spengler, "is the former Russia, Dostoievsky the coming Russia."¹⁹

SOVIETISM AND CAESARISM

But in thus dealing with the nations, Spengler does not show any preference for Soviet Russia. His idol is not Lenin but Dostoievsky, hence he says, "The real Russian is a disciple of Dostoievsky" and "to Dostoievsky's Christianity the next thousand years will belong."²⁰ There is nothing in contemporary Russia, however, to encourage such a prophecy. The mixed feelings with which Spengler proclaims the portents of western

¹⁸ *Ib.*, Vol. II, p. 43.

¹⁹ *Ib.*, p. 194.

²⁰ *Ib.*, p. 196.

doom are manifested in the conflicting accounts he gives of the final struggle between the Third and Fourth Estates in western Europe. These are bourgeois society and the mass. Although Spengler himself condemns the money-motif of bourgeois culture, and compares it unfavorably with the ideals of nobility and priesthood, he maintains that it is a genuine although distorted expression of Faustian culture. In the mass-civilization that he conjures up in opposition to it, he sees nothing but black shadows, the blotting out of "every form, every distinction of rank, the orderliness of property, the orderliness of knowledge." Its victory is inevitable but it will be the victory of a negative principle which must turn upon itself in blind fury. "Thus the Fourth Estate becomes the expression of the passing of a history into the historyless. The mass is the end, the radical nullity."²¹

Spengler, however, concludes his gigantic work in a more optimistic manner by offering an alternative solution to the problem of history, a means other than Sovietism. This is the principle of Caesarism. In it we recognize the Fascist movement in Italy and the ideal that Hitler has for Germany. How will it operate? The blight of money can be washed away only by blood and blood will flow from the sword which the new Caesarism holds over old capitalism. "The coming of Caesarism," says he, "breaks the old dictatorship of money and its political weapon, democracy."²² Such Caesarism will subordinate the acquisitive aspects of the Faustian economy to the productive, for its organization will transcend all interests. In place of a desire for profit there will rule a sense of duty as the incentive to social activity. Rulership will be found in strong families which will keep alive the traditions necessary for rigorous and dictatorial exercise of power. Such are the alternatives; it must be either the Fascist Caesarism or the victory of the Fourth Estate—Sovietism. Spengler has faith in Caesarism and is glad to see it approaching with quiet, firm step. It indicates our historical "direction"; if it were not for such a possibility life would not be worth living.²³

²¹ *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, p. 358.

²² *Ib.*, p. 506.

²³ *Ib.*, p. 507.

ONE CULTURE OR MANY

By what means is Spengler led to such a dire conclusion? Or, to propose a larger question, wherein consists the validity of his historical reasoning, what is its value? We may let him pass judgment upon himself. He did not plan a philosophy of history; he attempted no more than portraiture, which he has succeeded in creating; he has given us physiognomy rather than philosophy. Of this he is aware all through his work and thus says, "All modes of comprehending the world may, in the last analysis, be described as Morphology. The Morphology of the mechanical and extended, a science which discovers and orders nature-laws and relations, is called Systematic. The Morphology of the organic, of history and life and all that bears the sign of direction and destiny, is called Physiognomic."²⁴ The result of such a "physiognomic" method is something enlightening but not convincing. One may see a man's personality and much of his life-history in his countenance, but one cannot so easily pass judgment upon his character; in like manner, one may observe facial resemblances between two individuals who after all are entirely different sorts of men. The same applies to nations; we sense something characteristic about them, so that we can understand the spirit of France by visiting Paris or grasp the American spirit by a trip to New York. Moreover, we can observe analogies between Paris and Athens, the British Empire and the Roman. But we cannot thereby lay down principles.

Spengler's method of historical portraiture led him to regard the history of mankind as made up of separate cultures rather than as having one culture with different phases. In the ancient Asiatic world, there were such separate cultures in China and India; each lived its own life and died its own death. But in the ancient European world there was no such line drawn between Greece and Rome, so that we find complementary rather than contrasted forms of civilization and such an ingrafting of the Grecian by the Roman as to produce at last a Graeco-Roman type of life. In western history, what we find is not a series of national portraits but a system of cultural diffusion and social

²⁴ *Ib.*, Vol. I, p. 100.

heredity, or a Europeanized form of culture. How could Faustian civilization in distinction from the Apollonian have developed its physical science without the aid of Greek mathematics or its political constitutions apart from Roman law? Much of modern art has been due to the Renaissance as well as the tendency to return to the classical idea of form. If we eliminate classical influence from modern culture what remains is but sheep without a shepherd.

What shall we say of that spiritual psychology whereby Spengler distinguishes three souls, three corresponding cultures: the Apollonian, Magian, Faustian? The idea itself is inviting and tends to beguile us away from the drab space-time differentiations of history given habitually as east and west, north and south, ancient and modern, this century or that. There must be some more penetrating way of dealing with the massive experiences of races and the turns taken in the sluggish stream of human history. We recognize the need of something vital and expressive when we divide history into periods of the Oriental, Pagan, Christian, or when, under the influence of the aesthetical, we distinguish between the Classic and Romantic. Hence we are inclined to sympathize with Spengler's attempt to consider the essence and character of history rather than time and place of merely historical chronicle. Yet we find something unsatisfactory in the way the Apollonian, Magian, and Faustian souls appear and exert their sway in history.

A NATION'S CULTURE AND ITS SOUL

This is not due to the special, or Nietzschean, method whereby Spengler characterizes forms of culture or the periods of their regime; our dissatisfaction has a deeper source. We are dissatisfied with the way that Spengler relates soul or spirit to culture and civilization. If a soul like the Apollonian determines the particular form of culture bearing its name, what determines the soul? If this mysterious soul expressing itself in independence of any causal principle determines such institutions as slavery, feudalism, and capitalism, how can we account for the fact that these appear when they do and follow in the order indi-

cated? How can the spirit of the age, the *Zeitgeist*, or the behavior of a nation be accounted for by attributing to it a certain style of soul? When Christianity and the remnant of paganism found in neo-Platonism were struggling for survival and the domination of the western world, why did Christianity prevail? And when Mohammedanism arose in the VIIth century, why did not Christianity prevent it from becoming a world religion? There are mysteries in such movements and they are not to be explained away by evoking some even more mysterious soul.

If we consider this question more narrowly in the form of centuries which have their own dominant principles, the same difficulty appears and the appeal to a kind of soul seems to fail us. If the ancient principle of order prevailed in the age of Pericles and, later, of Augustus, if there was ignorance in the Dark Ages, the spirit of adventure in the XVIth century, of individualism in the XVIIIth, of evolution in the XIXth, and technicalism in the present one, shall we say that the "soul" was the result of the centuries or rather that the centuries were the product of the animating soul? Spengler's souls seem to be independent factors operating as they will without regard to any actual situations or causal influences. In the "American soul," as we might call it, the ideas of size and power, of limitless progress and equal opportunity have loomed large in American civilization. Even today we are still talking about our "rugged individualism." Is this due to a mysterious "American soul" in peoples who or whose ancestors were products of a different environment? Or is it rather something more causal, more natural in the form of the practical problems arising from the physical conquest of a new land alive with opportunities?

IS THE MACHINE A FRANKENSTEIN MONSTER?

Spengler's method of confusing effect with cause brings him to his dire conclusion that the nations of the western world are approaching a preordained period of decline. This comes about in connection with his sad moralizings upon "The Machine." The downfall of the west, which built the machine, is due to the fact that man has become enslaved in one of his own crea-

tions, a kind of Frankenstein Monster. It is true that the machine is a problem. It provides for mass production but not mass distribution and reveals the sharp contrast between engineering and economics. But the machine itself cannot enslave man; it can be no worse than a challenge to man to improve his social order in the way that he has improved his machinery. The problem of civilization is both social and technological and since we are destined to have machines it is for us to see that they work properly, not that they stop running; that they benefit more and more people as they become larger and larger and that they be used in place of plowshare and pruning hook rather than sword and spear; for peace, not war.

When we come to the final question of "decline of the west," we must admit that the World War has been the indication of something so terrible that a writer like Spengler may be justified in his pessimism. We can have no excuses to offer for it and no reasons for rejoicing in it. The war caused destruction which the future must repair and a debt which the future must pay. It can be made the cause of an actual downfall if the participants in it attempt to repeat the ghastly performance. But certain phases of the decline which might seem a real downfall in the minds of those who lived in the old order cannot be viewed so pessimistically by those who had long since outgrown them. This concerns the old ideal of monarchy. If, as is the case, there was the downfall of thrones in many European countries, the democratically minded person may consider that a cause for rejoicing and regard the falling of thrones a distinct gain.

Finally, we cannot agree with Spengler that the dying of the Faustian soul is destined to invite another and perhaps final conflict, a conflict between the forces of Bolshevism and Fascism. There are still other forces in the world. Since these two polities are now in operation, it is more logical to think of the world as watching their individual performances and thereby weighing their merits. At last they will be known by their fruits. Meanwhile, we might recall the words of wisdom we quoted from the Chinese classic, the *Yi-King*: "While there is no state of peace that is not liable to be disturbed and no departure of evil

men so that they shall not return, yet when one is firm and correct as he realizes the distresses that may arise, he will commit no error. There is no occasion for sadness at the certainty of such recurrent changes, and in this mood of happiness the present may be enjoyed."

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